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ABSTRACT  
 
This research is an attempt to understand the relations between the Ottoman imperial 
government and the local administrators of Egypt, namely the mamluk beys. Gaining more 
financial and political power, the mamluk beys commenced to challenge the authority of the 
Ottoman governor of Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century alongside the incessant struggles 
between each other. Using a variety of Ottoman archival documents and contemporary 
narrative sources, I examine the factors behind the mamluk beys’ authority expansion that 
resulted in uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir (Bulutkapan).   
Throughout the dissertation I pursue two arguments, which address key issues in 
Ottoman political historiography. The first argument concerns with the underlying causes of 
the mamluk beys’ extended authority. I show that short-tenured governors encountered with 
financially and politically powerful local components, which may be considered as a result of 
the decentralized administration system of the Ottoman Empire. Mamluk beys’ ambition to 
accumulate more financial income led them to contact European consuls directly in order to 
open Suez trade for them.  
The second argument concerns the centre-periphery relations of the Ottoman Empire. 
I show that, although they gained power and challenged the pasha, the mamluk beys did not 
establish an autonomous administration during the eighteenth century. The Ottoman Empire 
managed the short-term uprising of Ali Bey quickly by taking due precautions. However, the 
mamluk beys’ ambition and struggles resulted in semi-autonomous local administrators 
during the next century, although they continued to stay under the Ottoman administration. 
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Notes on Transliteration 
Both Ottoman Turkish and Arabic sources are used in this study. The names and titles 
of Ottoman officials, institutions and local offices and also the titles of books in Ottoman 
Turkish as well as transliteration of the parts from the archival documents are rendered 
according to transliteration system of Ottoman Turkish. The titles of Ottoman officials (i.e., 
vali), institutions (i.e., sancakbeyliği) and local officials (i.e., şeyhülbeled), and technical 
terms such as irsaliye or defterdar have been italicised in the thesis. However, some terms 
that are common enough to have entered the English language and frequently repeated words 
such as sultan, vizier, bey or mamluk are not italicised. Bey is capitalized when it is used as a 
part of title. Also, the word of mamluk is capitalized when it refers to a dynasty or institution 
as in the Mamluk sultanate, Neo-Mamluk or Mamluk households. But on its own, mamluk or 
mamluks, or mamluk beys are left without capitals. 
Egyptian place names and titles of books in Arabic that are cited in the bibliography 
and footnotes are rendered according to Arabic transliteration system. However, I 
have employed rules for Turkish and Ottoman transcription elsewhere in the thesis and for the 
rendering of some proper names, e.g., Mehmed, İbrahim and Rıdvan. When it comes to titles, 
I preferred Arabic transliteration for Ali Bey al-Kabir, since Ali Bey is known in the literature 
mostly with the descriptor al-Kabir. However, his mamluk Mehmed Bey’s title is referred in 
Turkish transliteration as Ebu’z-Zeheb.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
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S  Safer 
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R  Rebiülahir 
CA  Cemaziyelevvel 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the local administrators of Egypt, ‘the mamluk beys’, their 
relationship with one another and with the central government, by focusing on Ali Bey al-
Kabir’s “uprising” against the Porte between 1768 and 1772. 1  The topic requires an 
assessment of the political and financial administration of Ottoman Egypt in the mid-
eighteenth century using a multi-perspective approach. The political milieu of the eighteenth 
century Ottoman Empire was composed of a three-partite society: state power, provincial 
notables, and the people (namely reaya). This research, depending on empirical data drawn 
from the Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul, reveals a complex and complicated network 
of relationships between the imperial government and provincial notables of Egypt, which 
cannot be captured by simple explanations and standard clichés. This study will scrutinize the 
mamluk beys, who formed the local administration body of Egypt in order to shed light on 
mid-eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt and make a convincing interpretation of actual power 
relations.  
The study aims to be a part of a growing body of scholarship on eighteenth century 
Ottoman Egypt by focusing on its position within Ottoman provincial administration in the 
mid-eighteenth century. Ali Bey’s uprising, which took place in the second half of the 
eighteenth century in a distant province, comprises of some key aspects of the provincial 
administration of the Ottoman Empire. The ascendancy of the local notables in the provinces 
and their actions, which included occassional challenge against the administration of the 
central government of the empire, is subject of numerous studies. Positioning these local 
notables in the frame of the Ottoman provincial administration and assessing their situation 
                                                        
1 Ali Bey was among the most powerful local figures of the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt. He was the leader of 
Kazdağlı household, and was known in Turkish sources as Bulutkapan (cloud catcher). In this study he will be referred as Ali 
Bey al-Kabir, as he was known in Ottoman Egypt and his contemporary Egyptian chronicler al-Jabarti referred to him. 
 
 
2 
within the context of Ottoman legality has been a problematic theme in the historiography. 
Evaluating Ottoman Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century within the context of 
decentralization paradigm, this research aims to answer a number of questions about the 
motivations behind Ali Bey’s uprising. These issues mainly revolve around the relationship 
between the imperial and provincial administration, which consequently indicates the 
ascendancy of local notables, the focus of power in the province, as well as financial 
concerns, and foreign relations.  
The first question of this research is about the conception of rebellion in the second 
half of the eighteenth century. A number of case studies on the local notables in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century suggest that acting against the central government was not 
always perceived as a rebellion by the central government. While a number of local notables 
were forgiven and were bestowed administrative positions, Ali Bey was labelled as a rebel by 
the central government. Therefore, the question is when and where did Ali Bey cross the line 
of legality and was announced as a rebel. This thesis will investigate Ali Bey’s and his 
counterparts’ activities and their network of relationships in terms of provincial politics, 
foreign relations and influence on the province, and finance. Exploring the motivations of Ali 
Bey, another issue about his rebellion is finance. The archival evidence suggests that the 
mamluk beys were in the effort of channeling financial sources to their household. This point 
reveals the question of the financial and economic position of the province and mamluk beys’ 
effort to acquire more wealth. Did mamluk beys have a control over the financial sources? 
Was there a shift between the holders of the revenue source in the second half of the 
eighteenth century? Another point that deserves to be focused is holding the authority in the 
province. It is known that the mamluk beys occupied high positions such as şeyhülbeled and 
emirulhajj. Through these prestigious positions, the mamluk beys acquired enormous wealth 
 
 
3 
and authority in the province. This research will try to answer whether mamluk beys in high 
positions challenged the authority of governor appointed by the central government. In 
addition, Egypt was at crossroad of commercial centres, and a number of European countries 
consuls inhabited and traded in certain cities of Egypt. Did the agents of the European 
countries have any influence on the local notables’ resistance to state authority? Did the 
French- British rivalry on the Mediterranean and Indian trade have an encouraging influence 
on the mamluk beys’ action? The study will examine the aforementioned topics in the time 
period between the 1740s and the 1780s by centring on Ali Bey’s tenure of office as 
şeyhülbeled between 1760 and 1772.  
This time period has two significative aspects due to the process that the Ottoman 
Empire experienced, and Ali Bey’s actions in Egypt, which consequently contributed to the 
political instability experienced in Egypt in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. First, it 
was before and during Russia-Ottoman war between 1768-1772, which had undeniable 
negative effects on the empire. The second issue is about the Ottoman provincial 
administration in Egypt before the French expedition, which had consequently major effects 
on Ottoman Egypt’s political fabric. Existing historiography mostly focuses on the nineteenth 
century Egypt. However, in order to evaluate the nineteenth century’s developments, it is 
crucial to understand the second half of the eighteenth century. For this reason, this study will 
focus on the mid-eighteenth century, from the 1740s to 1770s. The latter part of Ali Bey’s 
rule overlaps with the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), which is often claimed to have 
consequently had a great influence on the Ottoman Empire’s manpower and financial sources 
in the late eighteenth century.2 During this period the imperial government’s relationship with 
                                                        
2 A war is a huge organizational task that requires a large amount of money. For this war, which lasted a period of four years 
and two months, the Ottoman Empire spent around 33 million guruş [1 guruş equals to 40 paras ] whereas the annual budget 
of the empire was running on 14-15 million guruş. For a detail see Virginia Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? 
Mobilization for the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War”, War in History, 1998; 5; 23, p. 27-30. 
 
 
4 
provincial notables, who supported the Empire in meeting demands of manpower and finance, 
is a topic of central importance.  
The Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 had a momentous impact on state-province 
relations both during and after the war. During the war, when the central government focused 
on the problems that the war brought, the provincial elites had the opportunity to test their 
limits in the provinces. In fact, it was in the form of a temporary enjoying of a power vacuum 
in the province rather than a structural administration flaw or an incessant political conflict. It 
can be suggested that the financial and political milieu of war produced an appropriate 
environment for rebellions and uprisings. It was not the first time that the Ottoman Empire 
had been forced to confront such problems. For example, in the early seventeenth century the 
central government was trying to cope with two on-going war fronts when the famous Celali 
revolts broke out, which agonized the empire for long years in the early seventeenth century. 
However, historians claim that the empire’s defeat had a transformative influence after the 
Russo-Ottoman war, on central government’s relationship with provincial notables, which had 
formerly depended on a relationship of mutual benefit.3 It strengthened provincial elites’ hand 
against the Porte. But still, the Ottoman central government maintained its strong political and 
economic influence on the provinces.  
It is important to highlight that the time period and data that study aims to investigate 
is beyond the debate of modernisation and globality framework. First of all, it was still pre-
modern age and transportation means were restricted in terms of pace and the limit of cargo in 
the mid-eighteenth century. Mainly, the developments such as invention of steamships and its 
employement in the Indian Ocean’s trading, as well as occupation of Aden by the Britain 
                                                        
3 Quataert and Khoury mention the impact of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 on the relationship between the central 
government and provincial elites: Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 
49; Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman Centre versus provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography” in Suraiya 
Faroqhi ed. The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 135 
 
 
5 
made an impact on the globalisation of the trading systems. However, this study covers the 
period before such developments until the 1780s. Therefore, the theories and paradigms about 
these new trends in the world’s trade are beyond this study. Instead, the ascendancy of local 
elements against the Ottoman central government’s representatives and paradigm of 
centralization/decentralization will be employed in the study as in this period the Ottoman 
imperial centre and provinces have been a stage for power struggles between the interest 
groups.  
In our case in eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, mamluk beys were actively 
involved in the local administrative and financial establishments of Ottoman Egypt until the 
French expedition (1798). As is well known, the term mamluk meant slave and referred to 
young men who were born outside of Egypt, enslaved through wars or invasions, and brought 
to the province. High-ranking mamluk beys brought in this menpower. Mamluks were 
recruited into households where they were trained in administrative and military skills. In 
accordance with their talents and skills, these mamluks were manumitted and continued to 
serve their masters. For the modern individuals, the term mamluk gives the impression of real 
slaves being employed in the Ottoman administrative ranks. However, the administrative 
terminology of mamluk in the context of the Ottoman Egypt indicates a de facto component 
of the provincial administrative system charged with overseeing financial and political affairs. 
“Mamluk”, whose literal meaning is ‘slave’, was only a word that referred to their origins and 
did not include any meaning of restriction in their activities in provincial politics. 4 These 
people acted and lived as a powerful part of the Ottoman provincial administrative system, 
rather than being real slaves, and they were promoted to the highest ranks in the provincial 
administration. During the time period that this study covers, most of the significant local 
                                                        
4 P. M. Holt, “The Cloud-Catcher”:’Ali Bey The Great of Egypt”, History Today, 1959, 9, 1, pp. 48-58.  
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administrative positions including the posts of emirulhajj, (hajj commander), defterdar, (chief 
treasurer), kaşif and sancak beyi (governors of the sub provinces) were occupied by 
manumitted mamluk beys of the Kazdağlı household. Mostly, the regimental officers were 
among the mamluk beys as well. The military system was intertwined with the mamluk 
households. 5  Those mamluk beys were in key positions, having influence on provincial 
politics, and sometimes their influence extended beyond Egypt. For example, emirulhajj had a 
control on the coffee trade between Jidda and Egypt as he was assigned the tax, which was 
collected from the coffee trade. He also, as a result of his duty, was in contact with the semi-
autonomous administration of the Hijaz. For example, in one instance, the sherif of Mecca 
increased the tax rate of coffee and as a result coffee prices increased in Istanbul. The Porte 
demanded Ali Bey al-Kabir, as he was the emirulhajj, to meet with the sherif and to discuss 
decreasing the tax.6  
Mamluk beys were an inseparable part of the bureaucracy in Cairo and they were 
actively involved in the central government’s policies regarding Egypt. Their positions in the 
Ottoman Egypt’s bureaucracy offered them a large share from the province’s wealth. 
Nevertheless, mamluk beys mostly developed good relations with the Porte so that they could 
keep their interests coming from different income sources such as tax farming or commanding 
the hajj caravan. However, their involvement in the provincial politics occasionally led 
mamluk beys to test their limits with the central government. Ali Bey al-Kabir who held the 
position of şeyhülbeled in Egypt in 1760, eliminated his potential rivals and lobbied for the 
dismissal of two governors of Egypt that were appointed by the central government in the 
years 1766-68. After strengthening his position in Egypt, Ali Bey extended his political and 
financial ambitions outside Egypt: first Hijaz, then Syria. Ali Bey’s involvement in other 
                                                        
5  Jane Hathaway, The Politics of households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdağlıs, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1997), p. 84 
6 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 325 (date early L 1178/late March 1765) 
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provinces’ politics was regarded by the Porte as a gesture of “rebellion” at the time, and 
required an intervention by the central government. His closest mamluk, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-
zeheb betrayed Ali Bey and took over the administration in Cairo. After Mehmed Bey’s death 
in 1775, Cairo became a scene for instability, which required an imperial intervention in 1786. 
Environmental factors such as famine and plague contributed to this instability as well and the 
eighteenth century ended with the French expedition. 
A considerable part of the historiography produced before the 1990s tended to 
propose that, during Ali Bey’s tenure of the office of şeyhülbeled, there was ‘objection and 
protest’ against Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt. Some historians claim that Ali Bey’s political 
and financial policies manifested a ‘counter stance’ and produced an alternative 
administration. 7  Contrary to the claim put forward in the existing historiography, which 
positions Ali Bey al-Kabir as a local rebellious administrator who tried to become 
independent from the Ottoman Empire, my thesis contends that Ali Bey was a political figure 
of eighteenth century Egypt, who tested his limits and took advantage of the decentralized 
administration of the empire. This study investigates Ali Bey’s action in terms of 
decentralization of Ottoman administrational system, redefines it, and scrutinizes its causes 
and results. An exhaustive research will help to illustrate the motivations behind Ali Bey’s 
resistance to the Porte, and his desire to extend his sphere of influence outside Egypt.  
Without exception, the imperial historians, i.e. Enveri, considered Ali Bey’s 
extension of his authority outside Egypt as an insurrection and rebellion against the Porte in 
the eighteenth century. However, some modern historians have added the notion of “an 
                                                        
7 This argument is suggested by following authors: Daniel Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of 
‘Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775, (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 
p. 6; See also, D. Crecelius, “Egypt in the Eighteenth Century” in M. W. Daly ed., Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 2: 
Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 59-86; 
Michael Winter, Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 25; Afaf 
Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
 
 
8 
attempt to re-establish the Mamluk Sultanate” 8 , despite the fact that contemporary 
historiography does not make any reference to a Mamluk revival in Ali Bey’s activity.9 This 
study seeks to deconstruct this hypothesis through a detailed examination of the relationship 
between central government and provincial administration. 
Measuring the real-world limits of Ali Bey’s authority in Egypt, and making a proper 
assessment of his “uprising” against the Porte requires a detailed scrutiny of four aspects of 
power-sharing that were faced by the central government in Istanbul and provincial 
administrators in Cairo. The first aspect revolves around the relationship between political 
actors of Egypt and central government; namely, Ottoman governor, şeyhülbeled, local gentry 
of Egypt including ulema, merchants, and mamluk households. The change of the local 
administrators’ command on the provincial sources can be considered as a distinctive motive 
and result in this relationship. The second issue centres on the financial situation of the 
province before and during Ali Bey’s authority. The political environment of the Ottoman 
Empire including internal and external politics is considered as the third component of 
approach for this study. Finally, the European countries’, especially Britain and France’s 
rivalries, especially over the trade in India and their ambitions to establish colonies in the long 
run during the second half of the eighteenth century had an influence of their attitude towards 
Egyptian local elites. All four aspects are to be explored under the light of state-province 
relations. Every chapter of this study is underlying and explaining one of the decisive 
components of eighteenth century Egypt’s politics and all aspects revolve around the 
relationship between the central government and provincial society.  
                                                        
8 Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt, p. 8; Winter, Egyptian Society, p. 25; Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt; 
Andrew James McGregor, A military history of Modern Egypt From the Ottoman conquest to the Ramadan War, (Westport, 
Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 33; Muhammad Rif’at Ramazan, Ali Bey al-Kabir, (Cairo, 
1950), p. 15  
9 For my thesis I consulted Abdurrahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti as the local historian and his account: Aja’ib al-Athar fi’l-
Tarajim wa’l-Akhbar, Abdurrahim Abdurrahman Abdurrahim, ed., (Cairo, 1997), and Enveri Sadullah Efendi as the imperial 
historian and his account: Muharrem Saffet Calışkan, (Vekayinuvis) Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. cildinin Metin ve 
Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774), Unpublished PhD thesis, (Istanbul, 2000). 
 
 
9 
Instead of concentrating on the discourse of decline, the modernization paradigm or 
the proto-nationalist approach, this study will evaluate Ali Bey’s uprising and the mid-
eighteenth century through the lens of decentralization, which will help us to see whether his 
action was a stance against the Ottoman Empire’s imperial attitude and sovereignty, or merely 
an enjoyment of the extended boundaries of the Empire’s administration.10  
Analysing and clarifying the political aspect of the uprising as well as reviewing the 
socio-political dynamics of the province in an era of conflict among the local authorities will 
put forward a new perspective to understanding mid-eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt. This 
study aims to provide a coherent illustration of the era before the French expedition in 1798 
and Mehmed Ali Pasha’s rule in the beginning of the nineteenth century, which put an end to 
the Mamluk administration in Egypt. By examining the financial registers and decree records 
that externalize the relationship between the province of Egypt and the central government, 
this analysis aims to be the first detailed research to focus on the essential foundations of Ali 
Bey’s “uprising” against the Porte. In addition to providing a first-hand account and realistic 
factual data, the archival documents help to position Egypt as a province of the Ottoman 
Empire rather than an autonomous principality.  
Decentralization and emergence of regional elites  
The thesis that the eighteenth century was the decline period for the Ottoman Empire 
is now mostly discredited. One of the most significant characteristics of the eighteenth 
century Ottoman Empire’s political history and historiography is recently shaped by, and 
                                                        
10 About decentralization see Halil Inalcik, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration” in Thomas Naff 
and Roger Owen, eds., Studies in eighteenth century Islamic History, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1977); Leslie Peirce, Morality Tales Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab, (University of 
California Press, 2003) Salzmann proposes ‘centripetal decentralization’: Ariel Salzmann, “An ancient regime revisited: 
privatization and political economy in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, Politics&Society, 21/4 (1993), 393-423; 
Bruce Masters, “Power and Society in Aleppo in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”, Revue du Monde Musulman et de 
la Medirettanee 62, 4 (1991), 151-8; Khoury claims that the decentralization paradigm has its own deficiencies in explaining 
the better integration of the provinces with the imperial government in the eighteenth century: Dina Rizk Khoury, State and 
provincial society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul 1540-1834, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9; James E. Baldwin, 
Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. 141 
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focuses on the notion of decentralization. By the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
decentralization of the imperial administration system resulted in the emergence of strong 
local elites all around the empire. Inalcik explains the emergence of local elites as a result of 
changes in the land tenure system. When the governors appointed local elites as operative 
factors in the provinces for their arpalıks, this strengthened the position of local elites.11 On 
the other hand, the central government’s new land administration policy, life-long tax farms 
called malikane caused an increase in the numbers of local notables. 
Egypt passed through a period of administrative and political transformation during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century Egypt politics, the mamluk 
beys became active. The factional conflicts fed the households as well as shifting the 
provincial revenues, in the case of eighteenth century Egypt, from the Ottoman officers to 
local officers. Because of the political rivalry and financial expediencies, mamluk beys vied 
with each other and with the central government. These confrontations sometimes evolved 
into disobedience and uprisings in the eighteenth century.12  
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that such changes were not peculiar to the 
province of Egypt. In other provinces of the empire, change and transformation were also in 
progress; Syria, Iraq, Cyprus, Aintab, Balkans, as well as the imperial capital.13 The political 
power shifted from the sultan in person to sultanic households such as those maintained by 
                                                        
11 Inalcik, “Centralization and Decentralization”, p. 31 
12 Two examples for rebellious administrators in the eighteenth century are Çerkes Mehmed Bey in the 1730s and Ali Bey al-
Kabir in the 1770s. 
13 For Cyprus see Marc Aymes, A Provincial History of the Ottoman Empire: Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in the 
nineteenth century, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) and Antonis Hadjikyiracou, “The Province goes to the center: the case of 
Hadjiyorgakis Kornesios, dragoman of Cyprus” in Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull eds., Living in the Ottoman 
Realm: Sultans, Subjects, and Elites, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016); For Balkans see F. F. Anscombe, State, 
Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands, (Cambridge University Press, 2014); For Iraq see Dina Rizk Khoury, 
State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul 1540-1834, (Cambridge University Press, 1997); For Syria see 
Karl Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708-1758, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980) 
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valide sultans, vezirs and pashas.14 This shift imposed important influences in the provinces. 
Provincial notables dominated all over the empire; however, decentralization had different 
features in different provinces. In what follows, the large provinces in the south of the empire 
will be compared with Egypt. 
In the eighteenth century the relationship between the central government and 
provincial elites depended on mutual need, which causes and also explains the interesting and 
complex interaction amongst them. Meeting the central government’s need for soldiers (or the 
need for cash in Egypt’s case) provided provincial notables an advantage against Istanbul. 
Yet, their need of state’s approval and support against their rivals in the province made them 
dependant on the Porte. Considering this mutual need between the Porte and provincial 
notables, it seems that it worked like the balancing of a pair of scales. The greater the 
advantage offered by provincial elites the more negotiation rights they acquired. On the other 
hand, malikane, the life-long tax farming system, helped the imperial government to maintain 
authority over the provinces. Moreover, vizier households controlled over the iltizam, tax 
farming, auctions in the provinces, thus the shared financial interest added more complexity in 
the association between the centre and provinces.  
A new governor arrived at Egypt with a large entourage from Istanbul or another 
province of the Empire. The people in the governor’s entourage integrated in the provincial 
administrative, commercial and political cultural system, and established ties with the local 
households. Likewise, the local groups were eager to relate with the governors’ household in 
order to extend their communication with the centre after they had left Egypt. This enabled 
the local groups to attach themselves to the imperial household and other provincial 
administrations as well as to protect their mutual interest afterwards. This connection between 
                                                        
14 Toledano refers these power centres as ‘kapı’ and mentions that local kapıs modelled themselves the kapı of sultan see 
Ehud R. Toledano, “The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research”, in Moshe Ma’oz 
and Ilan Pappe eds., Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History From Within, (London, 1997), p. 156 
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the Empire and Egypt continued for centuries. Quataert claims that this relationship 
depending on mutual benefit continued until the Ottoman-Russo war of 1768-1774. The war 
after a long peace period made the imperial centre undersupplied in terms of manpower and 
finance, which strengthened the hand of provincial elites.15  
Thomas Naff describes eighteenth century’s complexity as varying with respect to 
time, place, traditions, and conditions, and observes that the ayan would be merchants, 
artisans, guildsmen, government functionaries, land owners, religious authorities, legists and 
military officers. The common point that gathered these different types at one point was: 
urban residence and wealth. The ayan controlled the local revenues and security forces, which 
eventually led to challenge, or in some cases replaced, the Ottoman representatives in the 
provinces. However, the ayans needed the approval of the central government for legitimacy. 
In this sense, the ayans became recourse for both the central government and the reaya in 
some cases.16 In order to maintain their power in the provinces, ‘close relationship with the 
central government or support of the local community’ were the two means that ayans 
depended on. Investigating the possibility of creating a model ayan, Robert Zens mentions 
that ayans used either means, however, suggests that the mamluk beys were the exception in 
this case.17 It can be suggested that the mamluk ‘households’ did not need to use either means 
in order to maintain their position, as they were an essential element of the local 
administration in Egypt. However, it is for sure that mamluk beys referred to the central 
government’s support while positioning themselves in (or outside) the province. Three 
characters in the mid eighteenth century and their relationship with the central government 
proves the situation. The first example is Firari Osman Bey, who was compelled to leave 
                                                        
15 Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, p. 48 
16 Thomas Naff, “Introduction” in T. Naff and R. Owen, eds., Studies in eighteenth century, (Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1977), p. 7-8. 
17 Robert Zens, “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”, History Studies, volume 3/3 2011, pp. 
433-447, p. 447 
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Egypt by his rivals in the 1740s. He left Cairo and moved to Istanbul. In the meantime, his 
rivals in Cairo claimed him responsible for the unpaid annual tribute. Being held responsible 
by the central government, Osman Bey made an effort to clear his name. With a successful 
lobbying in the imperial palace not only did he get rid of the accusations he also earned an 
arpalık in Rumelia. 18  The second example is Ali Bey Gazzawi (1758-59), who was a 
counterpart of Ali Bey al-Kabir. Gazzawi took the support of the governor of Egypt, Kamil 
Ahmed Pasha (r. 1760), in the competition for being appointed şeyhülbeled when he was 
carrying out the duty of emirulhajj in the Hijaz. Kamil Ahmed Pasha provided him a support 
of lobbying in the imperial palace and managed to have a decree to be sent to Cairo about 
encouraging Gazzawi appointment as the new şeyhülbeled. However, their lobbying failed, as 
Gazzawi could not return back to Cairo.19 Finally Ali Bey’s closest man, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-
zeheb (1772-75) appears as an ally of the central government in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Mehmed Bey turned his back to his master after a short time he invaded 
Syria, and fought back. After eliminating his master, Mehmed Bey was appointed as the new 
şeyhülbeled by the central government and also even a decree was sent that addressing 
Mehmed Bey as Mehmed “Pasha”.20 These three examples demonstrate that the mamluk beys 
in Egypt shared some features in common with typical ayans in that they all, from time to 
time, relied upon the central government’s help and support.   
Although it is claimed that central government could not control and manipulate 
provincial actors from Istanbul, 21 the eighteenth century witnessed complex conflicts and 
agreements between the central government and the local administrators that occasionally 
demonstrates the opposite. This complexity cannot be explained based on random and single 
                                                        
18 See below chapter IV on the governor, p. 202 
19 See below chapter I on the rebellion, p. 69 
20 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 694 (date late R 1189/late June 1775) 
21 Quatert, The Ottoman Empire, p. 49 
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instances. Nevertheless, recent historiography contradicts Quataert’s hypothesis of 
uncontrollable provincial elites. Moreover, we should be mindful of the risk that reducing 
eighteenth-century Ottoman history to a decentralization paradigm, which may distort our 
understanding of the actual political environment in the provinces. 
Khoury discusses centralization/decentralization paradigm in her study mentioning 
that the government’s success in imposing effective controls challenges the validity of the 
decentralization paradigm in the eighteenth century.22 Her research of Ottoman Mosul from 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries reveals that the urban and rural society of Mosul 
actually became better integrated into the Ottoman system in the eighteenth century, the so-
called century of decentralization. According to Khoury, the central government’s power and 
authority was more evident in Mosul in the eighteenth century than in any other period. Her 
study highlights that the central government managed to organise the provincial provision and 
manpower effectively with the cooperation of local notables in the borderlands with Iran 
during this period.23  
In addition, Baldwin’s research reveals the strong ties of the Egyptian people with 
the central government’s bureaucracy where he shows that Egyptians did not hesitate to make 
legal applications to the Porte for resolving their problems. 24 Depending on inexhaustible 
sources of sharia court records, Baldwin introduces a large number of examples on how 
Egyptian people cemented close connections with the central government via jurisdiction, 
when they thought the provincial legal and administrative body failed to help them. For 
disputes between reaya and administrators as well as in between reaya, Egyptian people 
applied to the Divan-ı Humayun in relation to a wide range of issues including, debts, 
                                                        
22 Khoury, State and provincial society, p. 8. For more detail, see below, pp. 18-20 
23 Khoury, State and provincial society, p. 213, 214 
24 Baldwin, Islamic Law, p. 142 
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property, endowments, inheritances and even quarrels between neighbours. Baldwin mentions 
that the unlimited jurisdiction of Divan-ı Humayun proves the sultan’s control and authority.25  
Comparison of the Pattern of Decentralization in Egypt with that found in other regions  
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the emergence of a strong local elite 
characterizes the Ottoman Empire’s provincial administration. The literature relating to this 
aspect of Ottoman provincial life in the eighteenth century is both vast and varied; some of it 
focuses on governance in its local and microcosmic context while other authors are 
principally interested in identifying generalized trends and paradigms.26 In her study focusing 
on an earlier period, Hülya Canbakal points out that rise of local elites represented “a new 
mode of centre-periphery integration”.27 Strong and loyal to the central government in the 
first half of the century, existing historiography suggests that the loyalty bonds of those elites 
loosened in the second half of the century. Egypt experienced a decentralized period with 
powerful military grandees in the seventeenth century and with mamluk households that 
controlled the domestic politics in the eighteenth century. 28  The households kept their 
importance as mamluks, both men and women, continued to arrive in Ottoman Egypt and to 
acculturate and localize in these households. These households mostly established strong ties 
with military regiments, and had influence on local politics as well as military and economic 
affairs. Mamluk beys and their households formed the group of local notables in Egypt. The 
Kazdağlı household was the leading household that had a command of Egypt’s political and 
                                                        
25 Baldwin, Islamic Law, p. 59 
26 For an account of broader regional trends prevailing in the Arab provinces, see Dina Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus 
provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography”, The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 3: The Later Ottoman 
Empire, 1603–1839, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.133-156 
27 Hülya Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town ‘Ayntab in the 17th century, (Brill: Leiden, Boston, 2007), p. 6. 
Hulya Canbakal examines emergence of provincial elites in the seventeenth century in Aintab, a typical, relatively small and 
less important province between Anatolia and Arab provinces. 
28 Jane Hathaway, The Politics of households, p. 1 
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financial environment. Strong mamluk beys such as İbrahim Kethüda, Rıdvan Kethüda and 
Abdurrahman Kethüda were actively involved in the financial and administrational 
organisation in Cairo. The Ottoman Empire had to approve some of them as şeyhülbeleds, an 
important component of the provincial administration. The şeyhülbeled was often addressed 
alongside the governor in the firmans issued by the Ottoman sultan. Whether a member of 
military regiments or a şeyhülbeled, mamluks beys were loyal to the imperial government and 
acted under the control of the central government.  
Other provinces of the empire in the south such as Aintab, Syria and Mosul were also 
administered by strong provincial elites, yet, in different forms. These provinces had a 
common point with Egypt since they were located in close regions. Thus, they were affected 
by the Empire’s general political situation, yet each experinced their own special 
circumstances.  
Pattern of Decentralization in Syria:  
 
Syria is an important case for the eighteenth century provincial administration of the 
Ottoman Empire. Karl Barbir’s research reveals characteristic features of a southern province 
of the empire in the first half of the eighteenth century. From 1714, the central government 
appointed the governors of Damascus from the same family, al-Azm. As a local element, the 
Azms provided power from their local roots in Damascus and used it in line with the central 
government’s desire. They had long tenure of offices and also, other members of the family 
were appointed to the neighbouring provinces.29  
Although a specific family’s domination in the governorship demonstrates the 
decentralized administration of the Ottoman Empire, which led to a local autonomy in the 
province, detailed research demonstrates that the Porte appointed them because the Azm 
                                                        
29 Karl Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708-1758, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980) p. 45  
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family administered the province in line with the central government’s expectations. The Azm 
family’s half century long rule in Damascus was not the beginning of the province’s gradually 
separation from the Empire. Instead, the Azm family served a useful instrument for the central 
government, as they reorganized Damascus’s administration for the benefit of the Empire. 
Barbir considers al-Azm family as representing a skilful blend of Ottoman and local 
traditions, rather than being an alternative to the central government’s administration. Also, 
appointing a local figure as a governor, succession of the family members in a province, or 
having another family member to a neighbouring province was neither a new development in 
the Ottoman administrational system in the 1710s, nor it was not peculiar to Damascus.30 
Syria was important for the Porte as it sustained a hajj caravan every year. As an 
organisation, it was not as large as Egypt’s hajj caravan. However, it was significant as it 
conveyed dynasty’s members, aside from the fact that it represented the sultan as the servant 
of the holy cities. In the end of the seventeenth century, the organisation of the hajj caravan of 
Syria failed due to the increasing cost of pilgrimage, the increasing attacks of Bedouins and 
some greedy hajj commanders. Since this situation damaged the empire’s sovereignty and 
prestige, the Porte tried to solve the problem by appointing different local figures, even one 
certain sherif, as emirulhajj, until 1708. In 1708, the Porte attempted to try a new 
combination, and gave the duty of emirulhajj to the governor. The governor of Damascus was 
assigned the duty of the emirulhajj, commander of the annual pilgrimage, a very important 
duty as the Ottoman sultan considered himself as the servant of the Haremeyn: Mecca and 
Medina. Thus, the organisation of the caravan was connected to the Porte via the governor.  
By assigning the duty of emirulhajj to the governor, the Porte changed the 
administrative duty of governor as well. It was limited outside of Damascus and centralized in 
                                                        
30 Barbir, Ottoman Rule, p. 57-63 
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the province.31  First, the governors of Damascus were no longer expected to attend war 
outside of Syria, and in addition they were not appointed as grand viziers in Istanbul any 
more. In addition, a number of sub provinces were directly attached to the governor’s 
administration. Barbir asserts that during this period the governor of Damascus had a 
considerable authority in the province; in the meantime, he was being monitored by the 
central government in his communication with the elite, (ayan), businessmen, (tujjar), and 
people, (reaya).32  The central government gave this authority to the governor, as well as 
appointing him as emirulhajj, in order to control three local groups in the province: notables, 
janissaries, and tribes.33   
Nasuh Pasha (1708-1713) was the first governor that carried out the duty of 
emirulhajj. With the help of the daring and severity of his personal character, Nasuh Pasha 
controlled the Bedouins, fulfilled the safety of caravan and gained a surplus. He had a large 
retinue and troops. The central government renewed Nasuh Pasha’s governorship five times, 
as he was a capable person. However, at every turn, Nasuh Pasha requested a different sancak 
of Damascus for one of his retainers. When he requested Tripoli and Sidon in December 
1713, the central government terminated his office, and his life. 34  By 1714, the Porte 
appointed the governor from a local family, the Azms. Thus, the tenure of office, which 
would last for some sixty years, of the Azm family started. The five-year long governorship of 
Nasuh Pasha and the half-century long governorship of the Azm family serves as a good 
reflection of the Ottoman Empire’s approach to the administration of local figures. The 
Porte’s dismissing of Nasuh Pasha and appointing subsequent governors from a local family 
                                                        
31 Barbir, Ottoman Rule, p.13. The centralised administration in the hand of the governor in Damascus is claimed to have 
positive effects on the commerce in Damascus. See Mohannad Al-Mubaidin, “Aspects of the economic history of Damascus 
during the first half of the eighteenth century”, in Peter Sluglett with Stefan Weber, eds., Syria and Bilad al-Sham under 
Ottoman Rule, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), p. 137   
32 Barbir, Ottoman Rule, p. 20 
33 Barbir, Ottoman Rule, p. 45 
34 Ibid, p. 54 
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shows us that the central government required a certain arrangement in the provincial 
administration during this period. This certain arrangement of the Porte suggests that the 
central government supported the groups, which provided what the central government 
wanted. On the other hand, it ceased the administration of those who acted according to their 
self-interest instead of the central government, and those who focused on increasing their 
personal authority in defiance of the central government.  
Barbir claims that the first half of the century contrasts with the second half, as the 
central government was reluctant to attempt another reorganization. 35  This claim is 
compatible with the proposition of Khoury for Mosul, which mentions that the time period 
after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 witnessed a loosening of the central government’s 
administration in the provinces. In the time period after the 1770s, Syria was affected a 
number of incidents, which seriously influenced the central government’s position in the 
province. First, it was the target of an invasion by Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb. Then, because 
of Wahhabi-Saudi alliance, Bedouin tribes were displaced and moved to near Damascus, and 
caused pressure. Finally, Zahir al-Umar appeared as a local authority in Palestine. He was 
made inactive in 1775 by the central government; however, Jezzar Ahmed Pasha’s rise did not 
take so long to substitute him. Gürcü Osman Pasha (1760-1771) and Mehmed Pasha al-Azm 
(1772-1783) both held long tenures as governors of Damascus for long period of time; 
however, neither managed to achieve a strong stance on behalf of the central government. 
Barbir claims that the imperial government could not manage to administer the province after 
1783. It gave a lot of discretion to the governors, used the notables as an intermediary 
between the government and populace, and ignored the problems as long as they were not 
crucial.36 
                                                        
35 Ibid, p. 178 
36 Barbir, Ottoman Rule, p. 177 
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One can observe some similarities in the political culture of Syria and Egypt in the 
eighteenth century. In the first half of the century, as in the case of Egypt, there was violence 
between local factors in Syria as well; still, it was not in the form of rebellion against the 
central government. On the contrary, local factors were trying to affirm their place in the 
province’s politics. However, in the second half of the century, the imperial government 
failed to maintain the provincial system that had established in the beginning of the century. 
Barbir states that these local factors changed their direction from the rivals to representatives 
of the central authority, which affected the central government’s authority after the 1760s.37 
On the other hand, there are significant differences between Egypt and Damascus in 
terms of local notables and governorship. First of all, the tenure of office of the governor of 
Egypt was significantly shorter, mostly only one year, than his counterpart in Damascus. 
Also, there was no concentration of control in one family like the Azms. While the governor 
of Damascus was appointed from a local family, the governor of Egypt was appointed among 
the imperial elites. In Syria, the governor centralized the provincial politics in his sole hand by 
attaching the neighbouring sancaks to himself and commanding the hajj caravan. The central 
government appointed the governor of Syria as emirulhajj in order to prevent the local groups 
to become autonomous. Damascus’s centralized provincial administration in the hand of the 
governor from a local family, with the organisation of the hajj caravan contrasts to the 
situation in Egypt. The mamluk beys commanded the hajj caravan during the entire century. 
The central government never changed the mamluk beys’ responsibility, as they were capable 
to command the caravan in terms of finance and authority, and could provide safety against 
the Bedouins, except for a few instances. However, we see that, towards the end of the 
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century, the emirulhajj of Egypt challenged the central government via the governor in order 
to be assigned more financial sources.38 
Pattern of Decentralization in Northern Iraq: The Case of Mosul: 
Khoury examines a long period of Mosul, from mid-seventeenth century to mid-
nineteenth century. Her study helps us to take a step back and see how the political, social and 
economic aspects of the Ottoman provincial life changed in an Ottoman province located in 
southeast. Being a frontier province and a centre for mobilization of troops for wars against 
Iran, Mosul had a distinctive position for the central government. The central government 
took advantage of the local elements in order to meet manpower and provision of the army in 
Mosul. The central government’s approach to the province helped local notables to emerge as 
households and getting a stronger position against their rivals in the province depended, of 
course, on the level of their collaboration with the central government. In the first half of the 
eighteenth century, Mosul experienced an economic expansion and population increase by the 
Kurdish and Turkish soldiers due to war. Those military members were attached to one or 
another janissary regiment, and new comers had conflicts with older ones.39  
Provincial notables were in cooperation with the imperial centre from the second 
quarter of the century. Similar to Syria, the central government co-operated a local family in 
Mosul, the Jalilis, and maintained the provincial administration as well as deployed the 
provincial sources for the imperial army. A bilateral agreement continued until the second 
half of the century. When the Jalilis guaranteed to sustain the imperial army in terms of 
financial and military support in the war against Iran, the Porte appointed the Jalilis as 
                                                        
38 See below chapter III on the irsaliye, p. 178 
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governors. The Jalili family played an important role in revitalizing the trade in the region and 
manipulated it in Ottoman Empire’s interest.40  
Khoury mentions a transformation in the relationship between the state and 
provincial society in Mosul in the second half of the eighteenth century. The local elites were 
reluctant to cooperate as closely with the central government, as they had during the first half 
of the eighteenth century. The Jalili family worked accordingly to the mutual benefit of each 
side, and mobilized the troops and provisions until the Russian war. However, during the 
period after Russo-Ottoman war the relationship between this provincial elite and the central 
government broke down and never recovered in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.  
Nevertheless, the military instability of the imperial army due to the success and 
failure - the defeat in Belgrade in 1715 and victory ended up with new tax farms being created 
in the Iranian borderlands. As a result, Mosul notables were left in an ambivalent situation. 
Yet, they preserved their loyalty with the help of new tax farms in the Iranian border regions. 
However, the relationship between the provincial elites and the central government became 
tense after the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), as the local notables’ trust in the imperial 
elites’ military policies weakened and they hesitated to support the central government any 
more.  
Khoury claims that the uprisings of Ali Bey al-Kabir and Zahir al-Omar reinforced 
the violent confrontation between two Jalili households.41 In addition to trust issues, the other 
reason for the tenser relationship was the tax monopolization of the Mosuli elite. Khoury 
states that while the central government was busy dealing with the war and uprisings, the 
                                                        
40 Khoury, State and provincial society, p. 57-58. Khoury confirms Quatert’s claim by saying that the connection between 
state and Mosuli elites was effective until 1768. However, the provincial elite and the central government broke up in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century. 
41 Khoury, State and provincial society, p. 69 
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Mosuli elite had enough time to seize the superiority in rural industry and pastoral 
production.42  
The Case of Egypt: Typical or Exceptional? 
  The administrative system in Egypt was different from the aforementioned provinces, 
as the governor appointed by the central government kept its presence until the early 
nineteenth century. Under the governor’s management, however, households had a significant 
control on the finance and land administration of Egypt besides their political influence. They 
challenged and tried to change the regulations according to their interests. For example, in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the members of the households drafted illegal 
agreements in order to hold a tax farm in the household’s possession. Some mamluk beys did 
not hesitate to fabricate testaments for a deceased person in order to keep the revenues from 
villages, which were appointed for the central treasury. However, during the second half of 
the eighteenth century, the central government detected those agreements, voided them and 
endeavoured to keep the income of its treasury.43  
Existing historiography claims that mamluk households gained more power against 
less authoritative governors by the end of the eighteenth century. With the influence of 
European travellers, some historians claim that the governor became, practically, only the 
representative of Ottoman Sultan with a small number of soldiers in his entourage, but 
especially outsiders considered the mamluk beys as the real administrators in Egypt.44 Anis 
mentions that the European travellers and merchants, who were not familiar with the 
decentralized administration system of the Ottoman Empire, had difficulty in relating to the 
existence of the Ottoman governor alongside the mamluk beys in Egypt in the late eighteenth 
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43 See below, chapter III on the irsaliye, p. 179-184 
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century.45 However, correspondence between Cairo and Istanbul proves that, although the 
central government included şeyhülbeled in the administration from the 1730s, the Ottoman 
governor in Egypt held the authority over the mamluk beys until the last quarter of the 
century. 
Al-Jabarti’s and Damurdashi’s accounts give us a detailed history of mamluk beys’ 
struggles in Cairo.46 While supplying us an intricate account of the relationship between 
mamluk beys, these narratives’ focusing on the struggles provides a false impression for 
today’s readers about past political environment. The narration of incessant conflicts between 
mamluk beys has led the modern reader to perceive the eighteenth century Ottoman Egyptian 
provincial political milieu as revolving solely around the internal politics of the mamluk beys 
in Cairo, and to see this arrangement as unstable and insecure for the indigenous people as 
well as foreigners. However, recent historiography and chapters of this research as well, 
which based their research on archival documents, demonstrate that the eighteenth century’s 
provincial politics, provincial administration and management, and relationship with the 
central government was not solely dependent on the mamluk beys and their struggles. To the 
contrary, the mamluk beys and their conflicts seem not to have had a very strong impact on 
Egyptian people’s everyday lives. One would be hard pressed to find a provincial political 
crisis that affected Egyptian people more than the French expedition at the end of the 
eighteenth century, or Mehmed Ali’s drastic policies in the early nineteenth century. Even 
during Ali Bey’s uprising and central government and Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s 
counteraction against him, the correspondence proves that the operations and organisations 
including public constructions continued to function as they were supposed to.  
                                                        
45 M. A. Anis, Some Aspects of British Interest in Egypt in the Late 18th Century (1775-1798), unpublished PhD thesis 
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In his article on Fayyum, Alan Mikhail helps us to re-locate mamluk beys and their 
authority and influence in Egypt and relieves us of the necessity of perceiving mamluk beys 
as the “only” political actors of Egypt.47 Mikhail proposes, from his research on repairs of 
dams, that mamluk factions had little influence in some of the sub provinces such as Fayyum. 
He is deducting this claim from the correspondence between the small town, Fayyum - 
provincial capital, Cairo - and the imperial capital, Istanbul, as people of villages were the 
main performers and addressees of the central government correspondence.  
It is possible to carry Mikhail’s proof/determination from the Fayyum case and 
generalise for the whole of Egypt, as Egyptian people including Cairenes lived free for the 
most part from the disturbances that characterized political struggle between the mamluk 
beys. The situation was the same in the neighbouring provinces. When a disagreement 
happened, the central government usually chose to negotiate with local elites and mamluk 
beys via the governors.48 Disagreements between mamluk beys and the central government or 
governors did not cause political crisis, even if mamluk beys succeeded in engineering the 
dismissal of an Ottoman governor. When Ali Bey managed to have Hamza Pasha dismissed 
in 1766, the Porte appointed Rakım Mehmed Pasha as the new governor. The central 
government neither started a war against mamluk beys like a dictatorship, nor left the 
administration of Egypt to mamluk beys like a weak state. 
Collaborating with mamluk beys and other gentry, the governor of Egypt was the 
actual administrator in Cairo in the mid-eighteenth century. Although mamluk beys could 
dismiss the governors, this did not mean that they did not come to an agreement with the new 
ones. Even during the exceptional time period of Ali Bey’s uprising (1768-1772), Ali Bey 
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never cut his relationship with Istanbul. Unlike his later successor Mehmed Ali Pasha, Ali 
Bey did not try to separate the province from the empire in the areas of agricultural 
production and trading. The ships from Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta continued to 
operate to other parts of the empire including Istanbul. During Ali Bey’s uprising, everything 
functioned as before, except for the irsaliye-i hazine. Ali Bey did not send the annual tribute, 
however, this was not the first time that central government failed to receive it in time.49 
Egypt occupied an important place in the organisational system of the Empire. It was 
the producer and supplier of a number of food products, exotic herbs and coffee needed in the 
domestic market, especially in Istanbul. Although the area around the Danube was the first 
supplier of grain for the imperial capital and its surroundings, Egypt produced a considerable 
amount of commodities such as rice and sugar, which was consumed in a wider geography 
including especially Mecca and Medina. The absence of the food products from Egypt caused 
price increases in Istanbul’s market. As a concerned government, which attached importance 
to providing the peoples’ everyday needs and basic foods, the central government paid 
attention to Egypt’s market as well. The prices of food products and their abundance in the 
market were always in the agenda of the government, and controlled via the governor, 
şeyhülbeled, and seven regiments’ officers.50 
There are a number of features that separate Egypt from other provinces and create 
its own unique circumstances. First, Egypt was a lucrative province, which provided a wealth 
of agricultural production for the Haremeyn and for Istanbul, as well as its cash support to the 
sultan’s treasury via the annual tribute. Egypt’s separation from the empire would make a 
deep impact far greater than other provinces. For this reason, the central government was 
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always cooperative towards mamluk beys, though, it did not legitimate mamluk beys as 
governors. Both in Syria and Mosul, the local elites were appointed and approved as 
governors. In our case, in Egypt, it was not the same. The central government continued to 
appoint the governors of Egypt amongst the high-ranking pashas and experienced statesmen. 
In this sense, Egypt contradicts the general pattern.51 In some cases (i.e. Ali Bey al-Kabir’s 
uprising) mamluk beys challenged the governor’s authority. For this reason, it is claimed that 
the governors were a counter balance to strong mamluk figures. However, one aspect that 
makes Egypt unique compared to other provinces is the presence of the şeyhülbeled. The 
şeyhülbeled, the notable of the country, was a title that was used by the most powerful 
mamluk bey in Cairo. In the 1730s, when this title was first used, the central government did 
not approve; however, in time, it had to accredit the title and include him in the province’s 
administrative system.  
On the other hand, as a province of the Ottoman Empire, mamluk beys and their 
approach towards the central government shares a similar pattern with that found in other 
provinces. Until the 1760s, while local notables administered the provinces in line with the 
government’s desire, they centralized the provincial financial and political affairs in their 
hands. However, after the 1760s, the local notables became reluctant to cooperate with the 
government. In Egypt’s case, we see that mamluk beys began to create a pressure on the 
governor starting after 1764.52 Ali Bey dismissed Hamza Pasha in 1766. Against Khoury’s 
suggestion of weaker government emerging after the Russian war concluded by the treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the actions of the mamluk beys in Egypt proves that they started to 
challenge the central government via the governor before the Russian war. 
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Ali Bey’s authority had undeniable effects on the administration of Egypt. His 
political ambitions changed the fabric of political life of the province. Ali Bey’s authority 
came to an end with his closest mamluk ally, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s betrayal. After the 
termination of Ali Bey’s authority, the central government collaborated with Ebu’z-zeheb and 
confirmed his authority as the governor of Egypt; nevertheless Ebu’z-zeheb died shortly 
thereafter.53   After Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s leadership, the political milieu in Egypt 
continued in a more chaotic and turbulent mode until the French expedition.  
Ali Bey played a determining role in the dismissal of two governors; Hamza Pasha 
(r. 1179-1180/1765-7) and Rakım el-Hac Pasha (r. 1181-1182/1767-68). It is obvious that he 
was not the first local administrator that dismissed the governor appointed by the central 
government. However, since he eliminated all his potential rivals, bought numerous new 
mamluks from Caucasia for his household, and established his own army, Ali Bey caused 
dramatic changes in the political landscape of Egypt.   
Ali Bey’s authority had a dual effect for Ottoman Egypt; one was about the province 
itself, and the other concerned the central government of the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the 
first effect, the local administrators in Egypt were interested in attracting more European ships 
in the Red Sea ports in order to increase their income. So they started to disregard the central 
government’s rules about foreign trade and welcomed the European ships in the Upper 
reaches of the Red Sea. Therefore, they extended their authority over foreign affairs. The 
second effect was the empire’s need for Egypt’s support as well as the beginning of 
administrative restlessness while the Empire was at war with its rival, Russia. Ali Bey’s 
“uprising” coincided with Russo-Ottoman war between 1768-1774. Before this war, the 
Ottoman Empire experienced a long period of peace for 30 years.  
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The State of the Field in Research on Ottoman Egypt 
Since the 1960s Ottoman Egypt has been a research subject for the scholars writing 
about the Middle East. Based on primary sources such as archival documents, contemporary 
historians’ chronicles and travel accounts, a considerable body of research has been 
accumulated. However, a large body of research has been devoted to nineteenth century 
Ottoman Egypt, as Mehmed Ali Pasha’s rule in Egypt is mostly considered as an incipient 
separation from the Ottoman Empire. The eighteenth century history of the province has 
suffered neglect compared to the later periods. On the other hand, in order to properly 
interpret nineteenth century and post-Ottoman Egypt, the eighteenth century deserves serious 
scholarly attention.  
 Although modern historians tend to examine the nineteenth century Egypt separately 
from the Ottoman Empire’s history, Egypt remained as a province until the British mandate. 
In the nineteenth century Eyalet-i Mümtaze Evrakı replaces the defter series of Mühimme-i 
Mısır, which provide us a great amount of information about Egypt’s politics, economy, and 
land administration in the eighteenth century. However, the central government was still 
active in seeking solutions to the provincial problems such as plague. Mikhail mentions that 
Egypt under the rule of Mehmed Ali Pasha was still a part of the Ottoman Empire and the 
entire conflict between Mehmed Ali and the central government was a power struggle in the 
internal frame. Although he challenged the empire, his administration stayed, bureaucratically 
and legally, in the Ottoman Empire’s frame.54 Recent historiography put forth in the light of 
empirical data shows that neither Mehmed Ali nor Ali Bey had the goal of separating the 
province and establishing a new sovereign state. Nevertheless, the documents prove that they 
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were only ambitious political figures that tried to accumulate more power and leverage 
against the central government and their counterparts.  
The French expedition has a distinguishing place in the history of Egypt. The time 
period before this historical case must be examined in detail in order to properly understand 
subsequent developments during Mehmed Ali Pasha’s governorate. Until recently, the 
historians who approached Egypt with proto-nationalist paradigm claimed that Egypt 
exhibited a sudden development in terms of economic and political progress after the French 
expedition. Bonaparte’s invasion was thought to have brought independence as well as 
development in science and art. Ze’evi criticises the proposition of Ottoman decline paradigm 
and westernization/modernization of Egypt after the French expedition and points out that the 
Ottoman Empire was experiencing transformation outside the influence of the West and 
would complete this transformation without it.55 Modernization and colonization both are 
topics of the nineteenth century, which is beyond the scope of this study.56 However, more 
investigation on the second part of the eighteenth century reveals more details and saves us 
from repeating clichés about the periods that came afterwards. The studies of Alan Mikhail 
and James Baldwin contribute to the existing historiography on eighteenth century Egypt. 
Especially, Mikhail’s study investigates the transition period of the province from the 
eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century. He mentions that the existing 
literature distorts our understanding of the period by an anachronistic attempt to evaluate the 
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period through the lens of chronologically inappropriate categories of analysis such as 
colonialism, reform movements and modernisation.57  
 For this reason, more research focusing on the provincial administration of Egypt, its 
relationship with the central government and European countries will reveal more information 
about the period before and after the French expedition. Although there are a number of 
studies that shed light on Egypt’s relationship with the European countries between 1775-
1798, there is still few researches being conducted that focuses in detail on Egyptian 
provincial realties in the mid-eighteenth century.58  
P. M. Holt and S. J. Shaw’s pioneering studies are among those that examined 
Ottoman Egypt in depth and reveal the principal aspects of Ottoman provincial administration 
in Egypt.59  While Holt’s research depends on the Arabic chronicles, Shaw relies on the 
Ottoman archival documents in the Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul. While Holt 
revealed the political networks between the mamluk beys, Shaw examined the establishment 
of the Ottoman administration in Egypt. Holt’s Egypt and the Fertile Crescent is a good 
reference for understanding the political milieu of the Ottoman Egypt in detail. Jane 
Hathaway aimed to complement Holt’s book with her Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule. 
Unlike Holt, Hathaway approaches the Ottoman Egypt from the perspective of change and 
transformation, and examines the era by putting the decentralization of the empire and 
existence of the ayans in their appropriate context. Her study reveals a more realistic 
perspective regarding the important events of the era. 
Daniel Crecelius focused on Ali Bey al-Kabir’s and his client mamluk Mehmed Bey 
Ebu’z-zeheb’s authority in Egypt however he considers their authority in Egypt as “ the re-
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emergence of an autonomous mamluk beylicate in Egypt”.60 Crecelius claims that Ali Bey 
attempted to revive the medieval Mamluk Empire.61 Although it is a detailed study, the author 
displays deficiency in positioning Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire and Ali Bey’s 
uprising as a local notable. After the Ottoman conquest, Egypt turned into a province from a 
sultanate and from an imperial capital, Cairo turned into a provincial capital. Crecelius’s study 
fails to take this point into consideration while positioning Cairo and mamluk beys in the 
eighteenth century Ottoman Empire’s history. Also, Crecelius’s evidence concerning the 
motives and policies of mamluk beys is less detailed. The difficulty with his approach is the 
reader may perceive Egypt as an autonomous state, despite the fact that recent historiography 
relying on the archival documents demonstrates that Egypt and its administrators were closely 
monitored by the central government during the eighteenth century. 
Further, Ottoman perspectives of Egypt should be well understood and the 
circumstances around Egypt and Red Sea must be examined. For example, Crecelius handles 
the period before and after the Ottoman conquest in a mistaken way; as if Portuguese entered 
the Indian Ocean and threatened the Red Sea trade “dramatically” after the Ottoman 
conquest; 62 yet, we know from chronicle of Ibn Iyas that Ottoman Empire helped the Mamluk 
Sultanate in making the Mamluk navy stronger against the Portuguese by sending military 
and material help with Selman Reis.63  
Unlike Crecelius, Hathaway implements a broader focus and mentions the actual 
reasons behind the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. She reflects the Mamluk sultanate’s attitude 
towards the presence of the Portuguese in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The central 
Ottoman government approached to Egypt as a means of protection of both the Holy Lands 
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(Mecca-Medina) and Ottoman trade in the Indian Ocean, considering its financial proceedings 
a secondary matter. Hathaway also emphasizes the place of Egypt in the Ottoman Empire and 
its prominence as a cornerstone of Ottoman geo-strategic concerns.64  
Winter handles Ottoman Egypt under a wide spectrum of institutions and centuries 
covering a long span of time in his book. He starts with the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 
1517, explaining the conquest and earlier periods briefly, then proceeds to summarise 
developments up to the French expedition, telling us about Ottoman Egypt’s social, political 
and military history via its military and religious institutions. Winter’s approach is too general 
and he examines a period too wide. Also, Marsot provides a brief summary of eighteenth-
century Ottoman Egypt as well. Her approach includes “the impact of French revolutionary 
ideas” in the history of Egypt. Despite its brevity, Marsot’s study outlines many important 
events in their context of contemporary causation, however, these two work provide shallow 
works as they examined the whole “Ottoman period” of the province throughout the time 
period between 1517-1798.65  
On the other hand, Nelly Hanna’s research sheds light mostly on commercial and 
social aspects of Ottoman Egypt, and Andre Raymond’s research illuminates other aspects, 
such as the population of Egypt, and Cairo’s urban construction during the Ottoman period.66 
Mary Ann Fay’s works on the women of mamluk households and Hathaway’s work on 
marriage alliances are notable and reveals the role of women in the eighteenth century.67 The 
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marriage bound and mamluk women in this sense were crucial in terms of transferring wealth 
and legitimacy from mamluk masters to their manumitted servants.  
The earlier research tends to approach Egypt from a narrow and proto nationalistic 
aspect. They perceive and show Egypt as a stagnant periphery until the French expedition, 
which subsequently flourished thanks to the influence of the modern west. Ze’evi points out 
this situation in his article about modernism and the incorrect periodization of the history of 
the Ottoman Empire, and argues against the hypothesis that the West brought modernisation 
to Egypt after the expedition.68 On the other hand, more recent research, depending on the 
records of the imperial, or/and provincial archives, suggests more convincing and credible 
information about the Ottoman Egypt. Not being content with broad generalizations, they 
offer sophisticated combinations of the imperial and provincial transformations, and political 
and financial circumstances.  
The outline offered above suggests that former authors were influenced by the 
nationalistic methodology and approach Egypt as if it was a province that did not have any 
communication and connection with other geographical entities. A number of researchers 
ignored the fact that Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire and was administered 
according to the administrative system of the central government. In the relation of centre and 
province, Egypt and Istanbul took advantage of mutual benefits. On the contrary, recent 
historiography69 considers Egypt in the context of the history of the Ottoman Empire, as they 
depend on archival documents. 
Depending on the recent historiography, one can relocate the province according to 
the findings in the light of provincial and imperial archives. While Khoury questions in her 
State and Provincial Society the compatibility and convenience of the 
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centralization/decentralization paradigm on the eighteenth century Mosul, Alan Mikhail 
rejects the centre-periphery model in the context of a small Ottoman town, Fayyum. Alan 
Mikhail examines Egypt’s environmental history and locates Egypt as a centre and a 
periphery thanks to the connection between the imperial and provincial bureaucracy. His 
study on environmental history undertakes Egypt’s environment in the long eighteenth 
century, which proves that Ottoman central government, continued its involvement in the 
provincial administration, and shows the transition period in the province in the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. 70  Confirming that there was not any disconnection between the 
imperial government and Egypt in the eighteenth century, Mikhail puts the rule of Mehmed 
Ali Pasha in the Ottoman context and mentions that Mehmed Ali remained an Ottoman 
governor even though he ambitiously challenged the central imperial government.  
Focusing on the importance of irrigation system for the agricultural production in 
Egypt, he highlights the organizational relationship between Istanbul, Cairo and other sub 
provinces of Egypt. His research on dam repairs, shipbuilding and timber transportation, 
Mikhail brings a new perspective to Egypt historiography, which was previously mostly 
confined to the politics of mamluk factions. He emphasizes that peasants were actively 
involved in the imperial correspondence as the main actors who witnessed and experienced 
any infrastructural disrepair, as well as local Egyptian and imperial actors. Mikhail’s study 
expands the standpoint of the reader of Ottoman Egypt’s history, which had focused only on 
mamluk factions and provided a misconception of a province filled and administered solely 
by mamluk beys. He asserts that Ottoman central government left the maintenance of 
irrigation works to the experts and first hand users, namely Egyptian peasants, and provided 
them a capable and professional bureaucratic system (a subject that James Baldwin’s research 
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also points out), so that they could seek imperial intervention and mediation whenever they 
had a problem with other villagers. Far away from being oppressive, the central government 
let Egyptian peasants guide and canalize their efforts during the repair and maintenance 
processes. 
A review on the existing literature shows that recent studies provide more detailed 
research depending on the archival records, and tends to position Egypt as a province that was 
affected by the central government’s changing circumstances and policies. Hathaway’s 
research focuses on political structure of Egypt, explains households and demonstrates many 
aspects of mamluk administration in Cairo. On the other hand, Mikhail’s environmental 
history and Baldwin’s legal history focus on the daily life and problems of the Egyptian 
people and society, and reveal the people’s relatively strong and close relationship and 
communication with the imperial government. Ultimately, these studies save the history of 
Ottoman Egypt from unhelpful generalizations and inappropriate clichés.  
This study aims to be part of this trend by focusing on Ali Bey’s uprising during the 
Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774). The detailed examination of the decree records will reveal 
mamluk beys’ engagements in provincial administration and their activities in land 
administration.  
Sources and Structure 
To explore the history of Ottoman Egypt between the 1730s and 1780s and to 
contribute to the current historiography as an academic work, this study is based upon 
primary sources such as chronicles of the contemporary era and archival documents in the 
Prime Minister’s Archive in Istanbul. The archive provides a mass of empirical data for the 
study of eighteenth century Egypt. In addition to the correspondence of the Ottoman central 
government with Egypt, contemporary chronicles will help to shed light on the era. 
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Comparing the historiography sustained by the central government and chronicle of 
the Egyptian historians such as al-Jabarti’s Ajaib will bring a nuance to the study. Beginning 
with the Egyptian chronicles, Abdurrahman al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt, Ajaib al-Athar fi’l-
Tarajim wa’l-Akhbar offers a detailed account on Egyptian internal politics. It will serve as 
our indigenous source. Al-Jabarti’s Ottoman-Turkish counterparts are Enveri and 
Şem’danizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi. Their works will provide the perspective of the 
central government.  
 Narrating how and why Ali Bey rose against the central government, Enveri penned 
his chronicle in the war headquarters during the Ottoman-Russo war (1768-1772). Extraneous 
to both Ali Bey and the Egyptian society, Enveri provided us a short, narrow and biased 
narration, in which he demonstrated the perception and judgment of the Ottoman sultan and 
ruling elite towards Ali Bey’s uprising.  
Istanbul-based chronicles did not focus on either the details of Ali Bey’s period of 
rule as “a self-proclaimed sultan” of Egypt, or the perception of Arabic and Turkish speaking 
Egyptian people who were impacted by his actions. On the other hand, closely related with 
the Egyptian ruling elite and society, al-Jabarti witnessed the uprising of Ali Bey and all the 
social and political incidents of the period. His narration provides a diverse and in-depth 
knowledge/information, as he witnessed the incidents, and knew how the Arabic and Turkish 
speaking audience received the actions of Ali Bey. 
Although some researchers have claimed the uprisings’ aim turned into one of re-
establishing the Mamluk Sultanate or the constructing of a new national state, examining 
contemporary chronicles and archival documents, we cannot detect any expression of a desire 
for independence on the part of mamluk households.  
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The Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi -BOA) 
provides a huge documentation concerning eighteenth century Egypt. The Mühimme-i Mısır 
Defterleri series offers the decree records of the Porte from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century to the nineteenth century. These records are the principal official sources that this 
research is based on. They provide numerous details about the central government’s close 
relations with Egyptian administrational elite and society. The decrees are generally addressed 
to the heads of executive and jurisdiction: to the governor and the kadı, in addition to umera-i 
mısriyye and seven regiments’ officers. Certain firmans were addressed additionally to the 
ulema-i ezheriyye- the scholars of Azhar and the sâdât-ı bekriyye. The Porte held, mostly, the 
governor, kadı and şeyhülbeled responsible for the issues.  
The composition of the decrees informs us about the primary concerns and demands 
of the Porte from the Egyptian administrators, including the officials and the local interest 
groups. The mid-eighteenth century decrees are mostly focused on the financial duties of the 
province towards the imperial capital and the Haremeyn. In addition, there is a large 
documentation regarding the repairs and maintenance of various places in Egypt. The 
problems confronted during the execution of a demand are echoed in the archives as well. The 
financial and military records are kept as well. 
Among the other series in the Prime Minister’s Archives, the Cevdet Tasnifi has also 
been consulted. The financial documentation, mostly detailed and condensed statements of 
irsaliye-i hazine are consulted from the defter series of Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (TSMA- 
Topkapı Palace Museum Archives). The extensive use of archival documentation contributes 
a wider perspective for our understanding of the relationship between the local administrators 
and the central government.  
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This study will examine the uprising of Ali Bey in the frame of financial and political 
factors. Both factors are bi-directional. The economic situation of Egypt provided the 
province a huge income that the local administrators had the lion’s share of it in the mid 
eighteenth century. The central government had been taking the benefit of this income via 
taxation as well.  
The research on the answers of the questions about local notables’ ascendancy are 
embedded in the chapters of this dissertation. The methodological approach and a wider 
historiography are explained in the Introduction. Chapter I will examine the process and the 
details of the uprising from the perspectives of the Ottoman and the Egyptian contemporary 
historians. One of the most important variables is the economic condition. Chapter II 
examines the economic position of Egypt and the financial power that provided for its people 
and thus its administrators. Also, the European countries commercial interests and their 
connections with the local notables of Egypt is examined in this chapter. Chapter III is on 
financial administration of the province and aims to reveal the revenue share of the various 
parties. Depending on financial opportunities and motivations, the political milieu is 
examined from both domestic and foreign perspectives. The annual tribute was one of the 
largest benefits that the central government acquired from Egypt. Regularity/irregularity in 
the delivery of the annual tribute, and changes in the amount caused alerts in the imperial 
capital and resulted in a close scrutiny of the accounts of Egypt. The relationship between the 
annual tribute and rebellion is enclosed in this chapter. Chapter IV focuses on domestic 
politics: mainly the governors, their duties and positioning in the province, and the conflicts 
they had with the mamluk beys.  
By examining the decree records that were sent to Egypt by the imperial government, 
this study aims to contribute to the existing literature in financial and political history of the 
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mid-eighteenth century. Mamluk beys’ activities and attempted changes in the malikane 
system in order to increase their interests, the pattern of the annual tribute and mamluk beys’ 
involvement with disruptions during the preparation of the annual tribute, political 
relationship between governor and the mamluk beys and the central government’s close 
inspection of all these issues is fully revealed in this body of documentary evidence. 
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Chapter I: Rebellion 
The period between 1740 and 1775 is a peculiar fragment of time in the history of 
eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt, which witnessed a dramatic change in the balance of 
authority of local political actors. This 30-40 year period in the middle of the century enables 
us to reveal the direction and limits of political change. In the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Ottoman Empire enjoyed financial stability, which was also apparent on the political stage. 
After a long period of disorder, Egypt too enjoyed the stability of the political milieu, which 
brought along prosperity and an undisturbed economy during Ibrahim Kethüda and Rıdvan 
Kethüda’s duumvirate (1744-1754). In addition, until the mid-1760s Cairo underwent rapid 
urban development with numerous construction projects undertaken by Abdurrahman 
Kethüda (d. 1776). However, in the second half of the century, the politics of Egypt witnessed 
an “uprising”. A powerful mamluk bey, Ali Bey al-Kabir (1760-1772), extended his authority 
outside Egypt, where his authority conflicted with the other local elements and the Porte. 
Selecting the previous lands that once were occupied by the Mamluk Sultanate, Ali Bey’s 
campaigns on the Hijaz and Syria were interpreted as an attempt at revival of the Mamluk 
Sultanate.  
This study contends that it was the existing political environment and sources of 
financial interest for the local administrators of Egypt, Ali Bey in our case, which led him to 
seek to hold authority in his hand, but not the desire to revive the previous regime or to 
establish a new country independent from the Ottoman Empire. Ali Bey’s motivation was 
aimed at acquiring more financial gain and competent authority more than a desire to become 
independent from the Ottoman Empire. The research on Ottoman Egypt’s economy 
demonstrates that Egypt’s economy did well in the eighteenth century and most of the 
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economic sources of the province were under the administration of mamluk beys. Ali Bey 
held a strong and powerful position as a şeyhülbeled in the province. However, the governor 
appointed by the central government was still the strongest political figure in Egypt. After 
deposing Rakım Mehmed Pasha in 1768, Ali Bey acquired the title of kaimmakam, acting 
governor, and merged it with his title of şeyhülbeled. Thus, he held the whole Egyptian 
administration in his own person.  
Forming his local power centre, Ali Bey eliminated his opponents in Egypt first. Holt 
claims that Ali Bey was preparing for his independence while he was eliminating his rivals.1 
In contrast to Holt’s independence argument, Hathaway points out that Ali Bey’s main 
starting point was to be the principal authority holder, i.e., taking on the role of a governor in 
Egypt, rather than reviving the Mamluk Sultanate and being independent from the Ottoman 
Empire.2 Hathaway’s argument is logical as the mamluk household system was not peculiar to 
Egypt. This type of households and ruling families were common in neighbouring Arab 
provinces such as Syria and Iraq. The ruling households of Syria, the Azm family, and of 
Mosul, the Jalili family were locally based in the provinces and took over the office of 
governor by negotiating with the central government at the expense of realizing the Porte’s 
needs and interests in the province. When we look at these provinces, whose governors Ali 
Bey might consider as his counterparts, we see that the governors in these provinces, of 
Caucasian –or more specifically Georgian- origin just like Ali Bey, were a part of the local 
households in the provinces and they were ruling as the empire’s governors in Iraq and Syria 
rather than accepting representative being sent from Istanbul. It is difficult to determine 
whether Ali Bey desired to be recognized as the governor of Egypt who was appointed by the 
central government. However, it is certain that he desired to be the principal ruler of the 
                                                        
1 P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History, (London: Longmans, 1966), p. 93-99. 
2 Jane Hathaway, ““Mamluk Revivals” and Mamluk Nostalgia in Ottoman Egypt”, in Winter M. and Levanoni A., ed., 
Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, (Brill, 2004), p. 57. 
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province, and he did not hesitate to send his troops to neighbouring provinces, even though he 
knew that his actions would attract the wrath of sultan. 
Ali Bey enlarged his authority over the neighbouring provinces of Syria and Hijaz, 
which were in former times two dependent provinces of the Mamluk Sultanate, while the 
Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia. The contemporary historians confirm that Ali Bey 
was engaged in rivalry with Syria’s governor Gürcü Osman Pasha.3 With this information in 
mind, it can be speculated that his motivation to send his troops to Syria might have been due 
to his competition with his counterpart but the question of his motivation for interfering with 
Hijaz’s internal affairs seems to be unanswered. However, a quick academic research shows 
us that the governors of Egypt had the right to extend their authority to the Arabian Peninsula, 
to places such as Yemen, just as was in the case of Hadım Süleyman Pasha, Hasan Pasha, 
Özdemir Pasha and the like since the sixteenth century.4  
Ali Bey might regard himself as the holder of the right since he held the titular 
headship of Egypt. On the other hand, Egypt’s administrators had been in rivalry in the Red 
Sea trade with the sherif of Mecca.5 This rivalry comes to the fore especially during the 
authority of İbrahim and Murad Bey and the opening of Suez trade to European ships, so as to 
gain more profit than the Meccan sherif. Ali Bey’s expanding his authority over the Hijaz can 
be explained as cause and effect due to rivalries between the provincial administrators in 
eighteenth century Ottoman Empire to acquire a greater share of the income from the Red Sea 
trade. As will be explained in detail in the next chapter, the aim of opening the upper Red Sea 
to foreign ships was the desire on the part of the mamluk beys of the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century to enhance their income. However, it caused a decrease in the revenue of 
                                                        
3 Muharrem Saffet Calışkan, (Vekayinuvis) Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-
1774), unpublished PhD thesis, (Istanbul, 2000) p. 232 
4 See below chapter IV on governors, p. 210 
5 See below chapter II on economy and European interest p. 135 
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semi-autonomous ruler of Mecca and resulted in his complaint to the Porte. Ali Bey’s action 
in 1770 raised tensions between the administrators of the two provinces.   
Ali Bey was not the first Egyptian grandee to challenge and disobey the central 
government’s demands. Even his patron, İbrahim Kethüda (d. 1754) declined to obey every 
demand of the central government. Nevertheless, Ali Bey was the first grandee that extended 
his ambitions outside Egypt. In addition, he had his own economic and military sources 
independent from the imperial centre, as was the case of contemporary ayans in other 
Ottoman provinces.6 After engineering the dismissal of two governors in 1767 and 1768, the 
historians claim that Ali Bey established his rule by allowing the hutbe, the Friday sermon, to 
be read in his name after the Ottoman sultan’s name and instead of the Ottoman governor and 
had his name struck on the Egyptian money. It is noteworthy that the narrator of the Friday 
sermon, al-Jabarti, makes no mention of insistence by Ali Bey on his name being used in the 
sermon. Furthermore, he narrates that Ali Bey punished the imam for his mention. In addition, 
he narrates that Ali Bey’s name was not read in place of the sultan’s name during Friday 
sermons but merely alongside it.7 Evidence here supports the case that would challenge the 
argument of Ali Bey’s revival of the Mamluk Sultanate. It is certain that Ali Bey acted against 
the Porte’s demands; yet the claim that he intended to revive the Mamluk Sultanate seems 
excessive.  
The Friday sermon can be considered as the first evidence that Ali Bey did not 
attempt to take the place of Ottoman sultan as al-Jabarti narrates only one controversial 
instance, in which he had an imam, (prayer leader), first beaten and then forgiven.8 On the 
other hand, another matter is that historians such as Holt and Crecelius demonstrate an 
overreliance on the statements of al-Jabarti about Ali Bey’s interest in the Mamluk Sultanate’s 
                                                        
6 Jane Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1800, (Harlow, 2008), p. 79, 86 
7 Ibid., p. 85. 
8 See below in this chapter p. 54-55  
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history.9 Apart from Ali Bey’s reference to the Mamluk sultans just once, we cannot trace any 
other emulation and aspiration to resemble them by Ali Bey. 
Alongside the aforementioned points that over-exaggerate Ali Bey’s standpoint and 
mind-set by modern historians, the terminology of rebellion is another problematic when 
analysing local notables in the eighteenth century. Even though Ali Bey’s Ottoman 
contemporaries branded him as a brigand and rebel, his activities tell us another story, as he 
did not openly struggle with the central government. This chapter aims to investigate Ali 
Bey’s “uprising” in the context of the central administration of the eighteenth century 
Ottoman Empire. 
Although the contemporary historians labelled Ali Bey as a rebel, the modern 
terminology of rebellion does not match with the actions of Ali Bey, as he neither despoiled 
the Egyptian people nor did he raise the banner of rebellion against the Ottoman sultan. The 
context of rebellion in the eighteenth century has been researched by a number of historians.10 
It is obvious that Ottoman historians and contemporaries used the term rebel for individuals 
that somehow disputed the regular order while struggling for power. In the eighteenth century, 
Ottoman imperial government dealt with a number of ayans, who sought to expand the 
boundaries of their actions and tested their limits as they tried to redefine their place within 
the central administration. The government’s view was that such individuals were ‘brigands’, 
and intervened to discipline them. The definition of the term ‘rebellion’ did not include the 
plundering of peasants or seizing palaces in the eighteenth century. Yet, there was an invisible 
line that some local notables crossed by engaging in acts of doubtful legality.  
                                                        
9 Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti, Ajaib al-Athaar fi’l-Taradjim wa’l-Akhbar’, Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman ed., (Cairo, 
1997)   
10 On the rebellion in eighteenth century Ottoman Empire see Palmira Brumett, “Classifying Ottoman mutiny: the act and 
vision of rebellion”, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 22/1, 1988, pp. 91-107; Jane Hathaway ed., Mutiny and Rebellion 
in the Ottoman Empire, (Wisconsin, 2004); Marios Hadjianastasis, “Crossing the line in the sand: regional officials, 
monopolization of state power and ‘rebellion’. The case of Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu in Cyprus, 1685-1690”, Turkish 
Historical Review 2 (2011), pp. 155-176  
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Other rebellions before Ali Bey’s uprising 
Ali Bey’s uprising was not the first; Egypt experienced a number of revolts before 
that of Ali Bey. The first one was after the death of Hayır Bey in 1522. After Hayır Bey’s 
death, some mamluk beys questioned Ottoman suzerainty in Egypt. Two of them, Janim al-
Sayfi, the kaşif of al-Bahnasa and Fayyum, and Inal, the kaşif of Ğarbiyye went to Şarkiyye 
(Sharqiya) north of Cairo in order to cut communication between Cairo and the Mediterranean 
coastline. Mustafa Pasha’s expedition terminated their uprising against Ottoman rule in 
Egypt.11  
Hain Ahmed Pasha’s (r.1524) rebellion: Holt mentions that Ahmed Pasha was of 
Caucasian origin, which connected him with the mamluks. 12 His governorate lasted eight 
months before he announced his “sultanate”. Because of the fact that his deputy remained 
loyal to the Ottoman sultan in secret, his ‘sovereignty’ did not last long, only twelve days.  
As the second important vizier, Ahmed Pasha had been seen as the chief coordinator 
of Süleyman’s conquests of Rhodes and Belgrade. While expecting the grand vizierate, 
Ahmed Pasha was disappointed as were his fellow statesmen, when Süleyman I appointed 
İbrahim - his hass odabaşı, head of privy chamber, as the grand vizier. Although he was 
discontented with his new rank, the governorship of Egypt, Ahmed Pasha introduced himself 
as a just administrator in Egypt, and made new regulations. Nonetheless, he was harsh 
towards the rich and military officers; he confiscated the wealth of notables and put high 
officials to death.13  
According to Diyarbekri, the contemporary chronicler, Ahmed Pasha changed 
everything that he considered dysfunctional in the Ottoman system, and was disrespectful 
                                                        
11 Holt, The Fertile Crescent, p. 49. 
12 Ibid., p. 48. 
13 Ibid., p. 49. 
 
 
47 
towards the former Mamluk establishment. Ahmed Pasha was trying to show his audience 
that he had a different mentality from his predecessors and the Ottoman sultan.14  
When his deputy took action against his rebellion, Ahmed Pasha feared for his life 
and took refuge with one of the Arab tribes, shaykhs-Bakroğlu of Sharqiya. Refusing to kill 
Ahmed Pasha themselves, the elder people of the tribe turned Ahmed Pasha in. In the end, 
Ahmed Pasha was killed and the Ottoman rule was established in Egypt once again. Holt 
observes that one of Ahmed Pasha’s mentors was of shi’î origin, Kadızade Zahiruddin al-
Erdebîlî. Looking through this angle one can connect Ahmed Pasha’s rebellion to Shah 
Ismail. Unlike Ahmed Pasha’s rebellion, later revolts undertaken in the seventeenth century 
stemmed largely from discontent on the part of members of the military.  
In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Egypt was a stage for another rebellion. 
This time it was similar to Ali Bey’s as the rebel sought the help of a European country. 
Çerkez Mehmed Bey, a mamluk of İbrahim Bey Ebu Shanab (d. 1718), started a rivalry with 
İsmail bey son of İvaz Bey. İvaz Bey was khushdash, (brother in arms), of İbrahim Bey Ebu 
Shanab.15 Collaborating with Zülfikar, Çerkez Mehmed Bey eliminated İsmail Bey. Their 
rivalry was stamped on the political life of the 1720s’ Egypt. After Ismail Bey’s removal, 
former allies Zülfikar and Çerkez Mehmed became opponents.  
As a result of the general attitude of the eighteenth century competing mamluk beys, 
Çerkez Mehmet Bey was driven out of Cairo by Zülfikar. Normally a mamluk bey who was 
driven out would go to Istanbul and lobby through his contacts in the imperial divan. Instead 
of choosing the usual method, Çerkez Mehmed used his contacts in Algeria, and via Algeria, 
seeking the support of the Austrian King Charles VI; he went to Trieste, and then to Vienna.  
                                                        
14 Side Emre, “Anatomy of a Rebellion in Sixteenth-Century Egypt: A Case Study of Ahmed Pasha’s Governorship, Revolt, 
Sultanate, and Critique of the Ottoman Imperial Enterprise”, The Journal of Ottoman Studies, XLVI (2015), 77-129. 
15 The word of ‘khushdash’ indicates fellow mamluks in the same group. For detail interpretation see Jane Hathaway, 
“Osmanlının Çerkez Mehmet Bey’in İsyanina Verdigi Tepki:”, in Jane Hathaway, ed., Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İsyan ve 
Ayaklanma, (Istanbul, 2007), p. 165. 
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The Habsburg Empire had been the chief foe of the Ottoman Empire since the 
sixteenth century. Thus, Çerkez Mehmed Bey’s attempt to seek its support and protection 
enraged the Porte. A diplomatic letter expressing the Porte’s anger was sent from the imperial 
divan of Istanbul to Vienna prompting Çerkez Mehmed Bey to leave Vienna. This time 
Çerkez Mehmed Bey arrived at Trablusgarb, where he managed to go back to Egypt and 
gather a troop from bedouin Arabs. Mehmed Bey’s ambition to fight with Zülfikar Bey 
prepared his own end. He died on the banks of the Nile, when he was trying to escape from 
his opponent. Çerkez Mehmed Bey’s uprising turned into a high treason, when he received 
protection of the Empire’s “infidel” adversary. He was, simply, a local administrator, unlike 
Hain Ahmed Pasha who had attempted to revive the Mamluk Sultanate, or Ali Bey al-Kabir 
who extended his authority outside of Egypt. He had been forced into exile because of his 
rivals. Nevertheless, his playing of the ‘Austria card’ against the Ottoman Empire rendered 
his action more problematic.  
A number of military revolts took place against the governors during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in Egypt. The first revolt against the authority of the governor of Egypt 
was in 1586. When the governor made an investigation into the military members who had 
organised a coup d’état, the military members suspended him. The successor of the governor 
was dismissed as well, as the result of another revolt. They pillaged the properties of the 
governor and killed his retinue and other notables. The defterdar, the judge of Egypt of the 
time and other notables gathered in Sultan Hasan mosque in order to find a solution, yet they 
had to yield to the demands of the rebels. The third revolt was not long delayed, in 1598 and 
then another followed in 1601. For short periods, the military revolts challenged the 
governors’ authority in Egypt. Until the rule of Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha (1607), who took 
precautions that decreased the strength of the regiments, the restlessness continued. During 
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these revolts the regiments of müteferriqa and çavuşan, which were weaker compared to 
others, remained loyal to the governor. The governors had to seek the beys’ support and 
protection.  
By contrast, in the eighteenth century politics, the sipahi regiments, namely 
gönüllüyan and tüfenkjiyan, were the most disaffected elements. They rose against the 
governor, because their position was not as favourable as their counterparts barracked in 
Cairo. They served in the rural areas and were not as well paid as the müstahfizan and azeb 
regiments. Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha abolished the tax of tulba (request), which had been a 
valid tax in the Mamluk Sultanate and was revived by the sipahis for use by the Ottoman 
administration. This caused a bigger revolt in 1609. The rebels gathered at the tomb of Ahmad 
al-Bedouin, announced one of their members as the new sultan and moved towards Cairo. The 
governor quickly supressed this rebellion.  
This was a more serious action compared to the former revolts, as they proclaimed a 
sultan. The tomb of Ahmed al-Badawi provided a religious reference. This was the second 
significant rebellion after Hain Ahmed Pasha’s attempt. The contemporary chroniclers 
observe Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha’s suppression as the reaffirmation of the Ottoman dominion 
as it was the last attempt with regard to the revival of the Mamluk Sultanate. Furthermore, the 
sipahi revolts came to an end, and the abolishment of the tulba and kulfa promoted rural 
prosperity. Kulkıran Mehmed saved the imperial and provincial treasury from the exploitation 
of powerful local groups and individuals for a while. 
Yet the conflicts between the governor and the local groups continued. In 1623, the 
members of the Cairo garrison refused to accept a new pasha for the first time. Subsequently, 
in 1631, Musa Pasha ventured to kill Qaytas Bey, who challenged his authority, but it ended 
in failure as the other beys built a coalition, killed him and chose among their own 
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membership one to serve as kaimmakam. Subsequently, they informed Istanbul of the events. 
In 1659, Muhammad Bey, after his revolt, was appointed as the governor of Abyssinia but he 
rejected the appointment and was suppressed by an army mobilized from the centre. In 1711, 
an armed struggle broke out within the Egyptian military. After this struggle, the mamluk 
beys dominated in the politics of Egypt, and a significant challenge against the governor was 
not experienced until Ali Bey. 
The Porte assigned powerful governors that suppressed the revolts. In the eighteenth 
century, although the Porte claimed that all the governors it appointed were capable, there was 
no military intervention made by the governors in order to discipline mamluk beys, unless we 
count Gazi Hasan Pasa’s intervention to quell Murad and Ibrahim Beys’ authority in 1786. 
Holt observes that between 1711 and 1798 “two themes dominate the history of 
Egypt: the factional struggle, and, within each faction, the struggle of individuals for the 
ri’asa”.16  The fırst half of the eighteenth century had been the scene for many quarrels 
between two factions, the qasimi and faqari, but after the death of İbrahim Kethüda (d.1754), 
who had dominated politics in the years between 1743 and 1754, the Kazdağlı household 
maintained its dominant position up to the French invasion. It would be naive to think that 
throughout this period, competition or quarrels did not occur. On the contrary, personal 
rivalry continued among the Kazdağlı beys during the time of their ascendancy.  
In this period, the first competition was between Ali Bey Ghazzawi, who was 
eliminated by Ali Bey al-Kabir (Bulutkapan) and a very able and ambitious bey.17 Winter 
considers the latter as the second person, who desired to separate Egypt from Ottoman rule 
and re-establish Mamluk sultanate after Hain Ahmed Pasha.18  Ali Bey al-Kabir prepared 
                                                        
16 Holt, The Fertile Crescent, p. 90. 
17 Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of ‘Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 
1760-1775, (Minneapolis: Chicago, 1981), p. 38. 
18 Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 25. 
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thorough and ruthless plans that were composed of assassinations and prohibitions. He got rid 
of many beys and factions, amongst whom were some of his former allies and supporters such 
as Jezzar Ahmed Pasha (d.1804) or Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776). Ali Bey raised an army, 
which included mamluks, North African mercenaries, Druzes, Bedouins, Shi’s and Christians, 
and equipped them by utilizing gunpowder technology and by buying cannons from Russia, 
who were enemies of the Ottoman Empire.19 
Besides suppressing the mamluk beys in Cairo, Ali Bey overcame the bedouin 
shaykhs.20 After establishing the full authority in Egypt, Ali Bey attempted to extend his 
influence outside of Egypt. The next step was to extend his political ambitions to the Hijaz by 
appointing his favoured nominee as sherif against the Porte’s wishes. It is suggested that the 
motivation behind the Hijaz move was to increase the commercial activities and thus tax 
income by permitting European ships to enter the Red Sea. The last step was to expand his 
area of control to Syria, where his closest mamluk stabbed him in the back. Ali Bey’s motive 
to intervene in Syria was mostly likely due to his rivalry with Gürcü Osman Pasha, the 
governor of Damascus. Although Ali Bey’s mamluks İsmail Bey and Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-
zeheb defeated Ottoman forces and were about to seize Damascus, they returned to Cairo in 
the autumn of 1771, fought against Ali Bey and defeated him. Marsot considers this scene as 
repetition of history since the Ottomans had also bribed the second commander of the 
Mamluk Sultanate, Hayır Bey, during the conquest in 1517.21 Winter mentions that, all in this 
process, Ali Bey had two supporters, one of them was Zahir al-Omar, governor of Safed, and 
the other was Russia. When Ali Bey was defeated as the result of Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s 
defection, he had to take refuge with Zahir al-Omar.22  
                                                        
19 Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 49. 
20 Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule, p. 26, 107. 
21 Marsot, A Short History, p. 49. 
22 Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule, p. 26. 
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It is suggested that Ali Bey’s claiming independence from Ottoman rule and 
asserting his intent to re-establish the rest of the Mamluk Sultanate were based on Ali Bey’s 
desire to combine former Mamluk lands such as Jidda and Mocha in the south and Syria with 
its ports on the Levantine coast, which eventually would help him to incorporate those places’ 
lucrative commercial volume.23 Broadly speaking, Crecelius handles Ali Bey al-Kabir and 
Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s reign in terms of the financial, administrative and military 
organization, the emergence of the Kazdağlı household, and makes comparisons between 
Mehmed Ali Pasha and Ali Bey al-Kabir. He has important findings and reveals some hidden 
aspects of the developments such as the timing of Ali Bey’s revolt to coincide with the Russo-
Ottoman war of 1768-1774.24 This consideration may open a new window in discussing Ali 
Bey’s revolt. Accordingly, one should examine the effect of Russia or the other European 
countries on the revolt and nationalistic discourses in the eighteenth century. During this 
examination, English and French impact on the rebellions should not be excluded, as the two 
states made efforts to obstruct Russian expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.    
However, writing from an orientalist perspective, Crecelius names Ali Bey’s 
campaigns to the Hijaz and Syria, as “foreign wars”, disregarding that they were provinces of 
the same empire. Moreover, he regards Ali Bey’s attempts to have a say in the administration 
of these lands to increase his personal income as ‘the recreation of the medieval Mamluk 
Sultanate which fell in the face of Selim I’.25 It is obvious that Ali Bey attempted to take 
advantage of his political position in order to widen the administrative right given by the 
central government and to have more financial power. However, this does not prove that he 
wanted to recreate a Sultanate “in the direction of nationalistic sentience” and this case makes 
                                                        
23 Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt, p. 65. 
24 Ibid., p. 40. 
25 Ibid., p. 39. 
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a researcher contemplate whether the motives of the “rebel” were nationalistic/political as 
some have claimed or actually economical and commercial in nature.  
Ali Bey had a radical financial policy, took illegal taxes from European merchants, 
Copts, Jewish officers in customs, and other wealthy people. These taxes became a subject of 
imperial decrees, since the taxes taken from European merchants were determined by the 
ahidname-agreements made between the Ottoman Empire and European countries. Jews also 
suffered from Ali Bey’s policies in another way, because Ali Bey replaced them with 
newcomer Syrian Christians as officers in the Customhouses, in the Mint and the money-
changing offices.26 Marsot points out that Ali Bey did not trust the Jewish officers as they 
were in close alliance with regiments.27  
Ali Bey removed the Ottoman governor in 1768/69. He also refused to send the 
irsaliye-i hazine to Istanbul, and had his name proclaimed in the Friday sermon and struck on 
coins. At this point, some questions must be asked: did having his name proclaimed in the 
sermon and struck on coins in a restricted area mean his acceptance by all the people 
including the ulema and other beys? If it was so, how was this incident responded in the 
imperial capital? The most important indicators of the independence of Ali Bey should be 
examined carefully to understand Ali Bey’s period. A witness of Ali Bey’s authority in Egypt, 
al-Jabarti, narrates the Friday sermon in a different way. He narrates that when the imam 
prayed for Ali Bey after the Ottoman sultan, Ali Bey beat the imam due to having his name 
prayed in the sermon. However, he sent presents and gifts to his house the day after. This 
narration makes it difficult to believe that Ali Bey deliberately had his name recited in Friday 
sermons.  
                                                        
26 Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule, p. 26. 
27 Marsot, A Short History, p. 49. 
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The central government used alternative ways to deal with the rebels, so as not to 
damage manpower potential or the products and the revenue coming to Istanbul. Sometimes 
this political manoeuvring worked, other times it did not. For example, when Muhammed Bey 
(governor of Jirja) proclaimed his independence from Egypt’s governor in 1659, before the 
pasha struggled with him, the Porte realized that Muhammed Bey’s desire was to become 
independent. The Porte tried to solve the problem by appointing him as the governor of 
Abyssinia, but he rejected the appointment. After his rejection, a big military power was sent 
to Menfelut to suppress his rebellion. Winter considers Muhammed Bey’s rebellion as a 
different in character from other rebellions.28 He claims that in general the beys who mutinied 
against the governor, used to get on well with Istanbul, since they were aware of the fact that, 
earning the sultan’s displeasure would put to an end to their career. Nonetheless, Muhammed 
Bey rebelled not only against the governor, but also against the Porte. At this point a question 
emerges: what is rebellion and what does it mean in the eyes of those who rebelled in the 
eighteenth century and those who have examined their rebellions in later centuries? 
The conception of the uprising in Egypt: Rebellion, Mutiny, or Uprising: All or None? 
One of the problematic questions that this research investigates is the issue of 
categorizing Ali Bey al-Kabir’s movement against the central government. When did Ali Bey 
cross that invisible line between the legality and brigandage? It is for certain that by failing to 
send the annual tribute and Holy cities’ cereal and expanding his authority over neighbouring 
provinces, Ali Bey succeeded in attracting the wrath of the imperial government. Moreover, 
he interfered with the Hijaz and Syria. Although it was in war with Austria and Russia, the 
Porte had to send troops under the command of Numan Pasha along with Kilis governor Halil 
                                                        
28 Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule, p. 36, 52. 
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Bey in 1772 in order to eliminate Ali Bey.29 Also, the Porte sent a decree to the sherif of 
Mecca demanding them to be cautious should Ali Bey send his men to the Hijaz and create a 
disturbance.30 However, for the central government, it took three years to label him as a rebel 
and issue a fatwa in order to eliminate Ali Bey.  
Examining the terminology of rebellion, Hadjianastasis mentions that it became 
“synonymous” with the Ottoman Empire’s period of decline, as rebellions are generalised as 
the weakening of the central government.31  Defining the frame of the Porte’s perception of 
rebellion “‘isyan” - rebellion, and “şakavet” - brigandage, Hathaway observes that all those 
who failed to fulfil the demands of the Porte were considered rebels by the Porte. However, 
being labelled as a rebel was not a point of no return for local notables. Rather, the Porte was 
willing to sit at the table for negotiation. Refusing requests to send supplies for the imperial 
kitchen and shipyards, cereal for Holy cities and most importantly the annual tribute could 
render the administrators “şaki” – brigands in the eyes of the imperial government. Ali Bey 
was not the first administrator that failed to fulfil his duties towards the Porte. Many mamluk 
beys had attracted the wrath of the Porte before. Nevertheless, the difference between them 
and Ali Bey was that the former were willing to negotiate and had good agents in Istanbul 
lobby on their behalf. This, of course at the outset, was done with the intention of gaining the 
Porte’s consent. Good lobbyists not only disconnected a mamluk bey from rebellion, but also 
could provide him with a proper post in any corner of the empire. The only thing required was 
a good agent in Istanbul who was capable of showing the good will of the former “şaki” to the 
Porte in order to recover his credibility in the eyes of the Porte.32  
                                                        
29 C. AS 51/2389 (date late Z 1184/early April 1771) The Porte allocated 4.000.000 paras for the budget of the campaign, 
and demanded the remainder from the bequest of deceased governor of Egypt, Rakım Mehmed Pasha. In addition, the Porte 
appointed the governors of İçil, Musul, and Haleb. However, the governor of Haleb, Abdurrahman Pasha, failed to achieve 
the duty due to an unknown reason. C. AS 57/2661 (29 M 1185/14 May 1771) and C.DH 71/3532 (29 M 1185/14 May 1771). 
30 C. DH 9/410 (20 Rebiulevvel 1185/3 July 1771). 
31 Hadjianastasis, “Crossing the line”, p. 155 
32 Hathaway, “Osmanlının Çerkez Mehmet Bey’in İsyanina Verdigi Tepki”, p. 168  
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The case of Zülfikar Osman Bey reveals some clues about the on-going practice. 
Despite the fact that he was considered as a rebel at first, the Porte excused Osman Bey after 
he paid his debts to the Porte. Osman Bey even managed to acquire a sancakbeyliği in Edirne 
after a two-year lobbying period. 33  Failing to follow ‘the current procedure’ like his 
predecessor Ali Bey, Çerkez Mehmed Bey had descended to the level of treachery and 
betrayal by taking refuge in the Habsburg Empire in the 1730s as well. A rebel or a bandit 
could make amends through the mediation of agents in Istanbul; however, a traitor had to pay 
the price with his life.  
In Ottoman Egypt of the second half of the eighteenth-century, the expectation of the 
Porte from the mamluk beys was that they should fulfil two primary duties: to protect the 
revenues of the “bayt al-mâl”-the public treasury and uphold the “nizam-ı kadim” – the 
established old regulations and good order. The Porte emphasized in numerous decrees that 
fulfilling these duties would save them from wrath and punishment both in “this world and 
the next one”. Ignoring the duties, which they were charged with, resulted in warnings and 
condemnation.34 It is difficult for us to trace the further reaction of the Porte towards “‘asi and 
şaki- rebel and bandit” mamluks. The decree registers in Mühimme-i Mısır defter series is 
silent during the time period coinciding with Ali Bey’s rebellious activity.35  
The mamluk beys’ perception of the central government is as significant as the 
Porte’s approach and perception of mamluk beys and rebellion. Hathaway mentions that the 
relationship between the Porte and mamluk beys depended on negotiation and a give and take 
attitude on sources and personnel, rather than a rivalry between two competitors. She draws 
attention to the fact that “the Arab ayans” controlled the fiscal, human and regional sources in 
                                                        
33 Ibid., p. 169. 
34 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114  (date late B 1176/ early February 1763). The decree is accusing mamluk beys’ degenerating the 
order in Egypt and questioning their reason of existence.   
35 There is a four-year gap in decree records of mühimme-i Mısır defter series during the uprising. See MMD, vol. 8, nr. 645 
(date late M 1184/mid-May 1770), and nr. 646 (late S 1188/ early May 1774). These successive decrees were sent with four-
year time gap. 
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the Arab provinces of the Empire. The crucial point in this sense is whether the “Arab ayans”, 
mamluk beys of Egypt in our case, felt oppressed by or conversely empowered by the Porte.36 
This assessment seems convincing as some decrees prove that the Porte’s approach was 
always rather that of “superintendent” over the mamluk’s administration. The mamluk beys 
were in need of, and had, the central government’s legitimization for their position in Egypt, 
just like their counterpart ayans in other provinces of the empire. On the other hand, a case in 
1767 shows us that they started to test their limits in the second half of the century.  
The emirulhajj of Egypt had taken extra money, which he claimed was required in 
order to fulfil his duty to protect the pilgrims’ safe journey, causing the Porte to develop a 
sharp attitude towards the mamluk beys. These particular actions caused the annoyance of the 
Porte on the issue of the emirulhajj’s taking money from the irsaliyes of the years of 
1169/1755-6, 1170/1756-7, 1172/1758-9 and 1173/1759-60 without permission from the 
central government.37 The Porte considered the revenues assigned for the emirulhajj, which 
consisted of a sum of money from the irsaliye and the coffee taxes, were more than enough to 
meet the emirulhajj’s expenses. The emirulhajj took from the irsaliye a huge amount of 
money. The total extraction from the four-year irsaliye amounted to 15.000.000 paras. The 
Porte’s reaction is therefore understandable since it did not want to share the revenues with 
another strong character in Cairo, as the post of emirulhajj was prestigious in addition to 
being profitable. The total revenue of the emirulhajj in 1200/1786 from legal sources was 
21,425,000 paras; 16,750,000 of it was coming from the irsaliye-i hazine and 4,675,000 of it 
was from the charges that emirulhajj was allowed to take in the port of Suez.38 Since the 
emirulhajj had a command over the coffee trade as well39 which resulted in an increase in 
                                                        
36 Hathaway, The Arab Lands, p. 112-113. 
37 For central government’s remonstrance about the expenses without see chapter III on Irsaliye and Rebellion p.165-178. 
38 S. J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt (Princeton, 1962), p. 247. 
39 Hathaway, The Arab Lands, p. 84. 
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financial power, this was seen to have a direct influence in bringing greater political power, as 
well. This indicates that the mamluk beys held the authority of the administration in Egypt 
and evaluated every opportunity to become stronger financially. Ultimately, financial means 
was the key to political power and authority.  
However, caution must be taken in attributing this ambition to Ali Bey exclusively. 
Whilst all the mamluk beys were struggling for the financial power and authority, Ali Bey 
was the most ambitious and intelligent figure, who managed to eliminate his ‘potential’ rivals 
among mamluks and officers and succeed in acquiring supreme authority. In return, the Porte 
did not hesitate to show the mamluk beys its iron fist. The şeyhülbeled Ali Bey al-Kabir 
applied and requested a pardon of the aforementioned amount with the excuse of the high 
number of the pilgrims of that year and the threat of an attacking the Harb, a bedouin tribe. 
Although the Porte accepted a small part of the request of Ali Bey and excused only 150.000 
paras due to the threat from the bedouins, the Porte continued to accuse the mamluk beys of 
devouring the revenues of bayt al-mal with ambition and demanded them to manage the 
financial administration according to the previous order.40 
The central government’s strong and rigid stance against Ali Bey’s “request” is 
noteworthy. Ali Bey as the şeyhülbeled sent a petition requesting to be excused of the amount 
of 3.750.000 paras every year. Yet in return, the central government, which was desperately 
in need of cash, threatened abolishment of the regiments. Albeit the threatening, the Porte was 
open to negotiation. It is remarkable that the central government did not reject the petition 
outright and agreed to pay 150.000 paras. On the other hand, in order to prevent further 
appeals, the Porte questioned the raison d’etre of the seven regiments, which then resulted 
                                                        
40 “ ... hazine-i mısriyyeyi ekl ü bel’e kemal-i hırs ve izlerinden neş’et eyledikleri zahir olup ve umur-ı mısriyyenin tertibat-ı 
kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesini mülahaza eyleyeler …”MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114. 
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with the threat to abolish them. 41 It was stated in the decree that during the Mamluk Sultanate 
and after the conquest of Egypt by Selim I, the regiments were maintained in order to preserve 
the East Mediterranean from the Christian nations’ attacks. Yet in time, as a result of 
ahidnames and other agreements, military attacks by the European countries were eliminated. 
Moreover, the Ottoman maritime power in the Mediterranean assured the province’s safety. 
Thus, the mamluk beys and the military power they offered in Egypt were not essential or 
required any more. The decree mentioned that they did not even deserve the mevacib, their 
salary, and other incomes since they undertook only one or two duties such as leading the 
pilgrimage caravan. Thus, charging extra money was a waste for the treasury. The Porte 
mentioned that the abolishment of the regiments was rational and lawful according to Islamic 
law, sharia. The damage they caused was far beyond their benefit.   
However, the central government’s approach to the mamluk beys who were 
enlarging their share in the political authority day by day by circumventing the governors and 
failing to send the revenues did not go beyond the rethorical stage or turn into direct action 
until the 1780s. It can be concluded that the Porte was making a “power demonstration” by 
emphasizing that the mamluk beys were still dependent on and still maintained close relations 
with the central government. The decree is, furthermore, complaining about the “degenerated” 
administrative system of local administrators in Egypt, which shifted the revenues from the 
central government treasury to their own accounts. The Porte always proposed preserving the 
previous order instead of generating and applying new regulations. In addition, the Porte 
encouraged both the ulema and military officers (zabitan) who had the right to speak in the 
                                                        
41 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114 (date late B 1176/ early February 1763).   
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administration in order to work harmoniously with and act according to the governor’s 
opinion.42  
The correspondence between the central government and the administrators of Egypt 
reveals the approach of the imperial administration towards the fiscal and administrative body 
of Egypt. Imperial decrees demanded that the governor, local administrators and notables 
such as şeyhülbeled, chief officers of the seven regiments and ulema should comply with the 
regulation made by the central government. The principal regulation, which the imperial 
expected to be complied with, was kanunname-i Mısır alongside other regulations, which 
were made in the first half of the eighteenth century.43  
Another warning was sent after this decree in order to inform the interest groups of 
Egypt which consisted of local administrators, ulema, notables and elites of Egypt- “bi’l-
cümle ümera-i mısriyye ve sadat-ı bekriyye ve ulema-i ezheriyye ve yedi ocağın zabıtan ve 
ihtiyarları” about the appointment of the new governor, Rakım Mehmed Pasha. After Hamza 
Pasha, Rakım Mehmed Pasha was the second governor to be dismissed through Ali Bey’s 
intervention. It emphasizes that the mamluk beys sent a petition promising the Porte in ten 
articles that they guaranteed their obedience to the Porte and its representative, the governor 
and vowed to fulfil what was expected of them. Consequently, in a threatening manner, the 
Porte warned the mamluk beys to obey the demands in the sultanic decrees as well as to the 
governors appointed by the central government and to give up the behaviours that will ruin 
them in “this world and the next world”. 44  Furthermore, the Porte emphasized that only 
                                                        
42  ‘Ecdad-ı izam ve aba-i kiramım -nevverallahu merakıdehum- hazretlerinden mevrus olan iklim-i Mısır’ın nizam-ı 
umurunun tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesi üzere rüyet ve idaresi zımnında taraf-ı şahanemden nasbolunan vüzera-yı 
celilü’ş-şanımın rezinlerine muvafakat ve mümaşat olunarak tedbir-i umur-ı mısriyyede medhali olan ulema ve zabıtanın 
cümlesi cemi’-i akval ve harekatlarını ulu’l-emrin emr ve rızasına ve valilerin re’yine tatbik ile’  MMD, vol. 8, nr.488 (date 
late Z 1180/late May 1167). 
43 A decree points out that a regulation was made in 1147/1735 see MMD, vol. 8, nr. 376 (date mid Ş 1179/late January 
1766). 
44 ‘imdi ba’de’l-yevm selamet-i haliniz lazım ise evamir-i padişahaneme kemal-i itaat ve inkiyad ederek bais-i hüsran-ı dünya 
ve ahiret olacak evza’ ve harekatdan istiğfar ve ihtiraz vücuda umur-ı mısriyyede valiniz müşarun-ileyhin emr ü nehy ve re’y-
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through obedience as they had promised would the Porte forgive their crimes and show mercy 
and pity. 
Although the Porte did not take a de facto action after the dismissal of Hamza Pasha, 
the discourse of the decree referred to the mamluk beys’ displeasing actions towards the 
governors and emphasized the fact that the Porte had only postponed punishing them. Had the 
mamluk beys regarded the Porte as an equal power, rather than contesting it, it is highly likely 
that not only Ali Bey but also all the other mamluk beys would have shown an indication of 
their intention to bring the Porte in line, just as they had been doing with respect to one 
another. At any rate, a violent opposition towards the new governor or other activities 
including snubbing or humiliation would be enough to show that they were not subjects of the 
empire but rather they were viewed to be as powerful as the Porte. In this sense, the mamluk 
beys’ first aim was not to challenge the Porte in terms of holding the authority but to find a 
firm place and to enlarge their command on financial institutions, enabling them to embody 
their collaborators’ authority as well. The mamluk beys were aggressively trying to be 
involved in the Ottoman administrational system. However, it was difficult for the historians 
of the twentieth century, who had a nationalistic mind-set, to understand the mamluk beys’ 
desire.45 
Ali Bey was not alone when he crossed the line between being an ayan and rebel in 
1768.46 A counterpart in Palestine, Zahir al-Omar had been building his leadership for years 
as well. Starting his career as a tax-farmer, Zahir al-Omar established his leadership in Sayda 
from the 1740s onwards by using diplomacy, marriage alliances, violence, negotiation and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
i tenbihine kalben ve kalıben cümleniz mümaşat ve imtisal’ ‘ve sair temşiyet ve ikmalleri murad-ı mülukanem olan kaffe-i 
umur ve hususun ala ma yurad temşiyet ve tanzimlerine’ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167). 
45 P. M. Holt, “The Cloud-Catcher”: ‘Ali Bey The Great of Egypt”, History Today, 1959, 9, 1, pp. 48-58, p. 57  
46 For detail about Zahir al-Omar see A. Sabbagh, al-Rawd al-Zahir fi Tarikh Dahir, Manuscript at SOAS Library; A. H. 
Joudah, A History of the Movement of Shaykh Zahir al-‘Umar al-Zaydani (1690?-1775), unpublished PhD thesis, (The 
University of Michigan, 1971) 
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intimidation.47 He struggled with the governors of Damascus from time to time.48 The central 
government sent decrees to the governor of Damascus ordering him to collect tax from Zahir. 
Emecen claims that those decrees prove that the central government approved his 
administration in his territory.49 Zahir’s activities help the urban development in the territories 
that were under his authority. Under his administration, Safed, Sayda and Akka expanded and 
flourished since Zahir gave weight to agriculture and commerce. He improved the conditions 
of peasants.50 While Akka was not larger than a village previously, Zahir invested in the town 
and urbanised it. The population rose. He traded cotton and grain in the port town. The French 
merchants had a more suitable environment for commerce in Akka. Just like the governors of 
Damascus, Zahir assigned his sons to neighbouring towns that he administered. Until the 
1760s, he always showed his loyalty to the central government, albeit having conflicts with 
the governors of Damascus. 
His being located in a port town helped Zahir al-Omar to connect and cooperate with 
Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Russians.51 Ali Bey al-Kabir and Zahir had met, when Ali was 
exiled from Egypt in 1766 and they maintained their relationship afterwards.52 Joudah states 
that Zahir al-Omar had similarities with Ali Bey in terms of political, commercial and local 
conditions, since both rose against the central government and allied with the Russians. 
Although there are similarities between the two, there were a lot of differences as well. First 
of all, Ali Bey was a member of household in an already commercially developed and 
flourishing province, which had a strategic and financial importance for the central 
government. Unlike the mamluk beys of Egypt and governors of Damascus, Zahir had to 
establish his rule on his own with his ambitious endeavours, as he was not a member of an 
                                                        
47 Joudah, A History of the Movement, p. 20-65 
48 Ibid., p. 62 
49 Feridun Emecen, “Zahir el-Ömer”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 44, p. 90-91 
50 Emecen, “Zahir”, p. 90 
51 Joudah, A History of Movement, p. 9-10 
52 Sabbagh, al-Rawd al-Zahir, p. 16a 
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established household. In addition, Zahir developed the agricultural and commercial 
conditions in the districts under his administration. The primary sources tell nothing about 
increase and development during Ali Bey’s rule in Egypt compared to the time period before 
him. The only thing Ali Bey accomplished was to “canalize” the revenue to his household.  
Joining forces with Ali Bey when he sought refuge in Palestine and fighting against 
the central government’s troops, Zahir associated himself closely with the sponsors of 
rebellion. He was eliminated in 1775 by the forces of the central government and Jezzar 
Ahmed Pasha replaced him in the region. 
Jezzar Ahmed Pasha arrived in Egypt in the retinue of Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha in 1756. 
Affiliating himself with the household of Ali Bey al-Kabir, he became a mamluk and stayed 
in Cairo.53  During this period he familiarised himself with the social and administrative 
condition of Egypt and penned a report on Egypt in 1780.54  Taking over a number of offices 
such as mütesellim of Beirut, beylerbeyi of Rumeli and mutasarrıf of Karahisar, he finally 
became a vizier and was assigned as the governor of Sayda in 1775 after Zahir was 
eliminated.55 Jezzar Ahmed Pasha kept his position in the region until his death in 1804. 
During his period of office he maintained a close relationship with the central government and 
showed his loyalty all the time. However, strengthening his position in Damascus was 
considered disturbing and worrisome by the central government, as he might have rebelled 
like his predecessors. Jezzar Ahmed Pasha resided in Akka during his tenures of office in 
Damascus and Sayda. The commercial and agricultural position continued to develop in Akka 
and Sayda during his term of office. Growing stronger in financial terms helped him to be 
politically powerful.56 The most important military success of Jezzar Ahmed Pasha was his 
                                                        
53 al-Jabarti, Ajaib, p. 224 Jezzar Ahmed was known as Bosniak Ahmed during his mamlukship career in Egypt. 
54 S. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century: Nizamname-i Mısr, (Oxford, 1962) 
55 Feridun Emecen, “Cezzar Ahmed Pasha”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7, pp. 516-518  
56 Emecen, “Cezzar Ahmed Pasha”, p. 517 
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defence of Akka against Napoleon’s army in 1799. However, even this success could not earn 
him appointment to Egypt as he wished.  
Although some of his actions attracted the anger of the central government, Jezzar 
Ahmed Pasha’s career was not affected, as he was an able politician who managed to 
maintain the balance in a cosmopolite region, which was inhabited by a wide of range of 
people from Arab tribes to the French merchants. Albeit the central government considered 
assigning him in different regions several times, they did not want to put the region’s political 
stability at risk. Notwithstanding, unlike Ali Bey and Zahir al-Omar, Jezzar Ahmed did not 
cross the line of legality and stayed loyal to the central government. 
Notions and titles: Being a şeyhülbeled in the beginning and at the end of the century  
Use of the title of “şeyhülbeled” appeared in the beginning of the century as a praise 
that implied the holder of this title grasped the authority. The time and actor of the first usage 
of the title is controversial. While Holt, who was unfamiliar with the Ottoman Turkish sources 
observes that Jabarti used the title in order to refer a servant of Kazdağlı İbrahim Kahya for 
the first time57, Shaw mentions that according to the mühimme-i mısır defter series, Çerkez 
Mehmed Bey called himself şeyhülbeled. 58  Hathaway’s commentary also seems to 
corroborate Shaw’s claim as she mentions that the Porte perceived his use of the title of 
şeyhülbeled as a part of Çerkez Mehmed Bey’s rebellion. The title of şeyhülbeled began to 
represent a holder of authority against the Porte in this period. In this sense, we can say that 
the rebel Çerkez Mehmed Bey was the first mamluk bey that used this title in order to 
emphasize his power and authority against the Porte.59  
                                                        
57 Holt, The Fertile Crescent, p. 92. 
58 Stanford J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the age of the French Revolution, (Cambridge, 1964). 
59 Hathaway, “Çerkez Mehmet Bey’in İsyanı”, p. 168. 
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The title of şeyhülbeled played an important role in representing the mamluk beys’ 
discourse regarding the pronouncement of their authority. In the beginning, the Porte regarded 
this title as a sign of rebellion but later on willingly addressed the authoritative mamluk bey as 
şeyhülbeled. When a powerful mamluk bey such as Çerkez Mehmed Bey entitled himself as 
the şeyhülbeled of Egypt, the Porte considered this action as rebellion. However, by 1746, the 
central government started to use the title and addressed Zülfikar Osman Bey as 
şeyhülbeled.60 Existing decrees show us that Osman Bey, Halil Bey and Gazzawi Ali Bey 
were also addressed as şeyhülbeled before Ali Bey’s tenure.  
Hathaway points out that normalization of the use of the title of şeyhülbeled explains 
the Ottoman Empire’s provincial policy. When Çerkez Mehmed Bey sought refuge in Austria, 
he established himself as şeyhülbeled causing his actions to be viewed as rebellion. Yet, after 
the confirmation of Cairo’s ruling elite, the Porte itself started to entitle some mamluk beys, 
especially those it accepted as its interlocutors in Egypt. The Porte’s provincial policy was 
based on its institutionalizing of threat elements that had confronted it and diplomatically 
adding them to its own body.61 Therefore, the post of şeyhülbeled in Egypt is an example of 
the Ottoman Empire’s ‘mechanism of legitimisation’, by which Suraiya Faroqhi mentions that 
the Empire ensured its existence for a long time.62 
Since the second half of the sixteenth century, mamluk beys conspired to dismiss a 
number of governors just as their counterparts did in the imperial capital.63 Supporting the 
governors who acted in line with their benefit and preventing new governors’ from interfering 
                                                        
60 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 279 (date early CA 1178/late October 1764). 
61 Hathaway, “Çerkez Mehmet Bey’in İsyanı”, p. 169.  
62 See Suraiya Faroqhi, Yeni Bir Hükümdar Aynası, (Istanbul, 2011) 
63 Lusignan depicts the messenger, the way he wore and behaved when he went to Istanbul in order to deliver the request of 
Cairo’s grandees of dismissal of a governor. S. Lusignan, A history of the revolt of Ali Bey Against the Ottoman Porte 
Including an account of the form of the government of Egypt together with a description of Grand Cairo and of several 
celebrated places in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria: to which are added, a short account of the present state of the Christians 
who are subjects to the Turkish government, and the journal of a gentleman who travelled from Aleppo to Bassora, (London, 
1784), p. 34 
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with and diminishing their revenues were the primary motivations for dismissing the governor 
appointed by the central government. Especially in the seventeenth century, cavalry regiments 
were malcontent since they thought their revenue was low and they resented they were being 
assigned to rural areas away from the provincial capital. The eighteenth century dismissals 
were similarly motivated by the financial concerns of the grandees in Cairo. Time to time, the 
local administrators transgressed the line between themselves and sultan’s representatives 
when they interfered with the local administrators’ financial and occasionally political 
interests. Hamza Pasha’s tenure of office (r. 1179-1180/1765-67) witnessed many 
transgressions and instances of overbearing behaviour by the mamluk beys until he was 
dismissed by them in 1767. One example of this overbearing concerned forcing Hamza Pasha 
to petition the Porte and to ask for the charge of expenses for the repair of the governor’s 
palace. The response of the Porte points out that governors were forced by the mamluk beys 
to claim the amount under the cover of the maintenance fee from the irsaliye-i hazine and 
then used this money for themselves.64 The response to the petition also mentioned that while 
the absorption of his palace’s repair befitted the governor’s dignity, requesting its payment 
from the Porte was unacceptable. Another concern was the amount of caize to be paid by 
governor of Egypt to the sultan and other interest groups of the central government. 65 
The central government did have a concern due to aforementioned pressures of the 
mamluk beys on the governors. It is mentioned in the decrees that the local administrators’ 
transgressions resulted in the fall of the post of governorship in Egypt from grace. The Porte 
stated that the “oppressors” of Egypt, the mamluk beys, outbalanced the governors with 
tyranny so whenever a vizier was offered governorship of Egypt, he preferred another 
                                                        
64 “vülat-ı mısriyye ümeranın tahrik ve iğfal ve ibramlarıyla muğayir-i kadim peyderpey müteakıben saray tamiratı namıyle 
birer mikdar akçe mahsub etdirmege egerçe mecbur ve mecbul olub” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 228 (date early M 1178/early July 
1764). 
65 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 228 (date early M 1178/early July 1764). 
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province even though the latter was generating less income.66 Searching the motivating reason 
of the mamluk beys’ hostility towards the governors, the Porte mentioned the severe rivalry 
and competition among the mamluk beys. The Porte emphasized that they were laying plots, 
manipulating and cheating in order to eliminate the rivals67 and furthermore they charged 
what they had been making on the governors.68 The phrases that used in the decrees reflect the 
approach and reaction of the Porte towards Ali Bey’s involvement in the dismissal of the 
governors in Egypt. 
Political events that prepared the way for Ali Bey’s enlarged authority 
The phenomena of rivalry of factions that existed in the Arab lands during the 
decentralized period of the Ottoman Empire was manifested in a changed form since the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. Holt observes that the factional struggle dominated the 
mentioned time period and within each faction, the struggle of individuals for the ri’asa, 
(precedence), prevailed between 1711 and 1798. 69  After İbrahim Kethüda and Rıdvan 
Kahya’s duumvirate (1743-54), the domestic political milieu of Egypt did not settle down and 
the incessant conflicts between the mamluk beys continued. Before Ali Bey held authority, 
Halil Bey was the şeyhülbeled and continued to hold onto his authority until Gazzawi Ali Bey 
plotted against him. After assassinating his predecessor the şeyhülbeled Halil Bey in 1757, 
Gazzawi Ali Bey gained supremacy in Cairo. In 1760, he left Cairo as the emirulhajj and 
thereupon continued to plot another assassination against Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776), 
                                                        
66 ‘mütegallibe-i Mısır’ın valilerine tagallüb ve özürleri ne derecelere resin ve münteha olmuşdurki tevliyet-i Kahire-i Mısır 
vüzera-yı izamımdan birine teklif olundukda kalilü’n-nema edna bir livayı iklim-i Mısıra tercih ile Mısır valiliğinden istifa 
ederler. MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167). 
67 “valilerinden iştika eylemeleri su-i efallerini ve kizb-i ihtiyarlarını iş’ar mesabesinde değil midir vülat-ı Mısırın min 
ciheti’l-mal Mısırlu’ya teaddi şaibesinden oldukları delail-i mebsutadan bedidar olduğundan gayrı mütekellimin-i Mısırın 
zeharif-i dünya için birbirlerini hedm edemeyub bazısı baz-ı ahar hakkında bir hileyi hafr ile ihlakına tesaddi” MMD, vol. 8, 
nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167). 
68 “izhar eyledikleri fitne ve fesadları valilerine özür ve isnad edegeldikleri cay-ı eşkal değildir” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date 
late Z 1180/late May 1167). 
69 Holt, The Fertile Crescent, p. 90. 
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who was seen as the currently most powerful grandee in Cairo. 70  When Abdurrahman 
Kethüda learned about the conspiracy, he offered to the other grandees his resignation from 
the administration and proposed to leave Cairo. In his place he nominated a younger mamluk, 
Bulutkapan Ali Bey as the new şeyhülbeled.71 Once Gazzawi Ali Bey was notified about the 
agreement, he could not return to Cairo and he sought asylum in Gazza.72  
Bulutkapan Ali Bey came to the stage after Gazzawi left Cairo. al-Jabarti emphasizes 
that Ali Bey was a man of great strength and gives an example that once he was informed that 
the grandees of Cairo were debating whether to appoint him as an emir, with the support of 
one and the opposition of other, he said “I assume the office of emir only by my sword, not by 
anybody’s support.” 73  This debate might be concerned with the appointment of the 
şeyhülbeled. The archival documents demonstrate that Gazzawi Ali Bey had a successful 
lobbyist in both Istanbul and Cairo when he was in Gazza.74 He communicated with the 
current governor, Kamil Ahmed Pasha (r. 1760) who was willing to ally himself with 
Gazzawi Ali Bey in order to eliminate Halil Bey and Bulutkapan.  
Kamil Ahmed Pasha managed to provide the support from the Porte in bringing 
Gazzawi Ali Bey back to Cairo and make him şeyhülbeled. Kamil Ahmed Pasha had the 
Porte’s consent in this endeavour. Furthermore, the Porte sent a decree to Gazzawi Ali Bey 
praising him and confirming its support of Gazzawi Ali Bey in being named şeyhülbeled. In 
the decree, Ali Bey Gazzawi’s performance was praised as an accomplished emirulhajj who 
brought the caravan to the Hijaz safe and sound.75 Gazzawi Ali bey was described by Kamil 
                                                        
70 For Abdurrahman Kethüda’s building activities in Cairo see chapter II on economy, p.117 
71 For the details of proceedings about Ali Bey’s appointment see, Abdurrahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti, al-Jabarti’s History of 
Egypt, Jane Hathaway, ed., (Princeton, 2009) p. 104. 
72 Holt, The Fertile Crescent, p. 93. 
73 Hathaway, al-Jabarti’s History, p. 103. 
74 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 and nr. 201 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761). Although the decree was sent to Ali Bey and Kamil 
Ahmed Pasa in 1174/1761, it was recorded in early Sh 1177/early February 1764, since the decree was “mektûm” – 
confidential.  
75 “… sa’y-ı meşkurun ve harekatın Haremeyn ahalisinin ve huccac-ı müsliminin mahzuziyetini …” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 
(date early Z 1174/early July 1761). 
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Ahmed Pasha as a loyal officer who did his part perfectly as the emirulhajj. Gazzawi Ali Bey 
was planning to use the decree as a return ticket to Egypt. By Kamil Ahmed Pasha’s 
mediation, Ali Bey was “appointed” as the new şeyhülbeled of Egypt.76 Another point that 
was mentioned in the decree was Gazzawi’s endeavour to “apply and execute” the Porte’s 
demand in Egypt, highlighting his benevolence towards the poor and the needy. 77  By 
mentioning his good manner, it was noted that his employment in Cairo would be necessary.78 
Ali Bey was expected to carry out the Porte’s demands in Egypt essentially to maintain law 
and order in Egypt. This decree suggests that Kamil Ahmed Pasha, the governor who entered 
in a struggle with the local mamluk elements in Egypt as soon as he arrived, recognized Ali 
Bey Gazzawi as a potential ally for the Porte. His main aim was to break the power of the 
mamluk beys and subject them to the authority of the Porte. After some time, Gazzawi Ali 
Bey died in Gazza due to unknown causes and the plans about his appointment in place of 
Bulutkapan came to nothing.79 This correspondence between the Porte, Kamil Ahmed Pasha 
and Gazzawi Ali Bey is one of the few documents we have regarding the negotiation between 
the central government and mamluk beys. The Porte’s support of Gazzawi Ali Bey in return 
for his loyalty to the Porte and fulfilling the requirements of an administrator suggests that the 
Porte had other attempts for negotiation with other mamluk beys during the century.  
Ali Bey al-Kabir’s adventures in struggling with his fellow mamluks contain 
multiple examples of treachery and defection. Once Ali Bey started his career, he started to 
wipe out his potential rivals without considering allies or enemies. He was aware that one day 
                                                        
76 “hala Mısır valisi Kamil Ahmed Pasha -edamellahu teala iclaluhu- tarafından der saadetime tahrir olunduğuna binaen 
seni Kahire-i Mısıra Şeyhülbeled nasb u tayin eylemek üzere mahsus emr-i şerifimle müşarun-ileyhe tevcih ve tenbih olmagın 
ilam-ı hal için sana dahi işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve müşarun-ileyh vesatatiyle tarafına irsal olunmuşdur” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 
200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761). 
77 “bi’l-husus Mısır’da oldukça sadır olan evamir-i şerifemin infazıyla tahsil-i rıza-yı mülukanem ve himayet ve sıyanet 
fukaraya cümleden ziyade sarf-ı cehd ve makderet ve bezl-i tab u takat eylediğin yakinen ve tahkiken ve tahriren ma’lum-ı 
şahanem olub” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761). 
78 “senin gibi mücerrebü’l-etvar ve müstakimu’l-ef’al olanların bu hilalde Kahire-i Mısırda mevcud olmaları lazime-i halden 
idugu.” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761). 
79 A decree identifies Gazzawi by mentioning him as follows: “…müteveffa mirulhac Ali bey…” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 325 (date 
early L 1178/24 March-4 April 1765). 
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they could overthrow him just as they had done with his predecessor. Ali Bey’s first policy 
was to eliminate potential opponents and fill the posts with his men. He even exiled 
Abdurrahman Kethüda, who had made him şeyhülbeled, to the Hijaz, where he spent the rest 
of his life.  
A question about the uprising of Ali Bey was whether the Porte was expecting it. The 
correspondence that arrived in Istanbul just before the uprising of Ali Bey does not suggest 
any imolications of uprising, as the decrees sent in 1769 reflect on the ongoing endeavour of 
the Porte to maintain order in Egypt for years. This was carried forward by demanding from 
the administrators to put the mint in Egypt in order, to refund the revenues from the deceased 
mamluks’ villages from their colleagues and to receive the grain for imperial kitchen and 
supplies for the imperial navy in good condition.   
Similarly, for the imperial army operating at the frontier during the Ottoman-Russo 
war, the Porte demanded in Şevval 1182/ February 1769 from Egyptian administrators to 
prepare sufficient quantities of peksimit, a dried biscuit as ration for the Ottoman soldiers in 
the campaign in addition to rice for the imperial kitchens which had they not previously 
sent.80 Considering Ali Bey’s action as an open rebellion, one can assume that Ali Bey would 
not have sent the demanded food and soldiers as he was preparing to rise up against the Porte. 
However, the records of irsaliye indicate that the Egyptian administrators charged the irsaliye 
with the expenditures of peksimit and the soldiers who attended to the Russian war, which 
confirms that the demands of the Porte were sent during Ali Bey’s authority.81 Nevertheless, 
in another decree that praises Ali Bey’s good service to the central government, it is 
mentioned that since Ali Bey became the şeyhülbeled, the imperial supplies were being sent 
regularly compared to the previous years. The same order encouraged the governing authority 
                                                        
80 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 620 and nr. 622 (date late L 1182/late February 1769). 
81 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
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in the province to continue sending the demanded supplies with haste.82 From the official 
correspondence of the central government, it is difficult to trace the flow of events between 
1184/1770-1188/1774. The mühimme-i Mısır defterleri series does not provide any detail 
about the Ali Bey’s activities during his uprising. However, some documents under the 
classification of Cevdet tasnifi offer us some detail from the Porte’s side.   
Taken as a whole, the decrees sent to Egypt addressing the governor, kadı, 
şeyhülbeled, yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarlari in general imply that local administrators in 
Egypt (mamluk beys) were getting stronger day by day. A detailed examination in archival 
documents demonstrate that in the time period especially after the 1760s, the mamluk beys 
were trying to snatch more financial income from the Mint of Cairo, the governor’s income 
and trying to keep iltizam revenues in their hands. The central government was monitoring 
Egypt’s administration closely and sending mübaşirs, officers, in order to preserve the 
previous order in the organisational and administrational system. 83  The mamluk beys’ 
endeavour to shift the governor’s and kadı’s revenues to their own households was carried out 
at times with brute force and occasionally by bargaining with the governor under-the-table 
and forcing them to act according to their wishes. Such actions demonstrate the expanding 
limits of the local administrators’ authority in late eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt. 
However, this phenomenon was not limited to Ali Bey al-Kabir’s activities. Before Ali Bey 
and after him, mamluk beys continued to snatch what they could from the Porte both in terms 
of authority and financial resources.  
From the perspective of the imperial government, governors’ task was to prepare a 
decisive military expedition and limit the mamluk beys’ authority. Nevertheless, the 
eighteenth century’s decentralized administration in addition to incessant wars between the 
                                                        
82 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 624 (date mid ZA 1182/ mid March 1769). 
83 See below chapter III on irsaliye and chapter IV on governor for detail 
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Porte and Austria, Russia and Iran together with a diminished treasury prevented the 
realization of such a campaign.84 In contrast, we cannot claim that the Porte was helpless or that 
they were necessarily overpowered by the local administrators of Egypt. On the contrary, the Porte 
used both negotiations as a velvet glove on its iron fist. The central government used force when 
needed and in accordance with the circumstance. For example, the effort of the Porte for retrieving the 
revenues that had been allocated for the officers appointed by the central government is noteworthy. 
The province of Egypt was of utmost importance for the government and almost every governor who 
was appointed, or so the central government claimed, served as able, capable and loyal statesmen in 
their capacity as governors of Egypt. Thus, there was an expectation for them to re-organize the 
degenerated administrative and financial system. 
The contrasting narratives of the contemporary sources: The Rebellion of Ali Bey al-
Kabir in the Chronicles 
Apart from the archival documents, we have the chance to access information about 
eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt from contemporary chronicles as well as European 
travellers. Enveri, Şem’danizade, Vasıf and Cevdet Pasha are the Ottoman historians who 
inform us about Ali Bey’s al-Kabir’s rebellion. Al-Jabarti and Corci Zeydan are the Egyptian 
historians who narrate not only the rebellion but also the eighteenth century’s significant 
events and biographies of important individuals in detail. Al-Jabarti’s and Enveri’s chronicles 
are prominent for this research as they witnessed the time period when the rebellion took 
place. The two sources enable us to observe the events from different perspectives. Enveri’s 
official history book displays the central government’s perception of Bulutkapan’s uprising 
while al-Jabarti’s peerless work provides us with much more details as well as an educated 
Cairene person’s perspective.  
                                                        
84 Thomas Naff, “Introduction” in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, ed., Studies in eighteenth century, (Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1977) p. 10. 
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Official Historiography of the Ottoman Empire 
In order to see the uprisings from the perspective of the imperial administration, we 
must refer to the official historiography of the Ottoman Empire. Enveri Tarihi, composed by 
the official historiographer Sadullah Enveri Efendi during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-
1774, is one of the primary principal sources that contain detailed information about the 
eighteenth century. By making use of the original correspondence, Enveri provides reliable 
information pertaining to the uprising of Ali Bey. Ahmed Vasıf Efendi’s Mehasinu’l-Asar ve 
Hakaiku’l-Ahbar, Şem’danizade Efendi’s Mur’i’t-Tevarih and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s Tarih-i 
Cevdet are also among the primary sources available but less detailed than Enveri’s work. 
Although Vasıf Efendi is considered as having used Enveri’s work as a primary source, Vasıf 
Efendi writes about Murad Bey and İbrahim Bey’s activities as well. On the other hand, 
Şem’danizade studies a wider spectrum of time covering the period between the 1730s and 
the 1770s.  
Moving on to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s chronicle, “Tarih-i Cevdet” should be 
mentioned here as well. Although he authored his text in the nineteenth century, his work can 
be considered useful for the reason that he mentioned in his chronicle: “It is hard for a historian 
to write the events he witnessed free from rancour. Since the chronicles penned by the chroniclers are 
written with grandiloquent words ..., it is quite time consuming to edit and form a trustworthy 
history.” 85  Ahmed Cevdet Pasha used Enveri’s, Şem’danizade’s, Vasıf’s and al-Jabarti’s 
chronicle whilst writing his own. Therefore, Tarih-i Cevdet can illustrate how the 
Bulutkapan’s uprising was perceived in the next century from a different viewpoint. For 
example, instead of contemporary Ottoman historians, Cevdet Pasha mentions that Ali Bey 
used to read about the Mamluk Sultanate and imagined that “Once upon a time while they 
                                                        
85 Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Tarih-i Cevdet, (Istanbul, 1977) II vol. p. 412 
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were servants like us, they became rulers”, and dared to revolt against Ottoman Empire with 
the encouragement of Russia while the Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia.  
Enveri’s chronicle will be the first account that we will refer in this chapter. One 
should note that Enveri wrote his chronicle while he was on military campaign. Therefore, the 
information he acquired was delivered from Istanbul and other parts of the empire during his 
time away from the imperial capital and Egypt. For this reason, the information he gives about 
Ali Bey’s uprising is not as detailed as al-Jabarti’s chronicle; nonetheless Enveri, as the 
imperial official historian, had the chance to see the original documents which were delivered 
to the grand vizier. In addition to the uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir during the Ottoman-Russo 
war, there were the events of Mora’s situation, Ottoman fleet’s being destroyed by Russia in 
Çesme, the death of the Meccan sherif, the conflict between Janissaries and the soldiers of the 
galleons in Galata, and finally the death of şehzade Bayezid. 
Prior to giving a detailed account of the events, Enveri first chooses to narrate the 
rumours of Ali Bey’s death in 1185/1771-72: “… In 1185, on the 15th day of Rebiulahir (28 July 
1771), the news of the rebel Ali Bey’s death came from the ‘rikab-ı hümayun’ to the ‘canib-i serdar-ı 
ekrem’ at the military encampment. Since this rebel’s inconvenient furore made everybody terrified 
and astonished, receiving of the news of his defeat relieved the people and delighted them. But after a 
while, the news of his injustice and banditry rose once again and people realized that it was a ruse, he 
had not died. They began once again praying for the death of Ali el-Kebir constantly. Everybody 
continued to worry about the problem as previously. Hopefully, the remainder of Ali Bey’s 
circumstances will be given in detail later in the narrative.86” 
Enveri refers neither to Ali Bey’s seizing power in Egypt nor to his activities in 
Upper Egypt and the Hijaz. Rather he starts to narrate the Syria campaign. While narrating Ali 
Bey al-Kabir’s rebellion, Enveri first refers to the problem between Ali Bey and the governor 
                                                        
86  Muharrem Saffet Calışkan, (Vekayinuvis) Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-
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of Damascus, Gürcü Osman Pasha. He mentions that the central administrators had been 
worrying about the pilgrims’ safety in a case of potential conflict between Ali Bey and Osman 
Pasha until the pilgrims’ safe arrival in Damascus was confirmed.87 Both parties had been 
sending letters to Istanbul complaining about each other. 
The verification of the correspondence containing allegations in hope of punishment 
of the guilty continued. In the meantime the powerful and prosperous Egyptian faction 
rebelled. Enveri mentions that while the sultan was struggling with the enemy of religion, Ali 
Bey prepared his army and munitions, and sent them to Gazza and Ramla several times to 
contend with Osman Pasha’s soldiers. In fact, Zahir al-Omar, who was the administrator of 
Sayda and was famous for his wealth and the multitude of his soldiers, turned his face away 
from Osman Pasha for personal benefit and changed sides to help Ali Bey. The troops of Ali 
Bey and Zahir al-Omar entered Damascus and surrounded the castle. Therefore, Gürcü 
Osman Pasha was unable to resist and consequently chose to flee. 
Enveri goes on narrating us the details: “This events made the sultan get angry and he 
ordered to prepare an army on Syria to solve the problem. ... By the time this army arrived at Urfa, Ali 
Bey al-Kabir’s troops with the head of them one of the Egyptian emirs, entered Damascus and 
surrounded the castle. The ağa of the janissaries, who guarded the city, was really brave and defended 
the castle. Meanwhile, the news of Ali Bey’s death has spread among the Egyptian soldiers and for 
this reason they returned back to Egypt as if they flee. ... As the unsuitable wording of the governor of 
Şam and his hostility to Ali Bey, and his commitment that led to sedition were the reason of this event, 
he was deposed from governorship of Şam and appointed as governor of Karaman. In place of him, 
Azmzade Mehmed Paşa became the governor and Mirulhac of Şam. Also Osman’s two sons, Mehmed 
Paşa and Derviş Mehmed Paşa were appointed as administrators of Niğde and Akşehir sanjaqs.88”   
                                                        
87 Ibid., p. 232. 
88 Çalışkan, Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi, p. 268-269. 
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Enveri presumably did not know that the name of the Egyptian emir who joined the 
Syrian campaign was Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb, whom he praises later on for his opposition 
to Ali Bey. Also, unlike other sources, Enveri is the only source that attached the departure of 
the Egyptian troops from Syria to the rumour of Ali Bey’s death. Moreover, unlike the 
European sources, Enveri causes Ali Bey’s Syria campaign only to the hostility between him 
and Gürcü Osman Pasha; he does not refer to Ali Bey’s authority expansion. Another 
noteworthy point is that Enveri finds Gürcü Osman Pasha guilty. He states Osman Pasha’s 
hostile attitudes led events to this point:   
“… Gürcü Osman Paşa had the approval of the sultan and performed this duty successfully for a 
while. He was of Georgian origin and managed to acquire a considerable wealth. Since he lived in the 
same place for a long time and had a familiarity and friendship with the people and the merchants of 
the place, willingly or unwillingly, he acquired power. Also, his two sons had the rank of 
‘mirimiranlik’ by the grace of the sultan. Due to both his rank and wealth, he meddled in some issues 
outside his duties and he developed hostility with Ali Bey, şeyhülbeled and emirulhajj of Egypt. Each 
side sought to eliminate the other and to achieve this, both wrote reports and their correspondences 
including complaints arrived in Istanbul.89”   
Enveri’s causation relates the hostility between the two local administrators to self-
assurance and conceit. Those two characters were a result of the power that was provided by 
the rank and wealth; mainly the two features that made a local figure an ayan. Enveri extends 
his account of Ali Bey:  
“Concerning Ali Bey’s situation in detail and his rebellion’s state of affairs: We heard about 
Ali Bey as he is famous for being İbrahim Kethüda’s servant. As time passed, he became a leading 
figure among the other amirs and ‘şeyhülbeled’ of Egypt. He achieved what he wanted in a short time 
and had complete independence. Sometimes he even outbalanced the governor of Egypt and dismissal 
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of some of them was caused by his opinion. For these reasons, the governors were fed up with his 
deceit and deception, and they discussed about how to achieve his expelling swiftly and easily from 
Egypt. As a result, in 1177/1763-64 the governor of Egypt, Gürcü Mehmed Paşa (Kethüda Mehmed 
Pasha (1762-64)) became aware of Ali Bey’s behaviour that gave rise to mischief and caused 
problems and damage among the people in the province. He discussed the situation with wise 
counsellors of Egypt and made a decision. Mehmed Paşa commissioned Ali Bey with the duty of 
‘emirülhajjlık’ and sent him to the Hijaz (as a part of his plan to eliminate him). But since dismissal of 
Gürcü Mehmed Paşa coincided with his and the other pilgrims’ return, Ali Bey managed to return to 
Egypt with his followers and went on carrying out his previous cruelties. Yet, because some amirs, 
who were brave, courageous and coequal to him, opposed to him in the administration, he could not 
act as he wished. To eliminate his opponents, he hired some men to kill them in a secret way. It was a 
known thing that the Egyptian amirs were killing each other to be able to enjoy full authority on their 
own. But his opponents managed to learn his secrets by the agency of their spies and came to an 
agreement; they took Ali Bey out of Egypt forcibly in the beginning of the year of 1178/1764-65, sent 
him away and did not let him enter Egypt any more. Ali Bey travelled around Sa’id and Humam for a 
while and crossed the desert and asked for help from the shaykh of Humam. The shaykh helped Ali 
Bey to return to Egypt on condition that he obeyed the order and decrees of the Ottoman sultan.”90  
Enveri points out that Kethüda Mehmed Pasha discerned Ali Bey’s bad temper. 
Consequently, he plotted against Ali Bey by sending him to Hijaz as emirulhajj, and despite 
Pasha’s efforts, he failed to eliminate Ali Bey due to the end of his tenure in Egypt. Also, it is 
interesting to see that Enveri claims that shaykh of Humam helped Ali Bey only on condition 
of his obeying of the sultan. As it is obvious that shaykh would care about only his interest 
rather than Ali Bey’s obedience to the sultan.  
“Ali Bey managed to return to Cairo during the period of the governorship of Rakım 
Mehmed Paşa and take his revenge from his opponents. He killed most of those who claimed the right 
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to be chosen “şeyhülbeled”, exiled the rest out of Egypt and confiscated all their belongings. So he 
went on with his treachery. The governor of Şam, Osman Paşa, reported the discomfort and 
disturbance of the Egyptian people from Ali Bey to the central government. The Sublime Porte 
sometimes attempted to give the duty of the disciplining and chastening of Ali Bey to the governors of 
Egypt, and sometimes to Osman Paşa himself. But every time an obstacle occurred and they were 
unable to go on campaign against Ali Bey.”91 
Enveri states that although there was hostility between Ali Bey and Osman Pasha, 
the Porte attempted to give the duty of disciplining Ali Bey to Osman Pasha. A decree record 
confirms that the Porte asked Gürcü Osman Pasha to provide the food stocks and logistic 
means, mainly camels, for Numan Pasha’s troops.92 
In another part of his narrative Enveri wrote: “Ali Bey learned the issue and to guard 
himself, gathered soldiers and supplied other requirements. To enable this, he confiscated the goods 
and money of some wealthy people; shackled or killed those who did not follow him or did not help 
him. The end of 1182/1768-69: Ali Bey used to take care of hiding his cruelty and ensuring that news 
of it did not reach the Sublime Porte. In those days, the Sublime Porte was at war with Russia and Ali 
Bey exploited this opportunity and rebelled against the central government.” Here Enveri suggests 
that Ali Bey intentionally rebelled during the war, as he was aware that the central 
government would not intervene to punish his actions. Enveri continues with the Hijaz 
campaign’s details: 
“To make a fortune and gather all the authority in his hands, Ali Bey publicly spilled blood 
and ransacked people’s belongings. According to the correspondence of Şerif Ahmed bin Mesud, the 
Emir of Mekke-i Mukerreme, Ali Bey did not content himself with all these cruelties. Also, in the 
beginning of the year of 1184/1770-71, he spread his fierceness to the Holy Land and dismissed the 
                                                        
91 Ibid., p.330. 
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şerif from his duty. To appoint şerif Abdullah as the ‘şerif’ of Mekke and Hasan Bey as the governor of 
Jidda, he gathered more than ten thousand rebels and about one hundred cannons, arms and 
ammunition and sent them with the command of his son-in-law Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey and Mustafa 
Bey to the Hijaz. Mehmed Bey and Mustafa Bey spread the news of the dismissal of the şerif of Mekke 
by disseminating a fraudulent edict. Since there were some rumours about the dismissal of ‘şerif’ 
before in Mekke, the şerif could not oppose, but had to trust the news and complied with it to avoid 
causing a mischief. He left Batha lands and the house of Allah. … After they appointed Hasan Bey as 
customs officer, they said they were done and returned to Egypt and right after that turned their 
attention to Şam to expel Osman Paşa. Meanwhile, Şerif Ahmed bin Mesud realized that the decree 
was fake and all these plays were trickery of Ali Bey so he gathered an army and returned to Mekke. 
Şerif Abdullah and his supporters left Mekke as they were like summer friends. When this news arrived 
in Egypt, instead of realizing that the bad things he had committed never would be maintained, Ali Bey 
was unashamed and continued in his cruelty. He sent his men to Şam and in order to make things 
easier, wrote down an Arabic decree and sealed it like vezirial decrees.”93 
Like other contemporary sources, Enveri emphasizes that Ali Bey’s aim was to 
gather all the authority and financial sources in his sole hands. He provides a detailed 
narrative about the Hijaz campaign of Ali Bey’s troops; it is highly likely that he examined 
the correspondence from the sherif of Mecca, which arrived at the divan of the grand vizier. 
Here Enveri provides a copy of the correspondence of Ali Bey sent to Damascus. It can be 
seen in this letter that Ali Bey simulated sultanic decrees. The letter begins with a praise 
dedicated to himself: ‘miru’l-livai’ş-şerif al-sultani ve alem al-munifi’l-hakani miru’l-hajj al-
sabik ve kaimmakam-ı Mısır hâlâ’. We can evidently see in the aforementioned quote that Ali 
Bey does not claim himself as a sultan, but rather deputy of Egypt. The target addressee of the 
letter is the people of Damascus. In the letter, Ali Bey approaches to the Damascene people 
emphasizing that Osman Pasha behaves cruelly towards the people, merchants, pilgrims and 
                                                        
93 Çalışkan, Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi, p.331. 
 
 
80 
claims that he comes to Şam to save them from Osman Pasha’s cruelty and for the victory of 
the ‘religion of Islam’. Enveri’s narration about the Syria campaign’s details continues as 
follows:   
“With a scrap of paper Ali Bey wrote to his men from among the amirs of Egypt: İsmail Bey, 
Tantavi Ali Bey and Habeş Ali Bey who cooperated with the Arab shaykh Zahir al-Omar. They took 
over Nablus, Cuneyn, Gazza, Ramla and Yafa forcibly and appointed as administrators for these 
places his own followers.”94 
The governor of Damascus, ulema in Damascus and the Hijaz, and the sherif of 
Mecca reported the news about the details of Syria and Hijaz campaigns and the turbulent 
political environment in these provinces. Enveri states that as a result of the campaigns, the 
customary contribution of grain for sustaining the Haremeyn failed: 
 “Consequently, the usual sending of crops from the foundations of Haremeyn in Egypt was 
stopped and the people of Mekke and Medine were in hardship. Having this report, the wise men of the 
state and the ulema consulted and negotiated the issue. They reached a consensus view that; by 
sending the fake decree to Şam, acting in contravention to Allah’s consent and terms of the sharia, 
abusing and disturbing the people and towns, and sending his brigands. Ali Bey had and it was 
required that he should removed immediately.”95 Due to the aforementioned reasons, the statesmen of 
the central government decided that Ali Bey “reached the top of rebellion, depravity and cruelty” and 
“hereafter he would not behave wisely”. Here we see the invisible line that Ali Bey crossed 
resulting in his being branded as a real rebel on the contrary to his counterparts. For some, as 
Hathaway suggested, the rule of “being a rebel was not a point of no return” was not 
applicable. At this point, the central government sent the governor of Sivas Numan Pasha as 
the governor of Egypt together with Raqqah province supported by his retinue, the governors 
of Aleppo and Mosul, and the mutasarrifs of Kilis and I’zaz against Ali Bey in order to 
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punish him “according to the fatwa and eliminate the strife and sedition” in the beginning of 
Şevval 1184/18-28 January 1771. 
“Numan Paşa headed to Raqqah, gathering the soldiers appointed to his army. Meanwhile, 
Ebu’z-zeheb and other men of Ali Bey reached Damascus and the governor of Şam left the city, and 
conflict between the guards of castle and Ali Bey’s soldiers broke out. Ebu’z-zeheb did not intend to be 
in conflict with Damascus’s people but he had to, since he was the son-in-law of Ali Bey. Although he 
started the conflict grudgingly, after thinking carefully, he concluded that with the punishment of the 
sultan his life would be woeful. Once the news of the death of Ali Bey spread among them, Ebu’z-
zeheb Mehmed Bey left Şam and returned to Egypt.”96  
Although the Ottoman troops did not encounter Ali Bey’s troops directly, when they 
entered Syria, their presence was enough to dissolve the allied forces of Zahir al-Umar and 
Ebu’z-zeheb Bey. It also discouraged İsmail Bey to attack Syria’s hajj caravan, which had 
been part of Zahir’s strategy for attacking Osman Pasha.97 Also, it is worth noting that, once 
again Enveri praised Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb and portrayed him as a character who, in 
nature, would never oppose sultan’s law, but did so because he was compelled to by Ali Bey. 
In relation to Ebu’z-zeheb’s return from Damascus, information provided by Cevdet Pasha 
found in neither Jabarti nor Enveri indicates that İsmail Bey persuaded Ebu’z-zeheb to give 
up fighting for the conquest of Syria and return to Egypt. He was worried about Ebu’z-
zeheb’s success engendering the scorn of the other emirs. Enveri narrates their return to Egypt 
as follows: 
“Ali Bey’s expulsion and deportation from Cairo: The ‘sirdar’ of the Egyptian ‘amirs’ who 
were sent to lands of Şam by the aforementioned brigand, Mir Ebu’z-zeheb returned to Egypt quickly 
and met and had secret conversations with the ‘ulema’. He gave advice by saying to them: “It is 
doubtless to say that the way this rebel follows is not the right path. His riot will provoke the anger of 
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the Sublime Porte and he will not be able to escape from the state, which will last forever. In 
accordance with the imperative of holy edict- Qur’an: “And incline not to those who do wrong, or the 
Fire will touch you …” complied with the metaphor of this verse. Those who gave the control to this 
kind of whim owners’ foolish words and weak wishes, and who broke the wand of obedience into two 
pieces cannot retrieve their collar, run away from the punishment of the excellent shadow of Allah and 
be safe. Praise to Allah, I am tired and penitent from all what I did and did not do. I will never follow 
these brutes and rebels any more. I am scared of the immediate and deferred punishment” and stated 
that he turned his face of rebel aforementioned and all of them agreed that he deserved to be 
annihilated.”98 
Al-Jabarti does not tell about Ebu’z-zeheb’s conversation with the ulema.  
“Ebu’z-zeheb’s advice was persuasive. Once he received their approval, the people of Egypt 
surrounded Ali Bey’s palace that was the equivalent of that of Haman and Şeddad. When the brigand 
Ali Bey saw the siege and realized that it is the time of “the earth closed in on them in spite of its 
vastness” and that if he waited even for an hour it would be his end and annihilation, he immediately 
took his cash money and as much of his possessions as he could, and ran away from Egypt with his 
companions and supporters.”99  
In contrast to al-Jabarti’s and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s narratives, 100  only Enveri 
mentions that Ali Bey was surrounded by Ebu’z-zeheb. On the other hand, Enveri’s 
comparison of Ali Bey’s house to Hâmân’s and Şeddad’s house is noteworthy. According to 
the holy book of the Muslims, the Quran, Haman is referred to as the assistant of the pharaoh 
in ancient Egypt, who was the enemy of believers and the prophet Moses. Şeddad was 
referred to as another “infidel”, who built the incredibly beautiful gardens of ‘Irem’ and 
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claimed that he built the same beauty of Paradise on the earth, in a way, comparing himself to 
God. 
The document about the fight between Ali Bey and Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey 
arrived on 26 Safer/ 10 June 1771 and made the serasker overjoyed. In order to show his joy, 
he ordered drums and flutes to be played, had the cannon fired and also rewarded the herald 
abundantly, which made his peers jealous of him. 
“By the way, it was suggested by Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey to invite Osman Bey, who was 
among the Egyptian umera and had to leave Egypt and take refuge in Mekke during Ali Bey’s period, 
to give him the governorship. Osman Bey was invited to Egypt and Numan Paşa was ordered to follow 
Ali Bey and to annihilate him wherever he should find him.”101 
Osman Bey was appointed as the governor by the central government when Ali Bey 
organised the campaigns against the Hijaz. Osman Bey must have been an appointed officer 
in Cairo when he was informed that he was assigned as the governor. However, he had to 
leave Cairo and stayed in Damascus while corroborating with the new governor of Damascus 
Mehmed Pasha and waiting for the state’s army in order to fight against Ali Bey.102 Holt 
mentions Osman Bey’s presence summer in Cairo in the summer of 1769.103 
“The murder of Ali Bey: As mentioned before, Ali Bey was expelled from Egypt with the 
effort of the people of Cairo. He escaped to Yafa, being abandoned he travelled around for about one 
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memuresi hitamıyla aktar-ı şamiyeden fekk-i alaka-i müsaferet edinceye dek kendiye musafat ve muvalat izharıyla istihsal-i 
rıza-yı hümayuna her halde himmet buyurulub …” However, the correspondence between the central government suggest 
that Mehmed Pasha begrudged Osman Bey and there has been a problem between the two: “ ... müşarun-ileyh Mehmed 
Pasha hazretleri müşarun-ileyh Osman Paşa hazretlerinin zahiren suret-i istiklalini istiksar ile temkin-i vizaret ve rüşd ü 
rütbeye mugayir harekete tasaddi ve ibtida-yı emrde eşhas-ı na-puhte misillü izhar-ı münafese ve süluk-ı tarik-i münakaşaya 
ibtidar eyleyüb ...” TSMA.E 0249 (date 7 CA 1186/6 August 1772) 
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year and in the end he joined up with Zahir al-Omar, another brigand who was famous for rebellion 
and opposition. Ali Bey left Yafa and headed to Cairo, in order to take revenge on Ebu’z-zeheb 
Mehmed Bey and other of his opponents who had expelled him from Egypt. Along the way, he spread 
what happened to him in Egypt and numerous bandits joined him. Day-by-day their force became 
stronger as they moved on. In the meantime, Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey was busy preparing the grain 
that was traditionally sent to Haremeyn, sending the revenue to Istanbul, and taking care of the issues 
of huccac/pilgrims, which was the most important thing.”104 
In this context, Enveri’s prejudiced narrative can be seen interlineally since he draws 
a portrait of Ali Bey as a cruel man attacking an innocent loyal man, namely Mehmed Bey 
who is doing his assigned duty, preparing the grain contributions for Haremeyn. 
“When it came to the two brigands {Ali Bey and Zahir al-Omar}, they were helping and 
cooperating with each other and by gathering more men, getting stronger and stronger. Learning that 
they were coming with the intention of plundering Egypt, Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey consulted with the 
umera, who were steadfast in obeying the reign of padişah on the issue and got a fatwa from ulema of 
el-Ezher. The fatwa was recited in front of the council and its content was announced. Then they got 
prepared for the armed struggle. When Mehmed Bey heard that they were approaching to Egypt by 
traversing the desert, it was the fifth day of Saferu’l-hayr/20 May 1773, Thursday, Mehmed Bey’s 
army pitched their tents in Salihiyye and got prepared for the struggle. By the way, Ali Bey and his 
supporters were bragging of their number and equipment of war, they pitched in Kanatır, four hours 
distance from Salihiyye. The next day, on Friday after Mehmed Bey informed Ali Bey about their 
fatwa, being in a battle formation, they started contesting. They outbalanced Ali Bey’s army and won 
the struggle. They enslaved and chained who ever they managed. Tantavi Ali Bey, Murad Bey, Kaytas 
Bey, Hamza Bey, İsmail Bey, from the kethüdas of Azeb; Ali and İsmail Kethüda, three odabaşı, five 
kaşifs, the son of Zahir al-Omar, the son of Mutavele shaykh, many other factious ones who among 
those captured and the head of the devils, Ali Bey al-Kabir; sustained four serious injuries and could 
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not manage to escape. Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb returned to Egypt victorious with 1200 soldiers of Ali 
Bey. Mehmed Bey reported what had happened to İstanbul, and from there, the report reached the 
encampment on the twenty-second day of Rebiulevvel/5 July. As aforementioned, Ali Bey’s mischief 
and sedition was rumoured and spread, and everyone was suffering from him even more than the 
enemy of the religion. The Serdar-ı ekrem became so delighted that mehterhane performed cannon 
and rifle salutes and rewarded the herald excessively.105” 
Şem’danizade informs us about Ali Bey’s death as follows: “Mehmed Bey did not kill 
Ali Bey out of respect for the right of blessing, but imprisoned him. After one month, he died. The 
religion and the state became secure from his harm. If it is surveyed, infidel did perform such a 
treachery as this faithless one did to the religion and the state. During the military campaign of 
Moscow both from sea and land, Egyptian soldiers failed to join the imperial army. In addition, 
instead of joining the imperial army forty or fifty thousand soldiers were sent to Egypt for his rebellion 
in addition to the financial cost.”106 
Both Jabarti and Şem’danizade independently mention that Ebu’z-zeheb did not kill 
Ali Bey out of his respect for him and added that Ali Bey died as a consequence of his 
injuries. Moreover, al-Jabarti makes no reference to Ali Bey’s Yafa incident nor does he 
comment on Mehmed Bey’s preparing of revenue for Istanbul and grain for Haremeyn. It is 
also notable that we do not have any evidence about the role of the army ordered to be 
prepared by the central government in the South-eastern Anatolia and Syria. 
Unlike other sources, Enveri states that Ebu’z-zeheb proposed the Sublime Porte to 
summon the previous governor of Egypt, who escaped to the Hijaz, in order to reappoint him 
as the governor. Although there is insufficient evidence, it is highly likely that Ebu’z-zeheb 
made an agreement with the Porte when he was in Syria. He must have had a hidden agenda 
about being the next governor of Egypt. On the other hand, Enveri’s narration about the 
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Porte’s demand to search for Ali Bey particularly from Numan Pasha is unique. Other sources 
do not mention this. Lastly, unlike the other sources’ timing of one week, Enveri mentions 
that Ali Bey died after one month.  
All the chroniclers agree that after Ali Bey’s death, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb 
gained authority; he sent both the irsaliye to Istanbul and deşişe, cereal, to Haremeyn. 
Although a certain Osman Pasha was appointed as the governor of Egypt in 1772, we cannot 
trace his destiny after his contention with the governor of Damascus Mehmed Pasha. After Ali 
Bey’s elimination, the records in the Mühimme-i Mısır defter series continues and they show 
us that Ebu’z-zeheb was rewarded with the governorship of Egypt. But somehow decrees 
issued later refer him as the şeyhülbeled and a certain Halil Pasha as the new governor. 
However, since the contents of decrees address Ebu’z-zeheb, it can be concluded that while 
Ebu’z-zeheb enjoyed the full authority while Halil Pasha’s governorship was in appearance 
only. On the other hand, Ebu’z-zeheb must have been worried about the possibility of Zahir 
al-Omar’s revenge, as he sent letters to the central government telling that Zahir al-Omar 
should have been punished for helping the rebel, Ali Bey, and that he too might rise against 
the central government.  
In conclusion, Enveri’s chronicle is a primary source depicting key events from the 
perspective of the central government. Examining Enveri’s and other Ottoman historians’ 
chronicles enables us to see how the incidents in Egypt and Syria were perceived by the 
central government, especially while the state was at war. On the other hand, referring to a 
local chronicler, al-Jabarti, will provide us an insight of Cairo during the events. 
Local Chronicles  
For the period of decentralization of the Ottoman Empire, contemporary historians 
studying Ottoman Egypt have comparatively fewer Arabic chronicles to examine this era. For 
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the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there are several chronicles available: Ahmad 
al-Damurdashi’s ‘al-Durra al-Musana fi Akhbar al-Kinana’ 107 , Ahmad Shalabi Abdul 
Ghani’s ‘Awdah al-Isharat fiman Tawalla Misr min al Wuzara wal Bashat’ 108 , and 
Muhammad Ibn `Abdul Mu`ti al-Ishaqi’s ‘Kitab Akhbar al-Uwal fiman tasarrafa fi Misr mi 
Arbab al-Duwal’ that narrate the political atmosphere of the period from 1600 to 
approximately 1750 and provide the reader with a comprehensive picture. However, only al-
Jabarti (1753-1826) has authored a source that pertains to Egypt in the late eighteenth century. 
His book ‘Ajaib al-Athaar fi’l-Taradjim wa’l-Akhbar’ 109  gives an account of the events 
between the years of 1688-1821. He began to compile the factual information on which he 
later based his history around the year 1190/ 1776-77 when he was in his mid-twenties and he 
narrates the events of that period and the immediately preceding decade in considerable detail, 
benefiting from oral history (narrations from elderly people), official documents and tomb 
inscriptions.   
While examining al-Jabarti’s work, it is possible to imagine the scenery of that 
period described in Egypt’s history. His work opens a door for the modern day historian to the 
structure of the administration of Egypt in the past, the network of the mamluk beys’ 
relationships, and social structure of the province. From al-Jabarti’s narrative, one can easily 
discern the centre of authority among the administrative class. While reading al-Jabarti’s 
chronicle, the historian travels between the pages and is able to see the passion for power and 
authority, and loyalty and disloyalty. One can see in the accounts that the mamluks obeyed the 
şeyhülbeled, the present leader of the mamluks, unquestioningly. Sometimes they killed a 
colleague who shared the same household without a moment’s remorse for him, or, on the 
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contrary, formed alliances against him. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the fact that al-
Jabarti does not provide us a chronicle that is free from prejudice, bias and preconception. 
Even so, it can be said that the present-day historians can learn the details of political 
events and interpret them based on his chronicle. However, al-Jabarti sometimes interprets 
certain events in a way that we are not accustomed to in the modern day. For example, after 
the death of scholar shaykh al-Hafnawi on 23 August 1767 al-Jabarti makes an interpretation: 
“From that day on it began to rain trouble and affliction on the country, and the situations of Egypt 
became in turmoil and turbulence. Accuracy of the words of vezir Rağıb Paşa became apparent as he 
said before: “without doubt existence of shaykh Hafnawi is a safety and shelter for Egypt from the 
troubles.” … This is because he came out openly with the truth, and he ordered the good things and 
prohibited bad things.”110 
Al-Jabarti did not hesitate to express personal opinions, especially in relation to the 
occurrences after Ali Bey al-Kabir became şeyhülbeled and started to get rid of his 
competitors by killing them after a “friendly meeting” or sending them into exile. It is quite 
possible that he implied Ali Bey’s activities served as a cause of turbulence and chaos for 
Egypt. As modern historians, we can take advantage of insights into events provided by an 
Egyptian individual. One can realize this when reading about Ali Bey’s personality and 
activities in six pages, as opposed to reading about Ottoman sultan Mustafa III in only eight 
lines. As al-Jabarti lived in the political milieu of pashas, şeyhülbeleds, and mamluks, he 
narrates as an insider, and in turn enables us to see the real political role and effectiveness of 
figures in a more realistic way in Egypt of those times compared to the imperial historians. He 
gives more information about the personalities and character traits of important figures. Also, 
we see the events passing through al-Jabarti’s Egyptian identity as he lived in that society. al-
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Jabarti narrates the activities of mamluk beys in detail. Unlike the Ottoman official historians, 
he refuses to describe the actions of mamluk beys as uprisings against the Ottoman sultan.  
After detailing Ali Bey’s struggle with other mamluk beys about how he sent them to 
exile and seized their wealth, or killed them, al-Jabarti gives an exact date, on 23 July 1768, 
for a visit by an officer from Istanbul who brought a decree, a sword and a caftan for Ali Bey 
al-Kabir. Moreover, three days later the governor was invited to Ali Bey’s house for lunch 
and the Pasha offered Ali Bey gifts. 111  In the meantime, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb, the 
closest mamluk of Ali Bey, removed potential threats, emanating from other mamluk beys 
whether from his household or not, and aimed against Ali Bey’s authority. It can be seen how 
Ali Bey achieved all his dirty work using Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb as his agent. It is 
Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb who went to Upper Egypt and fought against bedouin Arabs, 
defeated them and forced them to act in accordance with the interests of Ali Bey al-Kabir. Ali 
Bey used all available opportunities to further his personal interest.  
An ağa, officer, came from Istanbul and notified the order of the central government 
requesting troops to support Imperial army. After a divan meeting organized in the castle, 
they sent Süleyman Bey Şaburi, the head of the soldiers, to the battlefield.112 On 17 Receb 
1182/27 November 1768, it is recorded that the governor of Egypt had concerns about Ali 
Bey’s activities. He wanted to organize a military response however Abdullah Kethüda 
informed Ali Bey about governor Mehmed Pasha’s intended action. Consequently Ali Bey 
had the doors of the castle closed, and caught Mehmed Pasha and placed him under 
surveillance in the house of Küçük Ahmed Bey. On 11 December 1768 Ali Bey took on the 
proxy and began eliminating the other beys by execution113.  
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On 10 Ramadan 1182/ 18 January 1769 Ali Bey wrenched away from Ishaq, a 
Jewish officer in the Bulaq customhouse, 40.000 golden coins and applied torture until he 
died. He repeated this with other merchants as well. In Shevval 1182/February 1769, Ali Bey 
prepared a lot of presents including good breeds of horses and sent them to the sultan and the 
statesmen in Istanbul. Alongside these presents, he complained about the governor of Şam 
(Syria) Azmzade (Gürcü) Osman Pasha and requested his dismissal by claiming that he 
helped exiles from Egypt in their struggle against him. In the meantime, Ali Bey, in a specific 
manner, exiled a group of umera, most of whom were the ağas of military regiments. First he 
used to seize their wealth, then took them out of Cairo, seized their tax farms, and distributed 
the proceeds to his followers.   
Al-Jabarti narrates Ali Bey’s having proclaimed his name in the Friday sermon as 
follows: “On 1 Ramadan 1183/29 December 1769, Ali Bey went to Dawudiyye mosque in order to 
pray, and the imam prayed for him after praying for Ottoman sultan. After the prayer, the imam came 
to Ali Bey and Ali Bey asked: why did you pray for me in the minber? Are you told that I am the 
sultan? The man answered: yes, you are the sultan and I pray for you. Thereupon, Ali Bey got angry 
and ordered his men to beat him. They beat him. He returned his home by riding his donkey. He was 
really painful and said that: “ Islam began strange, and it will become strange again just like it was at 
the beginning”. The next day, Ali Bey begging for forgiveness from him, sent him money and 
clothes114.” al-Jabarti does not mention this event as an indicator of Ali Bey’s independence.  
We see the issue of the sherif of Mecca from another perspective in al-Jabarti’s 
chronicle. As has been mentioned before, after death of the Meccan sherif, his brother Ahmed 
and son Abdullah contested the succession to authority. Ahmed took the administration and 
Abdullah took refuge in Egypt. Ali Bey showed hospitality to him and met all of his needs, 
considering this situation as an opportunity. Then he prepared for the military campaign 
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against Şerif Ahmed. The garrison went to the Hijaz under the command of Ebu’z-zeheb and 
Hasan Bey. The Egyptian soldiers defeated the Arabs in Yenbu’ and went to Mecca, Şerif 
Ahmed escaped and Ebu’z-zeheb seized the sherif’s house. Abdullah became the new sherif, 
Hasan Bey went to Cidde and became emir of Cidde, in place of the Ottoman pasha. After a 
few days, Ebu’z-zeheb returned to Egypt. The emirs in Cairo welcomed him in Birketu’l-haj 
located outside of Cairo. Ebu’z-zeheb entered the city with a really glorious parade; scholars, 
and prominent people greeted him, and poets composed encomiums for him. From this we 
learn that prominent people in Egypt did not consider this campaign as disobedience towards 
the Ottoman sultan.  
After the Hijaz victory, Ali Bey sent troops to Syria. The first troop was led on to 
Gazza by Abdurrahman ağa; next, Ali bey sent soldiers to Damascus in series. Ali Bey 
borrowed a significant amount of money from the emirs and refused to pay it back, and on top 
of that imposed extra taxes on villagers. In addition to that, he extorted money from Coptic 
Christians and Jews. Al-Jabarti narrates the events that occurred during and after the Syria 
campaign as follows: 
“In 1772, a big army prepared by Ali Bey surrounded Yafa, and captured the city after a 
challenging battle and reached as far as Haleb. When this news reached Cairo, the city staged 
celebrities. The emirs boasted amongst themselves, sang songs, and lit candles. Ali Bey became really 
arrogant and did not content himself with this victory. He ordered Ebu’z-zeheb to apportion the newly 
captured cities among the mamluk beys, without letting them have a rest. That was the last straw. 
Ebu’z-zeheb gathered the other beys together and made an alliance against Ali Bey. They returned to 
Cairo and two months later Ali Bey ordered Ebu’z-zeheb to organize another military campaign to 
Syria. With this order, the hate dwelling inside them was revealed. Ali Bey al-Kabir conspired with 
Tantawi Ali Bey against Ebu’z-zeheb on 4 Sevval 1185/ 10 January 1772.”115  
                                                        
115 Al-Jabarti, Ajaib, p. 573. 
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Al-Jabarti does not mention about the imperial army led by Numan Pasha sent to 
Damascus in order to take the current incident under control. Most likely he did not know 
about it. On the contrary to the opinion expressed by imperial historians, al-Jabarti says that 
Ali Bey surrounded Ebu’z-zeheb’s house, but Ebu’z-zeheb escaped towards the south and 
took refuge with Eyub Bey, the administrator of Jirja. However, Eyub Bey corresponded with 
Ali Bey despite Ebu’z-zeheb seeking refuge with him. When Ebu’z-zeheb realized that, he 
killed Eyub Bey and formed an alliance with all the other exiles and Qasimi emirs against Ali 
Bey. As soon as Ali Bey discovered that, Ebu’z-zeheb prepared a military troop lead by 
İsmail Bey. When the two troops met, Ismail Bey permeated and formed a unity with Ebu’z-
zeheb. When only few soldiers returned to Cairo, Ali Bey was infuriated. This time Ali Bey 
equipped another troop led by Tantawi Ali Bey and other sancak emirs. 
“At the beginning of Muharrem 1186/ April 1771, Ali Bey’s troops headed south. The two 
sides engaged on 15 Muharrem/18 April, the good fighters of Qasimis determined the result of the 
war. Ali Bey was defeated and escaped to Cairo. It is said that Ali Bey was going to surround the 
castle, but instead, he collected his all belongings and escaped towards Syria with his men on 25 
Muharrem/28 April. On 26 Muharrem/ 29 April Ebu’z-zeheb came to Cairo and became the 
şeyhülbeled. The first thing he did as a şeyhülbeled was to kill the officer, Abdullah Kethüda, who was 
responsible for the mint and declared the invalidity of the coins minted in the era of Ali Bey.116 
Ali Bey came to Egypt with a troop and the children of Zahir al-Omar. Ebu’z-zeheb got 
prepared for encountering him. He established his tent outside of Cairo and waited for Ali Bey. The 
troops of Ebu’z-zeheb and Ali Bey came across in Salihiyye in 8 Safer/ 1 May. Ali Bey was defeated 
again and suffered a serious injury. They took him to tent of Ebu’z-zeheb. Ebu’z-zeheb welcomed him 
outside of the tent, kissed his hand and helped him to go into the tent by linking his arm, but killed 
Tantawi Ali Bey and other emirs. They went to Cairo after a week, took Ali Bey to his house in 
                                                        
116 Al-Jabarti, Ajaib, p. 581-582. 
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Azbakiyye. Doctors came to house for healing Ali Bey but he died seven days later after they arrived 
Cairo on 15 Safer 1187/ 8 May 1773. They said he was dead because of his injuries.”  
It is remarkable to state that al-Jabarti does not narrate any negative anecdote about 
Egyptian people’s daily life being affected by the political unrest. Nevertheless, al-Jabarti 
mentions that he did not include all the details of Ali bey’s story and he indicates that he 
narrated the events “by failing memory and by a mind weakened and distorted by accumulated 
worries, grieves, political disturbances, the decay of states, and the rise of base persons.” al-Jabarti 
continues by adding his good will: “Perhaps the withered branch will turn green again; the star 
which has set will rise again; fate will smile after glowering at us, and will notice us again after 
feigning ignorance.”117 
Both chronicles of Jabarti and Enveri provide us first-hand information about Ali 
Bey’s rebellion. It is possible to acquire significant impressions from their narratives despite 
some elements of bias and their limited narrations. From Enveri’s narrative, it is clearly seen 
that Ali Bey’s action was regarded as a rebellion against the central government and the 
Ottoman sultan. Ali Bey is seen as rebellious and bluntly opposed to sharia law. However, it 
seems that the central government did not regard Ali Bey as a local administrator determined 
to gain his autonomy and extend his authority to other provinces of the Empire. Instead, he 
was regarded as an unruly local administrator. The central government was concerned about 
the conflict between two local figures; insomuch as the Porte was worried that if their conflict 
continued, it would jeopardize the security of pilgrims. Thus, the Ottoman side perceived Ali 
Bey’s Syria campaign as a conflict between himself and the governor of Syria, Osman Pasha, 
rather than a local administrator’s extension of his sphere of authority.  
                                                        
117 Hathaway, al-Jabarti’s History, p. 109. It seems that the task of writing down of his history up to the year 1805 took place 
in that same year (1220/1805) when Jabarti was in his early fifties; see Ayalon, “Djabarti”, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol.2, pp. 
355-357. 
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Nonetheless, Ali Bey as a disloyal mamluk to the central government did not aim to 
establish a new country by separating his province from the Empire. However, he was 
considered almost a perfidious individual who stabbed his master in the back during his war 
against the ‘infidel’. Enveri only complained about Ali Bey’s greediness, which led to a 
disruption in the good order and oppression of the people of Haremeyn.  
Moreover, Enveri provides the letter that Ali Bey sent to the people of Damascus. 
One can read from this letter a self-reflection of Ali Bey coupled with an explanation of his 
motives against Gürcü Osman Pasha. The letter describes Osman Pasha as a man who ruined 
the lives of people, their property and honour. Enveri’s script adds that merchants, pilgrims as 
well as travellers suffered from Gürcü Osman Pasha’s cruelty and he claims himself as their 
redeemer.  
On the other hand, the phrase of “miru’l-hajj-ı sabık ve kaimmakam-ı Mısır hâlâ” 
indicates that Ali Bey did not claim himself as an establisher of a new country by separating 
Egypt, Hijaz and Syria from the Ottoman Empire. Instead of the sultan or emperor, Ali Bey 
refers to himself as ‘kaimmakam-ı Mısır / deputy of Egypt province’, a title given by the 
central government to the şeyhülbeled of Egypt during the absence of a governor in Egypt. At 
this point, both chronicles mention that Ali Bey dismissed the present governor of Egypt, 
Rakım Mehmed Pasha, when he discovered that Rakım Mehmed Pasha was in the process of 
preparing an intervention. Had his aim been to establish a new rule in Egypt by excluding 
Ottoman imperial authority, he would have dismissed the governor long before and in a 
strategic manner. Neither of the chronicles provides us with concrete information about Ali 
Bey’s preparations for a planned dismissal.  
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Chapter Conclusion 
The Ottoman chronicles give no sign that Ali Bey was considered by the central 
government as a local administrator who attempted to establish a separate government. 
Neither the Friday sermons nor his letter to Damascus implies that Ali Bey intended to 
withdraw Egypt, Syria and Hijaz from Ottoman rule. However, Ali Bey was viewed as a 
rebellious local administrator who caused troubles in several ways whilst the Empire was in 
war with “infidel”: Ali Bey prevented the Egyptian soldiers from attending the campaign 
between Russia and the Empire; moreover, the soldiers were sent to Syria in order to suppress 
his attempt; and all of these caused extra cost during the financially difficult times of the 
empire. The Ottoman chronicles regarded Ali Bey as a disobedient person, who disrespected 
both the sultan’s and the sharia law, and disturbed the people and towns by ordering military 
campaigns. However, he was not regarded as separatist who attempted to establish his own 
government and country. The signs showing that his prior aim was to gain authority in Egypt 
and surrounding territory rather than an independence from the Empire can be summarized in 
three points: 
Ali Bey’s disobedience included his failing to send the annual tribute to Istanbul. Ali 
Bey neglected to send the irsaliye-i hazine; however, this was not happening for the first time 
in Egypt. There were examples of his predecessors who kept back the irsaliye for even longer 
times. Therefore, it may be difficult to interpret it as a sign of an intention to found an 
independent state. Some researchers suggest that Ali Bey had his name invoked in the Friday 
sermons, yet, we do not have clear evidence on this point. In support of this, al-Jabarti’s 
narration makes no reference to Ali Bey attempting to have his name being mentioned in the 
Friday sermon. 
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In addition to the abovementioned points, there is not sufficient evidence of Ali Bey 
giving himself the title of “sultan” of Egypt. Although a simple narration about him being 
fond of the history of Egypt and perhaps envious of the Mamluk sultans, he never claimed 
himself as a sultan, even in the letter that he sent to Damascus, in order to persuade the people 
to obey his suzerainty. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to interpret that when Ali Bey 
was the şeyhülbeled of Egypt, he was the most powerful administrator of his town and he 
enjoyed a full authority in Egypt between 1769 and 1772. He deposed the governors. By 
using the titles of ‘şeyhülbeled’ and ‘kaimmakam of the governor’ given by the central 
government and the local administrators and elites he claimed all the authority in his person. 
Ali Bey gained his full authority by eliminating all his potential opponents, including those 
who carried him to his current post. 
We can also assert that Ali Bey was such an ambitious local authority in the second 
half of the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt that while having full authority in his hands in 
Egypt, he attempted to extend it to both the Hijaz and Syria. Yet still after examining the 
existing documents, we do not come across any discourse referring to Ali Bey’s being the 
sultan of his periphery, or declaring war against the central government nor do we see him 
claiming himself as the holder of sultanic authority.  
It is also noteworthy that the decrees and financial documents show that the public 
life of Egypt was affected to a minimum level. The maintenance work of sedds, dams, bridges 
and other public buildings continued, and this demonstrates that social life was not affected to 
a great extent. Although the Ottoman historians labelled Ali Bey as “‘asi-rebel”, there is no 
evidence of Ali Bey being oppressive and tyrannical towards Egypt’s urban and peasant 
population. On the other hand, there is not any sign by Ali Bey of directly opening a banner of 
rebellion. It is true that there were some struggles and conflicts between Ali Bey and the 
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central government’s representatives. Ali Bey tested his limits and sought to extend his 
authority to neighbouring provinces. The hierarchical relationship between Egypt and the 
central government was, at least temporarily, disconnected. There was no acting governor in 
Egypt, state control, fell far short of what it is “ideally” expected to be and this state of affairs 
persisted throughout the period between 1768 and 1772. However, it is clear that one cannot 
detect a prolonged breakdown of state control in the region and it bears remembering that the 
period of “state breakdown” corresponds almost precisely to the duration of the Russo-
Ottoman war of 1768 to 1774. Moreover, the daily lives of the Egyptian people were affected 
to a minimum level, as al-Jabarti does not mention a narration of hardship being suffered by 
the people. Trade and agriculture were also not seriously affected. Although there was a short 
period of loss of control, the central government managed to handle the situation.
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CHAPTER II: Economic conditions and European commercial 
relationships and interests in Egypt 
 
Positioning Egypt in the world and, of course, in the Ottoman Empire’s economy is 
crucial in understanding the actions of the local notables of Egypt. Economic conditions are 
determinative on both human behaviour and the fate of states. To be able to examine the 
uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir and his position against the central government during the 
Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), we have to consider the economic status of Egypt during 
the eighteenth century. Strengthening their position day-by-day mamluk beys had a control on 
the administrative posts such as şeyhülbeled, emirulhajj and defterdar. It is important to 
evaluate the extent of the economic opportunities their posts offered them. Ascertaining 
whether the people and the local administrators experienced prosperity, or eighteenth century 
Cairo was a scene of a poverty, famine and depression in its economic status will be an 
indication of motives behind Ali Bey’s and other ambitious mamluk beys’ actions. Also, 
unravelling the priorities of the central government in terms of its encouragement of 
agricultural productivity and a thriving economy in Egypt and, more importantly, the nature 
of the central government’s attitude and protectiveness towards Egypt in this sense will bring 
to light key aspects of the political and social life of eighteenth century Egypt. The income 
levels and standard of living enjoyed by local administrators and merchants will be revelatory 
in terms of prevailing economic conditions in the province and will show us whether the 
economic conditions of Egypt in the eighteenth century was weak as it is suggested by some 
historians or was it reverse.1  
                                                        
1 S. J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century: Nizamname-i Mısır of Jezzar Ahmed Pasha, (Harvard U. P., 1962)  
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On the other hand, Egypt’s position in the world economy and politics during the 
pre-colonial period is another problematic that this study aims to investigate. A number of 
researchers have sought to highlight British and French interest in Egypt in the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century in one hand2, and speculated about Russian involvement in the eastern 
Mediterranean during the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774) and Russia’s ambitions and 
intentions in the context of Tsarina Catherine’s policy of encouraging local administrators to 
rise against the Ottoman Empire’s central government3. The relationship between the mamluk 
beys, especially Ali Bey al-Kabir and Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb, and consuls and/or 
commanders who represented the governments of the Britain, France and Russia is interesting 
and deserves to be investigated, as Egypt was in these countries’ agenda for political and/or 
commercial reasons. The reason that connects this topic to current study is the point of local 
elites that foreign countries concentrated on in order to position Egypt separately from the 
imperial government’s sphere and achieve their political or commercial goals. The main 
motivation of Britain and France was to open up the upper part of the Red sea to foreign trade. 
Since they failed to achieve their aim through normal diplomatic channels, they opted for 
negotiation with the local administrators of Egypt, i.e., the mamluk beys. Current literature 
suggests two different approach styles from these countries towards the mamluk beys: 
                                                        
2 Despina Vlami, Trading with the Ottomans: the Levant Company in the Middle East, (London, 2015); Christine Laidlaw, 
British in the Levant: Trade and Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, (London, New York, 2010); 
Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square English Traders in the Levant in the eighteenth century, (London: Macmillan, 
1967); Daniel Crecelius “A Late Eighteenth Century Austrian Attempt to Develop the Red Sea Trade Route”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp. 262-280; M. A Anis, Some Aspects of British Interest in Egypt in the Late 18th 
Century (1775-1798), unpublished PhD thesis (University of Birmingham, 1950); I.S. Russell, The Later History of The 
Levant Company 1753-1825, unpublished PhD thesis (The Victoria University of Manchester, 1935); Rosemarie Janet Said, 
George Baldwin and British interests in Egypt 1775-1798, unpublished doctoral dissertation, (University of London, 1968); 
Alfred C. Wood, History of the Levant Company (Oxford, 1935), p. 125. While Vlami’s study provides an up-to-date account 
on the Levant Company, the dissertations of Russell and Anis provide detailed information on the British-French competition 
in Egypt depending mostly on the National Archives in London.   
3 Constantin Panchenko, “Russian sources on the history of Ottoman Egypt 16th-18th centuries”, in Daniel Crecelius and 
Mohammad Husam al-Din Ismail, eds., Abhas al-Mutemer al-Salis li al-Dirasat al-Uthmaniyya fi Misr, (Cairo, 2004), pp. 1-
13; Daniel Crecelius, “Russia’s relations with the Mamluk Beys of Egypt in the Late Eighteenth Century”, in Farhad Kazemi 
and R. D. McChesney, ed., A Way Prepared Essays on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder, (NewYork Press, 
1988), pp. 55-67. 
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Positioning the şeyhülbeled and mamluk beys as an alternative to the imperial administration, 
they sought to attract their support by promising them huge revenues. For the aforementioned 
reasons, this chapter will focus on the economic condition of the province and European 
commercial relationships with and European countries’ interest in Egypt, in order to further 
investigate the role of foreign influence on Ali Bey’s uprising. 
Section 1: The economic condition of Egypt in the eighteenth century 
On the one hand, Egypt was a key component of both global and Ottoman economic 
interests in the eighteenth century. Settled at the crossroads of Asia and Africa, Egypt has 
always been a centre of attraction for centuries and known as umm al-dunya, mother of the 
world, because of its fertility and prosperity.4 Previous research has revealed that it had a 
crucial position in the circulation of goods destined for the domestic market of the empire as 
well as between Asia and Europe.5 For Egyptian merchants, it was a connection point, whose 
branches stemmed from Cairo and reached to Venice, Goa, Aleppo or Nigeria. On the other 
hand, Egypt was the biggest province of the Empire in terms of revenue potential, due to its 
productivity and its unique position between east and west. Egypt’s agricultural products such 
as grain, cotton, tobacco, and sugar cane not only supplied the imperial pantry, and holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina, but also occupied a significant place in Istanbul’s market, which, in 
times of dearth caused crisis and required the central government’s intervention in order to 
keep prices for urban residents under control.   
                                                        
4 Faruk Bilici, XIV. Louis ve İstanbul’u Fethi Tasarısı Louis XIV et son Projet de Conquete D’Istanbul, (TTK: Ankara, 2004), 
p. 45 Bilici mentions that Egypt had always been subject to competition for authority and domination by the imperial powers 
due to its fertility and geo-strategic position. Even XIV. Louis was advised to conquer Egypt by his advisors. 
5 Daniel Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18 th Century”, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 24, No. 2, (May 1992), pp. 189-206; Nelly Hanna, Making big Money in 1600 The Life 
and Times of Isma’il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998); Andre Raymond, Arab 
cities in the Ottoman Period: Cairo, Syria and the Maghreb, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Michael Reimer, “Ottoman 
Alexandria: The Paradox of Decline and the Reconfiguration of Power in Eighteenth-Century Arab Provinces”, Journal of 
the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1994) pp. 107-146 
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The products from the fertile lands around the Nile and the coastal area of the 
Mediterranean served as the central food source for the people in Istanbul and Haremeyn 
besides Egypt’s people, and its geographic position allowed both the local merchants and 
administrators to acquire a generous income. Rather than supporting the central government 
in their military aspects, Egypt provided the central government with large quantities of grain 
and tax revenue. For this reason, it can be suggested that in general, Istanbul did not expect 
significant armed support from Cairo, but always wanted the surplus of the treasury.  6  
The Ottoman Empire had a huge economic and financial advantage with the 
acquisition of Egypt in the sixteenth century. Land and urban taxes along with customs dues 
from the ports of the Nile, Red Sea and the Mediterranean filled the treasury of Egypt. After 
covering the expenses of the annual hajj caravan, and the grain and financial supports for the 
people of Haremeyn, the surplus of the treasury was sent to the central government in 
Istanbul. One year after the Ottoman conquest, the amount of the irsaliye-i hazine reached 16 
million paras and it increased to 20 million paras. With the introduction of new regulations, 
political and economic stability was accomplished by the end of the century.7 Furthermore, 
Egypt supplied the imperial kitchen and pantry with various products and foodstuffs such as 
rice, sugar, lentils and coffee. In addition, military supplies like gunpowder, twine and cord 
were sent annually for use by the army and navy. From time to time, peksimit, which is a dry 
biscuit for soldiers and sailors on campaign, was provided in large quantities by Egyptian 
people. Numerous sultanic decrees were issued on crop, military supplies and peksimit 
transport in the mühimme-i Mısır defter series. Between the years 1739 and 1790, 96.200 
qantars of peksimit was provided for the Ottoman army from Egypt via the port of 
                                                        
6 The number of soldiers that the central government asked from the Egyptian governor was not usually more than 3000 
according to Mühimme-i Mısır Defter series in BOA (for example, see MMD, vol., 4, nr. 12 (date mid B 1139/early March 
1727) 
7 Michael Winter, “Ottoman Egypt, 1525-1609”, in Martin W. Daly, ed., The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. II: Modern 
Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 5 
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Alexandria.8 557,5 qantars of twine and wick were sent to imperial shipyard between 1763 
and 1768. In addition, it is recorded 50 qantars of gunpowder was supplied from Egypt in 
1740.9  
Considering all the goods were sent from Egypt to Istanbul, it might be thought that 
the Ottoman Empire exploited Egypt as a province, but in fact it was the reverse. Egypt’s 
integration into a vast empire, which established a stable rule over its territory compared to 
contemporary regimes, provided a peaceful environment for its tax-paying residents (reaya), 
which allowed Egypt to experience a long period of prosperity. 10  Bruce Masters, while 
looking for an answer to the question of: “Why did Arabs accept the Ottoman sovereignty and 
did not revolt?”, finds the response in the economic arena. He mentions that the Ottoman 
sovereignty provided a prosperous milieu in which the Arab merchants developed their 
trade.11 In addition to a peaceful milieu, the Porte did not leave Egypt on its own but sustained 
and supported all the production and construction needs of the province. There are numerous 
examples and cases where the Porte spent large sums on conserving agricultural areas of the 
coast of Mediterranean, and reconstructing and rebuilding important public buildings in 
different areas of Egypt.12 
During the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period, Egypt always served as a 
crossroads where commercial goods were bought and sold. Its location between Asia and 
Europe allowed it to serve as an entrepôt for Indian goods, especially fabrics and spices, while 
                                                        
8 1 qantar equals to 56,449 kg 
9 For peksimit; 20.000 qantars in early L 1151/12-22 January 1739 MMD, vol. 5, nr. 445, {25.000 qantars in early CA 
1156/23 June-2 July 1743 (MMD, vol. 6, nr. 56), 1.200 qantars in late Sh 1171/early May 1758 (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 461), 
{40.000 qantars in late S 1188 in early May 1774 (MMD, vol. 8, nr. 646), 10.000 qantars in 24 C 1204/11 March 1790 
(C.BH, 9582), for twine and wick; 187,5 qantars in 1763 (D.BŞM.MSR, 7/30)}, 50 qantars in early M 1179/late June 1765 
(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 338), 320 qantars in mid RA 1182/ early August 1768 (MMD, vol. 8, nr. 588), for gunpowder, 50 qantars 
in early C 1153/late August 1740 (MMD, vol. 5, nr. 557). 
10 Winter, “Ottoman Egypt”, p. 6 
11 Bruce Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 8 
12 Research on construction and maintenance of dams, canals and bridges see Alan Mikhail, “An irrigated empire: The view 
from Ottoman Fayyum”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 42, No. 4, pp.569-590; Mücahide Güneş, XVII. 
Yüzyılda İskenderiye Limanı, unpublished master dissertation (İstanbul University, 2009) 
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Alexandria, Damietta and Rosetta on the Mediterranean coast, Suez, Tur and Qusayr on the 
Red Sea, and Bulaq on the Nile, served as transit zones for Asian goods. 13  Before the 
Ottoman conquest during the Mamluk Sultanate, the transit trade passing through Egypt was 
also vibrant. However, after the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the weakening of 
the Mamluk sultanate, the trade migrated to the south for a short period. Because of the 
Portuguese activity and harassment of commercial traffic in the Indian Ocean, Muslim 
merchants’ commerce whose trade had made Egypt a trade centre decreased considerably.14  
Ibn Iyas, the last historian of the Mamluk Sultanate, reports that in the years 1514-
1515 the port of Alexandria was desolated and no goods came to port. Besides other 
conditions, the high customs imposed by the Mamluk sultan also played a role in the decline 
of trade. At the same time, the port of Suez was empty for the last five-six years because of 
Portuguese pressure.15 The financial and political instability of Egypt alongside deficiency in 
the ability to cope with rivals in the Indian Ocean were the main factors that caused decrease 
in commercial activity of the region. According to some historians16, the decline of Egyptian 
industries, especially sugar and textiles, the depopulation of urban and rural areas and the 
reduction of agricultural revenues indicate the extent of the decrease in the economy. 
However, Nelly Hanna opposes this hypothesis of a sharp decline by claiming that the extent 
of the decrease was not that influential on the trade and asserts that if the overall picture were 
as bad as claimed by some researchers, Bulaq would not have survived as a commercial 
centre between 1450-1600. According to Hanna, the decline did not cover every branch of the 
                                                        
13 Abdülhamid Hâmid Sulayman, Tarikh al-mawâni’ al-Misriyah fi al-‘asri al-‘Uthmâni, (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Misriyah al-
Âmmah lil-Kitâb, 1995) p. 18 
14 Salih Ozbaran, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, vol. 
31, pp. 65-146 
15 Ibn Iyas, Badâ’i‘ al-Zuhûr fi Wakâyi‘ al-Duhûr, V vols, (Beirut, 2010) vol. IV, p. 320 and vol. V, p. 128 
16 Ahmad Darrag, L’Egypte sous le regne de Barsbay (Damas:Institute Francais de Damas, 1961); Michael Dols, The Black 
Death in the Middle Ages, (Princeton, 1979) 
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economy and was temporary in many fields. She supports her claim with the information 
from travellers’ that visited Cairo at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, and mentions the number of warehouses built by Sultan Qaytbay as an 
indication of commercial prosperity.17 
In the first decade of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire sent assistance to the 
Mamluk Sultanate in order to deal with the Portuguese navy in the Indian Ocean by sending 
both equipment and soldiers under the command of Selman Reis, the Turkish mariner. 
However, the weakened Mamluk sultanate could not cope with expansionist European forces. 
The Mamluk Sultanate’s situation generated a valid reason to organise an expedition. In 1517, 
Ottoman forces defeated the Mamluk sultan at the battle of Ridaniye and conquered Egypt. 
From that day onwards, Syria, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula were under Ottoman rule and 
the new ruler of these lands fortified the borders. As a sacred land of Islam, the Ottoman 
sultan regarded the Hijaz region as a restricted zone and banned European ships from entering 
the area north of Jidda. The Ottoman-Portuguese conflict continued up until the last quarter of 
the sixteenth century. During this period, Muslim merchants continued to trade with India, as 
their profits were high and consequently pushed the Ottomans to undertake efficient policies 
for promoting the trade of the Red Sea and Egyptian ports. These ports gained importance 
once more and trade began to increase. 18  The political and economic stability attracted 
European merchants to Egyptian ports, particularly to Alexandria. Both Egyptian merchants 
and the government recognized the profit from the coffee trade, which began in the beginning 
of the sixteenth century, and took the place of the spice trade by the end of the century. 
                                                        
17 Nelly Hanna, An Urban History of Bulaq in the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods, (Le Caire: Institut Francais d’archeologie 
orientale, 1983) p. 18-19. A number of European travellers such as Fabri, Berterino and Thenaud mentioned Cairo as a great 
city and a meeting point for the merchants from Europe, India, Turkey and Africa. Also, al-Sahawi tells us that six 
commercial warehouses were constructed by Sultan Qaytbay. 
18 Özbaran, “Hindistan Yolu”, p. 97 
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It is most likely that being incorporated within the Ottoman Empire enhanced 
Egypt’s economic status and strength since, by 1500, Mamluk control over the region had 
weakened because of its sprawling territories that stretched from Persia to Morocco and it was 
no longer in a position to resist the expansionist policies of European countries such as 
Portuguese activities in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, under Ottoman protection, Egypt was 
able to maintain its economic status as a key region of commodity exchange between East and 
West. Cairo was a junction point in which imported goods were distributed to the Delta and 
Upper Egypt. In addition, it was an international commercial centre, and its zone of economic 
activity covered as far as Arabia and India via the Red Sea; Abyssinia and Central Africa19 via 
the Nile; and Europe and other provinces of the Ottoman Empire via the Mediterranean. The 
numerous entrepôts built in Cairo, Rosetta and Bulaq demonstrated that trade increased 
during the Ottoman period.20 It can therefore be inferred that the first contribution of Ottoman 
sovereignty over Egypt demonstrated itself by bringing stability and a secure environment for 
conducting trade within a strategic commercial zone that was having difficult times due to 
weak Mamluk rule.  
Bulaq is a significant example of the results that were achieved for the growth of 
Egypt’s economy in the eighteenth century. It was widened as an urbanized area and joined to 
Cairo during the eighteenth century. The urban development of Bulaq started in the late 
thirteenth/ early fourteenth century during the reign of the Mamluk sultan al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Ḳalāwūn (regn. 693/1293-4, 698-708/1299-1309, 709-41/1310-41), when 
Bulaq began to play a role in the grain trade; but because of geographic obstacles it could not 
                                                        
19 The traditional two products brought from Central Africa to Cairo and sent to European countries were gold powder and 
slave. Because of lack of safety in Sahara routes, or more probably Central Africa trade migrating to Europe and America, 
slave and gold trade between Egypt and Central Africa sharply reduced in the eighteenth century. It can be supposed that 
Europe affected Egyptian, therefore Ottoman economy in a quite early period (Andre Raymond, Arab cities, p.184) 
20 Raymond, Arab cities, p.182 
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flourish until the fifteenth century.21 The shifting of the trade route for spices from Aden and 
Aydhab to Jidda and Suez in the fifteenth century contributed to Bulaq’s development. The 
commerce with European merchants also enabled Bulaq to develop. The roads to Cairo were 
maintained and improved, and some manufacturing structures such as a sugar refinery, grain 
mills and leather works were established here. In addition, the elites were building their 
palatial houses near Birkat al-fil, Azbakiyya or Bulaq. Abdurrahman Kethüda’s glorious 
palace covered 10.550 square meters.22 Bulaq housed 24.000 people towards the end of the 
eighteenth century.23 
Bulaq served as a station for wholesale trade between the Mediterranean and the Red 
Sea after the decline of the port of Misr (old Egypt) by the fifteenth century. It became the 
most important port of Cairo. Commercial activities were the primary factor that constituted 
Bulaq’s new urban form. It experienced a structural change day by day according to the needs 
of the trading group. The customhouse was the building needed in the beginning. 
Subsequently, new areas underwent urbanization to accommodate the growing population. 
The area between Cairo and Bulaq urbanized day by day by the incorporation of residential 
quarters into the commercial areas.  
Commerce was the primary factor behind the urban development and expansion of 
Bulaq as well as the distribution of buildings in the town. The most active and the wealthiest 
area was near the river, where the goods arrived, were unloaded and taxed. The wakalas, the 
commercial entrepôts, were also located there. Moreover, this area was favoured for building 
mosques, sebils, and caravanserais. Bulaq was a busy commercial location like Qasaba in 
Cairo, but unlike Qasaba, Bulaq’s architecture was commercial. According to a late 
eighteenth century source, the Mısır Nizamnamesi written by Cezzar Ahmed Pasha, Bulaq had 
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22 Raymond, Cairo, p. 278 
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more than ten thousand houses and agriculturally fertile lands, and confirmed that there were 
big caravanserais, public bathes and mosques in Bulaq.24 
From the days of the Mamluk sultanate to the end of the Ottoman reign, rulers 
always invested in Bulaq and constructed buildings. Among the Ottoman governors, 
Süleyman Pasha (1525-1535) and Sinan Pasha (1569-1571) built or bought caravanserais in 
Bulaq and even after finishing their duty in Cairo they continued to manage their investments 
in Egypt. Süleyman Pasha financed the construction of over 25 buildings. Davud Pasha 
(1537-38), İskender Pasha (1556-1559), Hasan Pasha (1580-1582), Ali Pasha (1558/1559), 
Hafız Ahmed Pasha (1591-1594), Mehmed Pasha (1596-1598) and Bayram Pasha (1626-
1628) were among the other Ottoman governors who erected buildings or had properties in 
Bulaq. They did not hesitate to invest in Bulaq even though they stayed in Egypt for only a 
short term, perhaps two or three years, because it did not impose financial risks. The 
architecture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stands out as the best example of the 
Ottoman period; as monuments were built by the people who held the political and economic 
power in their hands. A mosque, a public bath, part of a qaysariyya and several caravanserais 
are still standing as the monuments of the early Ottoman period construction. Hanna gives 
detailed information about the number of buildings. She counts nine caravanserais, and other 
hans, mosques, public baths and shops built by the early Ottoman governors and mentions 
that Bulaq reached its largest expansion during this period.25 
After the sixteenth century, merchants, officials, and aristocrat families replaced the 
governors as new builders of Bulaq. The Asi family was one of the earliest and outstanding 
families that constructed buildings in Bulaq. Abdulqawi al-Asi attained the title of 
                                                        
24 Ayşe Emecen, Suriye Bölgesinde Bir Osmanlı Valisi ve İmajı: Cezzar Ahmed Paşa (TSMA, nr E.4079daki Takrir ve 
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shahbender al-tuccar of Bulaq and Misr al-qadima (old Egypt) in 1580. Also, the Hasabs 
were another family who also invested in Bulaq. In addition to these two families, many other 
merchants or officers, who al-Jabarti calls ayan-ı Bulaq, took part in constructing new 
buildings such as caravanserais, mills, grinders, shops, sabils (public fountains) and mosques 
in Bulaq. To a lesser extent, constructions included industrial facilities such as sugar presses 
and cloth-dyeing workshops. Although they are not recorded in detail in sources, the 
construction was also active in the late Ottoman period. Over 25 wakalas were built between 
1600-1798.26 The apogee of Bulaq was during the Ottoman period. By the nineteenth century, 
railway systems were introduced in Cairo and it abolished both river traffic and the customs 
house. 
Against the hypothesis of dramatic reduction in trade in Egypt as a direct result of 
Yavuz Sultan Selim taking the artisans and merchants to Istanbul after the conquest of Egypt, 
Raymond mentions that the men who Yavuz Selim took to Istanbul in fact returned to Egypt 
after a short time, hence this could not have led to a dramatic reduction in trade.27 In addition, 
it is claimed that by becoming a province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and especially its 
capital Cairo, was adversely affected in terms of economy and trade. However, it can be said 
that although the production of luxury goods and artisanal products for the sultans and their 
palace personnel decreased and migrated in part to Istanbul, Egypt became an enormous 
market that opened up to the empire’s other provinces, especially Der-saadet, the imperial 
capital Istanbul.28 
Cairo was the centre for manufacturing and consumption. Besides its population 
density, Cairo was the place of residence for the politically and socially high-ranking and rich 
people who made up the dominant mamluk beys, important traders and the ulema class. It was 
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27 Raymond, Arab cities, p.180 
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these groups in particular that drove consumer demand for luxury goods. The decisive 
commodities for the Egyptian trade were coffee and spices. At least 62 caravanserais were 
designated to the sale of these two commodities in Cairo.29 Besides the Indian and European 
trade, being incorporated into a huge empire resulted in a reinvigoration of the activity of 
Egypt’s ports. In addition, domestic trade was also being realized in huge volume between 
other ports of the empire in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. The small amount of 
manufacturing in the coastal areas of the Mediterranean and the large quantity of agricultural 
products surrounding the Nile delta were in demand in Istanbul. Domestic trade played an 
important role in economic well-being and integrity to the empire.30 Raymond considers the 
sixteenth century as a difficult period of transition, the seventeenth century as a development 
period, and regards the eighteenth century as the peak of oriental commerce for the broad 
range of Egyptian trade.31  
Egypt’s continuing importance for the domestic trade of the Empire in the eastern 
Mediterranean is demonstrated by the fact that in 1783, more than two and a half centuries 
after the Ottoman conquest, 77% of the total trade in Alexandria was realized with other 
Ottoman ports.32 Panzac states that the merchants who carried out commerce in Egypt and 
other Ottoman ports were mostly Muslims and Turks (Alexandria: 92.7%, Istanbul: 71.7%, 
Algeria: 79.5%, Crete: 91.6%).33 On the other hand, the ports of Egypt attracted many ships 
from European countries, which were given capitulations by the Ottoman sultan. In the 
eighteenth century, France, Dubrovnik and Venice were the three trading partners that 
conducted commerce in Alexandria, which was Egypt’s biggest port and the gateway to 
                                                        
29 Ibid., p.180 
30 Daniel Panzac, “18.Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Bölgesel ve Milletlerarası Deniz Ticareti”, Süleyman Demirel 
Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 2000, vol. 5, p. 368 
31 Raymond, Arab cities, p.184 
32 Idris Bostan, “ An Ottoman Base in Eastern Mediterranean: Alexandria of Egypt in the 18th Century”, in Cengiz Tomar, ed., 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Egypt During The Ottoman Era (İstanbul, 2010), p. 68 
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Europe. English, Neapolitan and Russian ships were the other participants who conducted 
trade in Egypt. In addition to commerce, the European ships were employed by the central 
government for shipment of Egyptian goods to the imperial capital.34 Panzac states that 50% 
of the total trade between Alexandria and Istanbul is accounted for by European ships.35  
We can also learn about the commercial volume of Egypt from Panzac. In 1783, the 
trade recognized in Alexandria port was worth 60.914 livres tournois; 77% of it took place 
within domestic ports and 23% with European ports. Due to natural factors, Egypt lacked 
some basic raw materials like iron, copper, coal and wood, and had to import some of their 
requirements from Europe and others from different parts of the Empire. It is estimated that 
the total value of the imports from Europe was about 36 million paras in 1798.36 Another 
issue that had an effect on Egypt’s economy was the ‘structural harmony between basic urban 
activities, handicrafts, and commerce’.37 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, half of 
the population of Cairo was involved in artisan activities, one third was involved in 
commercial activities, and the rest were involved in service industries such as transportation, 
water carrying and entertainment.38  
The ports of Egypt had a significant place in the commercial activities in eighteenth 
century Levant. Mamluk beys were in one way or another involved in Egypt’s commercial 
activity through their relationship with officers in customhouse or merchants. A huge volume 
of trade, and artisanal or commercial activities were being realised under the surveillance or 
with participation of mamluk beys, which ultimately provided a huge profit for them. In the 
so-called decentralization century, the archival documents provide a solid proof of that the 
imperial government monitored the commerce in the ports of Egypt, and tried to keep it under 
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its control. The commercial goods from Egypt supplied a considerable amount of 
merchandised goods in the markets of Istanbul, Aegean islands and Anatolian ports. Different 
reasons such as an increase in the tax due to misconduct of customs officers or greediness of 
the sherifs of Mecca, or lack of goods due to environmental problems resulted in an 
intervention by the central government. Such situations show us that Istanbul maintained a 
close relationship with the Egyptian administrators, not solely the governor but also the local 
administrators as well. Numerous decrees were addressed to the governor alongside with the 
şeyhülbeled, kadı and seven regiment officers, which were demanding application of solutions 
suggested by the central government including forbidding sale of goods to European 
merchants, and in some cases to the provinces. At these times, the main concern of the 
imperial government was to keep the prices at an affordable level in Istanbul, the biggest 
market in the empire. Mehmet Genç points out that the central government had established a 
strong traditional policy basing on three priorities: “provisioning of the urban economy”, 
“fiscal revenue-tax collection”, and “preservation of the traditional order”. 39  The central 
bureaucracy did not hesitate to intervene in local and long distance trade in order to maintain 
these priorities and to make sure of the availability of the goods for the military, the palace 
and the urban economy. Although the early Ottoman sultans tended to be more 
interventionist, in the early modern period (1450-1750) the central government had to be 
more selective when intervening in the trade. Pamuk states that despite the fact that the central 
bureaucracy in the eighteenth century managed the economy of the empire based on 
negotiation with the local notables and merchants, domestic producers did not have enough 
power to pressure the central authority to change the traditions that the central government 
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had established earlier.40 Istanbul applied a pragmatist approach towards ayans by involving 
them in tax revenue collection.41 
As was the case for the rest of the empire, Egypt’s provincial monetary system was 
affected by the circulation of foreign currencies. Especially because of the bunduqi, the 
Venetian ducat and the Spanish riyal, the para was devalued from the late sixteenth century to 
the mid-seventeenth century. However, the Ottoman currency did not devaluate continuously. 
The currency exhibited a more stable situation in the eighteenth century, at least until the 
1780s, and the central government strengthened the monetary linkages with the empire’s 
peripheries.42 
Contrary to the decline paradigm, Pamuk asserts that the time period after the 
sixteenth century should be seen as a reorganisation period during which the empire adapted 
itself to the changing circumstances in Eurasia pragmatically. 43  His research reveals that 
during this period, the central government maintained the control on monetary linkages in 
Egypt. One of main concerns of Istanbul was to keep the rate of silver in para that was minted 
Egypt at the same level as the one minted in Istanbul.44  
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not go easily for the empire’s economy. 
Silver para coins used in daily transactions were progressively devalued by a total of three 
fourths between 1670 and 1798. As a consequence, the movement of gross prices increased. 
Raymond states that the price of one irdeb45 of wheat increased from 69.7 medins (i.e., paras) 
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in 1690 to 360.1 medins in 1791, qantar of butter increased from 300 medins in 1687 to 1.900 
in 1797 and coffee increased from 977 medins in 1690 to 3.313 in 1798.46  
The economic turmoil resulted in a number of economic and social difficulties. From 
1690 to 1736, the province experienced a persistent subsistence crisis and a variety of 
monetary difficulties.47 During the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, chronicles 
mention at least 16 large price increases and 13 monetary crises, however the forty years that 
followed generated a period 48  of recovery and prosperity. Nevertheless, right after that 
recovery period, people suffered from unprecedented price increases and a bout of epidemics, 
plagues and famine in the late eighteenth century. Even if agriculture flourished, economic 
problems persisted due to political disorders and the mamluk beys’ exactions. While 
Raymond claims that the characteristic features of Egypt’s economy in the eighteenth century 
were determined firstly by the dispute between mamluk beys and fiscal demands imposed on 
the subjects, and secondly by deteriorated administration49, Pamuk mentions that the central 
government managed and incorporated rebellious social groups by negotiation during this 
period. The central government adapted to changing circumstances not only in military affairs 
but also in financial institutions.50 
From the seventeenth century, the ağas of the seven regiments began to establish 
their dominance, and the late seventeenth century witnessed the rise of the households. The 
conflict between Kazdağlı and Fiqari followers continued during the century, as well. In the 
eighteenth century mamluk beys became the most powerful figures in the province of Egypt 
and, therefore it fell chiefly to them to manage matters involving money and authority in the 
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province.51 Contemporary historians depict Egypt as a scene of incessant conflicts between 
those who desired to acquire authority. Although they associate eighteenth century Egypt with 
the continuing tyranny of military establishments, the outbreaks of violence between rival 
military households and the episodes of the plague, the Egyptian economy did well 
throughout the eighteenth century. The years 1736-1780 were considered as abundant times 
by al-Jabarti. By mid-century, thanks to political stability, especially during the tenure of 
şeyhülbeled of İbrahim Kethüda (d.1754), Abdurrahman Kethüda (d.1776), Bulutkapan Ali 
Bey (al-Kabir) (d.1773) and Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey (1775), the economy provided 
prosperity for the middle and upper classes.52 
Among them, Abdurrahman Kethüda was the most significant one who used some of 
his vast fortune53 in restoring or building new religious and public works. Raymond mentions 
that Abdurrahman Kethüda had 32.9 million paras that he inherited from his father, apart 
from his other revenues. Abdurrahman Kethüda spent his fortune bringing to Cairo an 
Ottoman aspect. He built or restored 21 religious monuments, seven fountains and two 
bridges.54 Raymond considers Abdurrahman Kethüda as the person who brought the tulip 
period to Egypt and made Cairo “Ottoman”.55 The new architecture style that was introduced 
by Abdurrahman Kethüda between 1739 and 1765 brought to Cairo a new image that was 
similar to Istanbul’s style: Wealthy neighbourhoods were established near lakes or river and 
garden and promenade habitats and fountains and Ottoman style minarets were introduced. 
                                                        
51 Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdaglis, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1997) 
52 Daniel Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth Century”, in Martin W. Daly, ed., The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol.II: 
Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 59. 
53 For detail see Andre Raymond, Yeniçerilerin Kahiresi: Abdurrahman Kethüda Zamanında bir Osmanlı Kentinin Yükselişi, 
(Istanbul, 1999). Turkish translation of Le Caire des Janissaires: L'apogee de la ville ottomane sous 'Abd al-Rahman 
Kathuda (Paris, 1995) 
54 Andre Raymond, Cairo, p. 205. 
55 Andre Raymond, Yeniçerilerin Kahiresi, p. 12. 
 115 
Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776) constructed 12 mosques, 14 fountains, and three 
zaviye (monasteries) between the years 1744-1765, not including the restoration of existing 
buildings. The first and one of the most beautiful ones is the sabil (fountain) of Beyne’l-
Kasreyn, which was built in 1744 and viewed as one of the most important buildings in 
Cairo’s architectural history.56 The mosque of Mutahhar (1744), the restoration of Mosque of 
al-Azhar (1751-1756), the mosque of Şevazliyye (1754), zaviye (monastery) in the 
Mugarbiliyyin street (1754) are the other buildings he constructed.  
Besides the male administrators and nobles who had the authority and power, or 
merchants who had the financial power, female investors were also active in trade and 
investments in Ottoman Cairo. By the commandment of the Holy Qur’an, Muslim women had 
the right of ownership, administration and inheritance of property. Mary Ann Fay’s research 
depending on sharia court documents on vakıfs demonstrates that women were also economic 
participants in Cairo’s lively commercial life.57 Besides their pious aim, vakıfs used to be 
considered a means of investment that removed constraints such as the unequal inheritance 
sharing of women. Of the 496 newly founded vakıf records, women endowed 126 of them in 
the eighteenth century according to the ministry of Awqaf in Cairo. 58  A wide range of 
building types including shops, warehouses, caravanserais, gardens, apartment houses, public 
baths, mills, waterwheels, watering troughs, productive agricultural lands, springs, courtyards 
and coffee houses were endowed by women in the eighteenth century Cairo.       
We encounter some women of the mamluk households in this study as well. The 
daughter of Rıdvan Agha, A’isha Hanım endowed all of a wakala in Bulaq as well as 
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waterwheels, a mill, a baking oven and other places in 1758.59 Also, Zeyneb Hatun, a freed 
slave of the deceased emir İsmail Bey, endowed a considerable property including three 
wakalas, a coffee house, two shops, and a workshop for making and selling bread. Zeyneb 
Hatun’s shops were in the most prestigious places of the city; one in the east bank of Elephant 
lake, which was inhabited only by the members of mamluk households, and one on the 
western side of the city’s main canal, which housed middle rank mamluks. Fay proves in her 
study that women of the eighteenth century Cairo invested their capital in income generating 
properties. From the existing historiography, we can see that the eighteenth century economy 
in Egypt was prosperous and mamluk households as well as ulema and merchants derived 
benefit from it. 
Raymond displays in his studies that the Ottoman period Egypt could measure up to 
the period of the Mamluk Sultanate in terms of quality of architecture and quantity of 
buildings. He mentions that the number of buildings constructed between 1517 and 1798 was 
199, almost as many of as the number of major buildings, which is 233, built over the full 
extent of Mamluk rule.60 The population of the Ottoman Egypt increased as well, in Cairo and 
in the port cities where the trade was being realised such as Damietta and Rosetta. Many 
buildings including mosques, public fountains, schools, bathhouses, and warehouses were 
erected by the wealthy merchants and administrators.  
However, in the second half of the century and as a long-term effect of European 
economic expansion, the Egyptian economy underwent contraction, since European 
merchants introduced coffee and rice that they brought from the New World. Although these 
products were of poor quality, they were bought because they were cheap. Nevertheless, we 
observe that despite the effects of these long-term economic trends, Egypt was still a province 
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that the central government invested in and was in close relationship with. The new edifices 
that were built by two Ottoman sultans in the mid-eighteenth century demonstrate this. A 
fountain and a monastery (tekke) were erected by Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754) in 1750, and 
two fountains were built by Sultan Mustafa (1757-1777) in 1757 and 175961. However, in the 
years that followed, architecture was neglected, especially during the period of Ali Bey al-
Kabir’s authority at which time al-Jabarti complains that the maintenance of streets was 
ignored, let alone witnessing the construction of new buildings.62 
Crecelius claims that the new ruling beys in the second half of the eighteenth century 
including Ali Bey al-Kabir and those who succeeded him, contributed to the ruin of the 
economy, because they were short-sighted, ruined both the foreign and domestic merchant 
communities, left the countryside in chaos, and provoked two military expeditions of 1786 
and 1798, which undermined the foundations of the system that had provided the leadership 
of the province for centuries.63  
To conclude, after becoming a part of the Ottoman Empire, the economic potential of 
Egypt was revealed. The domestic and international trade flourished in the sixteenth century. 
The economic stagnation of the first half of the century was replaced with a thriving economy 
in the second half. Compared with the other provinces of the empire, the Egyptian people 
acknowledged the Ottoman sovereignty more easily, because they shared the same religion 
with the new rulers. However, sharing same religion was not the sole reason that made the 
Egyptian people accept Ottoman rule. The new prosperous economic conditions that the 
Empire provided for Egypt were among other notable factors that made it easier to yield to 
Ottoman sovereignty. Beginning from the mid-sixteenth century, Egypt offered a risk free 
investment opportunity for wealth holders. Even the Ottoman officials who served in Egypt 
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for three or four years made investments during and after their period of office in Egypt. Not 
only the officials won in this situation, but also the local people and neighbourhoods benefited 
from these investments. The foundation and growth of Bulaq as a commercial centre is an 
indication of the development of Egypt during the Ottoman rule. Therefore, the spread of 
wealth and prosperity among the people of Egypt through direct and indirect ways may have 
contributed to the acknowledgement of Ottoman sovereignty.  
The economic development continued in the seventeenth century and as opposed to 
previous claims that Ottoman rule reduced Egypt’s economic prosperity, recent studies have 
proven that the architecture and population of the province increased regularly, despite some 
difficulties associated with the process of transformation during this century. Like Bulaq, 
Azbakiyya can be shown as another example of urban renewal in this period. Azbakiyya was 
founded during the Mamluk Sultanate rule, but continued to develop and became a 
neighbourhood for notables; members of the Bakri family and shaykhs belonging to the 
Bakriyya dervish order and for mamluk beys, for example Ali Bey al-Kabir in the Ottoman 
period.64 One important factor that contributed to the flourishing of Egypt under Ottoman rule 
was its location. Egypt’s unique place at the crossroads of Middle Eastern trade, for example, 
offered great opportunities, and the local administrators had the chance to take advantage of 
this situation and acquire wealth during their tenure in positions of authority. Besides the local 
administrators, the central government also took advantage of Egypt’s favourable position 
with regard to agricultural products and military goods. However, this should not be 
interpreted in such a way that central government became the only beneficiary of this 
economic prosperity. People and traders of Egypt had an opportunity to export goods to 
different parts of the empire and thereby generated revenue for themselves. 
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When it came to the eighteenth century, the prosperous condition of Egypt continued 
for a certain period. The women of Egypt, on the other hand, were visible in the economy of 
the province in the eighteenth century. The number and the variety of buildings increased in 
this period in Egypt as well as the population and the economic volume. It may be the case 
therefore that these investments in Egypt during the Ottoman rule aimed at contributing to the 
well-being of Egypt rather than subjecting Egypt to economic decline. It may also therefore 
be suggested in this study that Egypt’s economy did quite well in the eighteenth century. 
However, it should also be noted here that, with the influence of environmental factors such 
as famine and plague, it did not last to the end of the eighteenth century. 
During the period of change and transformation in the political arena, the officers of 
military regiments came forward in the provincial administration in the seventeenth century 
Egypt, and the mamluk beys took over the authority in the eighteenth century. They were part 
of the military regiments and were also close to the local people. The wealthy local people 
such as villagers and merchants owned mamluks. The military regiments were intimate with 
the mamluk households. The mamluk beys therefore became local actors who played a role in 
political and economic life.  
Raymond’s research on the wealth of the notables in Cairo at the end of the 
seventeenth century demonstrates that a mamluk bey’s wealth was four times more than an 
average merchants’, and twice as much as that of a major merchant’s (tujjar) wealth. On the 
other hand, the wealth of a military officer such as agha and kethüda was greater than that of 
a merchant. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, whilst a bey owned on average 
1.809.482 paras, a janissary agha had 543.896 paras.65 Abdurrahman Kethüda’s personal 
fortune also proved that being a mamluk bey in the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt was a 
                                                        
65 Andre Raymond, “The Wealth of the Egyptian Emirs at the end of the seventeenth century”, in Winter M., Levanoni A., 
ed., Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2004) p. 361. 
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profitable position and it was worth the struggles, even going up against the central authority. 
The contemporary historians and narratives show us that the real reason of mamluk beys’ 
struggle was the desire for acquiring wealth and authority.  Thus, the transition from an 
economy in which both the central government and local authorities and people in Egypt 
benefited in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to a more self-interested economic 
comprehension in the second period of the eighteenth century could be a reason why the 
positive atmosphere in Egypt with regard to the economy turned negative.  
Unlike others, mamluk beys such as Ali Bey al-Kabir concentrated the wealth and 
power that they acquired on their own personal prosperity. Ali Bey and those who succeeded 
him channelized all the wealth to their households rather than investing in the province. They 
altered the structure of commercial communities, which resulted in more European influence. 
Ali Bey also monopolized the authority in his hand by eliminating his rivals. The competition 
between Ali Bey and the governor of Syria, Gürcü Osman Pasha, and his endless ambition to 
raise revenues especially in the ports of the Red Sea, and his determination to extend his 
authority outside of Egypt also indicate a change in the local ruling order. In order to increase 
his revenue for raising an army, Ali Bey, for example, imposed extra taxes on the customs 
holders and various communities in Egypt. Mainly Copts and Jews were affected by these 
reforms. Especially positioning the Christian Syrian community instead of the Jews in the 
customhouses resulted in more Europeans in Egypt that were in position to influence Ali 
Bey’s policies.  
In the light of these governing practices of Ali Bey, which seemed to be derived from 
personal-interest, it can be concluded that there was no intentional policy on the part of the 
central government to leave Egypt in poverty. On the contrary, the words of prosperity and 
expansion are more suitable to define Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century. It would be 
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difficult to expect such a move from the central government with regard to economy while the 
economy served as one of the most important factors which persuaded the people of Egypt to 
acknowledge the sovereignty of Ottoman Empire together with both sides’ sharing the same 
religious beliefs. On the contrary, it can be interpreted as evident that it was the self-interest 
of the local authorities such as Ali Bey, which marked a negative turn in the economy resulted 
in a breakdown of the ties between the central government and the people of Egypt. However, 
this loss of mutual trust and cooperation lasted a very short time, essentially confined to the 
period of the Russo-Ottoman war.  
During this period, especially after Ali Bey al-Kabir dismissed the Jews from the 
customhouses and brought in Syrian Christians, the trade between European merchants and 
Christian residents of Egypt increased, while at the same time the political influence of 
Europe on Egypt increased. From the first conquest onwards, the Ottomans had provided a 
defensive shield against European penetration and colonization. After they repelled the 
Portuguese from the Red Sea in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans maintained their 
relationship with Europe via the Mediterranean. European merchants could only live in 
caravanserais, the buildings that were built for trading and use of merchants in Cairo and the 
main port cities. They maintained their commercial enterprises via their few contacts among 
the native population. Looking from today’s perspective, their activity was really restricted, 
but they had the opportunity to get accustomed to a different society.  
The second half of the eighteenth century Egyptian trade history is to be researched 
by keeping in mind the British-French competition. Their influence on Egypt’s administrators 
and advisors cannot be denied. The short-sighted beys and their advisors always focused on 
the increase of revenues, and thus encouraged the European merchants to come to the Red Sea 
ports. Baldwin, the British trader, made the most effort to open the Red Sea ports for 
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European merchants, especially British merchants, who worried that the French would obtain 
the key to the earth’s trading centre, Egypt, before them. The British traders were worried 
because France had already started doing trade in Egypt in larger volumes than Britain.66  
While European merchants were bargaining with mamluk beys in Egypt, their 
ambassadors were simultaneously negotiating with the central government in Istanbul in order 
to bring their ships to Suez. There was a bargaining between the European merchants and the 
local administrators because the European merchants were liable to the exactions that the 
local administrators were collecting from them. However, these domestic exactions were in 
contravention to the treaties (ahidname) signed between the Ottoman Empire and various 
European countries. Therefore, many decrees were sent to Egyptian ports ordering their 
officials to avoid any exactions apart from the agreed tariffs in order to deal with the 
complaints of the European merchants.67  
To sum up, administrators in eighteenth century Egypt had a great opportunity for 
enjoying enormous power through trading between Asia, India and Europe, thanks to Egypt’s 
geopolitical location and abundant revenues received from taxes. It was the profit to be gained 
by the flourishing commercial activities and great amount of land tax that encouraged 
ambitious mamluk beys such as Ali Bey al-Kabir and foreign countries such as Britain, 
France and Russia from the mid-eighteenth century onwards in the wake of decentralization 
of the Ottoman Empire, to seek to seize full authority over Egypt.68 Local administrators were 
always open to external collaborators such as Russia who might support their stance against 
the central government. 
                                                        
66  For more information about Baldwin’s activities see Rosemary Janet Said’s unpublished doctoral dissertation, George 
Baldwin and British interests in Egypt 1775-1798, University of London, 1968. 
67 For example A.DVN.DVE, 148/6; A.DVNS.AHK.CZRK.d, vol. 2, 1215; C.HR, 2897; In some cases the Porte ordered the 
officers to return the illegal exactions C. BH, 11171  
68 Bashir Zein al-Abdin, the Political System of Ottoman Egypt (1099-1143/1687-1730), unpublished PhD thesis, (School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 1999), p. 62. 
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Crecelius claims that mamluk beys restricted themselves to Egyptian domestic 
issues, and concerned themselves only with increasing their income. Following the basic logic 
of a merchant, they were unaware of the factors that made Europeans “formidable 
competitors” in both the war and commerce sectors. 69  The same shortcoming can be 
suggested not only for the mamluk beys, but also for most Ottoman officials. They were so 
concerned with their personal interests that they could not do anything to compete with the 
Europeans, even when they realized the situation that the empire was in. 
Section 2: European commercial relationships and interests in Egypt 
  
Section 1 aims to demonstrate economic conditions of Egypt and its place in the 
empire’s economy in the eighteenth century. The ports of Egypt and Cairo alongside the ports 
on the Nile were crowded with indigenous and international merchants and their agents 
conducting trade with the Ottoman Empire’s domestic ports and/or European ports. The 
mamluk beys were quite involved in this commercial activity. The commercial activities 
between Ottoman Egypt and European states are worth consideration during the tenure of 
şeyhülbeled of Ali Bey al-Kabir (1760-1772) and Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb (1772-1775). In 
these activities, Crecelius emphasizes the influence of Ali Bey’s relationship with indigenous 
Christians, Copts, and European Christians, and claims that it was the first time that a bey 
interacted with them that closely.70 However, Zens asserts that it was not peculiar to mamluk 
beys to establish close relationship with foreigners in the eighteenth century but it was a 
typical feature of ayans to make agreements with Europeans.71 In the eighteenth century the 
trade with Egypt and the Levant was busy and in demand by the European merchants, so 
much so that there was a stiff competition between the European nations. From the beginning 
                                                        
69 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 68. 
70 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 66 
71 Robert Zens, “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”, History Studies, volume 3/3 2011, pp. 
433-447, p. 447 
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of the century, France, Britain and the Dutch Republic had been competing for more profit in 
their trade with the Levant. Towards the end of the century, when Russia joined the group, the 
rivalry became contentious. Benefits of the trade of the Levant in the eighteenth century did 
not revolve around a favoured nation of the Ottoman Empire, as was the case in previous 
centuries; instead, a broader group of European countries engaged in the commercial activities 
in the ports of Ottoman Empire.72 By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Egypt was a 
stage of rivalry for European nations as far as commerce and politics was concerned. 
However, during this period, which can be named pre-modern or pre-colonial, as well as pre-
industrial, one should not consider Egypt under a direct influence of the European countries, 
as European expansion was still in beginning phase. Colonization activities were in their 
infancy and the French-British rivalry for India had entered a quiescent phase by the time of 
Ali Bey’s tenure of office (1760-1773).73 Transportation was still slow and not yet, until the 
mid-nineteenth century, in a position to realize the advantages gained by widespread use of 
faster steam ships with larger cargo capacities. This consequently limited the quantity of 
goods that could be transferred in a single voyage. 
However, the volume of the trade that were realized in Egypt and its position as a 
crossroad in the middle of the continents made it an important economical and political sphere 
for European competition especially in the late eighteenth century. Egypt’s location linking 
trade of the Suez to the Mediterranean via land route inspired European consuls to shorten the 
route from India to Europe via the port of Suez in the upper Red Sea. For this reason, in the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, the European merchants made a lot of effort on this 
issue so that they could have gotten ahead of their rival in the Levant and India commerce. 
                                                        
72 Rhoads Murphey, “Conditions of Trade in the eastern Mediterranean”, Journal of the Economic and the Social History of 
the Orient, vol. 33 No. 1 (1990) pp. 35-50, p. 38 
73 The period of most intense Anglo-French rivalry in India is usually associated with the period of Robert Clive’s first 
governorship in India (1755-1760), which overlapped with the contest for global domination of trade during the Seven Years’ 
War (1756–63).  By 1769 France had largely lost interest in India favour of its lucrative trade with the West Indies.  
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The efforts of British consul George Baldwin who communicated with the mamluk beys and 
encouraged them to open the upper Red Sea for the European trade are significant. Despite 
the fact that the central government did not allow European ships in the upper Red Sea, the 
European merchants convinced the mamluk beys to make commercial agreements, which 
allowed them to trade in the Suez. This topic has importance and is relevant with the current 
study as the rivalry and ambition of the European countries led their merchants and consuls to 
make agreements directly with the mamluk beys persuading them to act against the regulation 
of the imperial government. Although these endeavours did not serve for the advantage of the 
European merchants, not yet, they are important as they show the earlier stages of ambitions 
and rivalry of the Britain and France on Egypt. 
The Ottoman Empire included Egypt under its hegemony and established a 
traditional organisation, inclusive of all aspects of administration, between 1517 and 1717. 
The time period that this study examines between the 1720s and 1770s was not radically 
different from the empire’s classic period. The two most important commercial goods, coffee 
and spices dominated Egypt’s commerce, and domestic trade outbalanced international trade. 
We see considerable endeavours by the European consuls and merchants to carry Egypt’s 
trade on an international basis by entering the upper reaches of the Red Sea in the last quarter 
of the century, however their full penetration of these seaways was not achieved until the 
1820s.  
Being far from war fronts, Egypt’s commercial zone was sustained in the eighteenth 
century.74 The numerous wars between Iran and the Ottoman Empire added to the demand in 
the empire for the European trade of cloth and even coffee.75 The need and the demand of the 
Ottoman populaces for clothes that the European nations provided, and the requirement in 
                                                        
74 Zein al Abdin, The Political System of Ottoman Egypt, p. 57 
75 Murphey, “Conditions of trade”, p. 46. The war between the empire and Iran resulted with the increased European trade in 
the empire. 
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Europe, for raw materials to manufacture led to an active market in the Ottoman ports, 
especially in the Levant. Egyptian and Levantine ports attracted many merchants from various 
nations in Europe who actively engaged in the trade. That is to say that not only Syrian, 
Yemeni and North African merchants but many European merchants also carried out 
commercial activities in Egypt. In addition to those, a considerable number of people moved 
to Egypt from the Kazdağ region of the western Anatolia. These people, along with engaging 
in the military, took part in commercial activities as well with tobacco being their main 
commercial good.76 One can suggest that their connection with homeland must have shaped 
the commercial relationship and network of Egypt with other parts of the Middle East. 
Furthermore, we can see that, this Anatolian faction, being a cosmopolitan component of the 
empire, found a strong place in the organisational management of the military as well. The 
importation of wood from Kazdağ region of Anatolia for the ship construction in Suez 
provides a telling example of this situation.77   
On the other hand, the Russian elements that were enslaved during the Russo-
Ottoman wars were brought to Egypt for military service as well. Crecelius mentions that they 
represented “a distinct social group in the mamluk ranks particularly in the household of 
Ibrahim Bey (1786-1798) during the last decade of the eighteenth century, which seems to 
indicate that they had a considerable influence on the actions of the mamluk beys.78 It also 
seems plausible that this cosmopolitan trading and ruling middle class might have had an 
impact upon the politics of Egypt in the late eighteenth century. The wide array of 
commercial goods that Egypt offered was more than enough to satisfy the group of foreign 
merchants in Egypt. The Red Sea and Egyptian trade offered them Chinese porcelain, Indian 
                                                        
76 Crecilius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 64  
77 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 138 (date mid L 1176/late April 1763) 
78 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 64 
 127 
spices, cloth, and Persian silks besides Yemeni coffee and Egyptian goods.79 French and 
English interest in Egypt produced more wakalas/ entrepot in the province. Large companies 
were formed for trading goods such as sugar, rice, leather, textiles, coffee and rugs, which 
were the chief goods for the international market.  
It is clear that, before and during the tenure of şeyhülbeled of Ali Bey, Egypt 
experienced a prosperous commercial and economic life. When we are looking for 
motivations of Ali Bey to rise against the central government, we find a prosperous economic 
condition that mamluk beys were involved in and took advantage of that prevailed during the 
period in which he lived. So, unlike our modern perception of the close relationship between 
the ‘economic stagnation’ and the terms of ‘uprising and rebellion’, eighteenth century Egypt 
offers us a different scenario. Instead of a deteriorated financial market, the primary sources 
suggest an active milieu in which the merchants competed to sell, buy and earn more; and 
from time to time economic boundaries applied by the commercial treaties, namely 
ahidnames, clashed with the political ambitions of the European merchants and mamluk beys. 
Without a doubt there is a relationship between Ali Bey’s endeavour to extend his authority 
over the Hijaz and Syria and the active economy of the Egyptian market. Moreover, the 
sources suggest that the financial activities may have been an attraction for the local 
administrators to have the lion’s share; so to say, the abundance of the commercial revenue 
encouraged the local administrators to rise up against the central government.80 
                                                        
79 Porcelain trading was profitable as Indian goods and Persian silk, yet few sources mention it. For more information about 
porcelain trading in the eighteenth century, see Cheryl Ward, “The Sadana Island Shipwreck: An Eighteenth-Century AD 
Merchantman off the Red Sea Coast of Egypt”, World Archaeology, vol. 32, No. 3, Shipwrecks, Feb 2001, pp. 368-382. 
Foreign traders were active in Egypt, nevertheless, the Ottoman domestic trade had greater significance over the trade with 
Europe see for detail, Daniel Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18 th 
Century”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 24, No. 2, (May 1992), pp. 189-206.    
80 Zein al-Abdin also asserts this situation in the political system, p. 59,  
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By the end of the eighteenth century, the leaders of the Levant market amongst the 
other European countries were the French merchants with their cheaper and colourful cloths.81 
The British merchants’ trade was not as profitable as that of their French counterparts; yet, 
even the modest profits they gained made it worthwhile to maintain their business in Egypt.82 
Also, Dutch merchants were involved with a growing profit in the Levant market.  
The estimated trade volume between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe was 
around 110 million livres tournois by the end of the 1780s. Approximately 50 million livres 
tournois of this trade was realized between the empire and its main partner, France.83 From 
1724 to 1789, the trade between the two countries increased by 190%, which equals to an 
average increase of 2.91% per year.84 In the beginning of the eighteenth century, around 50 
French merchants were operating in Cairo, and as many more were based in Rosetta and 
Alexandria. On the other hand, only two British merchants were operating in Cairo and one in 
Alexandria.85 Also, while in the beginning of the century the value of the French trade was 
one third of the English, by the mid-century they were equal, and at the end of the century 
Britain’s share of the Egypt trade had shrunk to the equivalent of their French rival’s position 
at the beginning of the century.86 
As time progressed during the century, Egypt became prominent in terms of both 
commerce and politics for all the European nations including Russia. The forerunners of 
Napoleon had appreciated the value of Egypt as a bridge to India: especially since the 
Ottoman Empire’s defeat against Russia was an indication of its weakness, and in the case of 
the empire’s complete collapse, France did not want to lose Egypt and made attempts to 
secure it as its own share.     
                                                        
81 Vlami, Trading with the Ottomans, p. 90 
82 The British established a consulate in Cairo long after France. See Wood, History of the Levant Company, p. 125 
83 Panzac, “Maritime Trade”, p. 192. (Note: Livres is the French currency) 
84 Murphey, “Conditions of Trade”, p. 47 
85 Anis, Some Aspects, p. 13 
86 Russell, The Later History of The Levant Company 1753-1825, p. 102-108 
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On the other hand, George Baldwin, who was a British agent active in Egypt after 
1773, wrote his superiors in London in order to point out the strategic importance of Egypt for 
Britain; “She is the Magazine of all the trade of Yemen, the mart of all the coffee and rich 
gums of Yemen, the extrepot of all the interior parts of Africa, producing gums, gold dust, 
ivory, senna and drugs” and warns: “France in possession of Egypt would possess the 
Master Key to all the trading nations of the earth”87 It is clear that Baldwin appreciated the 
value of the Egyptian trade’s profit; however, it was not easy for him to obtain recognition by 
his superiors of the seriousness of the threat posed by the French. 
In addition to its significance in terms of the commercial activity, Egypt was a 
subject of a rivalry due to several advantages that its geographical position offered. 
Connecting the Red Sea trade to the Mediterranean, and thereby to Europe, was the most 
significant advantage that geography gave to Egypt. This advantageous position also made 
Egypt a province concerning which the political ambitions of various European nations 
overlapped. The possibility of having the chance of administrating Egypt in line with their 
interests would serve the benefit of three countries in the late eighteenth century, i.e., France, 
Britain and Russia. Beyond the advantages offered by quick communication and 
transportation, having Egypt in their sphere of influence would provide those countries a 
greater market for the goods they bought from India. On the other hand, Russia had succeeded 
in establishing its naval presence in the Mediterranean against the Ottoman Empire, which 
made it another component of the rivalry in the region. 
Despite the existence of the European nations’ competing aspirations, the Ottoman 
Empire had closed the Red Sea trade route to European merchants by reason of the need for 
protection of the Holy cities, and claimed that the Red Sea was open only for the 
                                                        
87 Crecelius, “The attempt by Greek Catholics to control Egypt’s trade with Europe in the second half of the eighteenth 
century”, in Abdeljelil Temimi, ed., La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a l’epoque ottomane, (Zaghouan, 1988), p. 128 
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transportation of pilgrims.88 Nevertheless, the sherif of Mecca broke this rule in order to gain 
more customs revenue.89 On the other hand, the Porte demanded from Yemeni administrators, 
even though it had weak relations with them in the eighteenth century, not to sell coffee to the 
European merchants directly,90 as it decreased both the empire’s customs revenue and the 
coffee supply in the Ottoman domestic market, especially in Istanbul.91    
Opening the Suez trade to European merchants was one of the elements that gave 
shape to the European nations’ policy towards Egypt in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. The English-French rivalry in India and their plans for shortening the voyage 
between homeports and their colonies in India made Egypt, especially its ports on the Red 
Sea, the chief frontline in this race.92 Both countries were eager to seize the opportunity that 
Red sea ports, especially Suez, offered for a better communication and a more profitable trade 
with India. Managing to get in the Red Sea trade was on the agenda of France and Britain 
from the beginning of the seventeenth century93, yet it gained prominence with Ali Bey al-
Kabir’s uprising and reached its climax with the French expedition of 1798. Enabling 
European merchants to trade in upper Red Sea the port of Jidda formed the main agenda of 
the European nations at the end of the century.  
Some British politicians considered taking control over the Red Sea trade as a 
protection from the Russian element in the Mediterranean. The British politicians were 
                                                        
88 By doing so, the Porte prevented accumulation of the customs duty revenues in a relatively remote province, which would 
make the local components of the administration rich and powerful.   
89 Although the European merchants paid 3% customs duty as a requirement of the agreement, ‘ahidname’, the sherif was 
receiving 14% in addition to an anchorage tax. 
90  Name-i Humayun N.MH 6, nr. 265-266 (date early R 1131/late February 1719) On Yemeni-European commercial 
relationship in the eighteenth century, see; Ayşe Kara, XVII. ve XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Yönetiminde Yemen ve Kasımiler 
Dönemi, unpublished Masters dissertation, (Istanbul University, 2011), pp. 75-85, and Ebtisam al-Gerafi, al-Alakat al-
Ticariyye beyne’l-Yemen wa’l Britaniyye, unpublished Masters dissertation, (University of Sana’a, 2005). 
91 MMD, vol. 1, nr. 567 (date early L 1130/early September 1718), MMD, vol. 8, nr. 262 (date R 1178/September 1764), C. 
ML 3013 (date 29 Z 1120/11 March 1709) 
92 While the shortest journey between Calcutta and London took 150 days via Good Hope Cape, it was 63 days via Suez. A.C. 
Wood, The History of the Levant Company, (Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 167  
93 In 1708, French merchant/consul Merveille, and in 1711 La Lande convinced local administrators to sign agreements in 
Mocha, which would enable French merchants to become involved in the Red Sea trade directly. Zein al-Abdin, The political 
system, p. 305  
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worried that Russia’s potential threat of seizure of Alexandria might affect British naval 
supremacy in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, being active in eastern politics could 
compensate for what Britain had lost in the war of independence in America. Preservation and 
extension of the Ottoman Empire against Russia and claiming the tutelary possession of 
Egypt would be beneficial for Britain. Some ideas came up in the parliament such as keeping 
Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire and paying an annual tribute, which the mamluk 
beys were reluctant to provide, in return for a British military station, which controlled the 
India trade.94 In the meantime, European consuls made attempts to open the Suez trade for 
European merchants. Whilst embassies were in contact with the grand vizier in Istanbul, 
consuls tried to reach agreements with local authorities.95 Crecelius mentions that the British 
government did not support their agents in Egypt in order not to endanger the commercial 
activities in other Ottoman ports.96  
Although it was the local administrators and officials with whom the European 
merchants generally had problems, they carried on the negotiations with the local 
administrators and officers, since the Porte was reluctant to allow European trade in Suez.97 
On the other hand, the mamluk beys were interested in negotiating with European merchants 
and diplomats, because opening the port for trading directly with the Europeans meant more 
customs income. Indeed, this restriction was broken even before Ali Bey’s control in the 
region. In 1764, three ships that flew the British flag arrived at Suez port. British authorities 
claimed that those were corsair ships that were flagged with English flags.98 
                                                        
94 Anis, Some Aspects, p. 242 
95 Crecelius, “An attempt by Greek Catholics to control Egypt’s trade with Europe”, p. 69   
96 Ibid., p. 69 
97 Central government received countless complaints about the customs officials in the provinces who did not abide with the 
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autonomy of the provincial officers prevented the Porte to protect the European merchants from the harassment of the 
officers. Murphey, “Conditions of trade”, p. 36 
98 Raif Ivecan, XVIII. Yüzyılın II. Yarısında Kızıldeniz’de Ticaret, unpublished Masters dissertation, Marmara University, 
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During his control over Jidda and Mecca, Ali Bey al-Kabir got in touch with English 
vessels, which frequented Jidda and penetrated the forbidden waters.99 After Ali Bey, in 1774, 
Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb too had some agreements allowing English vessels access to the 
Suez.100 Crecelius refers to the agreements between mamluk beys and British merchants as “a 
reawakening of Egyptian regional ambitions and a motive for change in economy”. 101 
However, it was a premature attempt and Crecelius’s definition is over exaggerated since 
complaints from the sherif of Mecca, who was worried that agreements would affect his 
income in Jidda, made the Porte take action and send decrees forbidding the approach of 
European vessels to Suez once again.102 English merchants stepped back fearing that this 
cheaper channel would damage their trade in the Levant, namely, Aleppo.  
While causing an international rivalry, opening the Suez trade to the European 
merchants triggered a domestic rivalry within the Ottoman Empire as well. Both the mamluk 
beys of Egypt and sherif of Mecca were trying to gain the highest quantity of tax revenue by 
attracting the European merchants’ trade to their nearby ports. While the agreement, 
ahidname, between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire required a 3% tax the 
sherif of Mecca enjoyed 14% tax in addition to an anchorage fee. Nevertheless, in order to 
compete with the sherif, the mamluk beys asked for an 8% tax rate without the anchorage 
fee.103 In the struggle between its subordinates: the sherif, and the mamluk beys, the Porte’s 
action lent its support to its semi-autonomous subordinate: the sherif of Mecca.104 Due to this 
                                                        
99 Ahmed H. Joudah refers to Ali Bey’s contact with the Europeans in order to open Suez trade for them. See A. H. Joudah, A. 
H. Joudah, A History of the Movement of Shaykh Zahir al-‘Umar al-Zaydani (1690?-1775) unpublished PhD thesis, (The 
University of Michigan, 1971), p. 129 
100 Wood, The History, p. 167. 
101 Daniel Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of ‘Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-
Dhahab, 1760-1775, (Minneapolis: Chicago, 1981), p. 3 
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103 Crecelius, Daniel, “A Late Eighteenth Century Austrian Attempt to Develop the Red Sea Trade Route”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 1994) pp. 262-280. 
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conflict, the revenue of the port of Jidda decreased, and the sherif of Mecca complained to the 
Porte immediately. In order to prevent the mamluk beys from becoming stronger the Porte 
prohibited European trade in the port of Suez. The real motivation behind the Ottoman 
prohibition of the Suez trade to the European merchants was the same as that which 
influenced their decision not to apply the ikta system in Egypt. 105  The Ottoman central 
government prevented the local authorities of this rather distant province from becoming 
stronger and asserting its independence from the empire.  
Nevertheless, in 1775, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb negotiated with English 
merchants, and granted them the liberty to frequent the Suez port and to trade in Egypt. The 
European ships arrived at Suez annually for the next four years, until the Bedouin attack in 
1779.106  Local administrators and merchants were happy with the results of this trading. 
Despite the Porte’s protests and notices, the English trade prevailed until the French 
expedition.107 
During the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries French merchants were superior in the 
Egyptian market, compared to other European nations. After the second half of the eighteenth 
century, Britain, Russia, and even Austria took an interest in the Egyptian trade. In fact, both 
the commercial and strategic standing of Egypt resulted in this interest. France became more 
competitive after other European nations’ involvement in Egypt, and it ended with the French 
expedition of 1798. During this period, the British were the chief rivals of the French. French 
authorities attentively tracked the English travellers who visited Egypt. They translated their 
                                                        
105  See chapter III on Income Sources and Order p. 124 and Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative 
Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, (Princeton, 1962), p.30 
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work on Egypt into French immediately.108 In most respects, the French surpassed the others. 
Their trading volume was greater than Britain’s by a considerable margin.109 Yet, when it 
came to some political initiatives, they could not beat the British. For example, the French 
signed commercial treaties with the mamluk beys in 1784, which was more than a decade 
after their British counterparts. 
In addition to its commercial significance, Egypt always had a special place for 
eighteenth century educated men of France as well. The French knew about ancient Egypt, 
which was a rich, prosperous country and mother of art and science, and considered it as a 
heritage for modern European science and art.110 In addition, French media usually followed 
up Levantine politics especially during the more important times for Europe such as the 
Seven-Year’s War. In the early years of the second half of the eighteenth century, the average 
number of the oriental newspapers in France was around 4-5. However, when it came to the 
1770s, this number rose to around 40-50. These newspapers worked as modern news 
agencies. A correspondent reported the events from Aleppo, Smyrna or Cairo by mail.111 Ali 
Bey al-Kabir’s uprising112 attracted the close attention of Europe. This time, a land close to 
Europe, and the key to the future of the Arab people was on the agenda. In addition, the 
developments would change the European merchants’ interests in the Middle East. The port 
of Suez would be opened for the European trade, which made the Indian trade easier and 
closer to Europe. For these reasons, some travellers suggested that Ali Bey’s attempt would 
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have indirect effects on Europe, which would make European merchants richer.113 Ali Bey 
appointed a European merchant named Balthasar as the officer of the Jidda customs house, 
which encouraged more European merchants to visit the region.  
At this point, it is worth noting that the French described Ali Bey as: sultan, and the 
successor of the pharaohs, the liberator of Mecca and the promised lands.114 Europeans had a 
high opinion of Ali Bey and his adventure. They consistently monitored it. It was important 
for European people because this event revealed that the Ottoman Empire had a weak point. 
This sort of crisis would be the Achilles heel of the empire. However, the Meccan sherif’s 
return with bedouin soldiers and the defeat of Ali Bey’s subordinate in Mecca reversed the 
situation. As time proceeded and European merchants’ profits decreased, their fascination 
with the topic decreased as well.115  
In the late eighteenth century, French diplomats and travellers asserted about Egypt 
that it was out of the authority of the central government, that the authority and power of the 
governor was less than that of the mamluk beys’ and that the Porte’s involvement in Egypt 
was minimal, whilst the control of the taxable land was under the mamluk beys’ authority.116 
In addition, French travellers especially noted what they perceived as the Egyptian people’s 
lethargy and lack of ambition, by which it was implied that a potential expedition would be 
easier. Merchants and subservient people with an ephemeral administration made the province 
vulnerable. 117  The French travellers’ illustration of the Ottoman administration partly 
represented late eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt. It is a fact that decentralized Ottoman rule 
had prevailed in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire since the late sixteenth century. The 
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connection of the province and the Porte depended on fulfilling reciprocal conditions of give 
and take. As Shaw explains in his Financial and Administrative Organization of the Ottoman 
Egypt, as long as the mamluk beys provided the Porte’s demands, they were accepted as 
sufficiently cooperative agents by the Porte. Although it may have caused some problems 
during the late eighteenth century, it was the same procedure that had been operating for some 
time. The administrative perception of the French travellers, without a doubt, was different 
from this procedure; as contemporary counterparts of the Ottoman Empire, they did not fully 
understand the administrative system. Another point here might be travellers’ desire to show 
Egypt as a separated province from which France might obtain numerous advantages such as 
the creation of a financial and political of sphere influence in order to encourage a potential 
expedition into Egypt.   
The travellers claimed that the Ottoman administration ignored the reconstruction of 
the province, as well. Yet, some of their claims about this issue contradict the archival 
documents we have. In addition, Raymond’s investigation provides a comprehensive research 
about the expansion of urban construction in Cairo during the period of Ottoman rule.118 
Furthermore, the correspondence between the Porte and Egypt’s governor and notables proves 
how important the Porte considered reconstruction of dams and seawalls along the 
Mediterranean coast to be.119 Although Egypt was not as important as the imperial capital, 
Istanbul, the correspondence between the central government and provincial administration 
proves that the Porte attached considerable importance to the needs of Egypt and its 
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population. The necessary precautions were taken for preserving the cultivable lands of Egypt 
and maintaining the water supply of the coastal cities such as Alexandria. The Porte preserved 
the cultivable land, even by sacrificing its revenue in-cash from its annual tribute when it was 
most needed during the eighteenth century.120 
When it comes to the British, their commercial activities in Egypt decreased during 
the century, as they did in the Levant generally. The eighteenth century was a time period 
during which the Levant Company’s income fluctuated before its demise.121 Since the second 
half of the seventeenth century, the English trade in Levant had lost nearly one third of its 
capacity.122 The main reason for this decrease was the progress that France had made. In 
addition to the Spanish card, French merchants knew their market and customers well and did 
their trade accordingly. The French produced cheaper clothes, which were more suitable for 
the needs of the customers in Levant. French dominance in the market, even Dutch 
commercial revival and rivalry, and the scarcity of the raw silk in the market due to Russia-
Iran wars were the main problems that English merchants had to deal with. Exchanging 
woollen clothes for raw Iranian silk in Aleppo was the most profitable means of trade for the 
Levant Company’s merchants. The change in the amount of the Persian silk in the market due 
to reasons of Russian seizure of Iranian cities, Nadir Şah’s activities, rebellion in Shirvan, and 
Ottoman-Iran wars influenced English trade in the Levant in a negative way.123 In the mid 
eighteenth century, the Dutch especially took the advantage of English policies against the 
plague. The English vessels withdrew from the Levant ports in case of plague, even if it was 
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only a rumour, until forty days after the end of outbreak. In these cases, Dutch merchants 
enjoyed conducting trade in the absence of any rival. 124 Whilst trading with 15 bales of cloth 
in 1754, their merchandise reached 100 bales in 1765. They influenced French trade as well. 
Already at the early date of 1744, the number of French vessels operating in Ottoman waters 
was as much ten times greater than the number of English vessels.125 
English woollen cloth exports to the Ottoman market and raw silk imports were the 
main commercial material in British-Ottoman trade. In 1753, the cloth exports of Britain to 
the Ottoman market accounted for £126,027 of the total exports valued at £131,792.126 The 
trade in English cloth for Ottoman silk decreased in the eighteenth century for a variety of 
reasons.127 Whilst cloth exports in the 1770s were around £99,586 per annum, in 1792 it 
declined to £41,074.128 Towards the end of the century, the issue of the American war of 
independence (1775-1783) became another distraction for England from the Levant trade. The 
lowest level of the income of the British import in the Ottoman Empire was between 1774-
1783. The incessant wars negatively affected British trade.129 
Whilst looking for a new trading path and area in Russia, the war between France 
and Spain gave Britain the chance to re-establish its existence in the Mediterranean. 130 
Introducing colonial goods to the Ottoman market such as fur, indigo, logwood, foreign dyes, 
spices, pepper, cochineal, brazil wood, pimento, Swedish iron and amber, and India goods, 
helped British merchants to compensate their losses in the cloth trade especially after the end 
                                                        
124 Laidlaw, British in the Levant, p. 26 
125 Russell, The Later History, p. 92 
126 In 1780s while the British export to Turkey was around £103.000, the French export was £18-19 million. Anis, Some 
Aspects, p. 14  
127 Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square, p. 42. In 1666, the number of broad clothes exported to Turkey by English 
merchants was 13,672, and decreased to 3,618 in 1765. Also, they bought 216,318 lbs of raw silk from Turkey. This trading 
also decreased to 112,142 lbs in 1761. 
128 Russell, The Later History, p. 30. In order to balance the trade, English merchants embarked on the raw material (tin, 
brass, iron, earthenware, pewter, leather) and watch trade. 
129 Michael Talbot, British Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire During the Long Eighteenth Century, unpublished PhD thesis, 
(London: SOAS, 2013), p. 116 
130 Wood, the History, p. 147 
 139 
of Seven Year’s War.131 Unlike French cheaper and lighter French cloths, expensive English 
cloth and fur that were brought from the colonies were bought by the upper layer of Ottoman 
society. High quality English watches were also bought by a small number of people in the 
society.  
There were several reasons for the French acquiring commercial superiority in the 
Levant market. Having ready money and rather good diplomatic relations with the Ottoman 
Empire gave French merchants another advantage. 132  Financial support provided the 
opportunities for research and enterprise among clothiers, and therefore they were able to 
produce the right product that the customers liked. The French government supported the 
French merchants financially. Due to the English monopolistic nature and low economic 
standards, they could not compete with the French merchants.133 In addition, lowering the 
prices, the closer distance between the Levant and France134, and cheap labour made French 
merchants forerunners in the Ottoman market.  
The French had the option to compete with English woollen clothes in quality. Yet, 
more cleverly, they produced the clothes that appealed to the taste of their customers.135 The 
colour of French cloth was the most suitable to the taste of the Levantine people. On the other 
side, although English cloths did not satisfy the needs of Ottoman market, we have no records 
showing any endeavours to enhance the colour. The Levantine customers’ two expectation 
from the fabric were not shrinking and not fading. Putting aside the production of cloths with 
vibrant colours, the colour of English clothes was faded by the seawater even before the 
vessels arrived at the Levant ports.136 Although the company’s officers found the solution in 
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dying the clothes in the Levant workplaces, it did not serve the aim of carrying the British to 
the front in their competition with the French.  
French domination constricted the English presence in the Ottoman market. 
Nevertheless, English merchants leaving the Levant market in the 1790s, whilst the French 
focused on the domestic problems and ignored the Levant trade.137 It can be said that Britain 
was overly passive in pursuing its rivalry with France. Although they were rivals with France, 
we cannot see a considerable British challenge in the region in terms of politics and strategy 
until the French expedition. In fact, the British had noticed the geographical importance of 
Egypt for British India, yet the French expedition heightened Egypt’s significance.138   
The decreasing import and export business of Britain in the eighteenth century 
suggests that the British government’s policies stayed active in the Egyptian politics only for 
the purpose of coping with the French. British’s main policy in Egypt was not to let the 
French occupy a geo-strategically important point in the Ottoman Empire. The only effort in 
the sense of commerce was Baldwin’s, the consul of Britain in Cairo. His disagreement with 
British embassy in Istanbul, Ainslee, explains the inconclusive situation. In addition, the 
British foreign policy was orthodox and was far from taking the merchants’ views into 
consideration about Egypt. The only thing that kept the British engaged in the Egypt issue 
was the French activities in the region.139 The British had focused on French attempts to open 
their India trade via Egypt and the British put all the effort into securing to failure of French 
initiatives.  
The Levant Company played some part in causing the poor performance of British 
trade in the Levant contributing to lack of individual enterprise, and the cumbersomeness of 
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its joint-stock financial organization. The argument of legal regulations’ being inhibitive is 
commonly cited as a further limiting factor on the development of trade as well as financial 
burdens such as the consulage tax.  Even though it was suggested that the French merchants 
had freedom compared to the English merchants, their burden was not lighter than English 
merchants. In France, the trade with the Levant was in the monopoly of the chamber of 
commerce of Marseille. Both consulage tax and the tax that they paid to Leghorn which the 
French authorities required of French merchants to transfer their goods via Leghorn, in 
addition to rigid supervision of the products during manufacturing put French merchants 
under pressure as well.140  
Nevertheless, British merchants had an impact in the Ottoman financial organization 
by supplying credit for local tax farmers in Syria, the mültezims. Türkhan suggests that the 
Ottoman central government’s need for cash affected the provincial economies as well. The 
iltizam system led the local administrators to use the loan system extensively. Especially the 
British merchants in Aleppo were actively involved in lending money to creditors most of 
whom were either the producer groups of the Empire or tax farmers. Thus, the British 
merchants had the chance to permeate the local economy. In order to preserve their interest, 
they monitored the economic situations of their borrowers, inspecting income and expenses. 
English capital was in Ottoman financial circulation, and more importantly, the British 
merchants had the right to become involved in the process of cultivating commercial 
agricultural products.141  
Whilst French rivalry influenced British exports, though more rarely, it also affected 
British imports as well.142 An Aleppo factor of the Levant Company mentioned in his letters 
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that the scale of French merchants’ buying up the raw material in cash left no raw material 
available in the market.143 
In 1754 the Levant Company withdrew their consul in Egypt on the plea that the 
political unrest of the province made trading hazardous. The risk of trading in Egypt increased 
the establishment’s expenses. Thus, trading in Egypt was no longer profitable for the 
Company, because of ‘uncertain success’ and ‘certain great and growing annual charge 
attending it’.144 Until the end of the century, the Company did not appoint a consul in Egypt. 
However, the merchants related to the company continued doing business in Egypt.  
Until İbrahim Kethüda died in 1754, Egypt had experienced rather a long period of 
political stability under his duumvirate with Rıdvan Kethüda. After his death, the rivalry 
amongst the mamluk beys revived. The coincidence of the consul’s withdrawal from Cairo 
with the death of İbrahim Kethüda is significant. Nonetheless, the aforementioned factors of 
the decrease of the English trade during the century in the Levant explain the situation in a 
more comprehensible way. Towards the end of the century, however, Egypt became important 
due to India factor, which gave it an international significance. 
The East India Company, independent from the Parliament and the Levant Company, 
became invested in the Persian market for raw silk and this resulted in a decline in the 
revenues of the Levant Company.145 The presence of the East India Company in this market 
affected the Levant Company in three ways: 1. They violated the Levant Company’s legal 
rights, 2. The raw silk prices would decrease since the East India Company would damage the 
land trade from India to Persia, and 3. The East India Company would introduce the Indian 
goods more cheaply to the Ottoman market. Moreover, it was the East India Company that 
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attempted to open Suez port to the European trade. However, the Levant Company was not 
pleased with the presence of the East India Company in its territory even though they 
themselves were not in a position to gain any profit from it.146 
Whilst the rivalry continued between the two companies, the East India Company 
managed to negotiate with the mamluk beys about the right to trade in Suez but not with the 
Porte. 147  Yet, in a short time they realized that it was useless due to mamluk beys’ 
untrustworthiness and they decided to end it, as the British parliament did not approve it in 
order not to endanger the trade in other Ottoman ports. In the meantime, George Baldwin, the 
former consul of the Levant Company, was trading in the Red Sea with the cooperation of the 
East India Company. They were exchanging goods of Germany, Italy and France for Indian 
goods illicitly. Russell claims that the Porte could not cope with this trading activity and 
thereby found the solution in sending the bedouins against the caravan of Baldwin and other 
merchants. Some merchants were killed; Baldwin escaped to India and then returned to 
England as a bankrupted man.148  
This incident came out in the Porte’s correspondence with the governor of Egypt. 
Mentioning the repeatedly stressed ban of the European ships in the Suez, it emphasized that 
the presence of European ships in Suez imposed a number of “administrative and religious” 
inconveniences. In order to prevent European ships from entering the port of Suez, the Porte 
used religious means to propagandize that Suez was the entrance hall of the Holy cities – 
‘Haremeyn-i muteremeynin dehlizi mesabesinde’.149 
The Porte reproached the governor Raif Ismail Pasha with being negligent and lazy 
by condoning the fact that the mamluk beys Ibrahim and Murad had entered into agreements 
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with Europeans that allowed them in Suez, and reminded him that his connivance required 
punishment. Unlike Russell’s narration, the correspondence adds some imprisoned European 
merchants and seamen were released by İbrahim and Murad Beys with their merchandise, 
despite the fact that the Porte had ordered them to send the prisoners and commodities to 
Istanbul in order to hand them over to the English ambassador. Also, the Porte notified the 
governor about the intelligence of newcomer European ships approaching Suez and strictly 
warned him that he would be held responsible if they were allowed in Suez port.150 
As for Baldwin, he used his connections and after a couple of years in Britain he 
returned to Egypt as a consul of the Crown. In the beginning, the Levant Company protested 
by claiming that the East India Company did not have the right to trade in the Levant, yet, 
they realized that Aleppo was entering in the sphere of influence of the East India Company 
as well, and that the conditions were changing. That is to say that the existence of the East 
India Company was not only commercial but political as well. In the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the relationship of the two companies became cordial. 
The British consul in Egypt, George Baldwin, dedicated a considerable effort in 
order to persuade the British ambassador in Istanbul and statesmen in London about the 
importance of the Red Sea trade route. The personal conflict between Baldwin and the 
ambassador prevented Baldwin’s efforts from gaining results. For this reason, Baldwin did 
not hesitate to contact other European nations in order to realize his aspiration. He contacted 
his French and Austrian counterparts in secret. Austria, which was willing to become 
involved in the Red Sea trade compromised with George Baldwin, although he was British 
consul of Cairo. Baldwin offered Austria a more ambitious promise, by means of a possible 
war, to eliminate the Ottoman ships in the Red Sea, and also advised the Austrians to 
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encourage the local administrators in Egypt and Yemen to be independent; as the food 
supplies of these two provinces were crucial for the imperial capital.151  
On the other hand, Russia entered the Mediterranean sphere only after 1711 when 
they established their embassy in Istanbul, yet it was a rapid entry. Nevertheless, if we put the 
Mediterranean aside, Russia was always in contact with Orthodox Christian population in the 
Ottoman Empire. 152  From the sixteenth century until 1728, Russian travellers went into 
Ottoman provinces and communicated with Orthodox Christians. In fact, these travellers’ 
journeys were diplomatic. They financially aided Orthodox churches and told them about the 
achievements of Russian tsars.153 In the eighteenth century Russia used this connection in 
order to support small uprisings in the Ottoman Empire. Russia supported the uprising of Ali 
Bey al-Kabir, as it supported other minorities’ revolutions such as those of the Greeks. 
For instance, Tsarina Catherine sent agents in order to communicate with Ali Bey al-
Kabir during his uprising and promised him support.154 After Russia set the Ottoman navy on 
fire in Çeşme, the Russian fleet arrived in the southern Mediterranean. By that time, Ali Bey 
had sought refuge with Zahir al-Omar in Sidon. Ramadan mentions that Ali Bey met two 
captains from the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean during this period and sent a letter to 
tsarina with his messenger, Zülfikar Bey alongside presents to tsarina, and gave a promise to 
allow Russian trade in the upper Red Sea when he regained his former position in Egypt.155 
Yet, Ali Bey al-Kabir was impetuous and could not wait for the promised support. So, he was 
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unable to secure any concrete support from Russia and got wounded in the battlefield, which 
resulted in his death soon afterwards. 
Close relations between Russia and mamluk beys came forward in a later period, 
during the rule of Ibrahim Bey (1786-1798) as well. Ramadan mentions that Russian 
messengers encouraged Ibrahim and Murad to separate their administration from the Ottoman 
Empire and have full support of Russia.156 Crecelius asserts that Russia used the relatives of 
the mamluk beys to further its interests.157 A Georgian man who claimed to be a relative of 
Ibrahim Bey had an influence on him; he even fled to Upper Egypt with Ibrahim Bey. Agents 
such as him had a strong effect on the mamluk beys. They might have promised mamluk beys 
support should they gain their full autonomy. 
Although agents had an influence on the mamluk beys in terms of thought, it seems 
that mamluk beys could not get a solid external assistance from them. Hasan Pasha’s 
expedition suggests that a concrete support and service of Russia did not materialise during 
that period. İbrahim and Murad Beys’ request from the Pasha to cancel the expedition in 
return for paying the former unpaid levies suggests that if Ibrahim and Murad Bey were 
willing to get their independence, and get foreign support, they would not have preferred to 
compromise. Keeping all of the incomes and revenues of the province instead of sharing with 
central government was a strong motivation for the mamluk beys to rise up and claim 
independence. Yet, their willingness to compromise suggests that Murad and Ibrahim Beys 
did not get significant foreign support. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
We can conclude that during the second half of the eighteenth century, Egypt was a 
major player in the domestic trade of the Ottoman Empire; however, the agents and consuls of 
the European countries had already started to devote their efforts in order to locate Egypt in 
an international position and take bigger portions of the pie. Yet, it would take another fifty 
years for them to get involved in this trade. The profit that domestic trade provided Egypt’s 
local elite was satisfactory, however, European agents did their best to get mamluk beys’ 
cooperation for higher profits.   
I contend that the interests of the foreign consuls in Egypt had an impact on the local 
administrators by encouraging them to act independently from the imperial government. 
When examining the relationship between the mamluk beys particularly Ali Bey al-Kabir and 
his predecessors  (i.e. Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb and İbrahim Bey) and the representatives of 
the European nations that were trading in Egypt, we can see some evidences about the 
influence of financial motives and international trade on politics.  
The behaviour and attitude of the European merchants in their negotiations with the 
Porte and with the mamluk beys may give us some idea of the foreign components’ approach 
and their perception about the positioning of mamluk beys and the Porte within the existing 
political milieu. First, it is clear that the other European states did not support the uprising of 
Ali Bey against the central government as directly and openly as Russia. The main reason 
might be that Russia was in a war with the Ottoman Empire and trying to increase the 
perimeters of its interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to their maximum. To 
secure more interests, Russia made contact with Ali Bey and promised to support him in the 
case of a rebellion. Having had the support of a foreign country, Ali Bey and his allies must 
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have felt more confident in attempting to canalize their endeavours of usurping more authority 
and power from the Porte.  
Another important point arising from the above discussion is that Austria also 
contacted Ali Bey and his mamluk consultants and customs officers in order to open the Red 
Sea trade route. It is claimed that Austria was willing to encourage the mamluk beys to claim 
their independence from the Porte. It had welcomed another rebellious mamluk, Çerkez 
Mehmed Bey, in the 1730s after all, and supported him until Mehmed Bey caused a political 
crisis between Austria and the Porte. However, we lack sufficient evidence whether Austrian 
factors stepped into concrete action in this sense and helped Ali Bey or not.  
On the other hand, I contend that the British and French competition had an 
encouraging influence on the acts of mamluk beys and their ambition of authority extension in 
the province as well. During the mid-eighteenth century the mamluk beys had seized the 
revenues of the ports on the Mediterranean and the Nile from the governors via the janissary 
regiments. It is known that the mamluk beys were promoting the presence of the European 
merchants with the ambition of increasing their revenues. We can say that this was in line 
with the aim of the European merchants to trade in Suez given that at the beginning of the 
1760s, the competition between the British and French nations’ emerged from their efforts to 
have the permission for trading in the Suez and that they compromised with both the mamluk 
beys in Cairo and the Porte in the capital to do this.  
Furthermore although developing a more direct connection with the local 
administrators in the region, European nations were trying to be cautious as well in order not 
to displease the Porte and not to endanger their trade in other ports of the empire. However, 
the unstable mamluk regime prevented the European merchants from depending only on 
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agreements consolidated with them.158 Since it was the local elements that enabled them to 
trade in the Suez, it is highly likely that the Europeans encouraged the mamluk beys to 
become independent.  
Nevertheless, none of the beys claimed that he was the only administrative body in 
the region. Likewise, none of them demanded that the European nations should withdraw 
from their commercial treaties, ahidnames, with the Porte, or to form new agreements with 
them. ‘Enlarging the limits of the existing agreements with the Porte’ may be more 
explanatory for the local administrators’ approach. On the other hand, the mamluk beys’ 
loyalty to the imperial government in Istanbul provided them protection from the intrusion of 
Britain, France and Russia in the eighteenth century. 159
                                                        
158 Crecelius, “Austrian attempt”, p. 264 
159 Hathaway, The Arab Lands, p. 112-113 
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CHAPTER III: Irsaliye and Uprising 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to investigate the relationship between the provincial finance of 
Egypt, the revenues and expenditures of the state in Egypt, and the local notables’ 
interference with it in the mid-eighteenth century. Although the central government’s 
supervision continued on the incomes and expenditures, the interference of the mamluk beys’ 
in the finances of the province in the second part of the eighteenth century is remarkable. 
Occupying in the most important provincial administration positions such as treasurer, 
emirulhajj and şeyhülbeled, the mamluk beys had a command in the financial administration. 
Since this study focuses on the motivations of mamluk beys for disobeying the regulations of 
the central government and the reason they challenged state authority, examining the financial 
institution forms a crucial dimension of this research.  
The way leading to maintaining power passes from financial supremacy. The chapter 
on economic conditions of Egypt demonstrated that a mamluk bey had an enormous income 
in the late eighteenth century. The archival evidence suggests that mamluk beys tried to keep 
the maximum number of the tax farm in their hands and they made a lot of effort to canalize 
certain revenue sources to their households. These revenue sources included Cairo Mint and 
certain financial sources that were assigned for the governor and kadı of Egypt. On the other 
hand, it is evident that the mamluk beys endeavoured to gain more financial income at the 
expense of violating the system of malikane like their ayan counterparts in other provinces, 
and failing to send the annual tribute, irsaliye, in time and in full. The mamluk beys tried to 
keep the tax farms in their hands via inheritance and to canalize high amounts of cash from 
the irsaliye to their household. While the mamluk beys tried to seize the income sources, the 
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effort by the central government to keep the financial order in the province is noticeable. The 
extent of the mamluk beys’ command on the financial situation, and central government’s 
effort to keep the sources under its command will be the focus of this chapter. 
The two main income sources of Egypt depended on agriculture and commerce. The 
first one depended on Egypt’s fertile lands. The Sublime Porte generated a large amount of 
revenue through the taxation of rural areas. The second one was the commercial activity, 
which Egypt’s geographically distinct location afforded it. Not only goods produced in Egypt 
such as sugar, rice, and leather, but also imported commodities such as spices, coffee, and 
textiles used to pass through Egypt and created tax revenue for the Sublime Porte. The tax, 
which was taken through the customs houses, was the second important item for tax revenue. 
These two features of the province were behind the Empire’s wealth and provided an 
enormous income both for the province itself and for the imperial Ottoman treasury. From the 
Ottoman conquest onwards, miscellaneous revenues derived from those income sources that 
had flowed to Cairo until 1517 had to change their way towards the imperial capital, Istanbul. 
Even though all the revenue was not transferred to the imperial treasury, the Sublime Porte 
used to keep the records of the accounts until the nineteenth century. This shows us that the 
Porte tracked Egypt’s financial records meticulously in the eighteenth century and made the 
local administrators stay in line, at least up to a point. This situation contradicts the hypothesis 
of autonomous Mamluk administration in Egypt and confirms the close relationship between 
the imperial government and mamluk beys.1 
In this chapter, the financial revenue sources and expenditures of the province of 
Egypt will be examined. Archival evidence will help us to locate mamluk beys’ position in 
                                                        
1 For a discussion of the historiography on the Egypt’s positioning in the Ottoman Empire see above Introduction. Baldwin 
contends that Egypt maintained a close relationship with the central government in the eighteenth century and considers law 
and legal practice as the central element in the relationship between the central government and province James Baldwin, 
Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. 1. 
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the financial administration of Egypt. The income of a member of the local elite in Egypt, 
whether he was a merchant or a mamluk bey, was huge.2 On the top of it, the mamluks of the 
second half of the eighteenth century did not contend themselves with their revenue and tried 
to channel other revenue sources to their households. Namely, there was a connection 
between the state finance and political opposition and violation of the rules. However, it is 
noteworthy that the central government followed up the financial records and sent numerous 
decrees ordering the governor, şeyhülbeled, and other administrators to keep the financial 
order as it was. Making new regulations and setting new standards, the central government 
made an effort to keep its revenue safe from the mamluk beys in Egypt. Thoroughly 
explaining the revenue and expenditure items, this chapter will highlight whether or not there 
was a relationship between “uprisings” and the revenue share of the province. The distribution 
of the provincial revenue between the local administrators and central government will 
suggest new theories about the relationship between financial conditions and uprisings. The 
amounts of the incomes and the expenditures in Egypt, the sum sent to Istanbul as annual 
tribute and the regularity of tax revenues sent to the central government will highlight the 
financial relations between Egypt and the Porte. This chapter will also discuss whether or not 
we can detect any reason for the discontent of the mamluk beys against the central 
government during the tax collection process or whether the reason for the discontent was 
because of the financial interests of the mamluk beys. I contend that the increased ambition of 
the mamluk beys’ towards acquiring financial sources to their household induced them to 
violate the financial and administrative system of the province that had been established since 
the Ottoman conquest. 
                                                        
2 Nelly Hanna, Making big Money in 1600 The Life and Times of Isma’il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant, (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1998); Andre Raymond, “The Wealth of the Egyptian Emirs at the end of the seventeenth 
century”, in Winter M., Levanoni A., ed., Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2004) p. 361. 
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The Annual Tribute: Irsaliye-i hazine and Rebellion 
The administrative team of Egypt were expected to deliver a sum of annual balance, 
an annual tribute, to the central government, which was referred to as irsaliye-i hazine in the 
archival documentation. After the conquest by the Ottomans, Hayır Bey, the former governor 
of the Mamluk Sultanate in Aleppo and new governor of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt, used 
to send gifts and cash (a portion of the tax revenues) to the sultan every year. While Mahmud 
claims that irsaliye was not a regular and organized type of levy that was sent to the Porte 
until the governorship of Hadım Süleyman Pasha (931-941/1525-1535), Shaw implies that the 
exact amount of the irsaliye was already determined during the reign of Selim I as 
28.3725.815 paras.3 However, according to the records in Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, Seyyid 
Mahmud elucidates that the first organized annual levy, amounting to 299,591 golden coins, 
was sent to the Porte on 18 Rebiülevvel 933/ 23 December 1526.4 During the long term of his 
governorship, Hadım Süleyman Pasha (931-941/1525-1535) succeeded in applying Pargalı 
İbrahim Pasha’s reform. Rather than depending solely on the land and financial records 
inherited from the Mamluk sultanate, Süleyman Pasha’s officers measured the cultivable 
lands. Miri, evkaf and other lands were registered in different defters, according to which 
Egypt’s financial situation was arranged.5  
In the sixteenth century, Egyptian administrators were never expected to send more 
than they were able to.6 However, during and after the era of change and transformation of the 
institutions of the empire, the Porte needed irsaliye-i hazine more than ever, especially during 
wartime. Another interesting point that highlights the importance of irsaliye-i hazine for the 
Porte is shown in the reasons for dismissal from office. In the beginning, a governor was 
                                                        
3 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 55 
4 Seyyid Muhammed es-Seyyid Mahmud, XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyaleti, (Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1990), p. 61-62 
5 Ibid., p. 92 
6 Ibid., p. 93. Thus, the administrators did not need to suppress the Egyptian people in order to collect the annual tax, and a 
peaceful administration was realized in this period. 
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mainly dismissed based on his administrative failures. However, after a while, they came to 
be fired due to a failure to send the expected amount of the irsaliye-i hazine.7 According to 
the central government, the success of a governor was directly proportional to the sum of the 
irsaliye-i hazine that he sent to Istanbul.8 During the sixteenth century the amount sent to 
Istanbul was between 16.000.000 paras (400.000 gold coins) and 20.000.000 paras (500.000 
gold coins). The irsaliye was spent on the expenses of the divan and palace in Istanbul and 
sometimes used for cülus-ı hümayun bahşişi when a new sultan acceded to the throne. 9 
Afterwards, as the financial needs of the central government increased, the amount of the 
irsaliye was increased to 24.000.000 paras (600.000 gold coins) and then 28.000.000 paras 
(700.000 gold coins). 10  Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century as the political and 
administrative problems increased, the amount of the irsaliye that was sent to Istanbul 
decreased and failed to be delivered in time.11  
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, with wars and the loss of taxable 
agricultural lands in Europe, the Ottoman government concentrated on maintaining the rest of 
the Empire, especially the biggest province, Egypt. Thus, irsaliye-i hazine gained added 
importance. It was very important for the Porte that when it arrived to Istanbul, the officers in 
treasury were given ihsan akçesi, a bonus payment.12 Equally to its importance for the central 
government, irsaliye was an important source for mamluk beys as well. In the eighteenth 
century, it is evident that they channelled large amounts of money to their households from 
the irsaliye-i hazine by pressurizing the governors or extracting money without permission 
from the central government. 
                                                        
7 Seyyid Mahmud, Mısır Eyaleti, p. 124 
8 Ibid., p. 115 
9 Ibid., p. 119 Seyyid Mahmud states that Husrev Pasha, who was in office between the years of 941-943/1534-1536, sent 
40.000.000 paras (1.000.000 gold coins) to Istanbul in 942/1535 as irsaliye-i hazine. The sultan did not accept this and 
ordered not to send more than 20.000.000 paras (500.000 gold coins). 
10 Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization, p.285 
11 Seyyid Mahmud, Mısır Eyaleti, p. 120 
12 TSMA, D. 2352 – 473 (1120/1708) 
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Irsaliye-i hazine was an annual tax, the amount of which was determined by the 
treasurer of Egypt, and it had been always important for the Porte. In the sixteenth century, it 
can be suggested that the irsaliye-i hazine supported the main treasury in Istanbul and the 
Porte was anxious to go into debt. At the end of the seventeenth century, during the power 
shift between the military and mamluks, the central government regarded some mamluk beys 
who had directly and sometimes secretly contacted with them as loyal helpers and supporters 
in securing the irsaliye-i hazine.13 The relationship of the people in Egypt and the central 
government depended on a net of mutual responsibilities and expectations. These 
responsibilities and expectations can be considered as connections that were tying the central 
government to the Egyptian people and local elite as such. For example, the central 
government was expected to provide maintenance of irrigation dams so that the agricultural 
production in Egypt could be sustained. On the other side, the Egyptian people were 
responsible to pay their tax, and the governor and the şeyhülbeled were expected to pay the 
annual tribute to the central government. In the eighteenth century, the issue of sending 
annual tribute was an important agenda topic in the correspondence between the central 
government and the provincial administration of Egypt. The decrees that were sent in the 
second half of the eighteenth century provide us a number of illustrations on the extent of 
mamluk beys intervention into the share of the central government.  
In order to determine the motives behind the uprisings of the mamluk beys, the 
irsaliye hazinesi should be scrutinized. Receiving the irsaliye-i hazine in time and in good 
order was a priority for the central government in Istanbul and a mandatory objective for 
administrators of Egypt: the governor and the şeyhülbeled. There was a mutual need between 
the central government and the mamluk beys in Egypt. Although the Porte used mamluk beys 
                                                        
13  Bashir Zein al-Abdin, The Political System of Ottoman Egypt, 1099-1143/1687-1730, unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of London SOAS, 1999, p. 83 
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to secure the obligations in Egypt and Hicaz, mamluk beys only accepted this in order to fulfil 
their income sources. At the end of the century, however, neither of the two groups would 
continue to realize the objectives of the Porte: whether or not the mamluk beys and governors 
were in conflict, or whether there existed a single full strength tyrant.14  
The Irsaliye-i hazine was delayed several times due to political issues, such as the 
1711 crisis15, or Ali Bey al-Kabir’s authority between 1760 and 1772 during the eighteenth 
century.16 The irsaliyes during the years of 1178/1764-65 and 1179/1765-66 were not sent, 
although the obligation due for the year of 1180/1766-67 was approaching. Upon this, the 
Porte sent a decree that in early M 1181/June 1767 in order to demand the irsaliyes and warn 
the officers.17 The years of 1765-66 are important, as Hamza Pasha was the governor then; the 
conflict between Ali Bey and his counterparts rose, and Ali Bey was exiled with Mehmed Bey 
Ebu’z-zeheb. The Porte accused governors of being ignorant and careless, and mamluk beys 
of being shiftless, rude, rough and stubborn. According to the Porte, although they had been 
given an undertaking, mamluk beys and governors were responsible and guilty, and they 
would be punished if they would not send it immediately. A decree addressed to the Egyptian 
governor, kadı and şeyhülbeled Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey, instructed him to send the irsaliye 
in the same manner as before the uprising; by tracing through the documents in the archive it 
can be observed that Ebu’z-zeheb sent the irsaliye-i hazine of the years in which uprising had 
occurred.18  
Until 1742/1155, the Porte expected 31,719,055 paras as the annual levy in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. The fixed and mostly extra expenditures reduced the 
                                                        
14 Shaw, The financial and administrative Organization, p. 8 
15 Zein al- Abidin, The Political System, p. 93 
16 C. DH 12264 (date 29 ZA 1187/11 February 1774) “ … ve şaki-i mezburun tuğyanı sebebi ile bir kaç seneden beri tehir 
olan irsaliye hazinesinin tedarik ve tesyiri ... kullarımın sa’y ve gayretleriyle meram-ı hümayunum üzere nizam ve 
tetmimlerine ...”  
17 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 492 (date early M 1181/30 May-9 June 1767) 
18 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16903 and C. MTZ 7/329 (29 Zilhicce 1186/23 March 1773) 
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amount. In the first half of the century, in general, the Porte was paid two third of the irsaliye 
and the rest was spent for the miscellaneous expenditures. Between the 1740s and 1760s the 
irsaliye was increased to 35,381,948 paras. By 1766, it was decreased to 25,182,427 paras. 
Ali Bey failed to send the irsaliye after 1766. After defeating Ali Bey, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-
zeheb sent 126.992.801 paras (5079 kese 17801 para) for the irsaliyes of the years between 
1766-1774.19 Ebu’z-zeheb’s payment is remarkable as it shows us the amount that a member 
of the Egyptian elite could afford to pay to the central government. 
There were two routes that the officers had to follow while taking the hazine to 
Istanbul; either by ships through port of Alexandria or overland through Damascus to 
Istanbul. 20  The irsaliye-i hazine was generally sent overland, as it was considered safer 
compared to sea.21 An officer among the çavuşes and müteferriqas of the dergah-ı mualla was 
appointed to transport the irsaliye-i hazine; however, it was not always an appointed officer 
who transported the irsaliye. When the term of office of a governor came to an end, he used to 
take the irsaliye to Istanbul with him. Sometimes a sancak beyi, sometimes a defterdar, or an 
azeb ağası was appointed as the “hazine serdarı”, the head officer that was responsible from 
the hazine transport. The hazine serdarı was tasked to keep the soldiers in the guard of hazine 
in order, and to ensure that a guard protected the hazine from “urbans”, i.e., Arab Bedouins, 
and bandits.  
When the irsaliye reached Damascus, a ceremony was arranged in its honour.22 
When the hazine serdarı transported the hazine to Istanbul safely, he was promoted.23 The 
                                                        
19 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
20 The overland route was passing through these halting places: Adliye, el-Hankah, Ba Lubeys, Karin (Kureyn?), es-Salihiyye, 
Beyru Duveydar, Kutub (Kastab), Beyru’l-Iyd, Ummu’l-Hasen, Ariş, ez-Za’ka, ed-Deyr, Gazze, Mecdel, er-Remle, Re’su’l-
ayn, el-Akum, Lucevven, Aynu’n-neccar, el-Birketu’l-muntene, Cese Yakub, el-Kunaytira, Sa’sa’a, el-Dimask. (TSMA D. 
10477). 
21 Seyyid Mahmud, Mısır Eyaleti, p. 122. 
22 Dana Sajdi, “In Other Worlds? Mapping Out the Spatial Imaginaries of 18th-Century Chroniclers from the Ottoman 
Levant”, Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal Ottoman Studies, XLIV (2014) pp. 357-392, p. 363. Ibn kannan stated when 
irsaliye arrived. Al-Hallaq stated additionally when it delayed. p. 365. 
23 Seyyid Mahmud, Mısır Eyaleti, p. 122. The promotion was between 30.000 – 50.000 akce. 
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annual levy, (irsaliye-i hazine) was delivered to Istanbul by a crowded group of seven 
regiment soldiers. For example, 369 soldiers escorted the irsaliye, which consisted of 
10,645,327 paras in the year 1172/1758.24 The soldiers were promoted as well.25 The irsaliye-
i hazine was prepared in the Egyptian divan by the officers of treasury. Sarrafs would 
measure the paras and the defterdar would seal the boxes they put the paras in. In the 
presence of the members of the divan, the kethüda would deliver the irsaliye to hazine serdarı. 
The governors and sancak beys who were in office on the route of hazine were sent decrees, 
ordering that the needs of the soldiers and officers carrying the irsaliye-i hazine were met.26 
Once the irsaliye was delivered to the imperial treasury, defters and monies were inspected. If 
it was without defect, the governor of Egypt was sent a hilat. If it was incomplete, an 
inspection was instigated.27 Unlike centralized Ottoman rule, from the end of the sixteenth 
century, the malpractice of emins and mübaşirs made it difficult for the state’s money in their 
debit to be collected; as a result deficiencies in the irsaliye-i hazine became apparent. The 
Porte found a solution for this issue by advising governors not to give mukataas and iltizams 
to those who were poor and did not have a guarantor.28 
Before proceeding to examine the financial and administrative order in Ottoman 
Egypt, it is necessary to refer to the Coptic calendar, which was used in agriculture and thus 
taxation. In calculating the financial and agricultural issues, the Ottoman administration 
continued to use the Coptic solar calendar in Egypt after the conquest.29 Tut is the first month 
of this calendar, which coincided with the flooding of the Nile at the end of September. The 
                                                        
24 The number of the soldiers from each ojaq may be a clue about their dominance: 122 müstahfizan (janissaries), 50 
müteferrikagan, 60 çavuşan, 51 azeban, 33 gönüllüyan, 30 tüfenkçiyan, 23 çerakise. (Kamil Keçeci defter series: KK.d 4789; 
D.BŞM.MSR.d 16896, D.BŞM.MSR.d 16892 
25 Müteferriqas and çavuşs were given one para, and the others were given one akçe. Seyyid Mahmud, Mısır Eyaleti, p. 123. 
26 Seyyid Mahmud, Mısır Eyaleti, p. 123 
27 Ibid., p. 124 
28 Ibid., p. 117 
29 Özen Tok, “Osmanlılarda Kıpti Takviminin İdari ve Mali Alanda Kullanımı”, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi vol. 21 
year: 2006/2 (pp. 365-379) p. 370. 
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flooding of the Nile in September was a key point at the agricultural production and thus 
financial administration of Egypt, as it was this flooding that resulted with the major annual 
harvest. The central government was monitoring the flooding because it was essential for 
producing the grain that fed the Haremeyn, paid the tax revenue alongside the annual tribute. 
The production therefore taxing was connected to the flooding of the Nile in Egypt.30 
The Ottoman administration referred to Coptic solar calendar as sene-i tutiyye, and 
the accounts and calculations were made accordingly. Likewise the calculation of incomes 
and expenditures of the province, collection and delivery of the irsaliye-i hazine31 were also 
conducted according to the Coptic calendar. In the beginning of every Coptic year the 
governor, vali, the ruznameci, clerk in charge of financial transactions, the muhasebeci, chief 
accountant, and the mukataacı, tax farmer, reviewed the accounts and reported the 
expenditure and income to the central government. The tax collections and expenditures were 
formulated based on this calendar.  
On the other hand, the hijri calendar was used in cizye and Haremeyn proceedings, 
such as surre, due to religious issues. Also, the remaining balance of previous years’ 
uncollected tax was then collected in the new tut year’s incomes. Due to the difference of 
calendar usage in accounts, in order to prevent confusion between expenditures and income, 
the Porte asked the Egyptian governors to send every 33 years this redundancy of the eleven-
day period of each year, which is called hilaliyye, or tefavut-i sene-i hilaliyye as another 
irsaliye of Egypt.32 . According to Shaw, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries six 
extraordinary irsaliye-i hazine arrived at ceyb-i humayun in 1038/1628-29, 1071/1660-61, 
                                                        
30 Alan Mikhail, Nature and Empire in the Ottoman Egypt: An environmental history, (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
p.10 
31  Irsaliye-i hazine was a type of levy that was sent annually to the Porte from Cairo after spending the provincial 
expenditures from the tax income of the province of Egypt. 
32 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761) 
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1104/1692-93, 1137/1734-35, 1170/1756-57, and 1203/1788-89. 33  The issue of this 
extraordinary irsaliye was called tedahül, which means in Ottoman Turkish delay of payment, 
and the extraordinary irsaliye was referred as ‘sene-i mutedahile’.34 
Although the annual levy, irsaliye-i hazine was a type of tax, numerous expenses of 
Egypt and Haremeyn were disbursed from this levy. In the earlier stages of the Ottoman rule 
in Egypt, those expenses were met by the provincial treasury. However, later, since mamluk 
beys’ canalized the Egyptian treasury for their households in the eighteenth century, the 
public expenses were met by the irsaliye-i hazine.35 The repair and maintenance of numerous 
bridges, water channels, mosques, public buildings and market places in Cairo and Upper 
Egypt, and the maintenance of the dams near the Mediterranean were provided by the levy. It 
was spent not only on the expenses of the province itself, but also on the demand and 
necessities of Haremeyn, and the soldiers in Jidda port, who were in guard of the Holy cities 
Mecca and Medina. In addition, a certain amount was provided for the pilgrims’ security, and 
to arrange a greeting ceremony to welcome them. Besides, some supplies of the imperial 
kitchen such as sugar and rice, and the oakum supply of the imperial shipyard were sustained 
by Egypt’s annual levy. The equipment of the three thousand Egyptian soldiers who joined 
the wars between the Empire and Russia or Iran was also covered by the levy. The 
ammunition for Jidda and some other castles near Egypt were also paid out of this levy. 
Benefactions for some scholars in Haremeyn, the holy cities Mecca and Medina, food 
supplies, especially crops, repair and renovation of the markets and common buildings like 
mosques or the Holy Kabe were compensated by Egypt as well.36 Wicker, beeswax, oil, and 
                                                        
33 Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, (Princeton, 1962), 
p. 309 
34 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761) 
35 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16879, D. 5432 - 001 
36 TSMA.d 2230 (Z 1164/November 1751). 
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other needs of Haremeyn were sent to the Hijaz on a yearly basis.37 In addition, there were a 
few kalyate ships in Suez that were used for the transportation of grain to Haremeyn. The 
wages for the staff worked for the ships, and other expenses were also met by the levy.38 The 
Porte agreed to meet the repair and maintenance expenses of public buildings, which served 
for the good of the civilians in Egypt and the Hijaz. On the other hand, occasionally, the 
aghas of regiments or viceroys spent for the repair expenditures of their residences and 
palaces from the irsaliye. However, the Porte hardly ever permitted them to use the money 
from the irsaliye-i hazine, as it considered that it was their duty to repair their own 
residences.39  
Excessive expenditure  
All these expenses show that the mamluk administrators used the irsaliye-i hazine, 
rather than Egypt’s provincial treasury, for the expenses of Egypt and the Holy cities. On the 
other hand, in the decentralized period, this indicates that the Ottoman central government 
considered important the maintenance of facilities in Egypt and its vicinities, as well as 
Haremeyn. Nevertheless, the Porte required a mahzar, petition, from the governor or local 
administrators requesting permission before spending money on these issues. The Sublime 
Porte had rejected the use of irsaliye-i hazine without a direct order or permission issued from 
them. For any expenses that were planned to be compensated by irsaliye-i hazine, the local 
authorities had to apply to the central government. Every year’s levy was to be sent with a 
detailed account register; every guruş that was spent and all surplus revenues that were to be 
sent to Istanbul were recorded in that account register. Numerous decrees, which were sent 
from Istanbul, state that the Egyptian administrators could not spend anything from irsaliye 
                                                        
37 For example MMD, vol. 8, nr. 62 (date mid Ş 1175/early March 1762). 
38 D. 2378 – 002, D 6136 - 001 
39 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 228 (date early M 1178/early July 1764) and nr. 477 (date late L 1180/late March 1767) 
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without permission. In one of these decrees, the central government asked local authorities not 
to use even one penny from irsaliye-i hazine.40 The phrase "even one penny" demonstrates the 
importance of the issue. Nonetheless, the Porte could not prevent the spending of irsaliye-i 
hazine without permission.  
Nonetheless, numerous protests about “excessive expenses” spent from the ‘irsaliye-i 
hazine’ were delivered to Egyptian administrators by the central government.41 It is stated in a 
decree that all responsible officers should be careful, not to waste the ‘hazine’; according to 
the decree, the ‘greed of tyrants’, and ‘laziness and over-leniency of the governors’ were the 
primary factors that led to the increase of expenses and the decrease of incomes. 42  It is 
claimed in the decree that all the over-leniency caused chaos in the good order of the Empire. 
According to a later decree, a former regulation had been re-introduced in 1695 and it was 
required that all expenses should be spent according to this regulation. 43  In some cases, 
reactive precautions were undertaken through the carefulness of katips, clerks, in Istanbul. 
Mainly, these katips checked whether all expenses were authorized by the central government 
by checking the records one by one. For example, a decree that was sent to the defterdar and 
ruznameci of Egypt is a good example of their operation. In this decree that was issued on 
early N 1175/2 late March 1762, 44  firstly, the central government informed Egyptian 
authorities about the deficit of six different items which were spent in 1173/1760 without 
permission. Since the expenses were incurred without permission, the Egyptian officers were 
asked for re-payment of the full amount, which was 1,366,510 paras, as well as the expenses 
made in 1172/1761 for the full amount of 13 items, which cost 1,459,050 paras. The use of 
                                                        
40 MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 116 and 121 (date late C 1176/early January 1763) 
41 For example see MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 153, 154, 156, and 157 (date early S 1177/mid August 1763) 
42 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 171 (date mid C 1177/mid December 1763) 
43 A. DVN. MSR 5/34 (early M 1180/ early June 1766) 
44 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 64 (date early N 1175/late March 1762) 
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word “immediately” in the decree demonstrates that the Porte was strict in this issue of asking 
Egyptian officers to fulfil the obligations as soon as possible. 
The katips of the central government were not only cautious about the articles on 
which the money was spent, they also examined and adjusted the budget to account for those 
articles. In a decree that was issued on 7 January 1763, which was sent to the governor, kadı, 
umera, defterdar and ruznameci, the receivers had been informed about the over-budgeting of 
one of the expense items, which was the restoration of kisve-i şerife, the cover of Holy 
Kabe.45 The Porte issued permission for the Egyptian authorities to use 100,000 paras from 
the irsaliye-i hazine for one certain restoration. However, there were three restoration projects 
for the building, which cost 522,535 para; Egyptian authorities had not asked for permission 
to the Porte to use the money from irsaliye-i hazine for the other two projects. Thus the Porte 
asked for the repayment of the price difference, which was 422,535 paras; the Porte asked for 
a reimbursement of the money spent without permission. In another decree, which was sent in 
June 1745, the previous governor Yahya Pasha was ordered to pay for the expenditure that he 
had deducted from the irsaliye, which was not ordinarily counted as an expense item. 46 
Furthermore, in 1160/1747, the amount that had been spent on the repair of the palace of the 
janissary agha, which was paid from irsaliye, was reimbursed by the ağa.47  
As mentioned above, there are numerous decrees that highlight these problems. Their 
main common point is that expenses from irsaliye-i hazine were allowed only with the 
permission of the Porte; if unauthorized expenditure occurred immediate re-payment was 
requested. The decrees are significant as they demonstrate the strict attitude of the Porte and 
the cautiousness of the katips who worked in Istanbul. A decree sent in 1762 was relatively 
                                                        
45 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 116 (date late C 1176/early January 1763) 
46 AE. SMHD. I. 183/14244 (CA 1158/ June 1745) 
47 D. 2413 - 0056 
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more detailed than others.48 In that decree, the Porte accused Egyptian authorities of being 
fraudulent and of embezzling money from the irsaliye-i hazine. As understood from the 
decree, Egyptian authorities deducted money from irsaliye-i hazine for one article of 
restoration but for two consecutive years. Egyptian authorities were accused of fraud as the 
Egyptian authorities received money three times for one repair. As highlighted in previous 
decrees, the Porte asked for them to fulfil the amount and re-pay. Also, it is mentioned that 
the Porte warned the Egyptian authorities about trying to cheat and deduct money from the 
irsaliye by inscribing the expenditures in the next year’s irsaliye-i hazine records. A huccet-i 
şeriyye, a legal document, which shows the mamluk beys would act along the lines drawn by 
the Porte, is mentioned for emphasizing that they had guaranteed the Porte according to the 
Porte’s rules.49 The decree mentions that no matter how the Egyptian administrators tried to 
cheat, they would not succeed as the records were carefully scrutinized. In this decree, there is 
another issue about the records and a deficit. In 1175/1762, there was an enormous over-
spending without proving much detail on the logistics of the grain in-kind sent from the 
religious foundations in Egypt to the Hijaz.50 Examining the earlier records, the Porte claimed 
that a recent raise was already made for the Arabs work on logistics and requested that the 
deficit money to be taken from the responsible people and sent to the Porte.51 Likewise, there 
are numerous decrees that try to minimize the deficits of irsaliye-i hazine and ask for the 
over-expenditure. Such cases that the katips of the central government detected and sent to 
Egypt shows us that although the local mamluk administration deducted money unlawfully, 
the Porte was monitoring all the revenues and expenditures in Egypt.  
                                                        
48 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 67 (date early N 1175/ late March 1762) 
49 Another referral to the huccet-i şeriyye was made in a decree condemning the mamluk beys for the dismissal of Hamza 
Pasha. See chapter I on rebellion, p. 68 and MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767)   
50 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 72 and 73 (date mid N 1175/ early April 1762) 
51 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 65 (date early N 1175/late March 1762) 
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The irsaliye of the year of 1155/1742 was especially problematic. Another amount of 
2,000,000 paras was spent on some repairs in and outside of Egypt, and on other 
expenditures, but without permission from the Porte. The Porte demanded the amount from 
the responsible two governors; Yahya Pasha and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha.52 The Porte was 
meticulous when it came to irsaliye and was never tolerant towards governors or local 
administrators. The previous year, there was another correspondence about the expenditure 
from the irsaliye of the year of 1154/1741 without permission of the Porte. The Porte 
demanded an investigation from the governor, in order to detect whether the previous 
governor legitimated the expenditure, or mamluk beys spent it without a buyruldu, a 
permission paper, from the governor.53   
In such cases, if further investigation was required, an officer, a mübaşir, was sent to 
Cairo in order to inspect. For this case, former sipah ağası Mustafa was sent to Cairo. 
According to his investigation in the divan of Egypt, he was informed that Yahya Pasha 
(1154-55/1741-42) and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha (1156/1743) gave permissions for those 
expenditures, and he was shown the registers in defters as proof. As a result, the two 
governors were sentenced to pay 1,538,290 paras, and mamluk beys were sentenced to pay 
532,818 paras. 54  Another decree complaining about expenditures without permission 
illustrates the situation. The excess cost for transport of the gilal (grain contributions) of 
248,934 paras was registered and collected in the irsaliye of the hijri year of 1173. In 
addition, another excess amounting to 530,903 paras was added in the irsaliye of 1174 as 
transport cost for the gilal of 1173. In total, 779,837 paras were spent on transport in both 
cash and in-kind of gilal. Although, it is emphasized in the decree that the administrators in 
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53 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 105 (date mid L 1156/early December 1743) 
54 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 240 and 241 (date late CA 1158/ late June 1745) 
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Egypt could not unilaterally deduct the transport fee for gilal paid in cash, 55  Egyptian 
authorities continued to claim the transport fee in the years that followed the issuing of the 
decree. However, they were warned again about not counting up previous years’ expenditures 
in the following years’ irsaliyes; Egyptian administrators did not give up doing this either.  
In another example, a logistics expenditure incurred in 1174/1760-61 was counted up in the 
irsaliyes of 1176 and 1177/1763-4. This logistic expenditure referred to the grain, which was 
annually sent from Egyptian grain foundations to the Holy cities Mecca and Medina. The 
grain, which was from these foundations, was traditionally sent to Holy cities either in-kind or 
in cash. The officers charged the price of the transport of the grain of 1174/1760-61, which 
was carried first by animals and then by ships, from the irsaliye of the years of 1176-77/1763-
4. The irsaliye of 1176/1763 was debited 3,444,738 paras for transport expenditure while in 
1177/1764 a sum of 2,480,000 paras was charged from the irsaliye of that year as transport 
costs. An interesting and somewhat amusing side note to this case highlighting the suspect 
actions of the administrators was that they counted and charged the grain in-cash as if it was 
in-kind and charged it as “transport expenditure” as well. In the decree, it was demanded from 
the governor to gather all the officers including the şeyhülbeled, the defterdar, other mamluk 
beys, the seven corps’ officers, the ruznameci, and other responsible officers of the irsaliye, 
and declare that not more than twelve and a half para would be paid for the price of transport 
of each irdeb56 of the grain in kind and there would be no payment for the grain in cash. If it 
had been paid, those responsible would be found and payment would be collected from 
them.57 
It is possible to find numerous complaints and repayment requests cases in the Mısır 
mühimme defter series in the Prime Minister’s archives. These decrees show us that the 
                                                        
55 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 117 (late C 1176/early January 1763) 
56 The irdeb (irdabb) measure was the equivalent of roughly 70 kg. 
57 MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 149, 150, 151 (date early S 1177/mid August 1763), and h.404 (date early M 1180/early June 1766) 
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central government could detect the irregularities and unlawful deductions and demanded the 
local administrators to obey the regulations. The Porte continued to send decrees and to put 
the irsaliye issues in good order as it had been in the past and to prevent its decrease by means 
of unauthorized external expenditures. Ignoring the orders sent from the Porte, the 
administrators of Egypt continued to do whatever they considered best for their own interests. 
While the Porte was struggling in order to secure the revenues at their previous level, the 
mamluk beys’ and governors’ endeavours to make their portion bigger from the incomes of 
Egypt, in fact they had to reimburse the central government sooner or later, during the last 
half of the eighteenth century. Despite in tug of war and persistent struggle for the 
achievement of ‘good order’ in the finances of Egypt, it has to be said that overall the 
government’s aims were, sooner or later, mostly realized in the mid-eighteenth century. 
It is claimed in the decrees that when the Porte asked for the repayment of the 
expenditures debited without permission, the administrators of Egypt tried to find ways in 
order to avoid these repayments. The Porte demanded from Egyptian administrators for 
repayment of expenditures amounting to 1,361,443 paras, which had been deducted without 
permission and charged against the irsaliyes of the years 1173-1174/ 1759-60-61.  The 
Egyptian officers claimed in their response that 461,443 paras of that amount had been spent 
with the permission of deceased previous governor Mustafa Pasha and they could not repay it. 
The Porte considered this response and their claim as an attempt to cover up their fault by 
using the deceased governor. However, the Porte found the solution in demanding that 
amount from kethüda of the aforementioned governor, and was still persistent in demanding 
the rest of the amount, 904,885 paras, from the officers, namely, the mamluk beys.  
Similar cases, for example the irsaliye of the year 1175/1761-62, show that the Porte 
demanded restitution of 1,143,835 paras, which had been spent on seven-items of 
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expenditure. In addition, more than 1,275,000 paras was not sent, which was recorded as 
“illegal” by the previous governor Ebubekir Rasim Pasha (1175/1761-62). When the officers 
in Egypt pursued the 1,275,000 paras in order to collect it from those responsible, they 
revealed that Bulutkapan Ali Bey had in his possession 800,000 paras of that amount. Ali 
Bey promised to send that amount with the irsaliye of the year of 1176/1762-63, and it is 
documented that he kept his promise. However, the Egyptian officers did not send the total 
amount due of 2,534,430.  
In Z 1133/September 1721, the governor Receb Pasha made an extraordinary 
deduction from the hulvan. Receb Pasha requested deduction of 183.500 paras from the 
hulvan; he claimed that he used the money in order to defeat rebels. Yet, his request was met 
with a repulse due to the fact that since the conquest of Egypt, previous governors had never 
requested a payment for such a reason.58 The Porte warned the Egyptian authorities, as they 
deserved punishment; leaving aside a reference to payment of this amount, they continued to 
deduct expenditures from the irsaliye without permission. Meanwhile, the officers were asked 
to demonstrate a commitment in order to find those responsible for contravening the sultan’s 
orders and compel them to repay the expenditures.59 Despite its persistent sending of decrees 
to the Egyptian authorities, including the governor and şeyhülbeled, asking them to ensure the 
regularity and the fixed amount of the irsaliye, it cannot be said that the Porte achieved very 
much success. The mamluk beys made the best of their authority and power in order to 
channel the financial sources to their households. They tested their limits. On the contrary, it 
is difficult to suggest that these decrees successfully fulfilled the object of enabling the Porte 
to get the annual income from Egypt regularly and in higher amounts as the central 
government requested.  
                                                        
58 MMD, vol. 3, nr. 240 (date mid ZA 1133/mid September 1721) 
59 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 406 (date early M 1180/ early June 1766) 
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By eliminating his rivals from the very day he was appointed as a şeyhülbeled in 1760, 
Ali Bey centralized the power and authority in his hand. During the Ottoman-Russo war he 
rose up against the Ottoman Empire. His attempts at independence by not sending the annual 
levy, irsaliye-i hazine, to the Porte, his interference in Syria’s and Hijaz’s politics, and the 
betrayal of his closest mamluk and son-in-law, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb by his 
collaboration with the central government forced him to flee to Sayda. In the meantime, Ali 
Bey al-kabir cooperated with the governor of Sayda, Zahir al-Omar, and the Russians against 
the Ottoman Empire. Although Ali Bey achieved his goal by conquering Damascus, his 
closest man Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb changed his side and fought back with Ali Bey. One 
week after Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb caught and imprisoned Ali Bey, he died. Mehmed Bey 
Ebu’z-zeheb became the şeyhülbeled and established the previous order in Egypt until the 
latter died in 1775. After he died, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s mamluk Murad Bey returned 
from the Upper Egypt and took over the authority in Cairo, and his comrade Ibrahim Bey 
became the şeyhülbeled.  
Ali Bey’s disobedience was followed by Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey’s loyalty and 
short period of his ascendancy. During this period of time, an order that the central 
government approved was fulfilled in Egypt. Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb sent the irsaliye-i 
hazine that had not been delivered during the ascendency of Ali Bey to the Porte. After Ebu’z-
zeheb, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey rose to power. Non-payment of the irsaliye-i hazine 
prompted a punitive expedition led against İbrahim and Murad Bey’s authority by Gazi Hasan 
Pasha in 1786. Gazi Hasan Pasha’s expedition enabled a temporary stability in terms of the 
commitment of Egyptian local administrators. Nevertheless, after a short period, the mamluk 
beys who ran away to Upper Egypt during the expedition seized the authority. Day by day, 
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local authorities became stronger and continued struggling to gain a bigger portion from the 
wealth of Egypt.  
The political and financial situation of Egypt was not unique. Ayans, local administrators, 
dominated on politics in other provinces of the empire, as well. Towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, it can be suggested that far away from the imperial centre, Egypt remained 
in the hands of ambitious mamluk beys struggling for financial power and authority. This 
fight may have worsened the financial situation of the Egyptian people. Yet, it is hard to 
discover to what extent the financial situation of the ordinary people was affected by the 
struggles between the local notables. Despite all these fights occurring as street combats 
among the mamluk beys, daily life still continued as normal. This fact can be deduced from 
the detailed records of the irsaliye-i hazine of the years between 1180-1188/ 1766-1774. It is 
stated in these records that restorations of some mosques, dams near the Mediterranean, and 
bridges continued even during the politically unstable years of Ali Bey’s “uprising”. 60 In 
1185/1771, the expenditure of thirteen different restorations was cut off from that year’s 
irsaliye. Besides the daily life of the locals being unaffected by the uprisings, according to 
these records, some official duties of Egyptian administrators were realized regularly. For 
example, the grain was sent to Haremeyn, and the castle Ajrud, which was an important 
hosting stage for the pilgrims during the holy journey, was repaired; even soldiers from Egypt 
who fought in the Ottoman-Russo war and their terakkis were compensated from the 
irsaliye. 61  However, it is obvious that financial problems developed during these years. 
Especially after 1780, the crisis was felt deeply. First, para currency lost its value, after a 
couple of years famine and plague struck Egypt, and destroyed the economic situation of the 
people. English-French competition for Egypt, and Russian hostility due to the Ottoman 
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Russo wars might have played a role in the political instability of Egypt towards the end of 
the eighteenth century.  
Nevertheless, the correspondence between the central government and the governor of 
Egypt suggests that the Porte made an effort in order to maintain its authority and continue to 
take the benefits from Egypt while at the same time meeting the needs of Egypt and the Hijaz. 
The failure to send the irsaliye was unacceptable by the central government. It was an 
unchanging regulation and was expected to be fulfilled by the provincial administrators of 
Egypt. At the beginning of the year of 1180/June 1766, the Porte sent a decree demanding 
implementation of the customary regulations for the governance of Egypt in their proper 
form. The clerks at the Porte had taken the defters from the archives and examined the 
regulations. It was mentioned in this decree that the primary duty of officers in Egypt was to 
send irsaliye-i hazine fully without wasting even one coin, and on time. At the same time they 
were charged with sending full in amount and ordered to refrain from spending it recklessly. 
The central government mentioned in these decrees that it previously sent numerous orders to 
Egypt in order to secure stability and did not hesitate to call the local administrators 
“tyrants”.62  
The central government attempted to apply new regulations or insisted on keeping the 
previous order in the financial administration of Egypt. In order to put the irsaliye in order, 
the defters dating from seventy years earlier for the year 1107/1695 were examined, and 
revenues and expenditures identified in detail. According to those records: salyane, mevacib, 
ceraye and alik were given from mahlulat (the properties that were transferred to the treasury 
because of a lack of heir), not from irsaliye. Even if this was approved with an explicit order, 
it would not be registered in defters. Even when the duty of a governor terminated, all the 
                                                        
62 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 410 (date early M 1180/early June 1766) 
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officers that worked on irsaliye should check the records meticulously. Kaimmakams should 
not give mahlulat to people and include it in the treasury accounts. The informers should 
notify mahlulats to the governor directly. The crops and revenues of winter should be 
collected in the winter and not be delayed till summer. 
The decree that reminded the regulations to the local administrators of Egypt was 
addressing directly to the governor and encouraged him by saying: “You, the vezir, have 
endeavour and loyalty in your heart and as a requirement of this, you should work with your heart and 
soul in order to put to an end all these deteriorations in Egypt. You and all the officers, who are 
responsible for the irsaliye, should inspect previous defters, and arrange and clean up expenses and 
revenues according to their example. Unless you organize these accounts according to the previous 
order, nobody is permitted to take any salyane, mevacib, ceraya and alik. Even if you decide to give, 
do not register them in the irsaliye defters.”63 Moreover, an examination of the ruznames (daily 
account records) was demanded alongside identification of subsequent expenditure items; and 
the officers were charged with finding out the reasons behind the expenditure items, how they 
emerged, and why they were not met according to the old system with other revenues? 
Unapproved expenditures were to be revoked afterwards, and in case of a need, they were to 
be met from mahlulat or irad-ı cedid revenues as previously. 
Another issue was about idle villages and mukataas. This decree forbade officers to 
reflect falls in revenue deriving from idle villages in the irsaliye levy. They were instructed to 
compensate such revenue decreases from mahlulats. The governors were asked not to give 
any buyruldus, which were in compatible with this order. If they did so, their decisions 
(buyruldus) would bind themselves (şeyhülbeled or defterdar) to compensate the treasury at 
the end of their term of office.64 It is strongly emphasized in the decree that there had been 
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connivance and lack of compliance for 30-40 years, and it had become incumbent on them to 
put the financial affairs of Egypt in their previous order by recording all the revenues and the 
expenditures and complying with the decrees/demands. In this way, the plan of the Porte was 
to keep the irsaliye in good order and maintain its amount and regularity by sticking to the old 
system. The governors and mamluk beys were to obey the rules and keep the old system, or 
face punishment.65 The Porte identified some reasons about irsaliyes’ delay and decrease in 
amount, and demanded from the governors to fix them: The Porte accused governors of being 
ignorant and carefree, thereby causing the irsaliye to be delayed, and incomplete. 66  The 
causes of delays and decreases were identified and a considerable effort was shown to 
eliminate barriers preventing full and on time irsaliye payments.  One of the reasons for the 
delay of the irsaliye was that the mukataat, both cash and grain, were not collected in time 
during the year. Normally in order to avoid delays, the newly appointed governors had agreed 
to pay for their predecessors’ debts. However, frequently, governors refused to pay 
predecessors’ debt in accordance with their promises. The governors kept it in their debit. 
During the dismissal of a governor and the appointment of a new one, the accounts got mixed 
up making it impossible for the irsaliye to be collected in full and on time. 67 For this reason, 
the central government demanded the governors not to carry over the debts of their 
predecessors.  
The second problem that the central government identified was about promissory 
notes that the provincial administrators sent to Istanbul. Irsaliye used to be sent in cash and/or 
in promissory notes. These notes, which were taken from Egyptian merchants, who had 
commercial partners in Istanbul, were mostly included with irsaliyes. Evaluating the 
relationship between the imperial capital and Egypt, the promissory notes demonstrate that 
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interactive commercial, economic and cultural relationship continued actively in the 
eighteenth century. Egyptian merchants had strong commercial ties with the imperial capital 
as well. This proves that during the period of Ottoman sovereignty the province of Egypt, 
rather than being an occupied and colonized place was an integrated part of a greater Empire, 
which supported it, and lived on it. The officers in Istanbul collected money from Egyptian 
merchants’ counterparts in Istanbul. However, sometimes, problems occurred during the 
collection of the money from Egyptian merchants’ partners in Istanbul. The Porte determined 
that the Egyptian administration chose unknown and bankrupt merchants, instead of credible, 
well-known and wealthy ones. When the officers went to collect money, on occasion some 
merchants did not acknowledge their partnership with their counterparts in Egypt or claimed 
that they were not informed about certain issues, thus, did not pay the promissory notes.68 
This became a problem from time to time; the officers in Istanbul had to send back some of 
the notes to Egypt in order to secure their collection in Egypt. Yet, the officers in Egypt 
ignored or they were still unable to collect and thus the irsaliye incurred losses. The irsaliye 
was considered different and special from other revenues of the central government and it was 
claimed that because of ignorance of the governors, the revenues were wasted for years. The 
government insisted that the Egyptian administrators send irsaliyes in cash. If they had to 
send it as promissory notes, they were expected to choose merchants among the wealthy and 
credible. Besides, the maximum amount of a promissory note provided by a single merchant 
should be no more than 1000-2000 paras instead of accepting credit promises in big amounts 
such as 8, 000 -10,000.69  
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The emirulhajj and irsaliye 
In the mid-eighteenth century the Egyptian authorities took 3,750,000 paras without 
permission in the years of 1169/1755-56, 1170/1756-57, 1172/1758-59 and 1173/1759-60 for 
the emirulhajj’s expenses.70 Although the central government did not accept the charge and 
demanded a repayment, it had to make this addition formal and legal. So, the Porte had 
increased the salary of the emirulhajjs of Egypt by adding the customs of coffee in the port of 
Suez and another addition amounting to 3,750,000 paras from irsaliye-i hazine during the 
reign of the governor Kamil Ahmed Pasha, in the eve of Ali Bey’s rise to the post of 
şeyhülbeled.71 After this arrangement was agreed to, it was strictly forbidden to take any extra 
money offset against the irsaliye. Our next case will show the mamluk beys’ noncompliance 
and their unamenable behaviour, when it came to money matters. The mamluk beys managed 
to get whatever they wanted by deterring and placing pressure on the governors. A short time 
after Hamza Pasha arrived in Cairo and took on the governorship, the emirulhajj Hasan Bey 
came in front of him and said that he would not leave for the pilgrimage, unless he was given 
2,500,000 paras as a support from the irsaliye. Moreover, he insisted on taking money from 
members of the military corps, with the condition that they were to be paid out of the irsaliye 
later, if the Porte refused to give him that money. Due to Hasan Bey’s insistence, the new 
governor Hamza Pasha had to give a buyruldu sanctioning the commitment of the mamluk 
beys for payments from the corps (ocaklu) to be offset against the irsaliye payment for the 
year 1180/1766-67. Obviously, the Porte found this unacceptable, as emirulhajj’s revenue was 
considered adequate without such external support. It was commanded that the buyruldu, 
which was taken from Hamza Pasha by force and with a high hand, was invalid and 2,500,000 
paras was to charged to those who had who secured the money in the beginning, i.e., the 
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ocaklu, not from the irsaliye.72 These cases demonstrate that the central government chose to 
negotiate with the mamluk beys in order to keep its control on the provincial revenues rather 
than taking more strict measures and excluding the mamluk beys from the boundaries of 
imperial control. Toledano refers this point as ‘employing various tactics to ensure a certain 
measure of control over revenues’ and claims that the redefinition of imperial boundaries was 
misinterpreted as Ottoman decline.73 
The Triangle of Interests: Irsaliye-i hazine, Mamluk Beys and Governors 
The land taxation that the Ottoman Empire applied in the eighteenth century did not 
produce a yield in the long run because of the fact that the central government could not 
regain the control of the revenue sources after iltizam holders’ death.74 One can see that 
mültezims’ heirs were a big problem in this case. The mühimme defter series provide 
numerous examples about the conflict between the heirs and the administrators, as mamluk 
beys disagreed to give up the iltizam and insisted on they were the heir of deceased mamluk 
beys. It can be suggested that the revenues of Egypt, which were canalized to irsaliye-i 
hazine, was a stage of conflict and struggle between the Porte, mamluk beys and governors. 
We can reach some cases through the correspondences between the Porte and Egyptian 
authorities, which give us a cross section about the topic.  
The case of Çavuşlar Kethüdası Çerağı Hasan Bey and issues relating to his 
estate: One of the mamluk beys, çavuşlar kethüdası çerağı (assistant of çavuşlar kethüdası) 
Hasan Bey was killed by one of his enemies (presumably Ali Bey al-Kabir) in Kasr Ayn in 
1180/1767. The information about Hasan Bey and his huge estate was delivered by Tatar 
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Ahmed, who was on duty in Egypt for some governmental obligations.75 At the time of his 
death, Hasan Bey had accumulated tremendous wealth. Apart from cash money and other 
properties, he owned annual revenue, which was worth more than 2,000,000 paras. It was 
known that he was extremely wealthy and his nickname was a proof of this: Ebu’z-zeheb-
father of gold. The source of his wealth was the villages, which had been mahlulat, and were 
supposed to belong to the bayt al-mal, i.e., the state treasury. The conflicts and struggle of 
gaining the superiority among mamluk beys had been leading them to embezzle mahlulats 
and the Porte was aware of it. In this case, we see that the Porte tried to reclaim the mahlulats, 
even if it was a little bit after the fact. 
In the decree, which was sent to the governor and other officers in Egypt, it was 
mentioned that according to the latest arrangements,76 the hulvan that belonged to those who 
were murdered or were runaways derived from musalehe. That means even if other people 
bought the villages, which had belonged to Hasan Bey, the auction held was invalid by that 
time. The villages that were already supposed to belong to state’s treasury were now to be 
claimed back. The Porte appointed a “reliable” mübaşir, an officer that carried out all the 
work, in order to identify all the villages and properties that Hasan Bey had owned by using 
registers, ruzname defters in the castle of Cairo. After detecting the people who took over 
Hasan Bey’s villages and properties, the mübaşir was supposed to reclaim them on behalf of 
the state, and sell them in auction and transfer the proceeds to the Porte.77 A short time after 
Hasan Bey was murdered, it was revealed that mamluk beys also forced Mehmed Bey and 
another Hasan Bey to flee to Jidda, and çavuşlar kethüdası Süleyman Bey, the boss of 
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murdered Hasan Bey, to Dimyat.78 The runaway mamluk beys owned a huge amount of gilal 
(grain), which was to be sent to the Haremeyn, and a number of state properties, as well. 
Şeyhülbeled Halil Bey, who was one of the mamluks of İbrahim Kethüda, previous emirulhajj 
Hüseyin Bey and Cüce Hasan Bey proposed to pay 9,900,000 paras to the governor Hamza 
Pasha in exchange for the gilal and state properties, and 2,500,000 paras for the hulvan 
villages of those who had been murdered and run away. Hamza Pasha had to give them a 
buyruldu, which confirmed the transfer, although it was contrary to the law. The Porte found 
this transfer unacceptable, as they paid less than the real-market value for all these properties. 
It was mentioned that let alone the others’ properties and hulvans, the hulvan of murdered 
Hasan Bey was worth 2,000,000 paras. 
On the other hand, it was suggested that the ‘murdered’ Hasan Bey was the assistant 
of the ‘runaway’ Süleyman, so both had embezzled the state’s property and Süleyman must 
have had much more money and property than Hasan Bey. In addition, Mehmed Bey and 
other Hasan Bey were well known with their wealth and the multitude of their villages. The 
revenue of each of these mamluk beys from villages was estimated at approximately between 
2,500,000-3,000,000 paras. The Porte was well aware that şeyhülbeled Halil Bey and other 
mamluk beys attempted to cheat and buy all these properties at prices well below their true 
market value. The mübaşir demanded identification of these four mamluk beys’ property, 
cash, gilal (the crop that was sent to Haremeyn) and other state property (mal-ı miri), and 
arrangement of an auction to sell them for değer baha 79  (the exact market price of the 
properties and villages), and then bring back the cash to Istanbul. 80 
According to surviving correspondences, it appears that the previous governor 
Hamza Pasha was dismissed and a decree was sent to the newly appointed governor Rakım el-
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Hac Mehmed Pasha.81 During the governors’ duty change, this case was ignored and the 
mübaşir did not work on it. Yet, the new governor reported that the previous governor had 
secured the villages and other properties for the şeyhülbeled Halil Bey and other mamluk beys 
in return for 38 items of kaime, accounts. In addition to that, previously, the villages of Ali 
Bey were kept in return for 10 kaimes. In total, the value of 48 kaimes was 7,500,000 paras 
annually and the Porte claimed them for the treasury.82 However, there is no indication as to 
whether or not they were sent. 
Another example in the archives highlights the struggle for benefits between mamluk 
beys, governors and the Porte: the case of Canım/Hayati Yusuf Bey. Yusuf Bey was one of 
the strongest figures among mamluk beys in Cairo, and was in charge of financial issues 
including collection of irsaliye-i hazine. This case is a good example of the misconduct of 
mamluk beys and governors, and their connivance in sharing the revenues and ignoring the 
central government’s demands and requirements. 
The Case of Gönüllüyan çorbacı Canım Yusuf Bey: A member of the corps of the 
gönüllüyan, çorbacı Canim Yusuf Bey, who was reputed to be domineering and brutal in his 
treatment of Egyptians, was operating the provincial finances and dealing with state fiscal 
matters and properties. As a result of the combination of his ambition and lack of work ethics, 
being in charge of the financial office and being stronger than the other beys, he was able to 
collect a huge amount of personal wealth. He illegally took money and property from both the 
provincial treasury and the irsaliye. In addition to that, he extorted huge amounts of money 
and permitted others to do so as well. He was responsible for the decay of orderliness in the 
sending of the irsaliye.  
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After his death, correspondence was sent which stated that all his properties, villages 
and money belonged to the Porte in return for his extortion, as he was responsible for the 
problems relating to the irsaliye’s failure, such as delays and decreases in the amount 
dispatched. The decree demanded from the mübaşir, the officer who was sent from Istanbul to 
handle these issues in Cairo, to identify the properties and cash Yusuf had owned, and make a 
list of all the property in order to sell them and send the money to the Porte. The mübaşir was 
warned about the aforementioned illegal musalehe as well 83 . Besides the mübaşir, the 
governor and other officers were ordered to ignore this kind of musalehe as it was not valid 
any more and accordingly they were instructed to do what was demanded of them.84 Yet, 
when the decree arrived in Cairo and was read by those who were in charge, they said that 
customarily the estate of a mamluk who died a natural death was given to the governor. For 
this reason, Yusuf bey’s hulvan was given to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha, the governor at the 
time. At that time, Mehmed Pasha had been appointed as the governor of Sayda and was 
preparing to head to Sayda, his new duty position. When the mübaşir informed him about the 
situation, Mehmed Bey not only hesitated to repay the hulvan money immediately but also 
misinformed the mübaşir about the amount of the money he gained from hulvan. Although he 
had 1,500,000 paras from this hulvan, he claimed that he had 625,000 paras and he was ready 
to pay whenever he got a decree, which was addressed to him by name to pay the amount. 
Another decree was sent to the governor mentioning that since Yusuf Bey did not earn his 
inheritance and it was obvious that he had gained all his wealth via the position he was in 
charge of through extortion, all his property including the hulvan that the governor took, 
belonged to the Porte and it should be sent to them in its entirety.85 
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The Porte also sent decrees to Sayda where the Mehmed Pasha was the new 
governor. Mehmed Pasha was rebuked; he was accused of being an ally with those who 
perpetrated misconduct in Egypt and of sending away the mübaşir without giving him the 
money. In addition, in the correspondence it was claimed that he misinformed the Porte about 
the amount and allowed his kethüda to take 250,000 paras from that hulvan.86 Mehmed Pasha 
was ordered to pay the amount immediately and warned that he would be punished if he acted 
otherwise. It is not clear whether Mehmed Pasha repaid that hulvan money or found an excuse 
and refused to pay. Yet, it is obvious that this was not his only confrontation with the Porte 
about fiscal issues.  
The Case of Ali Bey and Kethüda Mehmed Pasha: In another case, a petition by 
Ali Bey el-Kabir (with the title of previous emirulhajj) was sent to the Porte claiming that 
Kethüda Mehmed Pasha unlawfully took a large amount of money from the irsaliye-i hazine 
in addition to the travel expenses assigned to him, at the time he was appointed as the 
governor of Sayda. It was claimed that in addition to 3,400,000 paras, which was the travel 
expense assigned for him; he borrowed 9,201,815 from the irsaliye of the year 1176/1762-63, 
and 9,453,662 paras from the irsaliye of the year 1177/1763-64. In total, Mehmed Pasha was 
accused of taking 18,655,477 paras from the irsaliye-i hazine in return for two pieces of ‘ 
deyn-i divan temessük’. Irsaliye-i hazine was ready to be sent to the Porte and Mehmed 
Pasha’s taking money caused delay. After this petition, the Porte sent a decree to the Egyptian 
governor Hamza Pasha, in order not to depend only on Ali Bey’s petition but to ask for an 
investigation to find out the truth, as well as affirming that nobody could borrow money from 
the irsaliye-i hazine, even the governor himself. A decree requesting information about the 
issue was also sent to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha himself, as well.87 
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“to Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Sayda, 
According to the information we got from Egypt, you borrowed from irsaliye-i hazine 
18,655,477 paras. Although the revenues obtained in Egypt is adequate for a governor, it is strange 
for you to take all that money. Is it true that you borrowed all that money? If it is, what did you spend 
it on? Please inform immediately!”88 
All these cases prove that governors were more concerned about their personal 
interests than those of the Porte. It is highly likely that Mehmed Pasha did not repay this 
amount but his response to the Porte is interesting in that it reveals the governors’ point of 
view and conditions that they had to handle during their duty in Egypt. Mehmed Pasha 
responded to this decree, when he was the governor of Karaman. He summarized the 
situation, revenues and expenditures in his report, stating that as a governor in Egypt the 
revenues did not meet the expenditures and he spent the mentioned money to cover his 
normally recurring expenditures. Mehmed Pasha’s report is important, as it demonstrates the 
revenues and expenditures of the governor of Egypt and more importantly the financial 
conflicts and struggles between the governor and mamluk beys in eighteenth century Egypt. 
In his petition to the Porte,89 Mehmed Pasha, complains of shortage of revenues, and the 
problems that prevented him from gaining them, stated his revenues as follows: 875,000 
paras from küşufiyye of governor of Egypt, which he could not obtain. Spice customs from 
the port of Suez. (Mehmed Pasha claimed that he had given more than 1,375,000 paras to the 
soldiers in Jidda when he went and came back to Jidda as subsequent tax). Hulvan revenues in 
Egypt (he claimed that Egyptian mamluks took it).  
However, the expenditures of a governor of Egypt were larger: The price of the fur 
caftan for Egyptian statesmen, which cost around 7,500,000 paras. A huge amount of 
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expenditure to support governor’s employees and entourage, ‘kapi halki’, for their essential 
requirement, bahşiş, and ulufe for a year. In addition to terakkiyat, annual divan debt under 
the name of mevadd-i meçhule, which cost 15,150,000 paras (The mamluk beys forced the 
governor to pay this amount by showing buyruldus of previous governors) 
Consequently, at the end of the period of two-year duty, the amount of divan debt, 
and terakkiyat, alikat, ceraya given to the employees in the divan cost 37,500,000 paras, 
excluding the other expenditures. The revenues from küşufiyye, hulvan and spice customs did 
not compensate the expenditure cost of 37,500,000 paras, and it became a custom for mamluk 
beys (umera and ocaklu) to gather and force the governor to issue a temessük, a kind of debt 
invoice, offsetting to irsaliye-i hazine and pay the rest of the debt.90  
Based on Mehmed Pasha’s report, the Porte asked for an investigation by current 
governor Hamza Pasha, in order to ascertain whether Mehmed Pasha had spent the money 
that he borrowed from the irsaliye for provincial expenditures. Hamza Pasha was to carry out 
his investigation, by scrutinizing ruznamce defters, in order to respond to the following 
questions: 18,655,477 paras that Mehmed Pasha peculated derived from which revenues? 
Identify item by item. During his two-year duty, for which expenditures did Mehmed Pasha 
borrowed money from irsaliye? What was the amount of Mehmed Pasha’s hulvan and other 
revenues? Did he spend the money that he borrowed for the issues he claimed? 
It is notable that the Porte did not ask for the money from Mehmed Pasha directly 
although it desperately needed the money from Egypt by that time, but advised the current 
Egyptian governor to find out whether his predecessor spent the money for Egypt’s 
expenditures or not, and whether what Mehmed Pasha said and what he did were consistent. 
Shaw claims that governors collected as much tax revenues as possible for both themselves 
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and the sultan by exploiting the conflicts between mamluk beys;91 however, the documents 
prove that generally governors considered their interests first.  
Taxation of the land in Ottoman Egypt and the Provincial Society 
The main question that this chapter aims to determine is the relationship between the 
state finance and the reasons for the mamluk beys’ discontent and uprising. It is important to 
position the mamluk beys in the financial administration of Egypt in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. For this reason, brief information about the land taxation will be explained. 
Land was the main source of wealth in Egypt and provided a large volume of revenue for the 
Porte; therefore, it was important that the Porte should seek to maximize its agricultural 
output. The Ottoman policy was to keep cultivators (fellahs) on the land, encouraging them to 
exploit the land, to produce and to pay the tax. The Porte organized and operated a land 
system in order to fully exploit the land held in the possession of the sovereign and increase 
the flow of revenue into the imperial treasury. The tax coming from Egypt and Syria formed 
one of third of the imperial revenue.92 Just like the Islamic states before it, the Ottoman 
Empire used an intermediary through the institution of mukataa. The authority in mukataa 
was assigned in different ways: Timar, emanet, and iltizam. Unlike the Mamluk Sultanate, the 
Ottoman Empire did not use the ikta system in Egypt: instead, during the period that Ottoman 
government rule was centralized, a system of emanet trusteeship was employed. After the 
seventeenth century, with decentralization and the increasing need for cash to finance frequent 
wars, the iltizam system was employed. In his book on Egypt’s financial administration, Shaw 
explains the reason for the Ottoman’s adoption of a system different from elsewhere in the 
Empire and from that used by their predecessors in Egypt as follows: 1) the Ottoman military 
system had begun to use “new corps of infantry supported by salary alone, to provide a more 
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united trained obedient and available military force” from Mehmed II’s reign onwards, 2) the 
need to keep the military forces united, as they were small in number, in case of a probable 
attack from mamluks and Arab bands and 3) the fact that Egypt had a unique place, as it was a 
granary, to serve as a base for soldiers and supplies in the southern parts of the Empire.93  
 The introduction of the timar system would have alienated the grains and provisions 
that the Empire needed from Egypt.94 Thus, in the sixteenth century, imperial possessions in 
Egypt were divided up between civilian emins, (trustees, imperial officers) who were paid 
fixed annual salaries. When an emin assigned responsibility for a number of adjacent 
mukataas, he was named a kaşif, just like in the system of the Mamluk Sultanate. In time, due 
to the administrative and political necessities, the iltizam system was introduced into Egypt.95 
In the iltizam system, the mültezim was required to pay the tax as a lump sum in cash. The 
tenure of usage was indefinite in length. The mukataa contracts were usually agreed for 
specified terms, but the mültezim had the right to renew the contract so long as he fulfilled the 
requirements. Lands or villages were often offered at auction in return for bedl-i iltizam or 
hulvan.96 All the officers were free to undertake tax-farm contracts through auctions except 
for the “dellalbaşı”, who was the officer that administered the auction in Cairo divan, and his 
assistants; this is due to the fact they held a key position for the awarding of iltizams.97  
Today, we do not have a record of the actual income potential of mukataas; instead, 
we have the record of the value of the contracts sold at auction. Shaw mentions that the 
conductors of the auctions were not aware of the consequent value of the mukataa and were 
also uninformed about its level of probability.98 He states that the buyers, who knew the real 
value, were raising the prices until it reached the true value in order to create competitive 
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bidding. It is generally accepted that only about one-eighth of the consequent value of given 
mukataa was realized when sold at auction. The decline of the Porte’s authority and the 
increase of the rule of mamluk beys affected the revenues from the vacant mukataas and their 
sale progress and hulvan revenues.99 These revenues were a manifestation of the increasing 
authority of the mamluk beys in the finance and administration of Egypt. The imbalance 
between Ottoman authority and the mamluk hierarchy was highlighted in the financial realm. 
The more effective sultans were able to reclaim a portion of their dwindling budgets by 
repossessing and selling the vacant iltizams. 
The revenue gained from tax farming was the central dynamic of Egyptian politics. 
In order to protect their own financial basis, competing mamluk beys wanted to ensure the 
assignment of mukataas to other mamluks in their respective households. In order to 
accomplish a smooth transfer and accumulation of financial authority in their own household, 
the mültezims turned over their right of possession to other mamluks, whom they wanted to 
succeed them. When a mültezim died, the treasury came forward to make arrangements for the 
transfer of the iltizam. Once the new holders showed their deeds, the officers had to withdraw 
the mukataa from sale.100 If a mamluk mültezim died unexpectedly before arrangements for 
his mukataa’s transfer had been formalized, claimants commonly used force to compel the 
governor to prevent the village being included in a public auction. In return for an under-the-
table payment delivered directly to the governor, the mamluk beys used to secure the village 
for themselves.  
In contrast to hulvan, this action, transfer of an iltizam without public auction, was 
considered as musalehe, and the money paid to the governor was called bedl-i musalehe. On 
average the bedl-i musalehe was three times the annual profit of a tax farm, while the bedl-i 
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hulvan was seven times the annual profit. For this reason, powerful beys used to inherit their 
masters’ or other mamluk beys’ iltizams through musalehe, whether they fulfil the 
requirements of the Porte or not. The term hulvan is mistakenly used for musalehe as well. 
The Porte was trying to limit mukataa transfer through musalehe. Therefore, a solution was 
implemented as follows: the mültezims, who died by means of execution, flight or war did not 
have the right to bequeath their iltizams, but those who naturally died and made specific 
requests in their wills were granted the right to bequeath their iltizam to those who could meet 
the requirements demanded of a mültezim. Nevertheless, this solution did not work in practice; 
usually the mamluks were able to secure their masters’ iltizam by musalehe. 101 However, the 
Porte had been able to take possession of some iltizams, even if they were sold by musalehe.  
There are several cases of the Porte intervening and taking the iltizam back: one of 
these cases recorded in the Prime Minister’s archives records (BOA) refers to a villager dying 
without an heir. According to laws, when an officer or a wealthy villager died without an heir, 
all his property including his cash, belongings, estates, and villages under his iltizam would be 
sold, and the cash alongside a detailed list of the properties sold be sent to the Porte. In 1754 
after the death of a wealthy villager named Salih, the Sublime Porte requested that his estate 
be sent in its entirety to Istanbul. The governor Kethüda (Gürcü) Mehmed Pasha and kadı, 
judge of Egypt, replied to Istanbul with a petition stating that when the first decree arrived in 
Egypt, the governor, kadı, defterdar, umera, seven regiment officers, freed slaves and 
employees of the deceased gathered. After they heard the decree, they were asked about the 
amount of the deceased’s estate and were made aware of the imperial order commanding 
truthfulness. Thereupon, the governor and other officers were told that Salih legally 
bequeathed his villages and other properties to his freed slaves in the regiments before his 
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death. In addition, his legal heirs, his wife and two cousins, were given a share of his other 
belongings. Therefore, Salih’s estate was already apportioned before his death, and his 
beneficiaries had previously reported the situation to the officers. Nevertheless, the Porte 
decided to pursue its case, as it was expected by the central government that mamluk beys 
would on occasion hide the deceased’s property.  
After the investigation, it was discovered that Salih’s beneficiaries conspired with the 
officers to illegally share Salih’s property. Interestingly, the governor who made the 
correspondence was involved in the illegal share. Salih’s beneficiaries gave to the governor 
Kethüda Mehmed Pasha 3,750,000 paras, to the governor’s kethüda 750,000 paras, to the 
şeyhülbeled Ali Bey (Bulutkapan) 3,000,000 paras, to the mübaşir 125,000 paras, and to the 
kadı 100,000 paras as hush money.102 In the decree, it is indicated the Porte was aware that 
this case was not unique, and unlawful proportioning of a deceased person’s estate was 
habitual in those from Egypt. Also, it is stated that although they deserved punishment, they 
would only receive a warning. As a result of the investigation, the Porte was able to reclaim 
the hush money of 5,000,000 paras from the governor and kethüda, and continued with the 
investigation in order to reclaim all of the illegally proportioned money, and muhallefat, 
bequest, of deceased villager Salih. 103  At the end, the Porte had to accept this de facto 
situation and had to resign themselves to it. Although the law bound mamluk beys 
theoretically, in practice they usually got what they wanted; sometimes with cooperation but 
mostly by forcing governors.   
In practice, by the end of the eighteenth century, the lands assigned at auction 
became private property, even though they remained imperial lands in theory. To make what 
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existed in legal theory corresponds with what existed in fact, a fourth way was found that 
mukataa could be held. The name of this method of tenure was the malikane system. Indeed, 
malikane system was principally the same as the mukataa in its basic features. The only 
difference was the right of passing it to a designated heir, which after arranging the musahele 
with governor became a mere formality. Under the malikane system, the right to transfer 
possession had been given to the mültezim with lifetime tenure, who was responsible for 
managing the land. This system could be considered as iltizam, management rights which can 
be inherited.  
These mukataas were considered as malikane not as iltizam after 1179/ 1765-6. In 
300 years of Ottoman rule, imperial lands in Egypt were alienated as different successive 
forms of tenure: emanet, iltizam and malikane (for the half century before Bonaparte’s 
expedition). Shaw claims that all of them reflected the stages of progressively weakened 
power of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt.104 At the end of the eighteenth century, in 1797, 
military men owned 59% of existing tax farms, tribal shaykhs owned 19%, women had 13%, 
and ulema had 7%. 105  In the eighteenth century, tax farming was considered as private 
property; it was sold, bought, mortgaged, and inherited. It is suggested that statistics gathered 
by the French indicate that the central treasury was receiving only one-fifth of the land tax 
collected from rural areas whilst most of the rest remained in the hands of tax farmers.106  
Not the all types of lands were transferred into malikane in Egypt. For example, 
hass-ı vüzera, which was given to governors of Egypt as they were ranked as viziers, was out 
of malikane. Revenues of hass-ı vüzera were separate from the imperial treasury’s income; 
the tax revenues from these villages were directly allocated to governors. Governors had been 
managing these villages by using kaşifs, who were considered as the personal entourage of the 
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governors. The duty of the viziers’ kaşifs was similar to the duty of the kaşifs of the Mamluk 
Sultanate. There were many kaşifs in the sixteenth century, however their numbers were 
significantly reduced after iltizam lands were extended throughout the country. These hassa 
villages were called küşufiyye and their revenues were called as mal-ı küşufiyye.107 
In the sixteenth century, provincial governors were administered through the emanet 
system, which meant the holders received a fixed salary and gave the full küşufiyye revenue 
directly to the governor. Once the governorships transferred to iltizam status, their salary was 
abolished. In its place, küşufiyye villages were added into iltizam revenues. In theory, the 
governor as the holder of the right of full produce, used to give a part of it to kaşifs in return 
for exploiting his land. In other words, in the case of the küşufiyye villages, provincial 
governors acted as mültezims for the governors rather than the imperial treasury. Provincial 
governors promised to deliver a certain amount of mal-ı küşufiyye and keep the surplus. In 
time, küşufiyye lands started to include all the lands except for the lands that were alienated by 
temporarily transferring to iltizam, and permanently transferring to foundations. All the lands, 
which were previously iltizam or vakıf, religious foundations; and somehow fell into idleness 
because of the absence of mültezims could provide money and labour to cultivate it. In 
addition, the cultivable lands that were not alienated and newly created by, for example, as a 
result of the flooding of the Nile were considered as küşufiyye. The provincial governors were 
directly responsible for their direction. It was the governors’ duty to sell these lands by 
auction to mültezims when the land became profitable, and transfer the revenue to the imperial 
treasury.108  
In the seventeenth century, it was observed that the mamluk beys began to hold 
iltizams. Beginning from this period of time, mamluk households began to shift the provincial 
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treasury to their expenditures, wages and other payments, and transferred obligation burdens, 
and the expenditures in Egypt and the Holy cities, to the irsaliye-i hazine.109 The Sublime 
Porte failed to fulfil its financial aims both by taking advantage of conflicts between mamluk 
beys to raise the revenues from mültezims, and preventing the mamluks from diverting the 
revenues that reached the provincial treasury to their private expenditures.110 Thus, their aim 
of controlling mültezims through hiring capable and powerful mamluks did not work, since 
the Sublime Porte could not control mamluk beys because of their endless ambition. In fact, 
mamluk beys worked hard to ensure the mukataa system functioned well and increased the 
treasury revenues; however, they took the benefits for themselves, instead of the Porte. For 
that reason, the Porte created a new way for securing its objectives by combining previous 
attempts: the Porte supported the mamluk leader who promised to send the greatest amount of 
hulvan; in return these mamluk leaders had the right to take defeated rivals’ possessions. An 
officer, called mübaşir, was appointed in order to collect hulvan and bring it to the imperial 
capital. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, most of irsaliye-i hazine was being used 
for the obligations and expenditures of Egypt and Holy cities; thus, hulvan became an item 
that made the most contribution to irsaliye.  
Revenue of the central government from the Urban Wealth: 
The state acquired five principal mukataas in urban areas 1- customs, (the total 
revenue of customs of the port of Alexandria was 5,405,705 paras. Bulak and Old Cairo’s 
customs revenue was around 3,516,436 paras. Revenues from Damietta’s customs was 
1,564,530 paras.111) 2- Police (Şurta) 3- Regulation of trade and industry 4- Centralization 
and control in specialized warehouses for the rural areas and 5- Regulation of navigation in 
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the Mediterranean and the Nile.112 The annual total fixed revenue of the imperial treasury in 
Egypt was 58,934,502 paras in 1004/1595-6, and it rose to 115,254,440 paras in 1212/1797-
8.113 Agricultural tax was two thirds of the total tax amount. The remaining, one third of tax 
was formed from customs duties, other levies on commerce, fines imposed for violations of 
commercial regulations, license fees on urban crafts, and the poll tax collected from non-
Muslims. 114 
The Expenditures of Egypt’s Imperial Treasury 
Expenditures for Egypt: 1) Salary for the officers 2) Wages (Mevacib) 3) Other expenditure 
(Teslimat, ihracat, adat).115  According to the system the Selim I established, 50.735.299 
paras were allocated for the salary and wages, and 7.618.634 paras assigned for the other 
expenditure of Egypt.116 
Expenditure for Pilgrimage and Holy Cities: 15.981.220 paras were sent to Haremeyn as 
surre. For other expenses of Haremeyn, 14.903.475 paras were allocated. 
Expenditures for the Porte: 1) Kitchen 2) Dockyard 117 
Chapter Conclusion  
In this chapter, the revenues and expenditures of the Egyptian treasury have been 
examined. By examining the documentation in the Ottoman archives about Egypt in the 
eighteenth century, it can be deduced that two main problems occupied the Sublime Porte’s 
agenda regarding Egypt: proper and legal exploitation of the land in order to provide revenue 
for the Sublime Porte and securing the tax in an agreed amount to the Porte without excuses 
or pretence. During the long eighteenth century Egypt occupied an important place in the 
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Porte’s financial agenda. Especially repeated wars with the Hapsburgs (1715-18, 1735-39, 
1787-91), Iran (1723-1727, 1730-32, 1735-36, 1742-46, 1775-79) and Russia (1735-39, 1768-
74, 1787-92) exhausted the imperial treasury. For this reason, the annual tribute coming from 
Egypt became more crucial. During the mid-eighteenth centuries the governors and the 
mamluk beys sent the irsaliye to Istanbul except for some omissions. Nevertheless, these 
omissions were being compensated by the successors a couple of years later. However, 
towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Porte had some difficulties in receiving the 
annual tribute from Egypt on time and in full.  
More wealthy and authoritative mamluk beys, as the generation of decentralized 
period of the Ottoman administration, began to channel the imperial revenues to their 
households. The financial power was the backbone of the authority of a mamluk household. 
Being aware of this fact, the mamluk beys first seized the governors’ revenues taking benefit 
of their short tenures in Egypt. From the 1760s onwards the task for the mamluk beys was to 
generate more income from the irsaliye.  The emirulhajj was the chief actor in doing this. The 
mamluk beys forced the governors to issue buyruldus and provided more revenues. Moreover, 
by generating untrustworthy promissory notes for the irsaliye-i hazine, they tried to cheat the 
imperial treasury. 
A better financial support helped Ali Bey to realize his ambitions. He acquired 
mamluks who were loyal to him, eliminated his counterparts in Egypt, and built his military 
troop including 10.000 soldiers from different backgrounds. In order to generate more income 
via the Red Sea trade, he interfered with the Hijaz’s politics and made agreements with the 
European merchants. He struggled with his counterpart in Syria, with whom he cherished 
enmity. I contend that the financial power was the principal mediator of Ali Bey in realizing 
his ambitions and it enabled him to strengthen his authority and extend it. In line with this, Ali 
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Bey began to seize the annual tribute, not bluntly but without being noticed, under cover of 
expenditures without permissions from the Porte. The central government protested and 
pursued the excessive expenditures via the governor and mostly achieved the reimbursement. 
However, Ali Bey’s authority damaged the execution of the regulations. Even though 
Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb compensated the Porte’s loss during his authority, his successors 
were reluctant to sustain regularity in their payments of the irsaliye.
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CHAPTER IV: Representation of the Central Government in Egypt: 
Governors 
Governors were the most powerful political actors in Egypt and represented the 
central government’s interest in the province alongside their responsibilities such as 
maintaining order and providing a peaceful environment that would help the peasants and 
urban residents to produce and pay their taxes. From the Ottoman conquest to the French 
expedition, the Ottoman governors, who were appointed directly from the imperial capital, 
administered Egypt for almost 300 years. Throughout this period, the central government’s 
expectation from the governor of Egypt was that he should regularise the Ottoman domain, 
utilise both human and material sources in favour of the Empire, and support the religious 
institutions and groups to maintain Islamic culture and traditions. However, during that long 
period of administration, the power and authority of the governor was affected by changes in 
the imperial government. This chapter, therefore, aims to analyse the position of governor of 
Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century and explore the relationship between the governor and 
local notables and determine whether the latter were being empowered at the former’s 
expense. It is important to explore the position of the governors and their relations with local 
notables because the governor was an important political figure as he was representative of 
the central government and head of the provincial administration. For this reason his 
relationship with the local notables, namely mamluk beys, was important as well. The 
expansion of mamluk beys’ administrative and financial limits played a determining role in 
defining the governors’ position in the province.  
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Current historiography suggests that in the sixteenth century the governors were the 
most powerful political actors.1 However, the change in the empire’s administration and land 
taxation system caused the governor to lose authority against the local notables. 2  Some 
historians such as Crecelius claim that governors’ losing authority resulted in a power 
vacuum, which caused ascendancy of conflicts and struggles in the military regiments and 
‘meanwhile the mamluk beys struggled to expand their tax farms and get the higher positions 
in the corps, while the governor did not do anything’.3 The difficulty with this statement is 
that it is too simplistic and over generalising. An in-depth examination of the primary sources 
of the mid-eighteenth century shows that the relationship between the governors and mamluk 
beys was more complicated. For example, the governorships of Rağıb Mehmed Pasha (r. 
1744-48) or Kethüda Mehmed Pasha (r. 1762-63) prove that generalisations are far from 
explaining the relationship nexus of mid-eighteenth century Egyptian administrators. In order 
to discuss the motivations behind the uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir and other mamluk beys’ 
becoming more assertive, it is essential to look at the relationship between the mamluk beys 
and the governors of Egypt. There is a historiography in which the theory was established that 
governor’s powers were nominal in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt. According to this 
theory, the governor of Egypt was an insignificant officer who left the administration mostly 
to the mamluk beys. 4  Holt suggests that late seventeenth century Ottoman Egypt was a 
province administered by strong mamluk beys, and he draws a picture of governors as weak 
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and temporary political figures. Egypt is viewed as a province that was formally a subordinate 
of the Ottoman Empire, but was administered by the mamluk beys de facto.5 Marsot shares 
the same idea as her colleagues. 6  However, the decree records show that the central 
government had a close connection in Egypt and tasked the governor firstly, and following 
him the kadı, the grandees and members of the seven regiments, and şeyhülbeled, among 
other officials to implement its policies in Egypt.7 I contend that the governor of Egypt was an 
active policymaker and executer of the central government until Ali Bey’s authority. 
However, the “nominal governor” definition belonged to the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century, and was produced by the European travellers who visited Egypt during Murad and 
İbrahim Beys’ tenure of office. Travellers’ accounts are important as they provide us 
information of the Egyptian society as an eye from outside. However, since they are the eye 
from outside, their statements can be limited and biased.  
Crecelius claimed that the governors in the eighteenth century were weak and 
powerless, that they had to instigate grandees of mamluk beys against each other, and he 
mentions that Rağıb Mehmed Pasha was one of them.8 He claims that Rağıb Mehmed Pasha 
instigated İbrahim Çavus, the kethüda of the corps, against Qatamish Beys in order to balance 
the local factions.9 On the other hand, the Porte described Rağıb Pasha as loyal and quick of 
comprehension, behaving desirably towards the central government, truthful, 10  a worthy, 
                                                        
5 Holt, “The Career of Kuchuk Muhammed”, p. 272 
6 Marsot, “Power and Authority”, p. 41-42 
7 Most decrees recorded in the mühimme-i mısır defter series are addressed to ‘Mısır valisine ve kadısına ve şeyhülbelede ve 
ümera-i mısriyyeye ve yedi ocak zabıtanına’ /the kadı, grandees of seven regiments, şeyhülbeled, and ümera-i mısriyye – 
Egyptian amirs following the governor. 
8 Daniel Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, in The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. II: Modern Egypt: From 1517 
to the End of the Twentieth Century, Martin W. Daly, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998), p. 74 
9 Ibid., p. 74 
10 MMD, vol. 6, nr.17 (date late RA 1157/early May 1744) “harekat-ı matbûası nezd-i humayun-ı hüsrevânemde merğûb ve 
makbûl ve kemal-i sadâkat ve dirâyet ile mevsûf ve meshûr mücerrebü’l-etvâr sadık-ı kavvâl olmağla avâtıf-ı aliyye-i 
mülûkânemden şerefbahş-sudur olan hatt-ı humayun merfifet-makrûnum mûcebince rütbe-i, vâlâ-yı vezârete is’âd ile îsar 
kılınan vezirim Rağıb Mehmed Paşa …” 
 198 
estimable statesman, and the most well guided and well directed among all the viziers.11 Al-
Jabarti mentions Rağıb Mehmed Pasha’s literary and scholarly side, as well.12 He stresses that 
Rağıb Mehmed Pasha had an excellent understanding, and used to converse with the ulema 
and had academic debates with them.13 Mehmed Süreyya Bey, the author of Sicill-i Osmani, 
also mentions about Rağıb Mehmed Pasha and he points out that he was a religious and 
strong man carrying out his duties well.14 He was talented and adept, and prominent among 
his fellows. 15  He was well educated both in science and politics, and was also a good 
translator.16 Rağıb Mehmed Pasha proves that he deserved the praise since the documents also 
suggest that he was Rağıb Mehmed Pasha who fixed the problems regarding the irsaliye 
dating from the tenure of previous governors, Yahya Pasha and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha, and 
was mostly successful in collecting their debts from the mamluk beys. Also, he solved the 
issues about the Haremeyn’s grain. Rağıb Mehmed Pasha’s tenure coincides with İbrahim and 
Rıdvan Kethüda’s strong authority in Cairo. It is remarkable that although the years that fall 
within Rağıb Mehmed Pasha’s tenure in office are the prosperous times of Egypt that al-
Jabarti mentions, the gilal of Haremeyn, cereal for the holy cities, and ocaklık (revenues for 
special purpose) of the kiler-i amire, sultan’s imperial kitchen, was not sent for a while, and 
was a persistent problem.17 While the grain was not sent to Haremeyn for almost nine years, a 
couple of decrees mention that the officer embezzled the grains.18 Therefore, it was Rağıb 
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Mehmed Pasha who collected the grain, which was owed by Zülfikar Osman Bey and the 
sefer serdarı Mustafa Bey19, and ultimately managed to send it.20  
Another issue that Rağıb Mehmed Pasha had to deal with was the mamluk beys, who 
were exiled from Egypt by their rivals, and their debts or properties. As a result of the conflict 
between mamluk beys, some of them had to run away from Cairo and leave all their 
properties to their rivals. 21  Normally the Porte rarely got involved in such cases unless 
mamluk beys influenced imperial interests. In 1157/1744, the emirulhajj Zulfikar Osman Bey 
and some of his followers had to flee Cairo, leaving their properties behind. The point that is 
relevant to the topic of this chapter is that Osman Bey and some of his followers had 
remarkable amounts money of irsaliye-i hazine of the year of 1155/1742 in their accounts. 
Although Osman Bey claimed that he had paid the amount in full, the irsaliye received was 
incomplete. The subject expected amount was 11.818.894 paras.22 The Porte did not accept 
any excuses, as the loss to the treasury ran to a significant amount. So Rağıb Mehmed Pasha 
was demanded first to check the ruznamce defters, to see whether Osman Bey told the truth or 
not, and then to collect the money from Qatamish İbrahim Bey and his fellow mamluks, since 
they held the properties of the fugitive Osman Bey and his fellows.23 Also, the Porte did not 
neglect to threaten the previous governors Yahya Pasha and Rağıb Mehmed Pasha. They were 
ordered to pay the amount if they had shown leniency that resulted in the failure to collect the 
money due.24 The decrees offer a hint about how the Porte motivated the governors in order to 
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collect the mamluk beys’ debts. During the investigation, the Porte found Yedekçi Mehmed 
Pasha was responsible as well, as he sealed the irsaliye when sending it to the imperial 
capital. In the beginning, although the Porte sent a decree demanding payment in full the 
aforementioned amount of 11.818.894 paras owed from Yahya Pasha (6.825.000 paras) and 
Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha (5.000.000 paras), from the mamluk beys.25 However, the mamluk 
beys submitted a petition requesting the amount to be reduced to 7.500.000 paras.26 
The Porte’s approach proves us that the divan in Istanbul had control and a close eye 
on Egypt’s governor in the mid-eighteenth century. The ambition of the Porte to receive the 
cash tributes on time was a strong motivation to follow the governors closely. Keeping peace 
in the province and collecting the tribute, which the Ottoman Empire desperately needed, 
were the principle duties the Porte expected from the governors. The governors’ 
administrative success was considered according to their success at managing to collect the 
required sum of the annual tribute and their ability to handle the local administrators who 
were in an incessant conflict with each other. The detailed activities of governors reveal the 
close connection of the central government with administrators of Egypt and this refutes the 
assumption of the governor as a ‘shadowy and passive spectator’. The four-year rule of Rağıb 
Mehmed Pasha in Egypt contradicts this claim.27 Rağıb Mehmed Pasha’s office in Egypt 
ended when Ibrahim Kethüda and his colleagues lobbied for his dismissal in 1748.28  
Egypt was more prominent for the Porte compared to other provinces in terms of 
being a financial support for the imperial treasury, and the importance of Egypt makes its 
governors prominent as well. It offered a huge potential in terms of its financial support to 
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Istanbul, every year, by providing tax in-cash for the imperial treasury and making in-kind 
payments for the imperial kitchen and the imperial shipyard, in addition to occupying a 
strategic position as a link between the central government and the Red sea, the Hijaz and the 
Indian Ocean. Therefore, the governorship of Egypt was a prestigious post in the imperial 
hierarchy. The classical pattern of career progression of the governors of Egypt usually passed 
from being grand vizier before or after the office in Egypt. Mostly governors of Egypt 
returned to Istanbul as grand vizier. Therefore, this case shows us the importance of the post 
of governorship in Egypt. It can also give us a clue about governors’ motivation to collect 
more wealth for pişkeş, a gratuity for the sultan. Winter mentions that Egyptian governors’ 
concern was not political but financial.29  
The Porte also gave greater importance to the appointment of the governor for Egypt 
as the governor was chosen among those who had close relations with the imperial palace and 
who were referred as competent administrators. Thus, the administration style in the capital 
reverberated in Egypt. The centralized approach of the sixteenth century was echoed in Egypt 
as well; the Egyptian governors managed the province’s affairs in a centralized manner. 
Indeed, the administration system worked well, or in other words it went in favour of the 
central government. Establishing a strong administrative body in Egypt helped the empire to 
extend its authority to the Yemen and therefore to the Indian Ocean trade. 
The office of governorship in Egypt was always competitive due to the high revenue 
it provided. In addition, in time, the worsening financial situation started to have an influence 
on the selection of the governor for Egypt because the nominees for the governorates were 
supposed to pay money, which is called pişkeş. There was an increasing need for cash in the 
central government, and this resulted in a tendency of the imperial administrators to see these 
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positions as a revenue source. The new nominees were expected to provide more money for 
the posts. For example, the previous defterdar of Egypt, Sinan Bey (1584-1587), was 
appointed as the new governor of Egypt in exchange for his offer of 600.000 golden coins; 
whereas the previous governor had offered 400.000 golden coins for his appointment.30 In the 
eighteenth century, the governor of Egypt paid 90.000 gurus (3.600.000 paras) in return for 
his appointment. Despite helping the preservation of financial and political stability in the 
province, however, the long-term tenures left their place to one-year tenures.  
Inalcik claims that the central government shortened the tenure of office of governors 
in order to keep their power under control in the provinces. 31 However, these short-term 
tenures (i.e. one-year term of office) resulted in some drawbacks for the administration. For 
example, short time office in Egypt prevented the governors from getting familiar with the 
province and the administration, and it limited governors’ efficiency in carrying out the tasks 
that were very important for the central government such as the readying of the irsaliye-i 
hazine.32 Holt highlights the aforementioned situations as the cause of the corruption of the 
administrative system in Egypt since they created politically “weaker” governors. 33  In 
addition to this, he observes that the shorter-term tenures resulted in the lack of continuity in 
provincial policies, and the lack of motivation for improving the province.34 Winter claims 
that since they occupied the office for only around one year35, the governors of Egypt seldom 
                                                        
30 es-Seyyid Mahmud, XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyaleti, p. 105 
31 Halil Inalcik, “Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman Administration” “Centralization and Decentralization in 
Ottoman Administration”, in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, D. Naff and R. Owen eds., (Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1977), p. 30 
32 James Jankowski, Egypt A Short History, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000), p. 54 
33 P. M. Holt, Egypt and The Fertile Crescent 1516-1922, (London: Longmans, 1966), p. 64. 
34 Ibid., p. 64. 
35 This was not a peculiar situation to the governors solely. It was a wider phenomenon which was applied in appointment of 
Greek Orthodox patriarchs as well see Molly Greene, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1453 to 1768: the Ottoman 
Empire, (Edinburgh University Press, 2015) 
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attempted to create projects that they themselves could see through to a beneficial outcome, 
and they were also reluctant to make investments after the sixteenth century.36  
From another point of view, however, short-term tenure clearly gave the central 
government the opportunity to increase the income acquired from these offices, which could 
be seen in the numbers of the governors who were appointed in the sixteenth as compared to 
the eighteenth century. While in the first century of the Ottoman conquest (between 1517 and 
1617) 38 governors served in Egypt, this number almost doubles in the eighteenth century 
with 32 governors being appointed during a half-century (between 1720 and 1770). 37 
Furthermore, since the governors had to pay huge amounts for the new office, it is claimed 
that they looked for ways to compensate their losses and to amass fortunes for their next 
office, presumably the office for the grand vizierate. The tax revenues were allocated as a 
salary for the governors by the central government. Although it is claimed that the governors 
were motivated to amass a fortune from the tax revenues, by the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the mamluk beys had seized these revenue sources, mostly by force. The central 
government strived for the return of the governors’ revenues, which mainly consisted of the 
custom taxes and of those from the grain villages and the provincial mint.38 
Nevertheless, in reference to the former argument, the correspondence of the mid-
eighteenth century suggests that the administrators and the new system did adapt to each other 
since we observe that large maintenance projects were carried out without problem, except for 
few corruption cases. 39  As for the latter argument, Abdurrahman Kethüda’s construction 
activities demonstrate that the local interest groups took over the task of improving the 
                                                        
36 Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule, p. 35. 
37 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. 6, p. 1812-13 see appendix I list of the governors of Egypt. 
38 See above chapter IV on governor p. 218  
39  For the details of the maintenance see Mücahide Güneş, XVIII. Yüzyılda İskenderiye Limanı, unpublished master 
dissertation, (University of İstanbul, 2009) chapter I. For the latter: an example; during the rule of Yedekci Mehmed Pasa the 
bridge in Fayyum was repaired. The estimated maintenance cost was 2.265.00 paras (87 misri kese 9000 para) but the 
governor did not repair all parts of the bridge and kept the remaining money in his personal account. MMD, vol. 6, nr. 238 
(date mid CA 1158/mid June 1745). 
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province. The correspondence between the central government and Egypt proves that a 
considerable amount of money was assigned from the irsaliye-i hazine for the maintenance 
and repair of bridges40, dams and sedds41, canals42, archways43, and water wells.44 The central 
government allocated large amounts of money for the construction in Egypt, and inspected the 
maintenance organization via the governor. In addition, Shaw mentions that the central 
government appointed authoritative governors in the 1760s in order to realise a number of 
reforms in Egypt.45 The local chroniclers state that they usually concentrated on raising the 
living standards of Egypt’s people, rather than interfering with the mamluk beys’ struggles.  
Hekimzade Ali Pasha was appointed Egypt twice in 1740 and 1756-1758. When he 
first came to office in 1740, he promised the mamluk beys that he would not interfere in their 
affairs. He addressed all of the local administrators and military men in the Karameydan, and 
told them that he did not intend to provoke a crisis, or execute mamluk beys, but that he 
wanted to pursue his duty such as collecting the tax, and sending the grain to Haremeyn.46 
This implies that Hekimzade Ali Pasha protected the mamluk beys from his intervention in 
local affairs such as to execute or to urge the assassination of powerful household leaders.47 
By the same token, Damurdashi’s narrative suggests some hints about a mid-eighteenth 
century governorship using Hekimzade Ali Pasha’s career.48 Once Ali Pasha got complaints 
from the public about the high price of wheat in the local market, he took action immediately 
                                                        
40 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 66 (in 1175/1761), nr. 137 (in 1176/1762), and nr. 425 (in 1180/1766).  
41 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 71 (in 1175/1761), nr. 148 (in 1177/1763), nr. 276 (in 1178/1764), nr. 323 (in 1178/1764), and nrs. 544, 
545, 546, 565, 570 (1181/1767). 
42 MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 139, 468, 556, 558 (in 1181/1767). 
43 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 172 (in 1177/1763). 
44 MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 197, 279, 290 (in 1178/1764). 
45 S. J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century: Nizamname-i Mısır of Jezzar Ahmed Pasha, (Harvard U. P., 1962), p. 
8 
46 According to Damurdashi, Süleyman Pasha aimed to kill four of mamluk beys’ grandees in order to get the central 
government’s gratitude, as the previous governor Azmzade Süleyman Pasha was dismissed because he had tried to meddle 
with the mamluk beys before. Al-Damurdashi’s chronicle of Egypt 1688-1755: Al-Durra al-Musana fi Akhbar al-Kinana, 
Crecelius, Daniel and Abdalwahhab Bakr, eds., (E. J. BRILL, 1991), p. 327 
47 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 72 
48 al-Damurdashi’s chronicle, p. 340 
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and appointed a capable officer, eminulihtisab, Yusuf Ağa.49 He inspected the prices and 
punished some of the suppliers.50  
Kamil Ahmed Pasha was another example that was appointed as the governor in 
1760.51  Al-Jabarti describes Kamil Pasha as strong, brave, sharp-witted, and a respected 
man.52 In a decree addressed to him, the Porte emphasised that he was educated in the sultan’s 
palace for forty years and he was known for his piety and truthfulness.53 Kamil Ahmed Pasha 
was meticulous in applying the orders; he did not always remain in the castle, but rode and 
walked about among the warehouses and fields. In order to assure the stability in 
administrative issues, he mentioned in a petition to the Porte that he spent a lot of money.54 A 
decree about buying ships for ‘gilal’ transfer in the Red Sea highlights the Porte’s experiences 
and approaches to both its governor and local administrators in Egypt.55 The gilal foundation 
of Egypt lacked sufficient ships for transportation of grain from Suez to Jidda and Yenbu, so 
during Kamil Ahmed Pasha’s governorship in Egypt in 1174/1760-61 an agreement took 
place between Egypt and the Porte to purchase ships from the merchants operating in the Red 
Sea. The Porte demanded that the governor buy one big and two small ships. The later 
correspondence revealed that Kamil Ahmed Pasha charged the price of one of the ships from 
the irsaliye; nevertheless, he did not proceed to buy the ship and then he was dismissed.56 The 
Porte demanded the current governor Ebubekir Pasha to investigate the issue, and refund the 
money.57  
                                                        
49 Ibid., p. 340 
50 Ibid., p. 340 
51 MMD, vol. 7, nr. 676 (mid ZA 1173/late June 1760). However, al-Jabarti claims Kamil Ahmed Pasha came to Egypt as the 
governor at the end of 1174/1760 
52 al-Jabarti, Ajaib, vol. 1, p. 405 
53 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (early Z 1174/early July 1761): ‘Senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin otuz-kırk seneden beri devlet-i aliyye ... 
perverişyab olub sıdk u diyanet ile ma’ruf ve evza’ ve kavanin-i miriye ve mülkiyeyi kemal-i idrak ... olduğuna binaen’ 
54 MMD, vol. 8. nr. 9 (early Z 1174/early July 1761): ‘… ve Mısırın tahsil-i nizamı için mesarif-i kesireye mübtela…’ 
55 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762) 
56 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762) 
57 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762) “Kamil Ahmed Paşa’nın yetmiş dört senesi irsaliye hazinesinden katiy 
vafir mebaliğ ahzından bahs ile Haremeyn gılali nakliçün iştirası ferman olunan sefayinden bir kıt’asının bahasını müşarun-
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In this decree, the approach of the Porte shows that the mamluk beys were not 
trusted, and implies that numerous incidents were experienced connected to trickiness and 
untrustworthiness of the local administrators in Egypt.58 Nevertheless, the mamluk beys allied 
against Kamil Ahmed Pasha and dismissed him.59 In place of Kamil Ahmed Pasha, they 
appointed the former governor, Mustafa Pasha, as the new governor.60 Mustafa Pasha sent his 
treasurer to Jidda as his deputy. The mamluk beys sent a petition to the central government 
explaining the situation. The grand vizier Rağıb Mehmed Pasha ordered Kamil Ahmed Pasha 
to be sent to Kandiye, and Mustafa Pasha to Aleppo.61 One of the reasons behind the mamluk 
beys’ dismissal of Kamil Ahmed Pasha might be that Kamil Ahmed Pasha re-captured the 
customs revenues, which initially had been assigned as the governors’ revenue source but had 
been captured by the mamluk beys.62 On the other hand, Kamil Ahmed Pasha communicated 
confidentially with Gazzawi Ali Bey against the grandees at the time, Abdurrahman Kethüda 
and Ali Bey al-Kabir, and presumably this issue was connected with his dismissal, as well.63 
In fact, we should also understand how the position of Egypt relates to the Ottoman 
Empire in order to understand the importance and prominence of governors of Egypt. Due to 
its privileged position with geographical and economic advantages, Egypt had been a leading 
country in the region since the period of Mamluk Sultanate. The Ottoman Empire benefited 
from this distinct position of Egypt by using it as a link between the imperial capital, Istanbul, 
and the Middle Eastern lands of the Empire. Egypt became more eminent in the Porte’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ileyh irsaliye hazinesinden ahz etmişiken sefineyi iştira eylemedi deyu tastir ve bu def’a gelen yetmiş dört senesi irsaliye 
hazinesi suret ruznamçesinde dahi sefine bahası olmak üzere beş mısri kese tahrir etmeleriyle hulasası ‘atebe-i ‘ulya-yı 
şehinşahaneme ba’de’l-‘arz meblağ-ı mezburu nefsü!l-emr müşarun-ileyh kabz edüp sefineyi iştira etmemiş ise andan tahsil 
ve eger Mısırlu hud’a-yı kadimeleri üzere meblağ-ı mezburu alıb töhmeti müşarun-ileyhe isnad eylemişler ise Mısırludan 
tahsil olunmak iktiza etmekle 
58 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762) 
59 However, conversely to what Jabarti narrates, one can easily detect that the decrees were addressed directly to Kamil 
Ahmed Pasha until Muharrem 1175/ August 1761, when we check the mühimmes. 
60 The mentioned Mustafa Pasha here might be Bahir Mustafa Pasha. Although Jabarti does not narrate his rule, Sicill-I 
Osmani states that Bahir Mustafa Pasha was the governor in 1171. 
61 Jabarti, Ajaib, vol. 1, p. 405 
62 MMD, vol. 7, nr. 756 (mid Ş 1174/late March 1761) sent to vali, kadı, ümera-i Mısır and yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarları 
63 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 and 201 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761) 
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political activities in the Middle East; it was a military base for the Porte and was used for the 
activities against the Portuguese in the Red sea and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, for the 
conquest of Yemen and the support and maintenance of Ottoman authority there, the support 
was provided by the statesmen and with the supplies from Egypt.64 Therefore, the governor of 
Egypt was the chief political actor in the region in the beginning years of Ottoman rule. For 
this reason, the officer to be appointed as the governor of Egypt was chosen carefully among 
the senior administrators who had gained experience in the sultan’s palace as it has been 
stated previously. These governors were called beylerbeyi in the sixteenth century and were 
chosen among those loyal to the sultan. 
Selecting the governor from among the palace men enabled the central government 
to maintain a close relationship with the governor of Egypt, a relatively remote province of 
the empire. Although most of the criteria of the sixteenth century remained limited to this 
century and were changed and transformed afterwards, we can suggest that some governors in 
the mid-eighteenth century, which this study covers, were among those who also gained 
experience in the palace. For example, Silahdar Mehmed Pasha (r. 1144/1731-32), Silahdar 
Ebubekir Pasha (r. 1147/1734-35), Boynueğri Abdullah Pasha (r. 1163/1750), and Baltacızade 
Mustafa Pasha (r. 1166/1753) were among those who started their career in the Enderun, the 
school of the Sultan’s palace.65 
On the other hand, in the sixteenth century, holding governorship in Egypt was one 
step towards appointment as grand vizier as well. In fact, the abundant revenue of the 
governor of Egypt in this period was a good opportunity for governors to get prepared in their 
career path towards becoming a grand vizier. We find that the same trend was acceptable in 
                                                        
64  For details about the military and financial support from Egypt to Yemen see Sadettin Baştürk, Telhisu’l-Berku’l-
Yemani/Ahbaru’l-Yemani (Tahlil ve Metin), Unpublished PhD dissertation, (Atatürk Üniversitesi, 2010) p. 322-367. 
65 Sicill-i Osmani, vol. 4, p. 1189, vol. 1, p. 80, vol. 2, p. 432, vol. 4, p. 1033   
 208 
the eighteenth century.66 However, when we look at eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, we 
find that some grand viziers were appointed as the governor of Egypt after their term of office 
in Istanbul. For example, Şehla Ahmed Pasha (1162/1749) served as grand vizier between 
1153-1155/1740-1742, and was appointed as the governor of Egypt on 19 N 1161/ 12 
September 1748. Boynueğri Abdullah Pasha was also appointed as grand vizier in Ş 1160/ 
August-September 1747 and worked as the governor of Egypt two years later in 1164/1750-
51. Said Mehmed Pasha (1170/1756-57) held the post of grand vizier for six months before he 
was appointed as the governor of Egypt, serving from 19 M 1169/ 7 October 1755 until 1 B 
1169/ 1 April 1756. Mustafa Pasha was a former grand vizier, when he was appointed as the 
governor of Egypt in 1171/1758. The unique position of the governorship in Egypt within the 
career chain reminds us once again the value of researching this topic in detail.  
The governorship in Egypt was a rewarding and high-status post. The Porte called 
the post “hasretü’l-vüzera”, the longing of the viziers.67 In the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, in general, the governor of Egypt was appointed among the kubbe viziers, one of the 
top viziers of the sultan. In the sixteenth century, the governor of Egypt was granted extensive 
powers to sustain the central government’s reign and authority in the newly conquered 
province. The governor represented the Ottoman sultan. Thus, he was entrusted with the 
absolute administrative and military authority in the province. Experienced officers who 
served in the sultan’s palace, previous beylerbeyis in different provinces, orviziers used to be 
appointed as the governor of Egypt with the title of beylerbeyi. Due to his strategically 
                                                        
66 For example, Rağıb Mehmed Pasha was appointed as sadrazam on 20 Rebiulahir 1170/12 January 1757, 13 years after his 
governorship in Egypt in the year 1157/1744. Also, Silahdar Hamza Pasha (governor of Egypt in 1179/1765-66) was 
appointed as grand vizier after serving in Egypt as governor. We can see this trend continuing until the end of the century; 
Zaferanbolulu Izzet Pasha was the governor of Egypt in 1205/1791, and then appointed as grand vizier two years later.   
67 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 the decree that was sent to the governor of Egypt Rakım el-Hac Mehmed Pasha in mid Z 1180/mid 
May 1767. “… hasretü’l-vüzera olan tevliyet-i Mısr-ı Kahire (the governorship of Egypt, which is longing of the viziers ) 
avatif-i aliyye-i tacdaranemden şeref-afza-yi sudur olan hatt-ı humayun mevhibet makrunum mucebince işbu 1181 senesi 
tutundan zabt olunmak uzere sana ihsan u tevcih ve iklim-i Kahirenin kaffe-i umur ve hususı uhde-i der-i ben ve der-i atine 
ihale ve taklid kilinmagin …”  
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important post, the governor of Egypt was not expected to attend the imperial wars; instead, 
he was asked to pay. For example, in 1151/1739, Acemzade Süleyman Pasha requested for 
permission not to attend the campaign. He was exempted, and was asked to pay 6.000.000 
paras, instead of attending to the campaign. The Porte wanted him to make a financial 
contribution as he earned a large fortune in his former post, in the province of Damascus.68 
The reports sent by the governors displayed the financial and administrative affairs of the 
province. Also, every governor used to examine the financial registers and records of his 
predecessor’s office. Thus, the central government monitored the province’s circumstances 
and governors’ achievements or inefficacy. 69  Collection of the irsaliye-i hazine and 
transporting it to the central government was of critical importance for the Porte. Therefore, 
governors were chosen for the service based on their ability to complete the task without 
instigating any problems. 
On the other hand, in the eighteenth century, some governors’ tenure was extended 
because of financial problems. The central government’s pragmatic approach appears in such 
cases. For example, in 27 R 1151/14 August 1738, the governor Mustafa Pasha was appointed 
for the following year as well, since the central government thought that he would not be able 
to pay his debts and levies that he was supposed to pay as the governor of Egypt in the case of 
dismissal. 70  After the government restored the caize, a type of levy relating to senior 
appointments amounting to approximately 3.600.000-4.000.000 paras, that the governor of 
Egypt was supposed to pay to the central government, Mustafa Pasha (1151-1152/1738-39) 
found himself incapable of sending the irsaliye-i hazine in full. In order to preserve their 
mutual interest, the Porte extended the term of office of Mustafa Pasha and applied pressure 
                                                        
68 MD, vol. 145, nr. 1677 (date mid Z 1151/late March 1739)  
69 es-Seyyid Mahmud, XVI. Asırda Mısır eyaleti, p. 126 
70 MD, vol. 146, nr. 296 to “Mısır valisi vezirim Mustafa Paşa’ya/ to the governor of Egypt, my vizier Mustafa Pasha” [on 27 
Rebiulahir 1151/14 August 1738]. About the controversy between the governor and mamluk grandees in financial issues, see 
chapter III on Income Sources, p. 152 about Kethüda Mehmed Pasha’s correspondence. 
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on him to pay fully and in time. Being in a war against Russia and Austria required ready cash 
and the central government tried to solve its cash flow problems by closely monitoring the 
levies from Egypt. The central government tried to redirect the revenues to the imperial 
treasury from expenditure to meet local objectives. Demanding the levies in full and on time, 
the decrees were addressed to the governors and seven regiment grandees more frequently. 
Therefore, the Porte proposed to Mustafa Pasha that he should resume the collection of the 
revenues from the customs of Damietta and Bulaq, which had customarily been earmarked as 
revenue sources for the governor, but had fallen into the hands of the müstahfizan (janissaries) 
grandees in recent years. Mustafa Pasha’s case reveals once again that the revenue sources of 
the governor were captured by grandees of the müstahfizan (janissary) regiment, and how that 
affected the decision making progress of the Porte. Although the controversy continued, it 
seems that the mamluk beys kept the revenue from the customs until the end of the century.  
The new governors usually travelled to Egypt by ship, arriving at the port in 
Alexandria. Usually the Kapudan Pasa was responsible for the transportation of the governor, 
his family and retinue. Although the governor was sent decrees regarding the issues of Egypt 
immediately after he was appointed, the central government approved his governorship after 
the new governor arrived at his residence in the citadel in Cairo. The journey of the governor 
from Alexandria to Cairo, when he first arrived in Egypt, provided an opportunity for 
networking between the newly appointed governor and people from outside of Cairo, 
especially for those who were willing to be appointed by the governor of Egypt as 
administrators of the sub provinces in the rural parts of Egypt. This networking opportunity 
can be considered important, as the governor, generally, did not leave the citadel once he 
arrived at his post. So, from the aspect of the merchants and local administrators who were 
willing to fill the posts in the sub provinces, this was a rare chance for a connection with the 
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governor. These connections included discussions about financial issues such as the 
administration of payments and debts, 71  or engaging with the governor and establishing 
political ties before he reached Cairo in order to sort their problems out. Al-Jabarti narrates an 
anecdote about the beginning of Şehla Ahmed Pasha’s office in Egypt. Before Ahmed Pasha 
reached Cairo, a mamluk bey called Omar Bey went to Ahmed Pasha. He entered his service 
immediately, provided horses for the Pasha and his men, and camels for their belongings and 
prepared food for them. In the meantime, he told the Pasha that his master was dead. Upon 
this, the Pasha dressed him with a hilat and secured him his master’s sancak beyliği without 
paying hulvan. Meeting the governor in Alexandria and earning his appreciation helped Omar 
to acquire a sancak. All this happened before the welcoming committee arrived in Alexandria. 
When all this was heard in Cairo, it caused a discontent among the other beys. They criticized 
the governor by saying that Omar Bey was a weak person and did not deserve a sancak 
beyliği. When this was said to Pasha, in order to silence them, he said: do you contradict my 
decisions before I even arrive in your town?72 This narration suggests that in the middle of the 
eighteenth century, a governor had enough authority to make the mamluk beys respect his 
decisions although his decision contradicted custom and law. 
The governors’ responsibilities  
The governor was responsible for the administrative, financial, legal and military 
duties of the province but the foreign politics of a province was subject to the central 
government. In the eighteenth century, the Porte expected from the governor of Egypt to 
provide public order and security in Cairo; to send grain and other needs to Haremeyn in time 
and good quality; to send irsaliye, hulvan, cizye, and ocaklık on time and in its full amount to 
                                                        
71 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 322 (date mid N 1178/ early March 1765). 
72 Al-Jabarti, Aja’ib, vol. 1, p. 315 
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the Porte; to apply the imperial orders in Egypt according to request of the Porte73; and to 
supervise the restorations of dams, bridges and water channels to be carried out expeditiously 
in order not to aggrieve the people.74 Ultimately, the central government’s demands from the 
governor of Egypt were: to send the irsaliye-i hazine on time and in full and to maintain the 
needs of the Haremeyn. As Shaw mentions, the central government could reach terms with 
anyone who fulfilled these duties.75 
When it comes to irsaliye, for the years between 1740-1785, we can divide it into 
three periods: Although İbrahim Kethüda (d. 1754) failed to send it regularly, we see that 
until 1767, the irsaliye was sent on a regular basis, the remaining sum after expenses which 
amounted to between 10.000.000 and 20.000.000 paras. Ali Bey did not send the irsaliye 
from 1767 until 1773. After eliminating Ali Bey, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb sent the total 
arrears from the previous six years and the two relating to his own tenure (1773-75) in a 
single remittance.76 After 1775, the accounts are confused; it is difficult to determine whether 
they were paid regularly. The regularity of the irsaliye payment suggests that the governors or 
mamluk beys provided the Porte’s number one requirement until the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, except for the six-year period that Ali Bey rose against the central 
government. Nevertheless, Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb repaid this six-year irsaliye during his 
tenure.77  
The detailed investigation of the decree records in the Prime Minister’s Archive 
suggests that the governors had occasional conflicts and struggles with the mamluk beys. The 
                                                        
73 In a decree, which was sent to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha in early M 1176/ late July 1762, it was mentioned that he was 
appointed as the governor of Egypt as he was considered that he was an able vizier who was capable of performing the 
aforementioned duties. MMD, vol. 8, nr. 90. 
74 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 90 (date late Z 1175/mid July 1762) ‘nizam-ı umur-ı Kahirenın istihsaliçün bi’l-husus haremeyn-i 
muhteremeyne gidecek gılal ve levazım-ı sairenin tahsiline ve enderun-ı hümayunuma gelecek irsaliye hazinesinin ve ocaklık 
zehayirinin tahsillerine ve levazım-ı şerifemin murad-ı hümayunum üzere’  
75 S. J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, (Princeton, 1962), p. 8. 
76 Examining the detailed account registers recorded in Baş Muhasebe defterleri of Egypt (D.BŞM. MSR. d), we see that the 
cost of some repairs in both Haremeyn and Egypt were paid from irsaliye in 1768, 1769 or in 1770. This shows us that during 
the uprising of Ali Bey the social life of local people were never affected.  
77 See for detail “the table” in appendix IX. 
 213 
mamluk beys united against the governor in order to preserve their authority and financial 
income. In short, it was their financial interests that motivated them. Despite this, the mamluk 
beys of Egypt in the eighteenth century mostly came from the same roots, namely Georgia;78 
nevertheless, their unity cannot be explained in terms of nationalism or proto-nationalism. If 
we take the proto-nationalist approach, we cannot explain why Ali Bey eliminated his rivals 
instead of cooperating with them. It is more accurate to state that the mamluk beys’ unity was 
based on preserving their own interests, as opposed to preserving their fellow countrymen or 
any concern for reviving the ancient Mamluk sultanate.  
The most significant influence of the mamluk beys on the governor was on finance. 
The mamluk beys shifted governor’s revenue to their households. Shaw explains the revenue 
sources and expenditures of the governor of Egypt as follows: 
Revenues of the governor: The governors had two types of revenue: the hass 
revenues, which were given by the sultan in return for their service, and other revenues that 
were assigned to them by the divan and treasury of Egypt. 79   The hass revenues were 
küşufiyye revenues which consisted of land taxes from küşufiyye villages. While revenue of 
the governor from küşufiyye was approximately 7,309,032 paras in 1086/1675-6, by 
1212/1797-8 it had decreased to 4,949,959 paras. The revenue of the governor from küşufiyye 
decreased by approximately 2,359,073 paras. The küşufiyye-i sağir revenues were paid by the 
officers in the divan and treasury in return for their appointment. The governor’s revenue 
from the küşufiyye-i sağir was more than 10,000,000 paras annually. After the reform in 
1082/1671-72, most of this revenue was shifted to the imperial treasury. In the eighteenth 
century, the governor had around 4,000,000 paras as the küşufiyye-i sağir as revenue from the 
                                                        
78 Daniel Crecelius and Gotcha Djaparidze, “Relations of the Georgian Mamluks of Egypt with Their Homeland in the Last 
Decades of the Eighteenth Century”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 45, No. 3 (2002), pp. 
320-341. 
79 Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization, p. 318  
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mint of Cairo. The governor had the right to gain 1,135,000 paras annually. Ali Bey al-Kabir 
seized this revenue, and after him, şeyhülbeleds continued to enjoy this revenue, instead of the 
governors.80 In total, the governor’s income from hass revenues was 13,000,000 paras in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century; however, it decreased to 9,000,000 paras at the end of 
the century.  
The revenues of the governor other than hass were as follows: In the seventeenth 
century, the governor of Egypt held a salary in the amount of 1.500.000 paras. Yet, in the 
eighteenth century, their salary was reduced to a symbolic amount of 1.095 paras. In addition 
to the salary, the governor and his retinue had the benefit of grain for themselves and fodder 
for their animals, which were paid in cash. Before the French expedition in 1798, governors 
received 7,741,000 paras annually as the cost of grain and fodder. Secondly, there was the 
revenue from customs. In the eighteenth century, the mamluk beys seized all of the customs 
revenues apart from the Suez via the janissary regiment. 81  In 1110/1698-9, the governor 
gained from the Suez around 4.543.196 paras. In 1759/60, the Porte estimated the amount 
that the governor had from the Suez as 8.750.000 paras annually.82 In 1791, Murad and 
Ibrahim Beys gave 6.585.000 paras to the governor. Shaw states that the governor earned 
from customs around 7.500.000 paras. Until 1671, hulvan was considered as a part of the 
hass revenues. After that year, the governor was asked to pay to the central government what 
he gained from hulvan revenues. In the eighteenth century, the governors’ income was 
considerable, amounting to between 15,000,000 and 25-30,000,000 paras. Shaw estimates 
                                                        
80 Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization, p. 323 
81 “Janissaries undertook to pay the taxes owed to the treasury for them by the valis, and kept the customs profits for 
themselves in return for fixed annual payments to the valis.” In the seventeenth century, customs of revenue from 
Alexandria-Rosetta, Damietta-Burullos and Bulaq-Old Cairo was 2,089,000 paras. Yet, in the eıghteenth century custom 
revenues increased and 2,089,000 paras became only a smaller proportion, compared to what janissaries gained. Although the 
governors were encouraged by the central government to take over, and even they endeavoured, they could not get the 
customs revenues back. Instead, the governors were paid an amount between 1,250,000-2,500,000  (Shaw, The Financial and 
Administrative Organization, p.325 (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 374 (date late B 1173/early March 1760)) 
82 Governor tried to show that they gained 6,500,000 paras from Suez (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 759 on 13 ZA 1173/27 June 1760), 
but the Porte (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 551 (date early C 1172/early February 1759)) and Cezzar Ahmed Pasha estimated around 
8,750,000 paras.   
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that the amount that the governor earned in the beginning of the eighteenth century was 
47.741.000 paras.83 This amount decreased to 25.741.000 paras a decade before the French 
expedition of 1798. In addition to the revenues, the governor received miscellaneous bribes 
and gifts.84  
Expenditure of the governor: The post of governorship of Egypt required high 
levels of expenditure. There were financial sources that were peculiar to the governors of 
Egypt. It is apparent that governorship in Egypt offered the governors opportunities to collect 
income across a broad range of categories. However, since the expenditures were higher, they 
had problems. In 1166/1752-53, the governor used to spend approximately 207.332 gurus 
(8.275.457 paras) for his regular expenditures for six months.85 In addition, the revenue shift 
from the governors to mamluk beys left the governors in serious debt. The Porte reproached 
the governors by implying that their income shifted to the mamluk beys as a result of their 
own neglect. When a governor was dismissed from Egypt and appointed to another post, he 
was often significantly in debt to the central government. The governors tried to compensate 
their debt, by borrowing from the irsaliye. 86  Therefore, they compromised the irsaliye 
revenues. In order to protect the governors and irsaliye, the Porte demanded governors to take 
over their previous revenue sources, the mukataa of Alexandria, Bulaq and Damietta customs. 
The decree that ordered the governors to resume control over the customs was addressed to all 
components of Egypt political milieu such as ümera, sâdât-ı bekriyye and kadiriyye, yedi ocak 
zabitani and ihtiyarlari.87 In this decree, the Porte demanded from the governor to re-establish 
                                                        
83 Shaw, Financial and Administrative Organization, p.327 
84 Shaw mentions that Evliya Çelebi states the gifts that the governor of Jirja presented to the governor of Egypt, and he also 
adds that the governor of Egypt charged 2.000.000 paras from the hajj caravan. Nevertheless, Shaw points out “during the 
eighteenth century, however, the quality and quantity of gifts given to the valis declined in direct relation to the decline of 
their powers and authority at that time.” Ibid., p. 327 
85 C. MTZ 7/318 (date 29 Z 1166/27 October 1753) 
86 During wars, the central government was desperately in need of cash. Irsaliye-i hazine of Egypt was a big proportionate of 
sultan’s personal treasury, ceyb-i humayun. 
87 MMD, vol 6, nr. 236 (date mid CA 1158/late June 1745)  
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the former order by Shaban 1158/September 1745. However, it is known that it was not 
applied until after the governorate of Kamil Ahmed Pasha (r. 1173/1760). Since Kamil Pasha 
himself was dismissed at the prompting of the mamluk beys due to his insistence on re-
establishing the former order. 
In addition to other expenses, the governor had to have an adequate number of 
soldiers in order to keep the peace and punish crimes. In fact, the head of every unit of 
administration had a number of soldiers in his retinue according to his rank. While a 
provincial official had a dozen or so men, and a district governor about a hundred or so, the 
governor pasha had several hundred. The pasha had to have enough income in order to 
provide financially for his retinue.88 In terms of solving the struggles between governors and 
mamluk beys, the system of short office tenures, usually for only one year, might have 
prevented the governor from bringing and implementing solutions for the long-term problems 
such as reclaiming their revenue sources from the mamluk beys. Given the limited sources of 
revenue available to local administrators, during their years in office, the governors seem to 
have concentrated their efforts on amassing funds to meet the cost of assuming a new post in 
following year, which sometimes involved becoming a vizier in Istanbul. Thus, one-year 
office tenure makes it complicated to evaluate the governors’ efficiency. In this sense, some 
long tenures such as that of Koca Rağıb Mehmed Pasha (r. 1157-1161/1744-48) make it 
easier to evaluate the relationship between mamluk beys and governors in a more revealing 
way.  
By the seventeenth century, the decentralized period, as in all provinces, Ottoman 
officials in Egypt experienced a declining influence over local administrative staff. 89 This 
                                                        
88  Metin Kunt, “Turks in the Ottoman Imperial Palace”, in Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires: A Global 
Perspective, Duindam, Jeroen and Artan, Tülay and Kunt, Metin eds., (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2011), p. 290-91. 
89 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 62 
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demonstrated itself in janissary grandees sharing the income sources that were assigned to the 
governor. Taking possession of selected revenue sources, the mamluk beys never paid the 
revenue to the governor or transferred it to the local military grandees and their households.90  
The corps of the müstahfizan (janissaries) was the most important military section of the 
seven regiments in Cairo. They were responsible for the city’s security, and they attended 
military campaigns with the imperial army. They always outnumbered other regiments. In 
1664, 4899 soldiers were registered in the regiment of müstahfizan (janissaries). This number 
rose first to 5263 in 1709 and then to 6893 in 1797. Forging a strong regiment made them an 
influential, pushing and aggressive force in the politics of Egypt. 91  The grandees of the 
janissary regiments owned ships that brought coffee from Yemen; this provided them with 
huge revenues and a command over the commerce of the Red Sea.92 
In the seventeenth century, during the reforms of Defterdar Ahmed Pasha, the salary 
of the janissary regiment, mevacib, was reduced.93 This cut encouraged the janissary grandees 
to compensate for their loss by seizing a portion of the income sources of the governors of 
Egypt, such as the customs of Bulaq and Damietta.94 Although the Porte urged the governors 
to retake the customs, müstahfizans continued to challenge the governors,95 and the central 
government’s pressure on governors did not result in a positive outcome. They encountered 
various conflicts with the mamluk beys, many of which concluded to the governors’ 
disadvantage, especially the taking of revenues from mahlul villages. Kamil Ahmed Pasha 
made a considerable effort to take control; however, the mamluk beys engineered his 
                                                        
90 See chapter III on Income Sources, Kethüda mehmed Pasha’s petition about governors’ income inadequacy p.184-86 
91 Al-Damurdashi’s chronicle of Egypt, p. 24 
92 Jane Hathaway, “The Ottomans and Yemeni Coffee Trade”, Oriente Moderno, Nuova Serie, Anno 25(86) Nr. 1, The 
Ottomans and Trade, 2006, pp. 161-171, p. 169 Hathaway points out that the ships that janissary grandees traded were 
usually Indian ships. Either the officers bought them, or established partnership with overseas merchants. 
93 James Baldwin, “The Deposition of Defterdar Ahmed Pasha and the Rule of Law in Seventeenth- Century Egypt”, 
Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies, XLVI, 2015, pp. 131-161, p. 142 
94 (TSMA) D. 06840-00003 
95 A decree that states the customs of Bulaq and around belongs to the governor’s revenue: MMD, vol. 6, nr. 236 (date late 
CA 1158/late June 1745) 
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dismissal in 1173/1759. The pressure of the Porte about this issue over the governors 
destabilized the balance between the mamluk beys and the governors.96  
Ghazaleh states that the military, legal and commercial spheres were intertwined in 
the eighteenth century, and this was used as leverage over the governors. 97  The most 
noticeable and palpable pressure placed on the governors by the mamluk beys was in 
compelling him to release buyruldus that enabled mamluk beys to take extra revenues from 
the irsaliye. Mostly, the emirulhajj alleged that more financial support was needed in order to 
provide for the safety of pilgrims. This had a negative effect on the Porte’s income by 
decreasing the amount of the irsaliye, in addition to inflating the mamluk beys’ personal 
wealth. On the other hand, the governors were still held responsible by the Porte for the 
compensation of the full amount.98 The governors of Egypt mostly went to their next post 
indebted, or found another way to compensate it from the irsaliye in the same manner as 
occurred in the case of Kethüda Mehmed Pasha.99 The Porte pursued such cases mostly in 
order to maintain financial order. For example, the levies and tax of jizya of the years between 
1168-1175/1755-1762 were not sent to Istanbul. The Porte was left devoid of a total amount 
more than 84.720.000 paras. 100  According to correspondence between the Porte and the 
governors of Egypt in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives, the demands of the Porte for 
compensation were met by the governors of Egypt with delays up to five years;101 however, 
accurate details about who was charged are unknown. 
                                                        
96 The Porte had been forcing the governors to retaking the mukaataas for a while. Mustafa Pasha (1738-39) was also forced 
to retake the revenues from Bulaq and Damietta mukaataas from regiment of müstahfizan. 
97 Pascale Ghazaleh, “Trade in Power: Merchants and the State in 19th century-Egypt”, Int. J. Middle East Stud. 45 (2013), 
71-91 p. 85 
98 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 340 (date early S 1179/late July 1765) “bu akçelerin cümlesi vülata cebr ve kürh ve desise ve hüd’a ile 
tahmil olunmuş akçelerden olmakdan naşi valilerin medyun olmalarına ve kesr ve mazarratı irsaliye hazinesine ve vüzr ü  
hıyaneti Mısırluya aid ve raci’ olub” 
99 See chapter irsaliye p. 160 
100 MMD, vol 8, nr. 340 (date early S 1179/late July 1765) 
101 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16890 (Z 1169/August 1756 
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The chapter on the irsaliye demonstrated that the central government monitored the 
provincial administration in order to prevent mamluk beys’ extracting money from the 
irsaliye-i hazine. However, the Porte’s endeavour was not limited to the monitoring irsaliye, 
as the mamluk beys also had managed to seize the governors’ other revenue sources, such as 
the grain from the tax-farm villages. By forcing the previous governors to issue buyruldus, a 
share of the grain was allocated to several mamluk beys. Orders were sent by the Porte to 
return those revenues belonging to the governors, in order to save them from debt. The 
previous buyruldus were cancelled, and for new requests it was ordered that applications 
sould be made to the Porte directly. 102  The mamluk beys’ dominance over governors in 
shifting their revenues to themselves and households affected the provincial mint and fineness 
of the coin minted in Egypt as well.103 In order to acquire more benefits from the küşufiyye of 
the mint, which had been assigned for the governor by the central government and then 
captured by the mamluk beys, the fineness of the coin issued in the mint house of Egypt was 
reduced. The central government sent a decree in order to set right the debased currency.  
During the centralized period, the cause for a change of governor was mostly based 
on reports by the sancak beys. However, in the decentralized period of the empire, one of the 
factors in a new governor’s being appointed to Egypt was reign change. From the end of the 
sixteenth century onwards, usually a new sultan acceding to the throne resulted in a new 
governor for Egypt. In addition, members of the military in the seventeenth century and 
mamluk beys in the eighteenth century influenced the tenure of office of the governors. They 
lobbied against the governors they did not like or found incompatible. The dismissal of the 
governor through the interference of the mamluk beys was not a rejection of the central 
                                                        
102 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 185 (early B 1177/early January 1764) 
103 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 408 (date early M 1180/ early June 1766) “Darbhane-i Mısır'da darb olunan altının ayar ve vezni 
asitane-i saadetim darbhanesinden darb olunan altının ayar ve veznine muvafık ve mutabık olması kavaid-i meriyye-i 
kadimeden iken Mısır'da darb olunan altının ayar ve vezni nakıs ve mağşuş olmasının ilel ve esbab-ı sairesinden biri dahi 
vülat-ı Mısır'ın küşufiyyesi ziyadece ihtilas için hakk nezareti ifaya adem-i mübalatı olmakdan naşi sikke-i hümayunumun 
ğaşşına badi olan ilel ve mevani'in külliyen ref' ü def'i”. 
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government’s legitimacy. Baldwin’s research revealed that the mamluk beys knew that the 
governor’s acting was restricted by the law, and they used the legal institutions in order to 
enforce the limits of the governor’s authority.104 
In a case of dismissal, it is possible to observe how the Porte reacted to the mamluk 
beys. The Porte accepted the ulema and military officers as a part of the administrative body 
in Egypt.105 The mamluk beys requested the dismissal of Hamza Pasha (1179-1180/June 1765 
to May 1767) in May 1767. As custom required, they sent a petition to the Porte informing 
the Porte that they wished the current governor to be replaced along with their reasons. A 
decree in response to their petition indicates how the Porte approached the dismissal of a 
governor in the period prior to Ali Bey’s uprising. Calling them “mütegallibe-i Mısır”, the 
Porte reproached the mamluk beys for being overbearing towards the governors, seizing their 
revenues and causing the governors to become indebted to the tune of approximately 
16.000.000-20.000.000 paras when they left Egypt at the termination of their duty. Instead of 
execution of their duties such as sending irsaliye to Istanbul and gilal to Haremeyn, the 
mamluk beys were accused of behaving in an overbearing manner in accordance with the 
coarseness of their personality: “mukteza-yı huşunet” and wickedness of their character 
“hubs-ı tıynet” which led them to seek to dismiss their governor. The Porte chided the 
mamluks for their action. It is noteworthy that the Porte did not select a name or a group but 
mentioned those who conspired to dismiss the governor as “mütegallibe-i Mısır” – usurpers of 
Egypt. 
Once the governor was dismissed, he was required to assign a trustworthy 
kaimmakam, (deputy), for his position, or remain governing until the new governor arrived. In 
                                                        
104 Baldwin, “The Deposition of Defterdar Ahmed Paşa”, p. 132 
105 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767) 
 221 
the eighteenth century, şeyhülbeleds were assigned as kaimmakam. If the governor died in 
office, both the kadı and defterdar took over the duty of kaimmakam in tandem. 
When a governor died in office, after paying his debts and distributing bequests to 
his heirs, all his belongings were sent to the Porte. An officer called mübaşir was employed to 
handle this duty. The mübaşir usually supervised and oversaw while the belongings of the 
deceased governor were being collected and carried to a safe place in the castle, for transport 
to the sultan’s palace in Istanbul. Since because this was a government duty, during the legal 
procedure, the kadı or other officers were not supposed to take money as tax from the 
mübaşir, but often those restrictions were ignored. In the imperial decrees from the eighteenth 
century the kadı was also demanded not to take money as tax during the procedure.106   
The governors and local interest groups: a conflict or pursuit of financial power and 
authority?  
Egypt was like a mirror of the imperial capital: the reflections of the orderliness of 
the reign of Kanuni Sultan Suleyman, and/or the change and transformation of the 
seventeenth century was immediately reflected in Egypt. It can be suggested that the stability 
in the management of the province was related to the components of the administration, and 
their authority share in the province. After dominant governors, certain military members’ 
gained power and authority and impressed their stamp on seventeenth century Egypt. As a 
result of the transformation process of the seventeenth century, the power balance changed in 
Egypt. Current literature draws a picture of prosperous Egypt with powerful, dominant and 
strong governors before the seventeenth century and of a chaotic Egypt with weak and less 
dominant governors in later periods. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish those periods of time 
as black and white. Local notables, in our case the mamluk beys, filled the gap left by 
                                                        
106 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 241 (early R 1178/late September 1764) After the death of Ahmed Pasha, his bequeath was demanded to 
be sent to Istanbul immediately. The kadı was warned not to charge tax as the proceedings was official.   
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governors in the eighteenth century. The decentralized administration with local 
administrators was viable, if not perfect. The mamluk beys fostered a good relationship with 
the central government, like their counterpart ayans in other provinces, and this helped them 
to enlarge their manipulation of Egypt’s politics and provincial administration, as they earned 
the central government’s legitimization while they were offering their loyalty and service.  
It is a fact that periods of prolonged peace led the armed soldiers to make their way 
to Egypt, and with the devaluation of the currency, military members were interested in the 
commerce and tax-farming more than military service; or they found a way to gain easy 
money under the disguise of trade.107 On the other hand, mamluk beys, becoming wealthy, 
began to seize the revenue sources, and the desire for wealth encouraged mamluk beys to 
integrate themselves further into the administration. Last of all, the mamluk beys who joined 
mamluk households were considered the real administrators of Egypt at the end of the 
eighteenth century.108  
Crecelius claims that the governors were sent to Egypt from Istanbul with a hidden 
agenda to challenge the authority of the mamluk beys. 109  Acting on secret orders, the 
governors were expected to do their best to bring down the dominant local grandees.110 On the 
other hand, the decrees, recorded in the mühimme-i Mısır defter series, suggest that the Porte 
considered mamluk beys as local administrators who helped the governor in carrying out the 
orders and duties. The mamluk beys were not referred as tyrants who seized the state’s 
authority in Egypt, as long as there was not an obvious disobedience. So to speak, the Porte 
                                                        
107 For detail see Andre Raymond, Artisans et Commercants, au Caire au XVIIIe siècle, (Damascus: Institut Francais de 
Damas, 1973-1974) The military felt the devaluation of silver money disastrously. From 1624 to 1798, Egyptian para lost 
four-fifths of its value. Among the soldiers, trading was common. From the Ottoman conquest on, the janissaries sold things 
in shops. (see Ibn Iyas, Journal d’un Bourgeois du Caire: Chronique d’ibn iyas, transl. G. Wiet, (Rennes: Armand Colin, 
1955-1960) transl. G. Wiet, vol. 2, p. 290) Raymond mentions that, looking for other sources, the soldiers started to exploit 
the city dwellers and trading. They did not had difficulty in trading because it was the occupation of some of them before 
joining the military, and also, ruling cast did not have any prejudice towards trade.  Andre Raymond, “Soldiers in Trade: The 
Case of Ottoman Cairo”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol.18, No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-37  
108 Luigi Mayer, Views in Egypt, (London, 1801) p. 59 
109 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 60 
110 Ibid., p. 60 
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was giving the local administrators their personal space to govern in the province; yet, it 
always mingled with the administration of Egypt. While authorizing the mamluk beys in 
practicing their authority in the administration, the Porte was providing a superior 
surveillance on the provincial administration. For example, the central government was 
managing and pursuing the larger organisations such as shipbuilding in Suez, or maintenance 
of seawalls on the coast of the Mediterranean. 
Before Ali Bey’s uprising, in the 1760s when the mamluk beys extended their 
authority over the governors to an excessive degree the Porte remonstrated with them bluntly. 
Although it did not take action immediately by sending troops, the Porte put its reaction into 
words. Rakım el-Hac Mehmed Pasha’s tenure of office (1181-1182/1767-68) is important as 
it coincides with Ali Bey’s tenure of şeyhülbeled. In the decree, which announces that Rakım 
Mehmed Pasha was appointed as the governor, his personality and his mastering of the state’s 
issues were mentioned.111 The generosity, patriotism, and shrewdness in his personality and 
his desired actions were praised, and he was expected to maintain his good behaviour.112 In 
other decrees, Rakim Mehmed Pasha’s loyalty, truthfulness, and sagacity were praised.113 In 
the beginning of his office in Egypt, it can be said that Rakım Mehmed Pasha supported Ali 
Bey al-Kabir in his struggles with the other mamluk beys. The şeyhülbeled Halil Bey, who 
was in charge before Ali Bey al-Kabir had a struggle with Ali Bey and his followers on 20 
Cemaziyelevvel 1181/14 October 1767. He was defeated and came back to Cairo and 
requested from the governor Rakım Mehmed Pasha the banishment of Ali Bey, and 5.000.000 
                                                        
111 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 (date mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767) 
112 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 (date mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767): ‘Senki vezir-i müşarun-ileyhsin zatında olan cevher-i fütüvvet ve 
hamiyet ve lem’a-i kiyaset ve dirayet muktezasınca öteden beri memur olduğun umur-ı devlet suretyab ve şuhud olan 
harekat-ı pesendidenden başka be-tahsis-i devlet-i aliyyemden ihraz ile hasıl-ı desdar-ı saltanat ebed müddetim olduğunun 
vaktinden beru salik-i mesalik-i sadakat ve istikametin ve istihsal-i rıza-yı yümn-i padişahanemden haiz-i fasl-ı esbak eksa-yı 
metalib-i ve amal olub fimabad dahi senden dab-ı devlet-i aliyyeme layık ve namus-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeme muvafık harekat-ı 
saide ve me’ser-i hamiyyet melhuz-ı tab’’ 
113 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767): “müddet-i medideden beri devlet-i aliyye-i daimü’l-kararımın 
menasıb-ı samiyesinden sadakat ve istikamet ve hüsn-i tedbir ve dirayet ile maruf ve mücerreb olan vezir müşarun-ileyh 
intihab ve sizi tarik-i müştekime delalet için rütbe-i vala-yı vezaret ile size vali nasb ve irsal olunmağla” 
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paras in order to defeat him. The Pasha declined to do that and the struggles ensued. 
Eventually şeyhülbeled Halil Bey escaped from Egypt. 114  On 2 Cemaziyelahir 1181/26 
October 1767, Ali Bey al-Kabir went to the castle and Rakım Mehmed Pasha dressed him 
with hilat and announced him as the şeyhülbeled. This date is the beginning of Ali Bey’s 
prolonged period of influence over the affairs of Egypt.115 On 17 Receb 1182/ 27 November 
1768, Rakım Mehmed Pasha released a statement proclaiming his concern regarding the 
situation. He wanted to take action against Ali Bey and break his authority. Yet, al-Jabarti 
claims that Rakım Mehmed Pasha’s closest man was a betrayer. 116  The kethüda of the 
governor Rakım Mehmed Pasha, Abdullah Bey, informed Ali Bey about the governor’s plan. 
Ali Bey occupied the gates of the castle and deposed the governor. Mehmed Rakım Pasha 
stayed at Küçük Ahmed Bey’s house like a prisoner. 117  However, from al-Jabarti’s 
aforementioned narration, in early N 1181/21 January- 1 February 1768, it would appear that 
Rakım Mehmed Pasha was still in control of the office, as the decree is addressed to him.118 
The author of the Sicill-i Osmani mentions that the central government dismissed Rakım 
Mehmed Pasha for the reason that his old age caused Ali Bey’s disobedience. 119  Rakım 
Mehmed Pasha died in Egypt in 1183/1769-1770, most probably before he managed to go to 
his new position in Jidda. Al-Jabarti states that it is highly likely that he was poisoned.120 
During Rakım Pasha’s governorship the repair and maintenance of the dams and 
water channels is significant, as they show us that in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
Ottoman central government was concerned with and engaged in Egypt’s order and needs. 
Also, the repair processes were realized in an imperial style, which contradicts the notion of 
                                                        
114 al-Jabarti, Ajaib, vol. 1, p. 416 
115 Ibid, p. 418 
116 Ibid., p. 418 
117 al-Jabarti, Ajaib, vol. 1, p. 490 
118 MMD, vol. 8, nr. 537 (date early N 1181/late January 1768) 
119 Sicill-i Osmani, vol. 4, p. 1346 
120 al-Jabarti, Ajaib, vol. 1, p. 525 
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Egypt as an autonomous province. The required equipment for the repairs were sourced, and 
bought in Egypt or brought from other provinces.121 All of the repair processes were planned 
by the central government in Istanbul, and the expenses were met by the annual levy, the 
irsaliye-i hazine. The Porte met the cost of repairs by irsaliye; it preserved the villagers’ 
cultivable lands, and met the needs of reaya, and supported life, agriculture and trade in the 
province. Likewise, it conserved the province from chaos and disorder.  
It is suggested, however, that in the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, the central 
government lost its ability to direct Egypt’s affairs. The members of the mamluk households 
took the leading positions in the administration and military regiments. The representatives of 
the central government, the governor, chief judge and black eunuch, could do little to prevent 
mamluk beys penetrating the provincial administration and endeavouring to change the flow 
of Egypt’s extensive revenue from imperial to local objectives. Since they did not have the 
power to control the local grandees, the governors found different means in order to maintain 
control such as supporting weaker households against the dominant ones, or giving consent 
for one household to eliminate another in return for hulvan.122  
Putting aside the notion of balance and decline of authority, further archival research 
challenges the discourse that insists on the characterization of governors as ‘weak’ or 
ineffectual. It can be said that the governors did their best to prevent income sources from 
remaining in the grip of the mamluk beys. This was arguably motivated by their desire to 
leave Egypt more prepared for their next post by maximizing their own financial sources. 
However, detailed archival research contradicts the notion of the weak governor, at least until 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. 
                                                        
121  For example, Egypt lacked of the wood, which was needed during the maintenance process. The imperial orders 
demanded it to be brought from South-west Anatolia [Kazdağı] by ships. For the importance of irrigation, the repair of dams 
and lack of wood see Alan Mikhail, Nature and Empire in the Ottoman Egypt: An environmental history, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), p. 8-18  
122 Daniel Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 60 
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Nevertheless, a conflict and a struggle proceeded between the two components of the 
provincial administration in the eighteenth century Egypt. As the mamluks got stronger in 
terms of financial and administrative authority, the revenues from major financial sources, 
notably from the tax farms, passed to mamluk beys.123 In this sense, the incomes of hulvans of 
a deceased mamluk bey had frequently become problematic. Terminologically called mahlul, 
these hulvans were among the income sources of the governor of Egypt. Mamluk beys 
persisted in trying to disengage the governors, thereby preserving their households’ revenue. 
In general, the mamluk beys used the procedure of “musalehe”124, which kept the cost of 
villages lower, while taking over their predecessors’ tax farms, in addition to the times that 
they found a way to circumvent the governors.125 
Occasionally issues about the hulvan cases between mamluk beys and governors 
were brought to the attention of the Porte. In one case, Yahya Pasha (1154-55/1741-42) raised 
a remonstrance about mamluk beys who prevented him from gaining his authorized income 
source, hulvan from a deceased mamluk, Rezzaz Hasan Kethüda.126 In response, the Porte 
sent a decree to Rağıb Mehmed Pasha (1157-1161/1744-48), the governor at that time, and 
demanded the price of some villages that Yahya Pasha was entitled to.127 Hasan Kethüda, who 
was a senior of the Azeban corps, died in Ramadan 1154/ November 1741. While some of his 
villages were being sold as musalehe, the followers of the deceased kept the rest of the 
                                                        
123 Nelly Hanna “Culture in ottoman Egypt”, in The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. II: Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the 
End of the Twentieth Century, Martin W. Daly, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998), p. 92 
124 musalehe or musalaha: an arabic word meaning ‘compromise reached by negotiation between opposing interests. 
125 See for detailed information chapter II on Income Sources and Order, p. 125 
126 Yahya Pasha raised a complaint about the issue two years after his office was terminated in Egypt, when he was asked for 
his duties and burdens for the central government such as caize, cizye and other avaids, which are cost of his post as the 
governor of Egypt. 
127 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 23 (date early R 1157/ mid May 1744) and MMD, vol. 6, nr. 173 (date mid L 1157/late November 
1744). According to regulations, when a holder of a tax farm died, if the village is registered on his name, an auction must 
have taken place, and the village must have been sold at its normal price, as bedl-i hulvan, which was seven times of its 
annual profit. But if the village was registered on a follower of the deceased mamluk bey, it was sold cheaper than the normal 
price, as bedl-i musalehe, which was three times of annual profit. And the amount that was obtained from the sale was the 
revenue of the governor, which he used to spend in general on soldiers of hazine, the burdens of divan, and caize, which is a 
burden that the governor had to pay as the cost of his post in Egypt.  
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villages, hoping that they could buy them at a very low price after Yahya Pasha left; they also 
did not allow other aspirants to buy them until Yahya Pasha (r. 1741-42) left Cairo.128  
At this point, one can raise some questions about Yahya Pasha’s highlighting of this 
issue after the end of his office. We do not have any evidence about Yahya Pasha’s 
demanding the value of villages from the followers of Hasan Kethüda. Did he demand the 
price from the followers? Did he use his full authority to enable the collection of the price? 
Was he convincing enough to obtain the price of the villages, arrange the auction and sell the 
rest of the villages? Or was it because of the fact that he was reluctant to deal with mamluk 
beys because of a probable conflict with them? Moreover, it is a subject of curiosity whether 
Yahya Pasha intentionally delayed the collection of the money after he evaluated the issue 
when he was still the governor of Egypt; perhaps he assumed that the latter governors would 
collect the amount instead of him. Alternatively, did he believe that he could pay his burdens 
to the Porte with his other incomes? Whatever the case may be, Rağıb Mehmed Pasha (1157-
1161/1744-48) was instructed to collect the price of those villages from the mamluk beys and 
send it to the Porte as the payment for Yahya Pasha’s burden to the Porte. As a result of this 
order, Rağıb Mehmed Pasha had to confront the mamluk beys. It is highly likely that the 
mamluk beys would not be easy prey and would not be eager to pay the money; it was proven 
that this was the case.129 
When Rağıb Mehmed Pasha raised the issue in the divan, followers of Hasan 
Kethüda claimed that by the time Hasan Kethüda died, the villages were held as a pledge. 
After he died, the holders of the villages paid whom and became mutasarrıf of the villages 
again; they then showed the references in front of the members of divan.  
                                                        
128 Yahya Pasha could not manage to take the revenues of those villages from the followers of Hasan Kethüda. After two 
years, when he was asked for his duties such as cizye and caize from the time of his office in Egypt, he raised his kavaim, the 
documents which proved that he could not collect his revenue, and requested the collection of that amount in the place of his 
debts. 
129 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 23 (date early R 1157/ mid May 1744)  
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The correspondence took place between Belgrad, where Yahya Pasha was currently 
in office, Cairo and Istanbul.130 In the end, the Porte found the mamluk beys’ responses to be 
lacking in credibility, and advised Rağıb Mehmed Pasha not to credit the mamluk beys 
justification/defence, and to proceed to collect the aforementioned disbursements. The Porte 
considered any other solution as unjustness towards Yahya Pasha, and something that might 
serve as a bad example and precedent for successor governors of Egypt.131   
This correspondence shows us that the central government was quite concerned with 
ensuring that the administrative mechanism worked properly in its relatively remote 
provinces.132 Although the prosecution about the deceased’s hulvan was prolonged for a few 
years, still the law case was pursued. If there was a problem, the correspondence found the 
governors in their current posts and they were expected to contribute to the solution.133  
During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Porte never asked the governors 
to break the mamluk beys’ power and dominance until Gazi Hasan Pasha’s military campaign 
on Egypt in 1786. Instead of dealing with powerful mamluk beys, each of the governors was 
ordered to meet the Haremeyn’s needs without fail, and to ensure that the irsaliye and other 
levies such as hulvan and caize were sent to the imperial treasury. There is no evidence that 
the Porte considered mamluk beys in a different way, than that of their being local 
administrators in the province. Although the governors were the main holders of the most 
important post and appointed by the central government in Istanbul, they were not the one and 
only addressees of the central government; mostly the central government directed their 
                                                        
130 Yahya Pasha pointed out that in general mamluk beys never let the governor have the kavaim, the documents of villages; 
they captured them in a way, even with fake documents. He explained that the reason that he had kavaim was that mamluk 
beys were very busy with Osman Bey’s family. 
131 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 243 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745) One year later another decree was produced which mentions the 
amount was not sent. The Porte deduced from the delay that the Egyptian local administrators behaved according to their 
non-ethical behavours: “… Mısırlının taahhüd ve iltizamlarinda televvün-i hal ve kizb-i akvallerini …”  (MMD, vol. 6, nr. 
311 and nr. 312 (early CA 1159/late May 1746)). 
132 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 243 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745). 
133 MMD, vol. 6, nr. 244 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745). 
 
 229 
decrees regarding different issues in or around Egypt to the officers at the head of seven 
corps, the kadı, the şeyhülbeled, the most powerful mamluk bey in Cairo, as well as the 
governor.  
The Prevalence of Change and Transformation: The Adjustment of the Governor’s 
Authority in Egypt 
Holt claims that one of the most easy and peaceful times was during the period 
following Canım Seyfi, and İnal’s, and then Hain Ahmed Pasha’s challenge to the new 
Ottoman regime, and reaffirmation of Ottoman authority by Pargalı İbrahim Pasha and his 
kanunname-i Mısır, for the regulation of the governorship of Egypt. 134  The centralized 
administrational system of the empire was echoed in Egypt as well. The governor was a 
powerful figure in Cairo, holding undisputed authority until the end of the sixteenth century. 
During these years the governors did not face any opposition against their authority. After this 
stable period, an increasing restlessness developed in Egypt that was related to the problems 
within the central government. The devaluation of currency, which resulted in unrest among 
the military establishment across the Empire due to the reduced buying power represented by 
the soldiers’ wages, caused population mobility. Mercenaries and other soldiers who were 
released from the battlefields of the western frontier moved to Anatolia and Egypt. As a result 
of the devaluation of the akçe and end of the expansion of the borders, the revolts of soldiers 
became common. Meanwhile, in the countryside, inflation and overpopulation pushed 
landholding cavalry officers and peasants off the land; this was to be called the ‘great 
flight’.135    
In Egypt, sipahis, whose main duty was to assist kaşifs in small provinces in order to 
collect taxes and maintain order, challenged the government. In fact, some military revolts 
                                                        
134 Holt, “the Beylicate”, p. 216 
135 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Economic Crisis and Partial Recovery” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 
1300-1914, Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1997), pp. 433-441 
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took place at the end of the sixteenth century. Even the Egyptian governor İbrahim Pasha 
(1013/1604) died in one of these revolts.136 Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha, who succeeded İbrahim 
Pasha investigated the death of the latter in order to identify and punish the perpetrators. 
Although this resulted in a larger revolt, Mehmed Pasha quelled it. In addition, he abolished 
the tax called tulba, in order to promote rural prosperity. These relatively successful actions of 
Kulkıran were limited achievements in terms of the future of the province, as they were not 
the solution in the long term.  
Kulkıran’s successor Kara Mehmed Pasha (r. 1016-1020/1607-1611), searched for a 
solution to the underlying problems. He found out that extra tax and some misconduct by 
administrative staff were the cause of the problems, and he took action in order to fix those 
deficiencies. He determined the problems and tried to fix them by introducing the following 
measures: The tax of küşufiyye cost 100.000 gold coins, which was collected by a newly 
appointed governor from the kaşifs. He abolished this practice, as it was a burden for the 
administrators and the people as well. The iltizams were managed by kaşifs. He shifted the 
iltizams’ management to the divan of Egypt. He dismissed the kaşifs and emins who ruined 
the orderliness of the province. He abolished the Mamluks’ system for land measurement, and 
applied the tarbii system. 137  He improved the adjustment of sikke. He improved the 
warehouses belonging to the government, and appointed trustworthy administrators. He 
gathered kaşifs, emins, sancak beys, and military members and told them that he would pursue 
the reforms according to the sultan’s orders. After his announcement about the abolishment of 
the extra taxes such as tulba, the soldiers from gönüllüyan, tüfenkçiyan and çerakise rose up 
                                                        
136 Holt, “the Beylicate”, p. 217 
137 The square measure tarbii, for measuring land was held to be a more accurate basis for land registration and taxation. The 
Ottomans carried out a comprehensive land survey in Egypt according to which square measure was made the standard 
means for land measurement replacing the Mamluk system of land measurement. 
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and killed the kaşif of Ğarbiye. When the governor Kara Mehmed Pasha sent a large army to 
suppress their uprising and compromised with the bedouins, they had to surrender.138  
It can be suggested that Kara Mehmed Pasha’s measures and solutions were not 
applied or were of minimal effective use in the long term. The perception of “maintaining the 
order” was the same as the eighteenth century perspective: abolishing the innovations, and 
restoring and re-establishing the institutions of the era of Süleyman the Magnificent was the 
action plan of both the governor and the central government. The central government was not 
interested in grasping the underlying economic factors, which resulted in the current situation. 
Nevertheless, Kulkıran’s end of tenure in Egypt was followed by the rise of beylicate in 
Egypt.139 These revolts revealed that the governors of Egypt were devoid of the support of the 
military regiments in Egypt. 
The costly battles with the Hapsburgs challenged the empire. In order to cope with 
the Hapsburg’s firepower, the Ottoman Empire armed the peasants with rifles. After their 
return from the war, peasants with rifles spread throughout the countryside and the result was 
civil unrest called the Celali rebellions. The Ottoman Empire responded to that crisis by 
“transforming itself from a military conquest state into a bureaucratic state and bastion of 
Sunni Islam.”140 In this sense, the sultan’s control over the Hijaz and the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina became eminent in his new role.141 
While the state treasury expenditures and revenues were well adjusted in the middle 
of the sixteenth century, the expenditures rose to triple the amount of the revenues by the end 
of the century. When expenditure and revenue fell out of balance, new revenue sources were 
sought and the irsaliye-i hazine of Egypt became a prominent source of ready cash. The 
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irsaliye-i hazine was expected, more than ever, to be full and complete, and greater in 
amount. In order to gain more dues and imposts in the course of new appointments or 
renewals, governors or other officers were dismissed more frequently. As a result of those 
changing circumstances, Egypt’s importance for the Empire shifted from being a staging area 
to a supplier of revenue to the imperial treasury and equipper of the Holy cities.  
Another issue in the financial administration was the military members. The number 
of some corps’ members increased in the seventeenth century and insufficient salaries 
encouraged or led them to take over financial and administrational duties. The cavalry 
members introduced some new types of tax such as tulba and kulfa.142 Intervening of the 
soldiers in administration started one of the biggest political problems in seventeenth century 
Egypt. In time, they interfered and rose against members of divan, even against the governor. 
Military members began to usurp the authority of governors.  
The end of the sixteenth century was also a turning point for the mamluk beys. They 
gained back authority, took kaşifliks by iltizam, and enabled their subordinates and sons to 
take office in the military corps. Sub district administration began to become corrupt. Thus, 
previous misconduct dating from the days of the Mamluk Sultanate returned. While they were 
the supporting force for the governor against the soldiery rebellions in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, the mamluk beys began to challenge the governor’s authority 
henceforth.143  
Crecelius claims that, in the change and transformation period of seventeenth 
century, Ottoman central government lost the ability to efficiently direct Egypt’s affairs.144 
Some incidents support his claims as follows; in 1032/1623, the military members did not 
                                                        
142 ‘tulba’ and ‘kulfa’ was a type of tax which was collected by the soldiers for administrative expenses connected with tax 
collecting. Although Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha (1015/1607) abolished illegal taxes such as tulba, kulfa and küşufiyye, 
especially küşufiyye was continued to be collected in the eighteenth century. [EI2, Groot A. H. de, Mehmed Pasha, Öküz] 
143 Hathaway, “Egypt in the Seventeenth Century”, p. 41 
144 Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 59  
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accept the new governor sent by the sultan, and insisted on the continuation in office of Kara 
Mustafa Pasha (1032/1623). Then in 1040/1631, by dismissing Musa Pasha (1040/1630-1) 
and enabling a formal deposition decision from the Porte, the Mısır kulu had become a 
precedent for those who came after them.145 
By the same token, some mamluk beys such Rıdvan Bey (1631-1656) revived the 
notion of beylicate.146 Rıdvan Bey’s dominance and influence both in Cairo and Istanbul 
challenged three governors, who wanted to break his authority. Holt claims that during 
military revolts, governors and sancak beys appeared in the beginning to be in close 
cooperation against the fractious elements among the military classes.147 However, in time, 
sancak beys gained power and became audacious, and during the seventeenth century, they 
began to compete with the military in this sense.  
Although the incidents of mamluk beys’ dismissing governors was an administrative 
problem in terms of the central government, for more than a century, until Mehmed Ali 
Pasha’s governorship in the nineteenth century, the Porte handled the affairs of Egypt in a 
mostly competent way. It can be assumed that the Porte perceived the problems in the 
administration in Egypt mostly as financial problems, consisting of incomplete and delayed  
irsaliye-i hazine payments. Competition among the mamluk beys and its reflection on the 
Egyptian political environment finds a place in the decrees, for example in the case of the 
problems in the administration of tax farms and villages.  
In conclusion, seventeenth century Ottoman Egypt was a scene of demographic, 
fiscal and military transformation, as a part of a wider trend witnessed throughout the Empire. 
Although the expansion was slower, the aforementioned military and economic crisis resulted 
                                                        
145 Holt, The Fertile Crescent, p. 218 
146 Holt explains the “bey” as a rank holder and mentions that it did not characterize with a specific office or function. Holt, 
“the Beylicate”, p. 220   
147 Holt, “The Beylicate”, p. 219 
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in migrations within the empire. Egypt was an important destination in this sense. Thus, 
transformed demographic, military and fiscal conditions continued to nurture household 
political culture in the eighteenth century.148 
Chapter Conclusion  
Egypt played a strategically important position in the Ottoman Empire’s integrity as 
a link between the central government and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina as well as in 
the trade between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean where the Ottoman Empire supported its 
religious legitimacy and commercial wealth. Furthermore, Egypt, as a province, provided an 
enormous wealth for the Empire as already discussed in the previous chapters. Taken 
together, the aforementioned reasons brought up the governorship of Egypt to a special 
position where the governors acquired a large wealth and they could advance to the post for 
the grand vizierate in the career chain. The Porte paid special attention that the governors 
appointed to Egypt were capable and loyal to the central government. The decrees that 
announce a statesman’s governorship in Egypt included, in general, the phrases about the new 
governor’s loyalty, truthfulness, and capability for the post.149 This was a way for the Porte to 
announce that the new governor was worthy and clearly deserving of this significant post. 
Although modern historians suggest that the governor in Egypt was nominal like an 
ambassador, the archival documents prove that the term of “ambassador” does not fit in with 
the governors of Egypt during the mid-eighteenth century. The two-way correspondence 
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149 For example to Hamza Pasha: MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767); to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha: MMD, 
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between Ottoman Egypt and the Porte shows that the governors were active figures in Egypt’s 
politics during that period.150  
In addition to shorter tenure in office, the dominance and seizing by mamluk beys’ of 
a greater share in the authority and more revenue sources in Egypt, including those belonging 
to the governors, made eighteenth century Egyptian governor weaker compared to his 
counterparts in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the decree records in the Prime Minister’s 
Archives suggest that the governor of Egypt was more than a shadowy figure or nominal 
presence in the Egyptian administration and politics. It was obvious that, like many other 
provinces of the Empire, the decentralized Ottoman system was reflected in Egypt as well. 
“Ayanlık”, and “ayans” (terms used for the local administrators) had become a reality for all 
the Empire. It can be said that the activities that mamluk beys’ were engaged in were more or 
less the same as those of the administrators in other provinces, except that Egypt was a rather 
remote province.  
Ottoman empire’s decentralized administrative system was concentrated on running 
the administration in Egypt in good order, and on receiving the revenues in full and on time, 
rather than on strengthening the role of the governor as representative of the central 
government. This pragmatic approach allowed compromise with the mamluk beys so long as 
they acted in accordance with the central government’s requirements such as keeping the 
prices low in the market or sending cereal to Haremeyn annually but more importantly 
providing the imperial treasury with the irsaliye-i hazine as the empire was desperately in 
need of cash.  
It could be inferred that on some occasions the governor, rather than executing his 
decisions, had to validate the decisions of mamluk beys. A clear example of this is seen in the 
                                                        
150 Baldwin, Islamic law, p. 31-74. For detailed information about Ottoman Egypt’s jurisdiction system in the eighteenth 
century see: James Baldwin, “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt”, Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies, 
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situation of Hamza Pasha’s rule (1179-1180/1765-67).151 However, the Porte was not late in 
its intervention; it tried to turn the situation in favour of the people and the state by sending 
decrees and officers to execute its demands.  
From the central government’s point of view, providing the revenues from Egypt and 
keeping the province in the compass of the empire were crucial; thus the details of struggle in 
the Egyptian internal politics was a matter of secondary importance. When we try to consider 
the situation from the point of view of the Egyptian people, including elites and Ali Bey’s 
mamluk counterparts, how would the situation look? Given that the policies pursued in the 
period of Ali Bey’s authority (i.e. imposing more taxes on the people) led to financial 
difficulties for people, we can suggest that the conditions might have been better for them if 
the central government had enjoyed greater authority over Egypt.  
During the centralized administrative period, the Empire had a control mechanism on 
the governor of Egypt; however, after the sixteenth century, the tenure of office decreased to 
one year. Furthermore, the governors tended to care more about collecting for pişkeş for their 
next post, which caused the governor’s authority to weaken in Egypt. Gaining power over 
time, the mamluk beys filled the authority vacuum; they had authority over the governor as 
well and seized his revenue sources. Therefore, in the 1780s, the revenue of the governor 
decreased by 50% compared to the beginning of the century. The Porte intervened in the 
issue; that is to say that in order to regain the governors’ revenue and to receive a regular 
annual tribute payment it sent several decrees that threatened the mamluk beys. Nevertheless, 
until Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb’s death in 1775, the governors of Egypt held the authority 
despite the challenges mounted by the mamluk beys.  
                                                        
151 See chapter III on Irsaliye and Rebellion, p. 179 
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When looking at the governors in office during the period in which Ali Bey held 
authority, we can see that the governors who were in office in Egypt were experienced and 
skilled statesmen; but that they could deal with mamluk beys’ dominance only to a certain 
extent. Mamluk beys were looking for the gaps in the authority, which could put the 
governors into a difficult position; they sometimes took advantage of old age or death, and 
sometimes dismissed the governors. Put in other words, they sought for the possible ways of 
having influence over the governors. However, Ali Bey al-Kabir gained enough power to 
challenge their authority with his young retinue and huge wealth that he acquired from his 
rivals’ assets. When it comes to the positions of the governors in the eighteenth century, we 
should consider that they not only needed to be competent and to have a strong and dominant 
character but they also needed enough time and financial power in order to cope with the 
aforementioned activities of the mamluk beys, who gained power over time and in succession. 
The tenure of office for only one-year period clearly did not offer enough time for the 
governors to establish “local” authoritative administration. In order to advance in their 
pathway of career, they might have seen the choice of completing their one-year duty as 
reasonable and considerable given that it was an easy task to deal with the mamluk beys to 
reduce their authority in the province. An example case could be that of Kamil Ahmed Pasha 
(1173/1759-60), who tried to keep the mamluk beys in line in an attempt to weaken their 
dominance but had to face up to their attempts to dismiss him.  
I contend that the central government did not force the governors to struggle with the 
dominant mamluk beys in order to seize the authority until Gazi Hasan Pasa’s campaign 
against Murad and Ibrahim Beys in 1786. It is likely that the governors did not want to 
encourage confrontation with the mamluk beys unless they were ordered to do so. One could 
suggest that they might have preferred to focus on their other tasks, which could bring more 
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benefits in their efforts to advance to the next post. Given that this next post in the one-year 
tenure was an important step in their career, this assumption seems to be plausible. 
In addition, we know that Egypt was once popular among the statesmen for a 
governorship post since it provided a great amount of revenue as was also admitted by the 
Porte. However, in the second half of the eighteenth century it was obvious that statesmen 
preferred to be appointed in the provinces that provided less revenue than Egypt. The chief 
cause for this lies in the fact that the mamluk beys’ brute force over the governors had 
resulted in loss of revenue and excesses of debt for the governors. Hamza Pasha’s experience 
with emirulhajj Salih Bey is an example of this phenomenon.152 In an attempt to address the 
issue, the Porte sent decrees to Egypt, as already discussed, which informed and warned the 
mamluk beys about their behaviour and attitudes. Although these had numerous repercussions 
in Istanbul and the mamluk beys were consequently rebuked and threatened with punishment, 
it seems that these steps taken against them did not fully resolve the problems. Therefore, 
once again, it could be suggested that the acts of mamluk beys had a considerable impact on 
both the policies of the governors in Egypt and their willingness to offer their candidacy for 
this once-coveted post.153 
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hasretü’l-vüzera olan iklim-i Mısır’a vali nasb olunan vüzera mansıbının menafi’i ve fevaidinden bi-behre kaldıklarından 
başka”  
153 MMD 8, h. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767):‘bu güne medyunen ma’zul olmaları mütegallibe-i Mısır’ın varidat-ı 
valiyi hod be hod ihtilas ve zabt tasaddi ve cüretlerinden naşi idiği malum-ı ilm-i alem-şumül-i şehinşahanem değil mi zann 
olunur’ 
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General Conclusion 
This study examines the uprising of a local notable, Ali Bey al-Kabir between 1768 
and 1772 during the Russo-Ottoman war. In order to reveal the causes behind Ali Bey’s 
uprising against the central government, and to understand the relationship in between the 
local administrative groups, Ottoman Egypt is examined in the light of the financial, political, 
and commercial activities of the mid-eighteenth century. Existing historiography suggests that 
Ali Bey’s “uprising” was a counter stance against the Ottoman sovereignty and it aimed to 
establish an independent nation. This study challenges previous historiography and makes a 
unique contribution to the literature in several aspects. First of all, an exhaustive research 
relying on the primary sources based on the archival documents and contemporary chronicles 
strongly suggests that Egypt remained as a crucial component of the imperial government in 
the second half of the eighteenth century. As already discussed throughout the study, the 
central government monitored the provincial administration closely during this period, and 
from time to time intervened in the financial administration in order to protect the order that it 
had established earlier. However, it is a fact that the breakdown of a four-year period, as 
indicated in the decree records in mühimme-i Mısır defter series, overlaps with the period of 
Ali Bey’s expansionist movements towards the neighbouring provinces. Also, the subsequent 
documentation clearly shows us that this breakdown was a short period, and it did not take too 
long for the central government to resume control.  
The original contribution of the current study to the field lies mainly in the detailed 
archival research on the provincial finance and politics of Egypt and in the facts that have 
been uncovered in the light of these. Throughout thesis different archival documents 
alongside the subsequent records have been deployed to demonstrate that all the functions of 
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the provincial administration including the maintenance works were realised by the operators 
from Egypt who were appointed by the central government, and that these continued in 
Haremeyn in the same way it had traditionally been before Ali Bey took temporary control 
over Egypt between 1768 and 1772. Also, the daily life of the Egyptian people was not 
affected by this period. Although the delivery of the annual tribute for the central government 
failed during Ali Bey’s authority, Ebu’z-Zeheb Mehmed Bey sent the annual tribute for the 
previous eight years, which is, at the same time, an indication of the volume of the economic 
wealth the local administrator in Egypt controlled. 
In addition, it has been argued in this study that Ali Bey’s uprising was not a stance 
against the sovereignty of the central government and that Ali Bey never raised openly the 
banner of rebellion against the Ottoman sultan. Neither the chronicles nor the official 
documents support the hypothesis that Ali Bey intended to establish a new government, which 
would be the foundation of a nationalist state. Rather, they suggest that Ali Bey’s attempt was 
a mere enjoyment of the extended boundaries of a local administrator whilst the central 
government was at war against Russia. It has been proposed in this study that Egypt’s 
prosperity and Ali Bey’s financial power enabled him to extend his authority outside of 
Egypt, which, however, resulted in a confrontation with the central government’s authority in 
Syria.  
One of the most important facts that this study has uncovered is that the mamluk 
beys channelled the state’s financial revenue sources to their households instead of meeting 
the central government’s requirements. Egypt had always been a cash supplier for the 
personal treasury of the Ottoman sultan via the irsaliye-i hazine. This meant an in-cash 
financial support for the expenses of the imperial government, which was already weakened 
by the costs of the war in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, the rivalry 
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among the mamluk beys for superiority in Cairo impeded the expectations of the central 
government, and delayed the irsaliye-i hazine and other supplies customarily sent for the 
imperial pantry and imperial shipyard. On the other hand, Egypt was responsible for sending 
cereals annually to the Haremeyn and this clinched the Empire’s authority in the Arab 
peninsula. Sending cereals to the Haremeyn was important in terms of strengthening the 
Ottoman legitimacy in the Hijaz. During the period covered by this study, it was clear that the 
central government faced several problems in receiving Egypt’s payments. In some cases, for 
example, even if the central government received the annual tribute and other payments, the 
local administrators were charging some extra expenses from the irsaliye without the 
permission of the central government, thereby causing delays and decreases in the amount of 
cash received.  
Furthermore, the short tenure of governors’ office in Cairo also resulted in authority 
gaps. Filling the vacuum, local elements gained more financial and political power in the 
province. Examining the primary sources, we observe that the mamluk beys showed 
insubordination towards the governors in some cases. Especially during the period after 1765, 
it could be observed that particularly the emirulhajj and the şeyhülbeled exerted pressure on 
the governors in order to have buyruldus issued for their personal financial benefit. In this 
sense, I argue that Ali Bey as the şeyhülbeled of the time, increased his pressure after Kethüda 
Mehmed Pasha’s rule (r.1762-64), which consequently made successor governors politically 
and financially weaker. However, the Porte protested the mamluk beys’ dominance by 
sending the decrees one after another. During Ali Bey’s authority, the insubordination of the 
mamluk beys increased in the political environment of Egypt. For example, Ali Bey 
dismissed the governors who were appointed by the imperial government, although 
dismissing a governor was not peculiar to Ali Bey. The mamluk beys appropriated the 
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revenues peculiar to the governor of Egypt such as customs and mint house’s mukataas. 
Having lost such revenues, most governors left office with payment arrears at the conclusion 
of their term of office.  
It has been argued that Ali Bey’s action was motivated by ambition for greater 
financial power. In this sense, the opening of the Red Sea trade route to the European 
merchants was a significant initiative. Encouraging the foreign ships in the upper Red Sea 
would clearly increase the revenues of the local administrators that were obtained from 
customs. Seemingly it was a profitable route for the foreign merchants as well; the profit that 
the European ships made via this route was enough to encourage them to carry on a bilateral 
negotiation method: with the Porte and with the mamluk beys. We know that the mamluk 
beys had enough authority to allow European ships into Suez. However, the European nations 
were reluctant to damage the commercial treaties that they had acquired from the Porte. Still, 
the European merchants made commercial agreements with Ali Bey for Suez trade although 
they did not have full trust in him. This led Ali Bey to become the first local administrator 
that allowed the European presence in the upper Red Sea. However, neither Ali Bey nor his 
successors denied the Ottoman administration in Egypt and did not encourage the European 
countries to communicate and make agreement directly with them instead of the central 
government. Still, it can be deduced that mamluk beys attempted to broaden the limits of 
existing commercial treaties.     
Further, the findings obtained from the archival evidence in Istanbul do not provide 
enough information to suggest that Ali Bey’s uprising was intended to separate the southern 
regions of the empire and to establish a new state. It is known that Ali Bey was considered as 
an “asi”- rebel that caused certain troubles whilst the empire was in a war with Russia. 
Certain measures that Ali Bey introduced during his period of authority and short term 
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uprising in Egypt between 1760 and 1772 caused some changes in Egypt’s politics. In 
addition to eliminating his local opponents and dismissing the Ottoman governors, he raised a 
big military force composed of ten thousand soldiers. It is not out of place to observe that Ali 
Bey’s activities were motivated by his he increased power and the greatness of his ambition; 
however, the end result of this was his betrayal by his closest mamluk. The consequence of 
these activities and Ali Bey’s self-claimed authority was a less stable economy and political 
atmosphere in Egypt as well as weaker Ottoman governors. Moreover, the mamluks who 
succeeded him in the office of şeyhülbeled continued to concentrate their power on promoting 
their personal interests, instead of channelling the finances on the welfare of the city as their 
predecessors such as Abdurrahman and İbrahim Kethüda had done, and thus political chaos 
increased after Ali Bey’s period of ascendancy in Cairo. Nevertheless, it is impossible to 
isolate the political situation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire’s. During the reign of 
Abdulhamid I, because the Porte failed to cope with Russian expansion in Caucasia, Crimea 
and the Mediterranean simultaneously, the political problems of the central government 
echoed in Cairo as well. It created a power vacuum in the province, which Ali Bey and other 
mamluks took advantage of. The political milieu of the central administration allowed Ali 
Bey and his mamluks to concentrate on fulfilling their interests and ignoring the duties 
assigned by the Porte. This resulted in turbulence in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, 
and was followed by the French expedition at the end of the century as well as semi-
autonomous administration of Mehmed Ali Pasha in the nineteenth century. 
On the other hand, pushing the limits and disobeying the rules that the central 
government had set was not unique to Egypt. A number of similar activities were proceeding 
in other provinces of the empire, especially, during the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), 
which have been the subject of numerous academic studies. The uprising of Zahir al-Omar (d. 
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1775) must be an important one as it is correlated to Ali Bey’s activity at close by location. 
Another example is that of Zahir’s successor, Jezzar Ahmed Pasha, who established his 
authority in Palestine in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Those activities are a part of 
a wider historical narrative in the Ottoman realms. However, it is difficult to argue that Ali 
Bey’s authority was as influential as either Zahir’s or Jezzar’s, since the former’s activities 
did not have a direct and sudden effect on Egypt’s commercial and political milieu as the 
others had. Zahir’s authority developed Akka from a small town to a port city, and Jezzar 
defended the city against Napoleon’s expedition. Their regimes provided prosperity and 
protection for the indigenous people.  
When it comes to the case of Ali Bey in Egypt, his uprising lasted for a short period 
and it is difficult to claim that it caused significant changes in the provincial administrative 
institutions in Egypt that would influence Ottoman administration and organisation in the 
province, or life standard of Egyptian people. It is understood that Ali Bey fell far short of 
establishing his autonomous administration as his uprising continued only for a short time 
and, more importantly, his closest mamluk Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-Zeheb betrayed him by acting 
in accordance with the Ottoman Empire’s interests. During much of his period of ascendancy 
Ali Bey was occupied with the campaigns in Syria and the Hijaz and he did not attempt to 
make any change in the provincial administration system during his uprising. The most 
noticeable and apparent influence can be the challenged authority of the governor office in the 
province. The şeyhülbeleds after Ali Bey’s authority continued to dominate the provincial 
administration. The governors appointed by the central government seem to have remained 
weaker between 1775 and 1798 compared to their predecessors. In addition, Ali Bey’s 
elimination of his potential rivals in Egypt led to the presence of few competitors in Cairo 
after Ali Bey’s defeat. This situation had a determinative effect on the provincial politics of 
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Egypt in the last quarter of the century and consequently affected the relationship between the 
provincial administration and the central government. Other than that it is difficult to claim 
that Ali Bey’s uprising had a causative influence on the administrative organisation of Egypt 
in the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
is the key for the developments in the political life of nineteenth century Egypt. The period 
from 1775 after death of Ebu’z-Zeheb to the French expedition in 1798 can be subject of 
another research and shed light on the history of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire at the end 
of the eighteenth century.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I 
The governors of Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century:1 
 
1- 1153/1740   Hekimzade Ali Pasha 
2- 1154/2741   Yahya Pasha 
3- 1156/1743   Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha 
4- 1157/1744   Rağıb Mehmed Pasha 
5- 1161/1748   Yedekçi Yeğeni Ali Pasha 
6- 1162/1749   Şehla Ahmed Pasha 
7- 1163/ 1750   Hasan Pashazade Abdullah Pasha 
8- 1166/1753   Mehmed Pasha 
9- 1166/1753   Baltacızade Mustafa Pasha 
10- 1169/1755-56  Hekimzade Ali Pasha 
11- 1170/1756-57  Azmzade Sadeddin Pasha, Said Pasha 
12- 1171/1757-58  Bahir Mustafa Pasha 
13- 1173/1759-60  Kamil Ahmed Pasha 
14- 1175/1761-62  Ebubekir Rasim Pasha 
15- 1176/1762-63  Ahıskalı Mehmed Pasha 
16- 1177/1763-64  Hacı Ahmed Pasha 
17- 1178/1764-65  Hacı Hasan Pasha 
18- 1179/1765-66  Silahdar Hamza Pasha 
19- 1180/1766-67  Çelebi Mehmed Pasha 
                                                        
1 Sicill-i Osmani, vol. 6, p. 1812-13 
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20- 1181/1767-68  Rakım Mehmed Pasha 
21- 1182/1768-69  Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha 
22- 1183/1769-70  Kelleci Osman Pasha 
23- 1186/1772-73  Vekil Osman Pasha 
24- 1187/1773   Kara Halil Pasha 
25- 1188/1774   Hacı İbrahim Pasha 
26- 1189/1775   Şehrî İzzet Pasha 
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Appendix II 
Şeyhülbeleds of Cairo in the mid-eighteenth century 
İbrahim Kethüda and Rıdvan Çavuş  1743-1754 
Abdurrahman Kethüda1   
Şeyhülbeled Halil Bey   1757 
Ali Bey Gazzawi    1758-1760 
Ali Bey al-Kabir    1760-1772 
Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb   1772-1775 
                                                        
1 Influential figure in Cairo between 1754 and 1760 but never officially appointed şeyhülbeled 
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Appendix III 
(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114/folio 28a) 
 
[Bulutkapan Ali Bey took 15 million paras from the irsaliye without permission.]  
 
(1) Mısır valisi vezir Kethüda Mehmed Paşa’ya ve ümera-yı Mısıra ve sadat-ı bekriyye ve 
ulema ve meşayih-i ezheriye ve yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarlarına hükümki: 
(2) Beher sal tarik-i Mısriyyeden azimet eden huccac-ı müsliminin zihab ve iyablarında tahsil-
i esbab emn ü refahları ve mirilhajj-ı mısır olanların mesariflerine medar ve ianet olmak için 
(3) irsaliye hazinesinden ala vechi’l-mutad verilegelen akçeden ve kahve tüccarından tertib 
olunan birer fındık altuni resimden maada bila-izn-i humayun (11)69 ve (11)70 ve (11)72 ve 
(117)3 (4) seneleri irsaliye ruznamçelerinden beher sene 150şer keseden ianet-i mirilhac 
namıyle 600 kese akçe masraf tahrir olunmakdan naşi mahsubiyetine musaade-i mülukanem 
olmayub istirdadiçün sadır (5) olan emr-i alişanım vezirim Kamil Ahmed Paşa’nın eyyam-ı 
hükumet-i Mısıra vusulunde bu madde için cevab olmak üzere gerek müşarun-ileyh 
tarafından gelen tahrirat ve gerek ümera ve ulema-i (6) mısriyye ve ocaklar zabıtan ve 
ihtiyarlarından gelen mahzarlarında (11)74 senesi ibtidasında fima bad cümle mukataat-ı 
mısriyye üzerine ianet-i mirilhac olmak üzere beher sene 150şer kese (7) akçe muzaf-ı cedid 
namıyle zam eylediklerini ve bu husus cari ve düsturu’l-amel tutulmak şartıyla (8) nizam 
verildigini inha ve fima bad mutaddan ziyade ianet-i mirilhac için akçe mutalebesinden olmak 
şartıyla salifu’z-zikr 600 kesenin afvını istida eylemelerinden naşi mahzarları mucebince bi’t-
terazi beynlerinde ihtiyar eyledikleri nizam-ı mezbur-ı mısır ruznamçesine kayd ve ba’de ezin 
mugayir-i rıza-yı hümayunum irsaliye (9) hazinesine iras-ı kesr ve noksan eder 
mutalebatdan/metalibatdan mucanib olunmak hususu iktiza edenlere tefhim olunmak üzere 
hatt-ı hümayunumla muanven sadır olan emr-i şerifim (11)75 senesi Receb-i şerifinde (10) 
irsal olunmuşdu 
Senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin bu defa der aliyyeme gönderdiğin kağıdlarından mirulhajj-ı 
mısır Keşkeş Hüseyin (dame izzuhu) yediyle geçen sene hajj-ı şerifden kafile-i huccac ile 
avdetinde Harb urbanı (11) huccac-ı müslimine isal-ı hasar kasdıyla sedd-i rah eyledikde vaki 
olan muharebede harb urbanı şeyhi ve biraderi ve oğlu ve sair akrabave a’vanından 24 nefer 
eşkiya-yı urban i’dam olunmağla urban-ı (12) mezkurun mecbul oldukları habaset 
muktezasınca bu sene-i mübarekede ahz-ı intikām kasdıyla huccac-ı müsliminin kat’-ı tarikine 
 250 
ve isal-i mazarratlarına müteheyyi ve müteşemmir oldukları ve sene-i sabıkadan ziyade 
tedarike (13) muhtac olduğu emir-i Mekke-i Mükerreme tarafından şeyhülbeled-i Mısır Ali 
Bey -dame izzuhu-ya tahrir olunmağla sinin-i saireye sirayet eylememek şartıyla bu sene-i 
mübarekede taraf-ı hümayunumdan i’anet olunmak ricasıyla ulema (14) ve ümera-yı mısriyye 
taraflarından tahrir olunan mahzar ve mısır mirilhaclarının irad ve masrafını mübeyyin terkim 
eyledikleri vafir bu tarafa irsal olunduğu ve mesullerine müsaade-i şahanem erzani (15) 
kılınmasını istida olunmuş mütekellimin-i Mısırın işbu istianetleri 7-8 mah mukaddem bi’l-
ittifak vaki olan taahhüd ve misaklarına münafi ve münakız olduğuna binaen şayeste-i itibar 
ve müsaade olmadığından (16) kat’-ı nazar işbu hila’ına cesaretleri mücerred hazine-i 
mısriyyeyi ekl ü bel’a kemal-i hırs ve azlarından neş’et eyledikleri zahir olup ve umur-ı 
mısriyyenin tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesini (17) eger cüzî mülahaza eyleyeler bu 
makule zuhur eden maddelerde taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyemden istianet lafzını kaleme 
getürmekden tehzib-i kuvvet-i nazar-ı aliyye eden ulema-yı mısriyyeyi dahi tağlit ile (18) bu 
emr-i müstağrib kendülere teşrikden şerm ü hicab ederler idi  
Bu vecihleki zaman-ı çerakisede yedi ocak tertibinin ve neferat ve zabıtanına mevacib 
tayininin serd-i hikmeti hakim-i Mısır olanlar (19) memleketlerini selatin-i maziye-i Rumdan 
ve müluk-ı nasaradan tahaffüz ve hıraset maslahatı olub tevfik ve inayet-i subhaniye ile 
cennet-mekan firdevs-aşiyan ceddim sultan Selim Han (aleyhirrahmetu (20) ve’l-gufran) 
hazretleri Mısırı feth ile memalikini kabza-i tasarrufa aldıktan sonra zikr olunan ocakları 
tertibat-ı muayyene ile ibka eylemesi tesellut-ı düvel-i nasaradan hıraset ve bu makule zuhur 
eden (21) umur-ı mühimmede eda-yı lazime-i hizmet ve ubudiyyet eylemeleri maslahatına 
mebni olub biraz müddetden sonra ekser düvel-i nasaradan hasbe’l-muahade tesellutları fikri 
dahi ber taraf ve fakat devlet-i (22) aliyyem ile muzafat üzere olmayan bir kaç devlet-i 
nasaranın teaddisinden sevahil-i mısriyyenin muhafazası için beher sene donanma-yı 
hümayunum kalyonlarından bir kaç kıtası ol havaliye memur kılınmağla bu cihet ile (23) dahi 
Mısır ocaklarının hizmetleri kalmayub divan-ı Mısırdan müretteb olan mevaciblerine cihet-i 
istihkakları fakat zuhur eden bazı hidemat-ı devleti aliyyede olmağa münhasır ve bu makule 
hidemat-ı hadiseye (24) kıyam için mevaciblerinden fazla arz ve talebinde olurlar ise asl-ı 
mevaciblerine cihet-i istihkakları kalmadığına binaen şer’an ve aklen ref’leri caiz olmağla 
ocakların ukala ve ehl-i insafı bu manayı (1) fikr edip ahara dahi bend ü nush ile vakit vakit 
zuhur eden hidemat-ı devleti aliyyemden eda-yı lazime-i şükr-ü nimete ibtidar etmeleri lazım 
iken huccac-ı müslimini bazı senelerde istikbal için (2)tecerrüde ihracı lazım geldikden bu 
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madde için irsaliye hazinesine itale-i dest-i hasaret edegeldikleri bi’d-defeat sebkat etmekle 
hakikat-i hal mukaddema bu mertebe izah u beyan olmaksızın (3) tahric-i masrafının men’-i 
babında ala vechi’l-icmal evamir-i şerifem ısdar olunub bu defa huccac-ı müsliminin tahsil-i 
esbab-ı emn ü selametleri için iktiza eden ianet maddesinden ümera ve mütekellimin-i Mısır 
marifetleriyle (4) her ocakdan bila terakki kifayet mikdarı neferat tertibi ve müntefi’-i baha-yı 
kura-yı mısriyyeye mutasarrıf olanlar dahi neferat-ı mezburenin levazım tariklerini ruyet-i 
inayet ile bu kadarca hidmet (5) mukabelesinden beher sene beytü’l-mal-ı müsliminden ahz 
eyledikleri emvala cihet-i istihkak tedariki kendülere vacib iken der saadetime mesarıf-ı 
miriilhac defterini dilhahları üzere tertib ile (6) istimdad eylemeleri nebezan-ı örf-i hamiyyeti 
hüsrevaneme badi olub bu vecihle kendülerinin -ma vudıu leh-lerini kendülere bildirip 
içlerinde diyanet ve insafdan behre-ven olanları mütekallibe-i (7) beyguranı tarik-i hidayete 
delalet ve hususan ulema-i mısriye bu babda lazıme-i hakkaniyetine riayet ile semt-i salah 
kendülere iraet etmek için işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve ... ile irsal olunmuşdur  
(8) Imdi vusulünde senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin ümera ve ulema-yı Mısriyyeyi ve yedi ocak 
zabitan ve ihtiyarları divan-ı Mısıra cem’ ve ferman-ı hümayunumu (9) kıraat ve mazmun-ı 
münifi ilan ve işaat eyledikten sonra hüccac-ı müsliminin emin ve salimin zihab ve iyabları 
kendülerden matlub-ı hümayunum idigini ve (11)43 tarihine gelince (10) irsaliye 
hazinesinden umur-ı hajja imdad olunmuş değil iken ol vakitden sonra refte refte ianet umur-ı 
hajja mebaliğ-i vafireye baliğ olub karibu’l-ahd de taahhüdleri üzere bir minval-i sabık (11) 
nizam verilmekle bu seneden sonra nizam-ı sabıkdan maada taraf-ı hümayunumdan ianet ve 
murad olunması havene-i beytülmalin beyhude ekl u bel’lerine ruhsat ve cevaz kabilinden 
olduğuna binaen emr-i muhal olduğunu (12) gereği gibi ifade ve ifham ve mukaddemat-ı 
sabıkamın eda-yı matviyyesi sana zahir olmağla iktizası üzere iskan ve iltizamlarına ihtimam 
edüp ocaklardan kifayet mikdarı (13) neferat tertibi ve kesiru’n-nema kura masraflarının 
imdad ve muavenetleri ile rekb-i hajjın techiz ve tanzimi bimennihi teala avdetlerin tecerrüd 
ihracı iktiza ederse anı dahi bu üslub üzere tertib (14) ve tesviyeye dikkat ve mübaderet ve 
irsaliye hazinemden muayyen olan mikdardan ve bu seneye tahsisen imdad olunan 300 rumi 
keseden ziyade bir akçaya itale-i dest tecavüz eylemelerine ruhsat ve cevazdan mübaadet 
eyleyesin ve sizki (15) ulema-yı mısriyyesiz siz dahi mukteza-yı şer’-i kadim üzere işbu emr-i 
şerifimin mazmun-ı münifini icrada vezirim müşarun-ileyhe mütabaat ve suret-i inkar ve 
muhalefette olanları şer’en lazım ve gerek ne (16) mübaderet ve inadında ısrar edenlerin 
cezaya istihkaklarını iftâ ile ifa-yı mukteza-yı hakkaniyetine riayet ve sizki ümera ve zabitan 
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ve ihtiyarlarsız dareynde selamet- hal size lazım ise (17) akıbet-i karınızı fikr ve mülahaza ile 
ferman-ı hümayunum üzere amel ve hareket ve hilafından cümleniz tevakki ve mücanebet 
eylemeniz babında ferman-ı alişanım sadır olmuşdur 
 
late B 1176/ early February 1763   
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Appendix IV 
 
(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200) 
 
[The decree about Gazzawi Ali Bey’s appointment as şeyhülbeled] 
 
Mucebince amel oluna deyu unvanına hatt-ı hümayun şevketmakrunum keşide kılınmışdır 
Mektum olmak sonradan kayd olunmuşdur  early Ş 1177/early February 1764 
 
Ümera-yı mısriyyeden hala Gazze’de ikamet üzere olan mirülhac-ı sabık Ali dame izzuhuya 
hükümki; 
 
(1) Senki Mir-i müma-ileyhsin (11)73 senesinde Mısır mirülhaclığı hamiyetine bend ü talik 
olundukda mukteza-yı memuriyetin üzere Mısır’dan huccac-ı müslimini istishab edup mezid 
refah (2) ve itminan ile eda-yı fariza-i hac ve ziyaret-i ravza-yı mutahhara etdürüb huccacın 
emnen ve salimen Mısır’a isalinden sa’y-ı meşkurun ve harekat-ı Haremeyn ahalisinin (3) ve 
huccac-ı müsliminin mahzuziyetini ve bi’l-husus Mısır’da oldukça sadır olan evamir-i 
şerifemin infazıyla tahsil-i rıza-yı mülukanem ve himayet ve sıyanet fukaraya cümleden 
ziyade sarf-ı cehd (4) ve makderet ve bezl-i tab u takat eylediğin yakinen ve tahkiken ve 
tahriren ma’lum-ı şahanem olub Mısır’dan tard u teb’idine bir dürlü sebeb ve illet yoğiken 
avdet-i hacda Mısıra (5) karib geldiğinde Mısırın mütegallibeleri Mısıra duhulden seni men u 
def etmeleriyle kat’an .. Gazzeye sıdk-ı/sarf-ı zimam hareket ve elyevm Gazzede meks u 
ikamet üzere olduğun malum-ı (6) hümayunumdur Lakin sen ümera-yı mısriyye beyninde 
eda-yı merasim-i ubudiyyet ve rıza-yı hümayunumun tahsili ile serfiraz olub daima harekat-ı 
memduha ve hidemat-ı cemile izharı zımnında (7) temşiyet-i umur-ı mısriyyeye ihtimam ve 
ikdamın ve tahsil-i rıza-yı hümayunum ser maye-i iftiharın olduğu nezd-i mülukanemde 
mütehakkik olub senin gibi mücerrebü’l-etvar ve müstakimu’l-ef’al olanların (8) bu hilalde 
Kahire-i Mısırda mevcud olmaları lazime-i halden idugu hala Mısır valisi Kamil Ahmed Paşa 
edamellahu teala iclaluhu tarafından der saadetime tahrir olunduğuna binaen (9) seni Kahire-i 
Mısıra Şeyhülbeled nasb u tayin eylemek üzere mahsus emr-i şerifimle müşarun-ileyhe tevcih 
ve tenbih olmagın ilam-ı hal için sana dahi işbu emr-i şerifim (10) ısdar ve müşarun-ileyh 
vesatatiyle tarafına irsal olunmuşdur İmdi keyfiyet-i malumun oldukda müşarun-ileyh ile 
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mükatebe ve muhabere merasimine riayet ve her ne vecihle kağıdı (11) gelir ise ve ne vakit 
seni taleb ve Mısıra celb ederse tahriri üzere amel ü hareket ve bi-avnihi teala Mısıra 
duhulünde makam-ı şeyhülbeledlikde kıyam ve müşarun-ileyhin (12) emir ve re’yi üzere 
harekat-ı sedide ve etvar-ı hamiyet ibrazıyla ferman-ı hümayunum olduğu üzere def’-i ihtilal-i 
vilayete ve tahsil-i nizam-ı Mısriyyeye senden memul-ı (13) şahanem olunduğu veçhiyle bi’l-
ittifak ve sarf-ı cehd-i mâlâ-kelam eylemen babında   
 
early Z 1174/early July 1761 
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Appendix V 
 
(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488/folio 126a) 
 
[The decree that the central government questions raison d’etre of mamluk beys] 
 
(1) Mısır valisi vezirim Rakım el-hac Mehmed Paşa’ya ve Mısır kadısına ve bi’l-cümle 
ümera-i mısriyye ve sadat-ı bekriyye ve ulema-i ezheriyye ve yedi ocağın zabıtan ve 
ihtiyarlarına hükümki; 
 
(2) Ecdad-ı izam ve aba-i kiramım nevverallahu merakıdehum hazretlerinden mures olan 
iklim-i Mısır’ın nizam-ı umurunun tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesi üzere rüyet ve 
idaresi zımnında (3) taraf-ı şahanemden nasbolunan vüzera-yı celilü’ş-şanımın rezinlerine 
muvafakat ve mümaşat olunarak tedbir-i umur-ı mısriyyede medhali olan ulema ve zabıtanın 
cümlesi cemi’-i akval (4) ve harekatlarını ulu’l-emrin emr ve rızasına ve valilerin re’yine 
tatbik ile gerek hazine-i irsaliyenin vakt u zamanıyla irsalinden ve gerek Haremeyn-i celileye 
muayyenu’l-irsal olan (5) gılal ve cerayanın bila bekaya aynen mahallerine irsal ü teslim-i 
hidmet-i bahiru’s-saadetinden ve sair sıyanet-i varidat-ı beytülmal-ı müslimin ve muhafaza-i 
nizam-ı kadimde ve idare ve temşiyet-i kaffe-i hutub (6) ve imla-i cüziyye ve külliyyede 
merasim-i ubudiyet ve istikameti ifaya her biri riayet ve mezid-i sa’y u gayret-i birle saye-i 
hümapaye-i şehinşahanemden nail ve malik  oldukları nimet ve ihsanın (7) hakk-ı şükrünü 
edaya müsaraat eyledikleri halde ‘ fi’d-dünya ve fi’l-ahireti’ nedamet ve vehametden vareste 
ve asude olub taraf-ı hümayunumdan muaheze olunmak değil haklarında muamele-i hasene 
(8) zuhur edeceği içlerinden ulu’l-ebsar olanların yakinleri iken beynlerinde şükr-i nimeti 
eylemeyub ve rıza-yı ulu’l-emri derk etmeyub küfran-ı nimet olan mütegallibe makuleleri (9) 
kendi meram-ı mefsedet-encamlarını icraya mübaderet-i birle muvafık-ı rıza-yı hareketi terk 
ve sairleri dahi yecibu’l-vakt mecburen veyahut tama’an ol misillülere murafakat ve mutabaat 
ve kendülerin (10) suret-i salaha tergib iradesinden olan valilerini tekdir ve ızrara ve hod be 
hod mesned-i hükumetden hal’ ve tenzile ve hazine-i irsaliyeyi ve gılal-i haremeyni ta’til ve 
te’hire cesaret (11) ve sair hilaf-ı rıza-yı hümayunum nice harekat-ı na-mülayemeyi irtikab ve 
hatta on maddeyi haviye mukaddema gönderilen hüccet-i şer’iyyede mestur olan uhud ve 
peymanlarını ez-vakitde (12) kırmış ve yine hilaf-ı uhud be iman-ı evza’ ve harekatı izhar ve 
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vali-i sabık Hamza Paşa dahi ol misillüleri mümkün mertebe tehdid ve suret-i istikamet ve 
salaha celb ü tergib (13) iradesinde olduğundan mukteza-yı huşunet ve hubs-ı tıynetleri 
icrasından birbirleriyle ittihad ve müşarun-ileyhi makam-ı hükumetden tenzil için bir vak’a-yı 
garibe ihdas ve meramlarını (14) intacdan sonra kendü töhmet ve kabahatlerini valilerine özr 
ve nisbet ve güne irad-ı enva’ bahane ve illet ederk mukaddemce bir kıta mahzar dahi tertib 
ve der aliyyeme tesyir etmişler (15) mahzarlarında tahrirleri üzere zahir halde iddiaları olan 
istikamet-i ma fi’z-zamirlerine muvafık olmak lazım gelse mukaddema mevaddı mübaşir ile 
der saadetime gönderilen hüccet-i mezkur (16) taahhüdlerini ibka birle ol vakitden beri 
hususat-ı lazımeyi muhtevi sadır olan evamir-i şerifemi niçün icrada tekasül ve rehavet ve 
hazine-i irsaliyeyi ve gılal-i Haremeyn-i şerifeyni (17) ne illete binaen te’hir ve tesvik ederler 
ve valilerinden iştikaları dahi mukaddemat-ı kazibe üzerine mebni olduğu bundan zahir 
oldurki müddet-i vafireden beri tevliyet-i Kahire (18) Mısır’dan munfasıl olan vüzeranın 
müddet-i zabtlarına göre hin-i infisallerinde kiminin 1000 kese ve kiminin 800 kese deyni 
zuhur edub hasretü’l-vüzera olan iklim-i Mısır’a (19) vali nasb olunan vüzera mansıbının 
menafi’i ve fevaidinden bi-behre kaldıklarından başka bu güne medyunen ma’zul olmaları 
mütegallibe-i Mısır’ın varidat-ı valiyi hod be hod (20) ihtilas ve zabt tasaddi ve cüretlerinden 
naşi idiği malum-ı ilm-i alem-şumül-i şehinşahanem değil mi zann olunur el-halet hazihi 
mütegallibe-i Mısır’ın valilerine tagallüb ve özürleri (21) ne derecelere resin ve münteha 
olmuşdurki tevliyet-i Kahire-i Mısır vüzera-yı izamımdan birine teklif olundukda kalilü’n-
nema edna bir livanı iklim-i Mısıra tercih ile Mısır (22) valiliğinden istifa ederler bu keyfiyet 
vali-i Mısır olanların Mısırluya taaddisinden mi neş’et eder yoksa havene-i rical-i Mısırın 
valilerine tegallüb ve özrlerinden mi iktiza (23) eder edna mülahaza ve teemmül ile malum 
olacak keyfiyyatdan iken valilerinden iştika eylemeleri su-i efallerini ve kizb-i ihtiyarlarını 
iş’ar mesabesinde değil midir me’a haza (24) vülat-ı Mısırın min ciheti’l-mal Mısırlu’ya 
teaddi şaibesinden berıyyussaha oldukları delail-i mebsutadan bedidar olduğundan gayrı 
mütekellimin-i Mısırın zeharif-i (25) dünya için birbirlerini hedm edemeyub bazısı baz-ı ahar 
hakkında bir hileyi hafr ile ihlakına tesaddi ve çok geçmeyub bazı aharı dahi makam-ı 
mücazatda anlara teaddi (26) edup bu vecihle vakit be vakit tahrk ve izhar eyledikleri fitne ve 
fesadları valilerine özür ve isnad edegeldikleri cay-ı eşkal değildir ‘eti’ullahe ve eti’u’r-rasul 
(27) ve uli’l-emre minkum’ ferman-ı rabbanisiyle amel ve ulu’l-emrin emrine ve vükela ve 
vüzerasının re’yine mutavaat etmeyub irsaliye hazinesine itale-i dest-i hıyanet ve gılal-i ahali-
i Haremeyni (28) itlak ve izaat ve hususat-ı saireyi muhtevi sadır olan evamir-i şerifemin icra 
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ve infazına mümanaat ve mefsedet eden havene-i rical-i mısriyyenin (29) ezmine-i sâlifeden 
beru be’s-i sebk ileyhden halas olamadıkları ahlakın meşhudları olur iken muteber ve 
olmayub bast u beyan olunan emval ve hidmet encamı (30) anlar dahi irtikab ve icrada 
selefleri eserine iktiza eylemeleri ve taahhüdlerine adem-i vefa birle adat-ı me’lufelerini icra 
kaydında olmaları vakit vakit manzar-ı kahr u gazab-ı (31) subhani olmalarını iktiza eylediği 
erbab-ı basiret indinde  .. .. olmağla bu ana dek maktul ve matrudunun meşhudları olan 
ukubat-ı elime bi’l-cümle kesb-i eydi-i (32) zamirleridir bu defa zuhur eden habaset ve 
mefsedetlerinin ifa-yı mücazatı bu mertebe .. vazıhadan ittiaz ile semt-i salaha meyl ü ibtidar 
ederler melhuzuyla rehin (33) mevki’ imhal ve Kahire-i Mısırda bulunan sadat ve ulema ve 
aceze ve zuafaya merhameten nebezan-ı ırk-ı hamiyyet-i hüsrevanem karin nev’-i itidal olub 
müddet-i medideden beri devlet-i aliyye-i (34) daimü’l-kararımın menasıb-ı samiyesinden 
sadakat ve istikamet ve hüsn-i tedbir ve dirayet ile maruf ve mücerreb olan vezir müşarun-
ileyh intihab ve sizi tarik-i müstakime delalet etmiş (35) rütbe-i vala-yı vezaret ile size vali 
nasb ve irsal olunmağla cümlenizi ikaz ve inbah için işbu emr-i hümayun şevket-makrunum 
ısdar ve irsal olunmuşdur imdi ba’de’l-yevm (36) selamet-i haliniz lazım ise evamir-i 
padişahaneme kemal-i itaat ve inkiyad ederek bais-i hızy ü hüsran-ı dünya ve ahiret olacak 
evza’ ve harekatdan istiğfar ve ihtiraz-ı vücuda (37) umur-ı mısriyyede valiniz müşarun-
ileyhin emr .. ve re’y-i tenbihine kalben ve kalıben cümleniz mümaşat ve imtisal ile 
muayyenü’l-irsal olan Haremeyn-i şerifeyn gılalini bila bekaya senesi içinde aynen ve ceyb-i 
hümayunuma (38) mahsus olan irsaliye hazinesini vakit ve zamanında tamamen irsale ve sair 
temşiyet ve ikmalleri murad-ı mülukanem olan kaffe-i umur ve hususun ala ma yurad 
temşiyet (39) ve tanzimlerine ve mukaddema Mevla ve mübaşir marifetiyle vaki olan taahhüd 
ve misakları muhtevi der aliyyeme gönderdiğiniz hüccet mestur mevaddın cümlesini 
muahedeniz üzere yerlü yerinde icra (40) ve infaza her biriniz azdan ve can sıdk-ı tab ve 
tuvan ederek cerayim-i sanihanızın nisyanıyla Hakkınızda zuhur-ı şefkat ve inayet-i şahanem 
medar olunacak etvar ve asarı izhar ve selamet (41) darını tahsil eylemeğe bezl takribine vüs’ 
ve mecal eyleyesiz ve senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin ba avn-ı hüda valisi olduğun Kahire-i 
Mısıra vasıl olduğunda işbu emr-i şerifimi divan-ı Mısır’da (42) cümle ümera ve ulema ve 
sadat ve ocaklu zabıtan ve ihtiyaranı muvacehelerinden kıraat ve mazmun-ı vacibü’l-
imtisalini her birine gereği gibi tefhim ve işaat ve bi’l-cümle tenbihat ve vesaya-yı (43) 
şahanemi kema hüve hakkuhu tenfiz ve icrasına ziyade sa’y ve dikkat ve mukaddema 
gönderilen huccetde mestur muahedelerinin hilafı ve şerefyafta-i sudur olan evamir-i 
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şerifemin muğayiri kema fi’s-sabık (44) icra-yı mel’anet ve mefsedet ısdar ile zahiren iraet 
suret-i itaat ve batınen yine me’luf oldukları tagallüb ve habaseti icra kaydında olanların 
ihlallerine gereği gibi tahsil-i vufuk edup sıhhati üzere (45) der aliyyeme ilam-ı mübaderet ve 
diğer emr-i şerifim mucebince selefin Hamza Paşa’nın mezid hakkaniyet ve adalet veçhiyle 
hesabı ru’yet ve kat’ olunduktan sonra arz ve vakarı ve izzet ve itibarı ile (46) savb-ı memura 
tahrik ve tesyiri hususuna dahi bezl ü vüs’ ve kudret edup zinhar ve zinhar evamir-i şerifemin 
hulasa-i sermed-i vaz’ ve harekete cevaz ve ruhsatdan ve edna kusur ve betaetden (47) ziyade 
tehaşi ve mücanebet olunmak babında 
 
Fi mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767   
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Appendix VI 
 
(C. DH 260 / 12969) 
 
[The Red Sea is forbidden for the English ships] 
 
Hala Mısır valisi vezirim Raif İsmail Paşa’ya hükümki; 
 
Süveys benderine iyab ve zihab eden İngiltere gemilerinin bender-i mezkure amed şede 
i’tiyadları mülkî ve dinî mehazir-i adideyi mütezammın olduğundan süfün-i merkumenin 
men’ u def’lerini muhtevi kerraten ba’de uhra celalziz Sudur olan evamir-i mufassala-i 
şahanemden başka dergah-ı muallam kapıcıbaşılarından mirahur-ı evvelim payesiyle Mısır’a 
memur mir Hasan dame mecduhu ile tesyir olunan hükm-i celilü’l-kaderimde ba’de ezin 
sefayin efrenciyyeden birisinin Süveyse duhulüne ruhsat verilmemesi tekid ve tasrih olunmuş 
iken ol evanda bir kıta İngiltere sefinesinin hamulesinin Mısır’a idhaline irade-i ruhsat-ı birle 
sefine merkumenin akabinde iki kıta gemi dahi vürud ve emtialarını Mısır’a nakl iradesiyle 
Süveys’den develere tahmil ve Mısır’a teveccüh ve hilal-i rahda taife-i urban yollarını kat’ ve 
emval ve meta’-ı mezkureyi garet ve bir kaç neferini idam eyledikleri leda’l-istima’ Mısır’dan 
bir mikdar asker tayin ve ber vech-i suhulet Süveys’de mevcud sefayinin ? mellah ve tüccarını 
ve içlerindeki yolcular zabt ve Mısır’a ihzar olundukda mahmiye-i mezkurede mukim 
İngiltere ve sair efrenc tacirleri aralığa tevessut ve şayet efrenc gemileri ruy-i deryada Süveys 
ve Yenbu’a amed şed eden Mısır sefinelerine isal-i mazarr ederler fikriyle emval ve 
mahbuslar bi-tamamiha mersumune redd ve bender-i Süveys’e süfün-i efrenciyye gelmemek 
ve Süveys ve Cidde benderlerinde emval-i Mısriyyeye taarruz olunmamak üzere iki kıta 
efrenciyyü’l-ibare kulnameler mucebince karar verildiği senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin varid 
olan tahriratında münderiç olduğu ecilden husus-ı mezburda tabiatiyle zuhur eden keyfiyet-i 
mezkure tamam-ı İnfaz-ı emr-i şerifime … vesile iken İbrahim Bey ve Murad Bey’in 
mücerred celb-i menafi’ zımnında tahrik ve iğvalarına mebni sabıku’l-beyan tacirlerin kelimat 
tasannu’ .. meyl ü rağbet ve leğv-i mahz olan taarruzlarına itimaden mugayir-i ferman 
Süveys’e gelen efrenc gemilerinin emval-i mazbuta ve mellah ve mahbusalarını ıtlak be 
teslimi tecvizin senden me’mul-ı teyakkuz ve basirete mugayir bir keyfiyet olmağla  
İngiltere gemilerini iktisab-ı menafi’ mülahazasıyla Süveyse gelmeğe sevk ve tergib eden 
Mısırlunun ekval-i bimallarına ferika olmayub madde-i mezkurenin bir mantuk-i emr-i ali 
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rabıtasına bi’n-nefs kıyam-i mübaderet ve sebilleri tahliye olunan mahbusundan iki neferin bi 
eyyi veçhin kan der saadetime tisyarı sadrıazam ve efham ve vekilü’l-mutlak sadakat şeyhim 
canibinden kaime ile sana iş’ar olunmuş idi  
bu mertebe vesaya ve tekidatdan sonra tekrar bu evanda efrenc gemilerinden bir kaçı 
Süveys’e varid olmak üzere oldukları köşküzar-ı hidivanem olduğuna binaen vaki’da süfün-i 
merkumenin rıza-yı şahane ve evamir-i padişahaneme münafi Süveys’e gelmeleri mahza 
infaz-ı ahkamda senin te’ami ve tekasül ve iğmaz ve rehavetinden neş’et eylediği ve bunun 
zımnında dergar olan ıkab ve ceza-yı saire mevadda olan tekasül ve isaet mücazatdan eşedd 
ve eşne’ olacağı bî iştibah olmağın imdi bu ârızanın indifa’ı ve sefayin-i efrencin bilkülliye 
Süveys’den inkıta’ları cezmen ve kat’a senden matlub-ı hidivanem olduğu cihetden ne tarikle 
olur ise süfün-i mezburenin bir dahi Süveys benderine uğramaları ve … istihsaliyle telafi-i mâ 
fâta bezl-i cedd-i müknet eylemen babında tekiden ve ikazen işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve ile 
irsal olunmuşdur Mısırlunun bu kaziyyede mefsedetleri dergar ve gayret-i islam ve diyaneti 
külliyen kırmış ve Haremeyn-i muhteremeynin dehlizi mesabesinde olan bahr-ı Süveys’e 
melel biganenin iyab ve zihablarına hükkam-ı dünyeviye ceri zımnında taife-i mesfureyi 
tergib ve teşvikleri akıbetkarda mazhar-ı kahr-ı kahharı olmalarını icab eder kazayadan idigi 
ve kusuret-i hakdan gelerek sebeb-i akva-yı infaz-ı ali olan mahbusların itlakına tüccar efrenci 
tahrik etmeleri fesad-ı batınlarına delil olduğu zahir iken kelimat-ı … Havale-i sem’-i itibar-ı 
birle emval-i … ve mellah ve tüccar-ı mahbusenin geriye itasına ibtidarın tehyiç gazab-ı 
tacdaranemi muceb-i halatdan olduğu malumun oldukda ber vech-i muharrer tarik ve ilacını 
olub Süveys’den efrenc sefinelerinin külliyyen inkıta’ına azl ü bezl-i kudret ve bade ezin 
taife-i mesfurenin mahall-i mezbure bir tekneleri geldiği mesmu’ olmak lazım gelür ise 
mazhar-ı ikab-ı şedid olunacağını mukarrer bilip  ana göre amel ü hareket ve hilafından hazer 
ve mücanebet eylemen babında  
Fi late Z 1193/late December 1779 
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Appendix VII 
 
(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 340/folio 83b-84a) 
 
[About delayed irsaliyes] 
 
(1) Mısır valisi vezir Hamza Pasa’ya ve Mısır kadısına ve ümera-yı mısriyyeye ve sadat-ı bekriye 
ve ulema-yı ezheriye ve yedi ocak zabıtan ve ihtiyarlarına hükümki: 
 
(2) Beher sene Enderun-ı hümayunum hazinesine canib-i Mısır’dan gönderilegelen irsaliye 
hazinesinin senesi dahilinde bir saat evvel Adiliyye’ye .. ve bu tarafa sevk ve tesyirine (3) 
ihtimam ve dikkat olunmak mütekellimin-i Mısır’ın vazife-i ubudiyetleri olduğundan başka 
bundan akdem rical-i Mısriyyenin cerağ-ı sabıkalarına itirafen ve isti’tafen irsaliye hazinesini 
(4) ve cizyenin iktiza eden mal-ı irsaliyesini senesi içinde asitane-i aliyyeme isale ve irsaliyye 
hazinesinden ferman-ı hümayunum sadır olmadıkça bir akçe ve bir habbe sarf olunmamağa 
(5) ve bir senenin mal-ı mirisi sene-i uhraya geçmiş olunur ise tashih ve tekmiline ve dahi 
nice mevadda ahd-ı vesik ve misak-ı ekidi muhtevi verilen hucec-i şer’iyye ve ulema ve 
sadatın (6) arabı ve ümera zabıtan ve ihtiyarların terki mahzarları divan-ı hümayun kaleminde 
hıfz olunub uhudat-ı mezbure düsturu’l-amel tutulmak ve ezmine-i sabıkada deyn-i divanın 
teksirine (7) badi ve bi’l-ahire ve irsaliye hazinesine hasarete müeddi olan tenzilat maddesi 
için bir takrib ile eslaf valilerinin verdikleri buyruldularına amel ü itibar olunmayub kaydları 
(8) ruznamçe-i Mısır’dan lağv ve ilga ve cümlesi ihrak olunmak üzere hatt-ı hümayunumla 
muanven 173 senesinden mufassal ve meşruh evamir-i şerifem sadır olmuş iken (11)76 ve 
(11)77 (9) ve (11)78 seneleri irsaliye hazineleri ve cizyelerin mal-ı irsaliyeleri henüz varid 
olmayub evamir-i şerifem adem-i mutavaat ile nizam-ı umur-ı mısriyyeye tatarruk haleli 
muceb olur (10) Mısırlı ricalinin etvar-ı na?ları yevmen fe-yevmen mahsus ve zahir olmakdan 
hali olmayub vülat-ı mısriyyeye muayyen olan iraddan kesr ve zarar namıyla vafir akçe 
ezmine-i (11) maziyede selefler mahsub ve inam edegelmeleriyle halefe dahi mahsub edek 
deyu cebren ve hah na hah asi urban misillü yedlerinden temessük ahz ve irsaliye hazinesine 
akçe yerine (12) vaz’ u irsal olunub hatta 168 senesi irsaliye hazinesinden 300 kese-i mısri ve 
küsur para ve 169 senesi irsaliye hazinesinden 1006 kese-i mısri (13) ve küsur para ve 70 
senesinde 229 kese-i mısri ve küsur para ve 72 senesinden 274 kese-i mısri ve küsur para ve 
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73 senesinden (14) 299 kese-i mısri ve 74 senesinde 453 kese-i mısri ve küsur para ve 75 
senesinde 825 kese-i mısri (15) ve küsur paraki min haysü’l-mecmu’ 4236 kese-i rumi ve 
küsur guruşa baliğ olan akçelerin temessükatı akçeye bedel irsaliye hazineleriyle (16) irsal 
olunduğu baş muhasebe defterlerinde mukayyed ve bu akçelerin cümlesi vülata cebr ve kürh 
ve desise ve hüd’a ile tahmil olunmuş akçelerden olmakdan naşi (17) valilerin medyun 
olmalarına ve kesr ve mazarratı irsaliye hazinesine ve vizri ve hıyaneti Mısırluya aid ve raci’ 
olub bu etvar-ı kabihalarından hicab ve istihya (18) eylemek lazıme-i gayret-i islamiyye ve 
vacibe-i uhde-i ubudiyetleri iken kendülerine kat’a … olmayub 3 senelik irsaliye hazinesini 
ve cizyenin 3 senelik iktiza eden (19) mal-ı irsaliyesini ekl ü itlaf daiyesiyle henüz vasıl 
olmayub bu güne iğmaz ve tekasülleri bais-i ta’cil ve istiğrab olmakla sinin-i mezburenin 
mal-ı irsaliyelerinden (20) hatt-ı hümayunumla muanven evamir şerifemle havale olunan 
akçeler 3 senelik irsaliye hazinesinden tenzil olunub maadası 3 senelik cizyenin iktiza eden 
mal-ı irsaliyesiyle (21) mean lazım gelenlerden tahsil ve ala eyyi hal der aliyyeme muaccelen 
irsal ve tesyir olunmak babında ferman-ı hümayunum sadır olmağın ihtimamen ve isticalen 
işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve ile (22) irsali olunmuşdur muntazıru’l-vurud olan hazain-i 
merkumenin irsalinde özr ve illete cay-ı kelam kalmayub bu gûneyi .. vaz’ u hareket ile 
hazain mezburenin (23) tehir ve tavik olunduğuna kat’a rıza-yı padişahanem olmamağla 
bundan sonra bir saat tevkif ve tesvik olunmayub mukaddema olan taahhüdlerine riayet ve 
misaklarından durup (folio 84a/1) ve bila emr-i şerif bir akçe ve bir habbe masrafa idhal ve 
eslaf buyruldularıyla valilere cebren akçe mahsub olunmayarak (2) ve evamir-i şerifemle 
havale olunan akçeler mahsub olunarak zikr olunan 3 senelik kusur kalan irsaliye hazine 
akçeleri ve sinin-i mezbure cizyelerinin iktiza eden mal-ı irsaliyeleri lazım gelenlerden ala 
eyyi hal bir gün mukaddem tahsil (3) ve der aliyyeme sevk ve tesyire bi’l-ittifak sa’y u 
ihtimam ve .. ikdam ve sizki sadat-ı bekriye ve ulema-yı ezheriye müma-ileyhimsiz 
mukaddema gelen arabi mahzarda sizin dahi (4) kefaletiniz olmağla ve ‘evfu bi’l-ahdi inne’l-
ahde kane mes’ûle’ nazm-ı kerimi muktezası üzere bu babda tegafül ve tesamühü tecviz 
etmeyub mukteza-yı taahhüdlerini icraya ve şurut (5) ve uhud-ı mültezimelerini ibka 
etdirmege bi’l-ittifak ihtimam ve dikkat ve sizki ümera ve sair müma-ileyhimsiz mugayir-i 
ahd u mîsâk vaz’ ve hareketden hazer ve kusur kalan (6) sinin-i mezbure emvalini birbirinize 
müsabakat ile cem’ ve edaya ve muaccelen der aliyyeme irsaliye .. cehd ve mekennet ederek 
aklınızı başınıza düşürüb telafi-i ma fâta (7) müsaraat ve emr-i şerifime imtisal ve itaat ve 
hilafından hazer ve mücanebet eylemeniz babında  
 263 
 
early S 1179/late July 1765    
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Appendix VIII 
 
(MMD 8, h. 649/folio 172b)  
 
[To Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb] 
 
(1) Sabıkan Mısır kaimmakamı olub devlet-i aliyye-i ebed-müddetime hüsn-i sadakat ve 
istikamet ve gayreti mücerreb olan Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey’e hükümki; 
 
Senki mir-i müma-ileyhsin sadakat-ı semir müma-ileyhsin zatında mezkur ve tıynetinde 
mermuz olan kabiliyet ve reşad ve sıdk ve sedad muktezasınca taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeme 
merbut rabıta-i ihlas ve taviyet ve zabıta-i kaviyye hususunda (2) ve ubudiyetinin .. zuhur 
eden me’ser-i mergube ve hidemat-ı makbulenden bazer ve bedidar ve nahiye-i halinden her 
vecihle ezva-i diyanet ve envar-ı kiyaset-i lami’ ve tabdar olub ala’l-husus mukaddema etba’-ı 
.. şeytani (3) ve imtisal .. nefsani ile Ali Bey’in irtikab eylediği sû-i hareketi takribiyle 
vuku’bulan halat reddiye ve keyfiyat-ı nâ-merdıyyenin indifâ’ı emrinde devlet-i aliyyeme ve 
‘ibadullaha etdigin hidmet bi-mennihi teala (4) sana dünya ve ahiretde sermaye-i iftihar ve 
itibar ve ila intiha-i’z-zaman mesâ’î-i meşkûren elsine-i kaffe-i alempane-i dâmen-i 
Muhammed’de haber esna ile .. tekrar tekrar olacağı zahir ve aşikar (5) olduğundan gayri bu 
defa derbar-ı adalet-kararıma tevarüd eden tahriratın rikab-ı müstetab-ı hüsrevaneme arz u 
telhis ve ref’ ü takdim olunub ve din-i Mübin ve haber-i hahan saltanat-ı seniyye-i İbrahim (6) 
olanların cümlesine vacibe-i zimmet-i vilayete/dirayete uhde-i muvaza olan gılal-i ahali-i 
Haremeyn-i muhteremeyn ve ceraya-yı sekene-i beldeteyn-i mükerremeteyn vakt u zamanıyla 
irsal ve tesyirinde vücuda gelen ilzam-ı tam ve sair (7) ifa-yı levazim hulus ve ubudiyet 
babında celveger mecla-yı zuhur olan sa’y-ı mâ lâ kelâmın ve kan be kan malum-ı mekarim 
mersum-ı padişahanem olub hakkında tezayüd-i teveccüh-i şahane ve .. .. inayet (8) 
çendaranemi muceb olmağla davet-i seri’u’l-te’sir-i mülukaneme nail ve mazhar olmuşsundur 
berhudar olasın min külli’l-vücuh ibraz eylediğin hidemat-ı pesendiden ve harekat-ı 
bergüziden nezd-i ferd-i hümayunumdan makbul ve meşkur (9) ve meşhud olan etvar-ı 
müstahsenen .. kabul ve tahsin-i hüdavendigaranemle melhuz ve manzur olduğuna binaen 
seni akran ve emsal beyninde  imtiyaz-ı birle ikfa ve ihdanın meyanelerinde bais şeref ve 
iftiharın olmak için (10) avatıf-ı aliyye-i hidivanemden sana inayet ve ihsan-ı şehriyaranem 
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olmağın inşaallahu teala atabe-yi behiyye-i cihandaranemle müftehir ve ser efraz olduğundan 
(11) ifa-yı şükür ve mahmedet nimet ve eda-yı rüsum ubudiyet ve sadakate kema yenbeği 
riayet ve her halde tahsil-i rıza-yı meyamin-i intima-yı şehinşahaneme nesar-ı vüs’ ve kudret 
eylemek babında taltifen ve ikramen ve sünuh (12) eden hidemat-ı makbuleni istihsanen işbu 
ferman-ı celilüllisan mekremet unvanım ısdar ve ile irsal olunmuşdur devlet-i aliyye-i 
ebediyyü’l-istimrarıma sadakat ile hidmet ve taraf-ı vazıhu’ş-şeref-i hüsrevaneme (13) ibraz-ı 
ihtisas ve ubudiyet edenlerden ni’am-ı iltifat .. tacdaranem .. olunmayub saye-i atufet vilaye-i 
dilaveranemde avn ü inayet bari ile izhar eylediğin istikamet ve sadakat (14) dahi nice nice 
mükafat-ı cemilesine neyl ile kâmkâr ve  kâmrad olunacağında iştibah eylemeyub ataya-yı 
celile-i hüdavendigaranemin vech-i layıkı üzere te’diye ve teşekkür .. kıyama ve mübaderet ve 
tarafına olan (15) itimad ve teveccüh-i hümayunumun ruz be ruz terakki ve tezayüdünü 
müstelzim olur asar-ı cemile ibrazına teşmir said mekennet eyleyesin seni ve senin gibi din ve 
devletime sadıkane hidmet ve eda-yı hukuk nan ve (16) nimet edenleri hak teala .. ber murad 
eyleye göreyim seni bundan böyle dahi damen-i gayret ve hamiyyeti dermiyan ve Haremeyn-i 
şerifeyn ahalilerinin vakt ü zamanıyla gılal ve cerayaları tesyirinde ve hazain-i mısriyye (17) 
bekayasının irsalinde ve sair umur-ı mühimme ve mesalih-i cüz’iyye ve külliyenin dilhah-ı 
şahaneme mutabık ve irade-i samiyyeme muvafık suretler ile tesviye ve tanziminde hala mısır 
valisi (18) vezirim Mustafa Paşa’nın ittifak ve ittihad ederek ihtimam ve dikkat ve iktisab nam 
istihsal mehasin teveccühat-ı şehriyaraneme sarf-ı mekennet ve takat eylemek babında 
 
 
Late B 1188/late September 1774 
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Appendix IX 
YEAR   AMOUNT OF THE IRSALIYE EXPENDITURE   THE AMOUNT TO BE SENT (Lazimu’l-irsal) 
1144/17311  31.719.055 paras   21.502.8699 paras   10.331.150 paras  
1145/17322  31.719.055 paras    13.155.483 paras   18.582.366 paras 
1146/17333  31.719.055 paras   8.190.210 paras   23.643.639 paras 
1148/17354  31.719.055 paras   6.582.414 paras   25.251.435 paras 
1149/17365  31.719.055 paras   12.732.182 paras   19.101.667 paras 
1150/17376  31.719.055 paras   6.648.548 paras   25.185.301 paras 
1151/1738  31.719.055 paras   11.938.170 paras7   19.491.774 paras  
1152/1739  31.719.055 paras   14.954.875 paras   16.878.974  paras 
1153/1740  The irsaliya of this year  is not delivered to Istanbul. The governor is previous sadrazam Serasker Ali Pasa. In the 
document the record says: “it is required to be checked from “Enderun-i hümayun defterleri”. The amount is determined as: 23.894.582 paras8 
1154/1741  31.719.055 paras   19.166.427 paras   6.057.126   paras 
1155/1742  35.496.742 paras   15.983.743 paras   19.562.999 paras 
1156/17439  35.381.948 paras   13.072.786 paras   20.693.572 paras 
                                                        
1 D. 2378 - 005 
2 D. 2378 – 005, D. 2378-003, D.2378-001, D.2378-002, D. 2378 – 006 
3 D. 4969 - 0001 
4 D.2381 – 005, D. 675 - 001 
5 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16879 
6 D. 5432 – 001 until 1156 
7 more than 16 purses are Ebubekir Ağa’s debt. 
8 D. 2844 - 0002 
9 D. 5432 – 001 until 1156/1743-44 
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1157/174410  35.381.948 paras   18.860.913 paras   16.635.829 paras  
1158/174511  35.381.948 paras   14.062.052 paras   21.434.690 paras12    
1159/174613  35.381.948 paras   12.751.349 paras   22.759.368 paras  
1160/174714   -     -    33.179.816 paras15 
1161/174816  35.381.948 paras   11.323.112 paras   24.173.630 paras 
1162/1748-4917 35.381.948 paras   14.081.165 paras   21.415.577 paras  
1163/1749-5018 35.381.948 paras   14.878.710 paras19   20.618.032 paras20 
1164/175021  35.381.948 paras   14.649.939 paras   27.398.984 paras  
1165/175122  35.381.948 paras   21. 832.326 paras   see below 
1166/175223  35.381.948 paras   13.098.672 paras   see below 
1167/175324  35.381.948 paras   10.724.468 paras   60.834.760 paras of last 3 years 
1168/175425  35.381.948 paras   36.516.683 paras   11.480.059 paras 
                                                        
10 D. 675 – 003, D. 2391 – 005, D. 2392 – 005, D. 2392 – 006, D. 2392 – 007, D. 2392 – 0011 
11 D. 2392 – 005, D. 2392 – 006, D. 2392 – 007, D. 2392 – 011 
12 D. 3161 - 0001 (565 kese 565 para is the certain amount that is arrived at Enderun-ı hümayun hazinesi. D. 2392 – 005, D. 2392 – 006, D. 2392 – 007, D. 2392 – 011) 
13 D. 2393 – 003, D. 2393 – 006, D.2393 – 007, D. 2393 – 008, D.2393 – 011, D. 2393 – 012 
14 D. 2394 – 001, D. 2394 – 005, D. 2394 – 008, D. 2413 – 0056, D. 2413 – 0057, D. 2413 – 0058, D. 2398 - 008 
15 The certain amount that is arrived at Enderun-ı hümayun hazinesi, the remaining amount might have arrived either. 
16 D. 2394 – 011, D. 2395 – 002, D. 2395 – 003, D. 2395 – 004, D. 2395 – 006, D.2395 – 0008, D.2395 – 0010, D. 2395 – 0011, D. 2396 – 001, D. 2396 – 003, D. 2396 – 005, D. 2396 – 007, D. 
2397- 001, D. 2397 – 008, D. 2399 – 0008, D. 2398 – 008, D. 2394 – 012, D. 2398 - 0004 
17 KK. D 2348 
18 D. 2398 – 001, D. 2396 – 009, D. 2398 – 008, D. 2399 - 008 
19 D. 4123 - 002 
20 D. 2604 - 0002 
21 D. 2230 – 001, D. 2230 – 001, D. 2394 – 012, D. 2398 – 004. 
22 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16889 
23 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16889 
24 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16889 
 268 
1169/175526  35.381.948 paras   17.958.337 paras   see below 
1170/175627  35.381.948 paras   21.000.000 paras  57. 251.609 paras of last 2 years 
1172/175828  35.381.948 paras   18.711.587 paras   10.645.327 paras  
1173/175929  35.381.948 paras   26.625.705 paras   see below 
1174/176030  35.381.948 paras   27.765.278 paras   25.489.921 paras 
1175/176131   -     -    3.600.170,5 paras32 
1176/176233  45.058.590 paras   34.589.997 paras   10.468.593 paras 
1177/176334  43.303.852 paras   25.497.337 paras   762 kese 23293 para 
1178/176435  46.188.734 paras   21.849.575 paras    - 
1179/1765   -     -     - 
1180/176636  25.182.427 paras   13.572.724 paras    - 
1181/176737  25.182.427 paras   14.761.430 paras    see below 
1182/176838  25.182.427 paras   2.358.418 paras    see below 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
25 D. 2887 - 0001 
26 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16890 
27 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16890 
28 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16896, D.BŞM.MSR.d 16892.  
29 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16894 
30 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16894 
31 D. 0077 - 0001 
32 The certain amount that is arrived at Enderun-ı hümayun hazinesi the remaining amount might have arrived either 
33 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16899 
34 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16899 
35 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 
36 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
37 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
 269 
1183/176939  25.182.427 paras   1.333.310 paras    see below 
1184/177040  25.182.427 paras   16.476.950 paras    see below 
1185/177141  25.182.427 paras   8.266.909 paras    see below 
1186/177242  25.182.427 paras   16.494.783 paras     see below 
1187/177343  25.182.427 paras   11.451.623 paras    see below 
1188/177444  25.182.427 paras   13.882.895 paras   140.867.801 paras of last 8 years 
1189/1775  25.182.427 paras      -     - 
1190/1776  25.182.427 paras    -     - 
1180-1190/1766-1776          71.340.000 paras45 
1191/177746  25.182.427 paras   23.325.280 paras     - 
1192/177847  25.182.427 paras   25.276.141 paras   1.7633.433 paras  
1193/ 177948  25.182.427 paras   15.449.241 paras   9.920.258 496 paras 
119449   25.182.427 paras 
1193-1200/1779-178550  -     -    182.208.748 25.182.427 paras 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
38 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
39 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
40 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
41 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
42 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
43 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
44 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A 
45 D.BŞM.ZMT.d 13837 
46 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16903 
47 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16903 
48 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16906 A 
49 D.BŞM.MSR.d 16906 A 
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120351   28.855.815 paras   28.855.815 paras    - 
120652   no payment due to drought   -    - 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
50 D. 2888 - 0001 
51 D.BŞM.d 5645 
52 HAT 117-4744 
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